Prior to the last financial crisis, the simple incentive-eort-performance relation was widely used in remuneration practice. However, financial regulators consider performancepay as a significant contributor to the misconduct and dysfunctional dynamics in the financial industry and recommend to link remuneration schemes with risk management and governance. This study examines the complex drivers of workforce performance and experimentally utilises various remuneration schemes with the suggested risk-linkage, testing on compliance behaviour and productivity in the international context Australia-
Germany. The thesis suggests five key findings: 1. Incentivized remuneration schemes diminish compliance behaviour, but do not remarkably increase productivity compared to fixed payment. 2. Relative performance information does not remarkably change compliance behaviour and productivity. 3. The degree of the audit probability only increases compliance behaviour if it is decreasing rather than increasing during a time period. 4. In a non-incentivized fixed payment treatment, students from the German Technical University of Munich are more productive than Australian professionals in the financial industry
in Sydney, explained by their lower age. Additionally, Munich students behave more compliant than Sydney professionals under the same fixed payment treatment. 5. Perception of full compliance within a group is a strong predictor for actual compliance behaviour which suggests that individuals adjust their behaviour to their perception of peer-behaviour.
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Prior to the last financial crisis, the simple incentive-eort-performance relation was widely used in remuneration practice. However, financial regulators consider performancepay as a significant contributor to the misconduct and dysfunctional dynamics in the financial industry and recommend to link remuneration schemes with risk management and governance. This study examines the complex drivers of workforce performance and experimentally utilises various remuneration schemes with the suggested...
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