A new delegation design for EU governance: how preference cohesiveness of multiple principals shapes the European Commission's discretion in trade negotiations

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Document type:: Zeitschriftenaufsatz
Author(s):: Heldt, Eugenia C.
Title:: A new delegation design for EU governance: how preference cohesiveness of multiple principals shapes the European Commission's discretion in trade negotiations
Keywords:: Original Article ; Trade negotiations ; European Commission ; European Parliament ; Multiple principals ; Principal-agent ; Discretion
Journal title:: Comparative European Politics
Year:: 2021
Journal volume:: 19
Journal issue:: 5
Pages contribution:: 576-593
Fulltext / DOI:: doi:10.1057/s41295-021-00247-4
Publisher:: Palgrave Macmillan UK
E-ISSN:: 1472-4790 ; 1740-388X
Date of publication:: 24.06.2021
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