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Document type:
Buchbeitrag 
Author(s):
Heldt, Eugénia C.; Mello, P.A. 
Title:
Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis 
Pages contribution:
1-31 
Abstract:
Whether in multilateral negotiations or bilateral meetings, government leaders regularly engage in “two-level games” played simultaneously at the domestic and the international level. From the two-level-games perspective, executives are “chief negotiators” involved in some form of international negotiations for which they ultimately need to gain domestic approval at the ratification stage. This ratification requirement provides the critical link between the international and domestic level, but...    »
 
Keywords:
bargaining, domestic politics, two-level games, interests, levels of analysis, negotiation analysis, ratification, veto players, win sets 
Editor:
Cameron Thies 
Book title:
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis 
Publisher:
Oxford University Press 
Publisher address:
New York 
Year:
2017