This paper studies how to incorporate small information
leakages (called “hints”) into information-set decoding (ISD) algorithms.
In particular, the influence of these hints on solving the (n, k, t)-syndromedecoding
problem (SDP), i.e., generic syndrome decoding of a code of
length n, dimension k, and an error of weight t, is analyzed. We motivate
all hints by leakages obtainable through realistic side-channel attacks
on code-based post-quantum cryptosystems. One class of studied
hints consists of partial knowledge of the error or message, which allow
to reduce the length, dimension, or error weight using a suitable transformation
of the problem. As a second class of hints, we assume that the
Hamming weights of sub-blocks of the error are known, which can be
motivated by a template attack. We present adapted ISD algorithms for
this type of leakage. For each third-round code-based NIST submission
(Classic McEliece, BIKE, HQC), we show how many hints of each type
are needed to reduce the work factor below the claimed security level.
E.g., for Classic McEliece mceliece348864, the work factor is reduced
below 2128 for 9 known error locations, 650 known error-free positions or
known Hamming weights of 29 sub-blocks of roughly equal size.
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This paper studies how to incorporate small information
leakages (called “hints”) into information-set decoding (ISD) algorithms.
In particular, the influence of these hints on solving the (n, k, t)-syndromedecoding
problem (SDP), i.e., generic syndrome decoding of a code of
length n, dimension k, and an error of weight t, is analyzed. We motivate
all hints by leakages obtainable through realistic side-channel attacks
on code-based post-quantum cryptosystems. One class of studied
hints co...
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