Reverse engineering (RE) of finite state machines
(FSMs) is a serious threat when protecting designs against RE
attacks. While most recent protection techniques rely on the
security of a secret key, this work presents a new approach:
hardware FSM honeypots. These honeypots lead the RE tools
to a wrong but, for the tools, very attractive FSM, while making
the original FSM less attractive. The results show that state-ofthe-
art RE methods favor the highly attractive honeypot as FSM
candidate or do no longer detect the correct, original FSM.
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Reverse engineering (RE) of finite state machines
(FSMs) is a serious threat when protecting designs against RE
attacks. While most recent protection techniques rely on the
security of a secret key, this work presents a new approach:
hardware FSM honeypots. These honeypots lead the RE tools
to a wrong but, for the tools, very attractive FSM, while making
the original FSM less attractive. The results show that state-ofthe-
art RE methods favor the highly attractive honeypot as FSM
candidate or do...
»