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Title:

A new delegation design for EU governance: how preference cohesiveness of multiple principals shapes the European Commission's discretion in trade negotiations

Document type:
Zeitschriftenaufsatz
Author(s):
Heldt, Eugenia C.
Keywords:
Original Article ; Trade negotiations ; European Commission ; European Parliament ; Multiple principals ; Principal-agent ; Discretion
Journal title:
Comparative European Politics
Year:
2021
Journal volume:
19
Journal issue:
5
Pages contribution:
576-593
Fulltext / DOI:
doi:10.1057/s41295-021-00247-4
Publisher:
Palgrave Macmillan UK
E-ISSN:
1472-4790 ; 1740-388X
Date of publication:
24.06.2021
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