After a short introduction in game theory two different contest models are analyzed. If two heterogeneously skilled players choose their legal and illegal input, then, besides the direct and indirect costs of doping, three major effects are identified which determine whether no-doping is an equilibrium: A likelihood effect, a cost effect and a base-salary effect. If two players who possibly differ in skill and risk aversion choose their investments, then two main results for the outcome of the contest are identified: If the trivial case of equally skilled and equally risk-averse players is excluded and the relative difference in skill is greater than or equal to the relative difference in talent, then the more able, more risk-averse player always has the higher probability of winning the contest. If the players differ in talent and the relative difference in skill is less than the relative difference in talent, then the more able, more risk-averse player first has the higher probability of winning but if the contest prize surpasses a certain threshold the less able, less risk-averse player has the higher probability of winning the contest.     «

After a short introduction in game theory two different contest models are analyzed. If two heterogeneously skilled players choose their legal and illegal input, then, besides the direct and indirect costs of doping, three major effects are identified which determine whether no-doping is an equilibrium: A likelihood effect, a cost effect and a base-salary effect. If two players who possibly differ in skill and risk aversion choose their investments, then two main results for the outcome of the c...     »