Persistent Fault Analysis (PFA) was introduced as a new approach to attack block ciphers at CHES 2018. Since then, it has been proven to be a powerful attack with an easy to achieve fault model which relies on the persistent alternation of constants e.g. S-Boxes. One of the main benefits, when working with PFA, comes from the perspective of an attacker: there is no need to conduct fault injections at runtime. As authenticated encryption is gaining more and more attraction from the research community e.g. the CAESAR competition, we opted to apply the principals of PFA to authenticated encryption schemes. Therefore, we decided to attack a subset of the AES based CAESAR finalists. In this work, we present a PFA of Deoxys-II, OCB and COLM. We show how to extend the original PFA to fit the needs of authenticated encryption schemes and what makes them vulnerable to PFA. Finally, we demonstrate the efficiency of the attacks by means of simulation.      «

Persistent Fault Analysis (PFA) was introduced as a new approach to attack block ciphers at CHES 2018. Since then, it has been proven to be a powerful attack with an easy to achieve fault model which relies on the persistent alternation of constants e.g. S-Boxes. One of the main benefits, when working with PFA, comes from the perspective of an attacker: there is no need to conduct fault injections at runtime. As authenticated encryption is gaining more and more attraction from the research com...     »