Existing research demonstrates that employee stock ownership (ESO) can increase firm performance. This is argued to occur due to enhanced individual employee performance that aggregates to the firm. However, ESO research on actual work behavior remains scarce and lacks theory on how and why employees respond to ESO, especially when there is no clear line of sight between their individual behavior and firm stock performance. Since ESO can confound incentive and benefit effects, I draw on and compare agency theory and social exchange theory to investigate the relationship between ESO and individual employee performance. Using five-year panel data of 156,051 employees, I find ESO to be related to both, employee performance quantity and quality. The results indicate that higher individual employee performance results from receiving the benefit of discounted stocks rather than a financial incentive effect. Hence, I contribute to ESO and compensation research by challenging the dominant financial incentive perspective highlighted in agency theory and providing evidence for a social exchange based understanding of ESO. I also extend pay, ESO and social exchange research through showing that small financial benefits, such as discounted ESO plans can drive individual employee performance, and show how this result changes over time.
«
Existing research demonstrates that employee stock ownership (ESO) can increase firm performance. This is argued to occur due to enhanced individual employee performance that aggregates to the firm. However, ESO research on actual work behavior remains scarce and lacks theory on how and why employees respond to ESO, especially when there is no clear line of sight between their individual behavior and firm stock performance. Since ESO can confound incentive and benefit effects, I draw on and comp...
»