A new delegation design for EU governance: how preference cohesiveness of multiple principals shapes the European Commission's discretion in trade negotiations

Benutzer: Gast

Dokumenttyp:: Zeitschriftenaufsatz
Autor(en):: Heldt, Eugenia C.
Titel:: A new delegation design for EU governance: how preference cohesiveness of multiple principals shapes the European Commission's discretion in trade negotiations
Stichworte:: Original Article ; Trade negotiations ; European Commission ; European Parliament ; Multiple principals ; Principal-agent ; Discretion
Zeitschriftentitel:: Comparative European Politics
Jahr:: 2021
Band / Volume:: 19
Heft / Issue:: 5
Seitenangaben Beitrag:: 576-593
Volltext / DOI:: doi:10.1057/s41295-021-00247-4
Verlag / Institution:: Palgrave Macmillan UK
E-ISSN:: 1472-4790 ; 1740-388X
Publikationsdatum:: 24.06.2021
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