Preventing side-channel attacks, which allow the extraction of secrets from implementations of cryptographic algorithms, is a challenging task. Masking countermeasures split secrets into multiple shares. In order to be effective, a strict separation of the shares is required while processing them. Unfortunately, the complex leakage characteristics of CPUs undermine this requirement. This thesis develops a high-level side-channel leakage model and applies it in a code generator to enforce the separation of shares.      «

Preventing side-channel attacks, which allow the extraction of secrets from implementations of cryptographic algorithms, is a challenging task. Masking countermeasures split secrets into multiple shares. In order to be effective, a strict separation of the shares is required while processing them. Unfortunately, the complex leakage characteristics of CPUs undermine this requirement. This thesis develops a high-level side-channel leakage model and applies it in a code generator to enforce the sep...     »