A finite impulse response (FIR) filter is a ubiquitous
block in digital signal processing applications. Its characteristics
are determined by its coefficients, which are the intellectual
property (IP) for its designer. However, in a hardware efficient
realization, its coefficients become vulnerable to reverse engineering.
This paper presents a filter design technique that can protect
this IP, taking into account hardware complexity and ensuring
that the filter behaves as specified only when a secret key is
provided. To do so, coefficients are hidden among decoys, which
are selected beyond possible values of coefficients using three
alternative methods. As an attack scenario, an adversary at an
untrusted foundry is considered. A reverse engineering technique
is developed to find the chosen decoy selection method and
explore the potential leakage of coefficients through decoys. An
oracle-less attack is also used to find the secret key. Experimental
results show that the proposed technique can lead to filter designs
with competitive hardware complexity and higher resiliency to
attacks with respect to previously proposed methods.
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A finite impulse response (FIR) filter is a ubiquitous
block in digital signal processing applications. Its characteristics
are determined by its coefficients, which are the intellectual
property (IP) for its designer. However, in a hardware efficient
realization, its coefficients become vulnerable to reverse engineering.
This paper presents a filter design technique that can protect
this IP, taking into account hardware complexity and ensuring
that the filter behaves as specified only wh...
»