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Titel:

Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis

Dokumenttyp:
Buchbeitrag
Autor(en):
Heldt, Eugénia C.; Mello, P.A.
Abstract:
Whether in multilateral negotiations or bilateral meetings, government leaders regularly engage in “two-level games” played simultaneously at the domestic and the international level. From the two-level-games perspective, executives are “chief negotiators” involved in some form of international negotiations for which they ultimately need to gain domestic approval at the ratification stage. This ratification requirement provides the critical link between the international and domestic level, but...     »
Seitenangaben Beitrag:
1-31
Stichworte:
bargaining, domestic politics, two-level games, interests, levels of analysis, negotiation analysis, ratification, veto players, win sets
Herausgeber:
Cameron Thies
Buchtitel:
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis
Verlag / Institution:
Oxford University Press
Verlagsort:
New York
Jahr:
2017
DOI:
doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.496
WWW:
https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-496
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