Establishing cooperation, typically formalized by so-called hedonic games, is a central concern in multi-agent system. The desirability of coalitions in these games is measured by means of solution concepts. The thesis is an algorithmic study of classical and newly proposed solution concepts. In addition, we open new perspectives by considering dynamics and by integrating empathy. We also study a game-theoretic model of residential segregation, which encapsulates Schelling's homophily incentives.
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Establishing cooperation, typically formalized by so-called hedonic games, is a central concern in multi-agent system. The desirability of coalitions in these games is measured by means of solution concepts. The thesis is an algorithmic study of classical and newly proposed solution concepts. In addition, we open new perspectives by considering dynamics and by integrating empathy. We also study a game-theoretic model of residential segregation, which encapsulates Schelling's homophily incentives...
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Translated abstract:
Das Erreichen von Kooperation, typischerweise formalisiert durch sogenannte hedonische Spiele, ist ein zentrales Anliegen in Multiagentensystemen. Wünschenswerte Koalitionen findet man dabei mit Hilfe von Lösungskonzepten. Die Arbeit ist eine algorithmische Untersuchung klassischer und neuer Lösungskonzepte. Wir entwickeln eine dynamische Sichtweise und integrieren Empathie. Wir untersuchen auch ein spieltheoretisches Modell von Segregation, das Schellings Homophilie-Anreize aufgreift.