A Generalization of Nash Bargaining and Proportional Fairness to Log-Convex Utility Sets with Power Constraints

Titel:: A Generalization of Nash Bargaining and Proportional Fairness to Log-Convex Utility Sets with Power Constraints
Dokumenttyp:: Zeitschriftenaufsatz
Autor(en):: H. Boche, M. Schubert
Zeitschriftentitel:: IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Jahr:: 2011
Band / Volume:: 57
Jahr / Monat:: 2011-06
Monat:: Jun
Heft / Issue:: 6
Seitenangaben Beitrag:: 3390-3404
Verlag / Institution:: IEEE
Status:: Verlagsversion / published
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TUM Einrichtung:: Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Informationstechnik
Eingabe:: 03.08.2011
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