

# **THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND DELIBERATION IN MODERN SOCIETIES**

A View from the 'Global South'

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# The Significance of Citizen Participation and Deliberation in Modern Democracies: A View from the 'Global South'

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For Elena Ruiz Sanabria and  
Octaviano Cruz Cardenas,  
with everlasting love.

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# Abstract

This dissertation centers around democratic innovations (DIs), participatory and deliberative democracy. In the three empirical chapters making up this dissertation, I examine the effects of political, economic, and temporal factors on democratic institutions across Latin America from 1980 until 2020. In the first chapter, I test quantitatively the impact of sociopolitical and economic variables on democratic innovation and institutional reform in Latin America after the decade of the 1980s. My quantitative results give credence to the positive effects of political equality on the emergence of DIs. In my second chapter, I research 'collective mandates' as a case of democratic innovation in Brazilian legislatures after the 1990s. My results indicate a positive effect of political ideology and electoral opportunism on democratic innovation and institution-building. Lastly, my third chapter examines the conditions and temporality present during the 2016 Mexico City Constitution-Making. My results confirm that enhancing citizen participation, fostering deliberation, and using technology secures epistemic gains and legitimacy in constitution-making.



# Zusammenfassung

Im Mittelpunkt dieser Dissertation stehen demokratische Innovationen (DIs), partizipative und deliberative Demokratie. In den drei empirischen Kapiteln dieser Dissertation untersuche ich die Auswirkungen politischer, wirtschaftlicher und zeitlicher Faktoren auf demokratische Institutionen in ganz Lateinamerika von 1980 bis 2020. Im ersten Kapitel untersuche ich quantitativ die Auswirkungen soziopolitischer und wirtschaftlicher Variablen auf demokratische Innovationen und institutionelle Reformen in Lateinamerika nach dem Jahrzehnt der 1980er-Jahre. Meine quantitativen Ergebnisse belegen die positiven Auswirkungen politischer Gleichheit auf das Entstehen von DIs. In meinem zweiten Kapitel untersuche ich "kollektive Mandate" als einen Fall von demokratischer Innovation in brasilianischen Gesetzgebungen nach den 1990er-Jahren. Meine Ergebnisse deuten auf einen positiven Effekt von politischer Ideologie und Wahlopportunismus auf demokratische Innovation und den Aufbau von Institutionen hin. In meinem dritten Kapitel schließlich untersuche ich die Bedingungen und die zeitlichen Abläufe während der Verfassungsgebung in Mexiko-Stadt 2016. Meine Ergebnisse bestätigen, dass eine verstärkte Bürgerbeteiligung, die Förderung der Deliberation und der Einsatz von Technologie epistemische Gewinne und Legitimität bei der Verfassungsgebung sichern.

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It warms my heart to express my sincere gratitude to André Bächtiger and Tim Büthe, my dissertation supervisors, for their unwavering guidance and support throughout my research project. Their comments on my writings were invaluable and significantly contributed to the finalization of my dissertation. I cannot thank them enough for their tutoring and constructive feedback. In particular, I appreciate their generosity in making time to supervise my research, especially with their packed agendas. Yet, what I value the most about them is their kind heart, positive attitude, and passion for research. Their example inspired me to stay optimistic and energized throughout my research project.

I am also grateful to have received a doctoral studies scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), which allowed me not only to study and research in Germany but also to cover my living expenses in Munich and Berlin over the past few years. I wish that more people could have access to similar opportunities. I know many skilled and committed individuals from around the globe who could benefit from the academic degree and self-development opportunities provided by DAAD. While having credentials and degrees does not guarantee success in academia or life, immersing oneself in diverse cultures broadens our world perspectives, makes us question our privileges, and inspires us to act against the profound inequalities in our society. As a DAADian, I am sure that DAAD provides the opportunity to earn a degree and gain social awareness.

My dissertation was immensely improved by the constructive feedback I received from the members of the International Relations Chair (IR Chair) at the TUM School of Social Sciences and Technology. I will always cherish the memories of our weekly IR-Chair meetings, in person and online during the pandemic, due to the great academic discussions and professionalism. I hereby thank the IR-Chair members, and other invited participants in our meetings for their time, questions, and critiques on my work: Abdel fattah Alshadafan, André Isidro, Charlotte Franziska Unruh, Chase Foster, Cindy Cheng, Henrike Sternberg, Jérôme Waßmuth, Juan Carlos Medina Serrano, Luca Messerschmidt, Milan Chen, Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald, Orestis Papakyriakopoulos, Richard Schenk, Se Hee Jung, Svanhildur Thorvaldsdottir, Timm Betz, Tobias Rommel, Vella Kigwiru, Zlatina Georgieva, and many others.

I also feel fortunate to have been a part of the academic community at TUM. As a doctoral student, I had numerous opportunities to participate in stimulating discussions in various departments with an extended scholarly community. I particularly enjoyed attending postgraduate seminars at the TUM School of Management, where I could exchange ideas with other candidates and talk about my research both formally and informally. Likewise, I fondly remember attending research seminars at the TUM School of Social Sciences and Technology, organized by top professors like Prof. Dr. Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt, Prof. Dr. Miranda Schreurs, and Prof. Dr. Simon Hegelich. Attending these seminars gave me valuable insights into research methods, science communication, and the opportunity to engage in academic discussions beyond our IR-Chair.

Besides, I had the privilege of teaching and sharing my research with students at the TUM School of Social Sciences and Technology. In this context, I would like to

express my gratitude to the students of the master seminar titled 'Democratic Innovations in Theory and Practice.' I am grateful for the thoughtful and valuable ideas shared during our discussions about democratic innovations, participatory and deliberative democracy. The students' diverse cultural and geographical backgrounds added diversity to our discussions. In particular, I found their perspectives on advancing democracy and social justice in, among others, the global community, education, and the workplace, to be exceptionally motivating. If the future lies in the hands of the new generations, I anticipate a more inclusive, equal, and democratic society.

Over the years I spent on my dissertation, I confirmed that including academic presentations, research sojourns, and conferences enriches the content of research projects. For instance, I could improve the framework of my introduction and conclusion by presenting my dissertation project at the COST-Action-sponsored International Conference "Constitution-Making and Democracy in Troubled Times" (Thessaloniki, 2021). The critiques were challenging but ultimately beneficial, particularly since at this point I was concluding my research project. Regarding my participation in this conference, I thank Ioannis Papadopoulos and Alexandros Kyriakidis, both affiliated with the University of Macedonia in Greece, for enabling my participation and presentation in Greece.

The most important chapter of my dissertation explores the rise of democratic innovations in Latin America. I spent considerable time researching cases of democratic innovation, developing arguments, hypotheses, and selecting the proper quantitative methods. This task was far from easy, despite its seemingly simple description. However, I was fortunate to receive guidance and mentorship from Tobias

Rommel to improve my quantitative analysis. Relatedly, Juan Carlos Medina Serrano taught me a new coding language from scratch, which I used for the quantitative analyses in my dissertation. Furthermore, this paper significantly improved thanks to the valuable criticisms I received when presenting past versions of it at international conferences and academic sojourns: 2021 APSA Seattle, 2019 IPPA4-Montreal, 2019 ECPR General Conference Wrocław, 2021 CA17135 Ljubljana, 2019 CA17135 Barcelona, 2020 University of Turku Research Sojourn (COST funded) and 2021 Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest Research Stay (BAYHOST funded). Finally, Thamy Pogrebinski and Melisa Ross shared valuable information enriching this chapter and invited me to present my dissertation project at the LATINNO closing event in 2021.

Collaborating with international colleagues is just as valuable as receiving mentorship and learning programming skills. I was fortunate to develop and sustain a transatlantic collaboration while working on my dissertation. I thank Leonardo Secchi from Santa Catarina State University (UDESC) in Brazil for his cooperation and for sharing data on 'collective mandates.' I first met Leonardo while attending IPP4 in Montréal, Canada, in 2019, but our collaboration also crystalized in co-authoring and delivering an exceptional chapter on collective mandates at IPSA 2021 in Lisbon, Portugal, along with Ricardo Alves Cavalheiro (UDESC) and Camila Vichroski Baumgarten (UDESC). Thanks to our collaboration, my interest in 'collective mandates' grew and inspired me to write a paper of my own on the topic. I even presented that article in 2021 at a COST-Action conference held in Ljubljana, Slovenia. During this academic conference, I received valuable feedback from all participants, but particularly from Monika Mokre, Sergiu Ghergina, Dániel Oross, Lívia de Souza Lima, and Sergio Barbosa.

I have always valued democracy and social justice. My research interest and passion for democratic processes and institutions have developed through both academic studies and casual conversations. But case studies to analyze have come to me unexpectedly. For instance, during my interview with the DAAD doctoral scholarship committee, I was asked about the newly created constitution of Mexico City since I pitched the topics of citizen participation and deliberation in my doctoral research proposal. At that time, I was unaware that the question and this case would eventually become one of the topics of my dissertation. The analysis of this case resulted in a couple of papers and a chapter on crafting the 2016 Mexico City constitution. Here too, the research greatly improved thanks to the input of Sergiu Gherghina, Dániel Oross, and Maija Setälä, who also generously provided me with the resources necessary to present my findings on this constitution-making case at various conferences and research sojourns. In 2019, I presented this topic at the 'Deliberative Democracy and Under-represented Groups' conference at the University of Pompeu Fabra in Spain. Additionally, I shared my research on constitution-making with participants of the Ph.D. Research Seminar at the Finnish Centre for Democracy Research at the University of Turku in Finland. Lastly, I want to acknowledge Gabriella Gómez-Mont (founder of LabCDMX) and Nelly Antonia Juárez Audelo (Mexico City Constitution-Making Constituent Deputy) for providing me with information on the Mexico City Constitution-Making.

Finally, I had the pleasure of spending countless hours at the office during my dissertation. Whether it was a weekday, weekend, or holiday, I found it to be quite an exciting experience. Sounds sad, but it was in the office where I also met very kind and fine people like Yvonne Buckley, Andrea Hintermair, Mireille Bertrand, Ekaterina Riembauer, Linda Sauer, Hedi Schmid, Ivana Jurik, Corinna Herrle, the watchmen,

and many others. It was really nice to chat with them and have a little break from writing my dissertation. Lastly, during my many hours at the office, I've been lucky enough to make some great friends like Abdel fatah Alshadafan, André Isidro, and Florian Schmidt. Spending time together in the office was essential for maintaining a positive attitude and making progress on our research and personal goals.

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# INTRODUCTION

## 1. About this Dissertation

As explicitly mentioned in its title, this dissertation is about the meaning and importance of citizen participation and deliberation. The backdrop of such topics relates to recent events in contemporary democracies with societal implications like the legitimacy of institutions and political inequality in decision-making. For instance, the management of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, BREXIT, the 2016 US Presidential Election, the 2018 Brazilian General Election, etcetera. With that backdrop in mind, I question the significance and actual contributions of citizen participation and deliberation in modern democracies and the causes of institutional change toward fostering deliberation and enhancing citizen participation.

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Since the framing concepts of this dissertation are citizen participation and deliberation, I build upon democratic innovations (DIs), as well as participatory and deliberative democracy. I center on DIs since they imply improvements in decision-making, policy-making, and other processes of modern democracies. For instance, crowdsourced constitution-making, as a democratic innovation (DI), allows citizens to partake in and influence the crafting of a constitution (Landemore, 2015; Cruz Ruiz, 2021). In the same vein, participatory budgeting enables citizens and elected officials to decide together how to spend public funds together (de Sousa Santos, 1998; Souza, 2001). Other examples of DIs are planning cells (Dienel and Renn, 1995), citizen assemblies (Warren and Pearse, 2008), deliberative polls (Fishkin, 2003), and collective mandates (Cruz Ruiz, 2023b).

In this dissertation, for methodological purposes, I conceptualize DIs as 'institutional changes' in modern democracies. With my working concept, I aim to capture actors' roles in reforming institutions, putting their political agendas forward, and struggling for political power. My concept of DIs helps me situate DIs along the evolutionary path of democracy and operationalize my DIs concept to detail further the influence of other factors affecting their emergence. On these grounds, in my dissertation, I focus mainly on DIs and their emergence. My emphasis differs, for example, from those of other colleagues who center on the effects of institutional changes like DIs' contributions to curing the 'democratic malaise' (Geissel, 2009; Geissel and Newton, 2012; Merkel, 2014).

In general, I have two main goals in my dissertation. First, I seek to advance our understanding of citizens' participatory and deliberative contributions to democratic processes and institutions, particularly in contexts of great economic inequality, recent democratization, and asymmetrical political power. Second, I

investigate the causes of democratic innovation and institutional reform, a mostly under-researched topic in democratic innovations, participatory and deliberative democracy. Notably, in the three main chapters making up my dissertation, I analyze qualitatively and quantitatively democratic units from the 'Global South,' in the period 1980-2020. In the first chapter making up my dissertation, I quantify the effects of political inequality on democratic innovation for 18 different countries over 35 years after 1980 (Cruz Ruiz, 2023c).<sup>1</sup> In the second chapter constituting my dissertation, I explore the effects of political ideology and electoral opportunism on the inception and diffusion of DIs in a single country by researching the case of collective mandates in Brazilian Legislatures between 1994 and 2020 (Cruz Ruiz, 2023b).<sup>2</sup> Finally, in my third chapter, about the Carta Magna of Mexico City, I examine citizens' inputs and influence on its crafting via digitally enabled collaborative platforms and other offline methods (Cruz Ruiz, 2020; 2023a).<sup>3</sup>

At least from three perspectives, the results of the chapters making up my dissertation advance our understanding of citizens' participatory and deliberative contributions to democratic processes and institutions, the role of the citizen in modern democracies, and the possible cases of institutional reform and innovation. First, this dissertation draws attention to DIs from the 'Global South' and pinpoints the possibilities and advantages of researching DIs cases and causes. Second, my results give credence to the meaningfulness of citizen participation and deliberation in democratic processes, but most of all, the possibility of engaging copious numbers of

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<sup>1</sup> My first chapter is based on an unpublished article (single authorship).

<sup>2</sup> This second chapter is also based on a soon to be published paper (single authorship).

<sup>3</sup> This third chapter is based on a working paper in the ConstDelib Working Paper Series (2020) (single authorship). Besides the aforementioned paper, in an already published paper (single authorship), I assess the inclusiveness of underrepresented groups and fostered deliberation of the 2016 Mexico City Constitution-making (Cruz Ruiz, 2021).

citizens in democratic processes via technologically aided fostering. Thirdly, about the DIs' predominant object of study, I shift the focus from processes and outcomes to causes and find quantitative evidence of the effect of exogenous factors on democratic innovation and institutional reform. In other words, I not only focus on DIs design or the impact of such DIs but also provide and test a causal explanation of the rise of DIs via statistical methods.

In my dissertation, one of my goals is to explore the significance of citizen participation and deliberation in modern democracies. I seek to locate the contributions of citizens to processes and institutions of democracy beyond the conventional understanding of citizen participation, like casting votes, revolting on the streets to oust authoritarian regimes or deliberation among the most affluent sections of society. I do not deny the contributions of established mechanisms of citizen participation. From a systemic view, different democratic activities, novel or not, contribute to sustaining the democratic system. Yet, my objective is to demonstrate that democracies could engage more citizens in decision-making to better govern and deliver, particularly in the modern world where problems are complex, and societies are considerably bigger than one century ago. Today more than ever, technology might enable such enhanced participation. However, society needs well-thought democratic designs accounting for real-world causes, closer to actual and not only ideal conditions.

Furthermore, my dissertation challenges arguments refuting citizen participation and deliberation contributions to processes and institutions of modern democracies, such as citizens being biased, ignorant, or disengaged. By focusing on Latin America, I approach this general debate to show the role of political actors in deepening democracy and the influence of the circumstances and temporality in democratic innovation and institutional reform. My dissertation shows the extent to

which, even in adverse social and unequal economic scenarios, citizens can contribute to democracy. Contrary to what critics argue, I show that citizens can engage in other activities beyond elections and that even in the most adverse scenarios, it is possible to include underrepresented groups in deliberations and decision-making.

In this introduction presenting my dissertation project, I trace the development of citizens' roles in democratic processes by surveying the literature on democracy. The main driver of this survey is my interest in the meaning of citizen participation and deliberation in modern democracies. My derived goal is to build upon that survey and pinpoint practices limited to voting, and others focused on agenda-setting or deliberation. Parting from the same survey, I underscore two points. First, I argue that these democratic practices constitute a 'Global North' perspective, corresponding to the Anglo-Saxon and European views. Second, I contend that the 'Global North' perspective, although not perfectly, emphasizes a linear democratic development moving towards democratic ideals and leaving behind authoritarian forms of government.

Consequently, to underline that 'Global North' perspective, I use the Latin American case to draw attention to the causes of democratic development in the 'Global South' from two perspectives. First, I highlight Latin America's historical, sociopolitical, and economic context, triggering innovations and reforms in democratic institutions and processes. Second, I underscore that democratic innovation and institutional reform in Latin America reflect not only a quest for democratic ideals but also citizens striving for the common good and solving their growing societal problems. The two perspectives from the 'Global South' emphasize the effects of circumstances and actors on democratic institutions and processes, particularly their pace, if not their linear development.

Besides, I explain my rationale in drawing on the Latin American experience with democratic innovations to explain the limited institutional adoption of the new citizen participation and deliberation mechanisms. I contend that this example from the 'Global South' helps us understand the role of political actors, interests, and sociopolitical and economic circumstances affecting democratic innovation and institutional change. Furthermore, by analyzing the Latin American case, I also offer a theory of institutional change describing the role of actors, political power, struggle, and an account of the effect of temporality on democratic innovation and institutional change. I use the Latin American case to highlight that most of the current scholarship on democratic innovations, as well as participatory and deliberative democracy, can look more at the 'Global South' to see how deliberation and meaningful citizen participation occur under different circumstances. This activity is helpful due to its theoretical and empirical implications.

Essentially, I argue that the two perspectives, 'Global North' and 'Global South,' complement each other and jointly highlight the importance of the citizen in modern liberal democracies. Mainly, I contend that the 'Global North' informs about the reasons, justification, and feasibility of incorporating citizens in democracy, while the 'Global South' tells us more about where, when, how, and why these innovations occur and are demanded. Combining the two is needed to face challenges like authoritarian leaders' rise and plan a sustainable future. For example, assuming that the future of society lies in urban settings, it is crucial that citizens participate and deliberate about their forms of government and put the common good as a goal. In sum, I argue that citizen participation and deliberation, normatively and empirically, are crucial elements to meet the increasingly complex world's challenges and get long-term thinking to face

future risks to society, such as pandemics, wars, or the effect of new technologies such as artificial intelligence.

In the remainder of this introduction, in section two, I survey the existing literature on participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, and democratic innovations. By doing that, I take note of participatory and deliberative ideals inspiring empirical political scientists, participatory and deliberative democracy theorists, and to a certain extent, political actors like activists and politicians to create new or reform democratic institutions and processes. In this section, I briefly summarize previous works on participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, and DIs. I supplement the latter by critically evaluating and situating my research among those research strands. Due to my particular interest in DIs as 'institutional changes,' the section on DIs is a bit more extensive. Then, in section three, I present the chapters making up my dissertation and their empirical and theoretical contributions. In particular, I highlight that democratic innovation and institutional reforms enhancing citizen participation and deliberation are not as ample as citizens would expect or sufficient to deal with problems affecting modern democracies, such as the rising number of populist leaders and increasingly complex societies.

## 2. Literature Survey

In my dissertation, my overall interest lies in citizen participation and deliberation in modern democracies. I mainly focus on the contribution, costs, and feasibility of incorporating more citizens into democratic institutions and processes. In addition to these complementary foci, I investigate the role of the interests and circumstances surrounding the creation of mechanisms boosting citizen participation and deliberation in democracy, its institutions, and processes.

In this introduction, I survey the literature on democracy and introduce the reader to the work of theoretical and practical democrats, particularly those researching the same topic since the second half of the twentieth century. I focus on their interest in asking whether modern democracies should and can somehow involve more participants in their institutions and processes. On these grounds, I will present in the coming pages the extent to which these democrats point out that it is normatively desirable to involve more participants and citizens in traditional or new democratic processes and institutions due to their contributions to democracy, for example, due to epistemic reasons, ethical, legitimacy, or representativeness gains. In addition, I call the reader's attention to other academic efforts to design mechanisms enhancing citizen participation and fostering deliberation that favor or achieve good and sound decisions, thus showing that incorporating more citizens into democracy and politics is feasible.

Along with this literature review, I emphasize that democracy research reflects the evolution and development of the role of the citizen in democratic processes. For example, over time, the role of the citizen transitioned at least from a role that was limited to participation in elections of elect elites or leaders to one that denoted more active citizen participation and deliberation in democracy. I argue that this development meant a change or a transition from voting to participatory and deliberative practices striving for a more inclusive and open democracy. That is, it was now not simply a matter of citizens expressing their political intentions by voting but also of raising their voice, having it heard, and later included in public policies and other democratic institutions and processes, for instance, through mechanisms such as participatory budgets, planning cells, or citizen juries.



Now, before starting my literature review on democracy, I want to highlight that my survey emphasizing the role of the citizen in democracy, to a certain extent, complements efforts to compare and contrast participatory and deliberative democracy. For instance, researchers' work and arguments in favor of pursuing participatory and deliberative democracy in *'tandem'* due to legitimacy benefits (Elstub, 2018). Likewise, my literature review supplements and builds upon DIs researchers' mapping of DIs concepts and cases, at least from two perspectives. First, DIs scholars work to trace the term in history, warnings about its overstretching, and DIs typology proposals (Elstub and Escobar, 2019a). Second, my dissertation supplements DIs scholars' work in mapping cases and focus on governance and public administration (Elstub and Escobar, 2019b).

Similarly, my literature review on deliberative democracy extends, comments, and coincides with similar works, for instance, Bohman's (1998) survey article tracing how this theory of democracy matured conceptually and empirically. In the same vein, in this introduction, comparably to Mansbridge et al. (2012), I pinpoint the limited deliberative capacity of established institutions or created spaces of deliberation to legitimate decisions and policies. Likewise, as Owen and Smith (2015), I underline the importance of centering the citizen at the heart of deliberation and democracy. Finally, as pinpointed by Bächtiger et al. (2018), I underscore that the 'systemic turn' spurred more empirical and theoretical research and the need to snapshot its current state.

Finally, the following subsections focus on participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, and DIs underlining theoretical and empirical debates on citizens' roles in democratic institutions and decision-making processes. In subsection 2.1, I underscore theoretical debates, institutional reforms, and innovations aiming to boost citizen participation. In subsection 2.2, I focus on the extent to which empirical and

theoretical democrats shifted their attention from simply citizen participation to accounts of the importance of fostering deliberation in decision-making and democracy. Lastly, in subsection 2.3, I accentuate how much of the research on DIs has put effort into gathering cases and debated what should be considered DI at the operational conceptual level. In section 2.3, I also situate my research in DIs research and detail my position among the theoretical and empirical debates I debate in the previous about participatory and deliberative democracy.

## 2.1 Participatory Democracy

In this subsection, I identify theoretical and empirical changes in democracy, particularly changes in democratic processes and institutions. At the theoretical level, I emphasize the extent to which participatory democracy scholars identified the limitations of the Schumpeterian democracy. Empirically, I identify examples pinpointing a change in the role of the citizen in democratic processes and institutions. Along the same lines, I also indicate the possible circumstances that might have affected the evolution of the concept of democracy empirically, for example, increased socio-political and economic complexity.

Seminal contributions to democracy scholarship have been made since 1960, when political theorists, empirical political scientists, and activists were arguably puzzled by the possibilities and actual opportunities to make citizens participate more in democracy. Previously, researchers and practitioners focused on institutions and processes of democracy—for instance, Schumpeter's (2003) understanding of democracy as a method to make decisions. The instrumental conception of democracy was the main object of study for participatory democracy scholars. For example, Pateman (1970) identified the limitations of representative and electoral democracy,

and emphasized a more active role of the citizen in democracy and its institutions. I assume such critique was legitimate, mainly as democracy, institutions, and processes centered on elections, leaders, and representation.

A closer look at Schumpeter's conception of democracy reveals a number of gaps and shortcomings in terms of participation and deliberation. Schumpeter's concept of democracy centered on a system based on representation and election procedures. From a perspective of collective decision-making, the Schumpeterian model of democracy stood as the opposite of participatory democracy goals since it focused on selecting elites who could lead and represent the people. Hence, participatory democracy scholars criticized the Schumpeterian view mainly because of its emphasis on the method of electing leaders and limiting citizens' political participation. The critique was straightforward: citizens could do more than cast a ballot, and elites could not manage complex problems alone (Manin, 1997; Sartori, 1987). About the latter, participatory democrats emphasized the limited capacity of elites when dealing with complex problems. For instance, as democratic units remained relatively small, this democracy form could cope with the tasks of representing and leading. Yet, as the tasks became more complex, perhaps as democratic units became more populous, elites were limited.

Along the same lines, participatory democracy scholars emphasized the benefits of allowing citizens to take a more active role in decision-making and policy-making. For instance, Pateman (1970) underlined that the participation of citizens in activities beyond the ballot had educative effects on citizens, gave them a sense of political efficacy, and made them understand and engage with public matters. Pateman's view complemented the Schumpeterian vision of citizen participation and laid the foundation of future scholarship, highlighting the benefits of citizen

participation in decision-making. Besides, Pateman's and other participatory democracy scholars' work placed the citizen at the center of democratic theory, institutions, and processes of democracy.<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, democracy scholars researching institutions and pluralism also engaged with citizen participation in democratic institutions. For instance, Dahl was concerned with the forms and opportunities given to citizens to participate in decision-making and including underrepresented groups of society in democratic institutions and processes. Dahl emphasized the importance of political equality and contention. Then, his research focused on pluralism and the importance of allowing citizens and groups of citizens access to democratic processes and institutions and distributing power in democracies. The latter ideas crystallized in his work on polyarchy, where he spelled out in more detail his understanding of the importance of contestation and the creation of institutions promoting political equality (Dahl, 1971).

Hitherto, it seems that after the Schumpeterian view on democracy, political theorists and democracy scholars focused their attention at least on two perspectives. One placed the citizen at the center of democratic institutions and beyond, for instance, in the workplace. Another centered on enabling citizen participation in institutions and processes of democracy. Critics of representative democracy pushed for more citizen participation in decision-making and policy-making, enabling citizens to influence democracy and its institutions. Inspired by theorists, practitioners advocated opening more decision-making processes and democratic institutions to citizen participation. However, some observers and practitioners warned about the

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<sup>4</sup> Pateman regarded hierarchical institutions beyond the realm of the state and democratic institutions, as to certain extent equivalent to democratic institutions, to pinpoint the possibilities of democratizing not only institutions of the public sphere. An example of the latter is the workplace.

risks of tokenism. They emphasized the actual and limited political power granted to citizens in decision-making like urban planning or social policy-making (Arnstein, 1969).

The further democratization of democracy and its institutions, and the role of citizen participation in it, continued as part of the research agenda of theorists and empiricists over the years. For example, democracy scholars, from a macro perspective, argued that neoliberalism harmed democracy, its institutions, and citizens' opportunities to participate in self-government by accentuating the ability of the market over the government to solve societal problems (Barber, 2003). Furthermore, as societies became more complex by the end of the millennium, it seems that representative democracy could not cope alone with every challenge posed by new and more demands for citizen participation or more political inclusion (Urbinati and Warren, 2008). The increased complexity of the modern world made political theorists contrast new citizen participation mechanisms' contributions and possible risks to established democratic institutions in this context.

This literature review shows that as research on participatory democracy matured theoretically, it was clear that citizen participation could contribute positively to decision-making, for example, by bringing new perspectives to problem-solving. However, a number of questions beyond the theoretical maturity of participatory democracy remain to be addressed at the time. Empirically, increased citizen participation had a cost. For instance, including more citizens in decision-making increased the complexity of the interactions among the participants and between the represented and representatives. At the theoretical level, citizen participation contributed positively to facing the modern world's problems but empirically posed

organizational problems, not to forget the increasing costs and legitimacy of the process.

In short, to a certain extent, building on the Schumpeterian view of democracy, democracy research focused on claims about the normative justification of citizen participation in democracy and its institutions. Literature on participatory democracy highlighted a shift from a passive role of the citizen in democracy to a more active role. This strand of research explored the benefits of citizen participation in facing the problems of modern democracies like urbanization and dealing with internal problems like extended representation. Participatory democracy, by theorizing about more active citizens' roles in democratic processes, triggered empirical research focused on mapping existing and creating spaces of citizen involvement.

Empirical researchers centered their attention on securing the minimum elements to have organized and effective participation complementing established democratic institutions. For example, empirical political scientists aimed to design and create new spaces for citizen participation, for instance, the 'Citizen Panel' (Crosby et al., 1986), a mechanism resembling the Anglo-Saxon' jury system,' in which a randomly selected group of citizens come together to study a social or political issue, and give recommendations to politicians or decision-makers on the same issue.<sup>5</sup> Crosby and colleagues were pioneers in designing such mechanisms to include more citizens in decision-making beyond the traditional institutions and processes of representative democracy. Besides, based on their experiences with the 'Citizen Panel' and work at the 'Institute for Citizen Participation and Planning Procedures,'

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<sup>5</sup> For instance, an example of political issues, on which citizen panels could contribute, are environmental matters such as the impacts of agriculture on water quality – see more in Crosby et al., 1986.

they came up with principles to evaluate whether a participatory process was successful. These evaluation criteria included, among others, random selection, facilitation, cost-effectiveness, and fairness. For instance, to create the mechanism for representing the public, these empirical researchers suggested that the random selection of participants was key to successful citizen participation since it eased out the monopolization of interest.

Another forerunner in developing participatory mechanisms on the other side of the Atlantic was Dienel's 'Planning Cell' (Dienel, 1989; Dienel and Renn, 1995; Dienel, 2002; Dienel, 1978). This DI is a participatory and deliberative mechanism constituted by randomly-selected participants, characterized by a diversity of views, to develop solutions to solve societal issues and give recommendations to decision-makers.<sup>6</sup> This design aimed to complement and respond to the challenges of the Schumpeterian form of government, emphasizing the policy-making cycle and informing decision-makers. This model organized public participation and considered participants to be public consultants. The model selected citizens randomly, limited their participation period, remunerated them, and included two facilitators. The outcome of this panel was a citizen report written after citizens got exposed to information about the matter to decide on, exchanged information, explored and discussed possible solutions, and evaluated potential consequences. As reported by Dienel, this process demonstrated that the citizen could participate in more meaningful activities of democracy, such as policy-making.

In sum, most of these participatory democracy scholars pinpointed the limitations of the representative electoral democracy, for instance, as economic, socio-

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<sup>6</sup> Planning Cells have been implemented to identify public's preferences on energy policies – see more in Dienel (1978).

political, and technological problems became more complex. That is, beginning in the second half of the Twentieth Century, socio-political and economic complexity increased and was reflected in great urbanization, demographic change, and governance problems. In that panorama, democracy, institutions, and elected representatives faced increasingly complex challenges in which, at least normatively, citizen participation could weigh in not only to legitimate decision-making but also to inform it and tackle complex problems. Empirically, to collectively solve complex problems, scholars and practitioners found in 'Citizen Juries' and 'Planning Cells' a way to increase communication between politicians, citizens, and other epistemic groups, thereby finding solutions to challenges of the modern world.

## 2.2 Deliberative Democracy

I turn now to theoretical and empirical studies on deliberative democracy and scholars contributing to democracy research from a deliberative perspective. I start underlying that deliberative democracy also emerged as a critique of representative and electoral democracy. However, with this note, I do not necessarily mean that I see in deliberative democracy a continuation of participatory democracy or a withdrawal from it, in the sense that participatory democracy reached its theoretical and empirical limit. On the contrary, these two strands of research have different aims. For instance, participatory democracy centers on the citizen and political equality, while deliberative democracy focuses more on the citizen and communication.

In this subsection, I highlight, similarly to the previous one, the development of research in deliberative democracy, i.e., a three-stage development. I start with the first stage by underlying that, at its genesis, most of the deliberative democracy research focused on the justification and the ideals of deliberation, consensus, public



justification, the common good, etcetera. For instance, seminal works of deliberative democrats in this stage evaluated whether deliberation was needed to achieve consensus among those exchanging reasons and the legitimacy of deliberation in the eyes of those affected by its outcome (Habermas, 1973; 1988). Other studies of influential deliberative democracy scholars pondered and placed political justification at the center of deliberative democracy and required free and equal citizens to engage in public reasoning and link that activity to public power authorization, the common good, and political equality (Cohen, 1996).

Compared to participatory democracy scholars, who aimed to enhance citizen participation in almost every aspect of public life, deliberative democrats highlighted from the very beginning the necessity of increasing not only citizen participation but also deliberation in democratic institutions and decision-making. In particular, the focus of deliberative scholars in this first stage centered on making a case for, among others, enhanced citizen participation, communication, consensus, and public will. This first stage was the fundament that informed theoretically the development of designed fora engaging citizens in meaningful reasoning and the analyses of deliberative processes creating the right conditions for deliberation. For example, since this stage, deliberative democrats have focused on justifying citizen participation in democratic processes, particularly to inform decision-making while highlighting the benefits of diversity (Bohman, 2006).

The second stage of the development of deliberative democracy was the transition from the justification or defense of this type of democracy toward research focused on implementing and assessing the complementarity of deliberation and established representative institutions. Deliberative democrats considered this stage 'the coming of age of deliberative democracy' since the scholarship engaged not only

with problems related to justification but also with institutionalization and empirical obstacles (Bohman, 1998). That is, deliberative democrats started researching beyond the deliberative ideals of fairness or equality to cover established institutions of democracy like parliaments and analyze deliberation in these institutions via a discourse quality index (DQI) and by centering attention on its variability under different contexts (Steiner et al., 2004; Bächtiger et al., 2007; Bächtiger, 2014). The latter does not mean that the additive effects of deliberation on established institutions were not present in the opening research agenda of deliberative democrats. For instance, Habermas pinpointed these effects when analyzing opinion and will formation within established institutions and informally in the general public sphere (Habermas, 1988).

I underline that this second stage of deliberative democracy covers research focused on examining created spaces for deliberation where most ideals and reasons for deliberation could be implemented and complement existing representative and electoral democracy institutions. An example of those created spaces approaching the 'ideal' of deliberation is the 'Deliberative Poll' (Fishkin, 1991; Luskin et al., 2002; Fishkin, 2003), which is a type of consultation combining public opinion and deliberation practices to get to know what the public opinion would be if citizens had opportunities to acquire more information in a given matter. This deliberation space is a non-partisan forum, including citizens representing the wider public, focusing on and measuring the effects of deliberation on participants' opinions. The 'Deliberative Poll' is one of the most popular fora of deliberative democracy and has been used for reasoning in various decision-making and policy-making matters ranging from urban

planning to Korean unification.<sup>7</sup> This deliberation space is particularly useful for testing deliberative democracy ideals and further researching the possibilities of complementing contemporary modern liberal democracies.

Certainly, deliberative democracy ideals could be researched beyond controlled deliberation spaces, for instance, in institutions or processes of representative democracies. I refer to processes where deliberation is inherent because the processes involve the exchange and weighing of opinions and other processes in which deliberation complements public reasoning and understanding of complex decision-making issues. For instance, in the case of constitution-making, researchers pinpointed the effects of specific elements around the deliberation in constituent assemblies, among others, the number of members deliberating, process' publicity, and the role of interests and power relationships involved in constituent assemblies and the deliberation about the common good (Elster, 1998). As mentioned previously, deliberative democrats have also researched deliberation in legislatures as a procedure and focused on its stages, sequences, and quality using the DQI, which mainly uses indicators accounting for participation, justification, common good, constructive politics, and respect (Steiner et al., 2004). The DQI is one of the first efforts to study deliberation quantitatively in different national parliaments and served as evidence that ideals could be tested empirically. In short, the study of deliberation in constitution-making and parliaments pinpoint a transition from the study of deliberation in its ideal form to empirical research.

Likewise, other deliberative democracy scholars focused beyond speech in legislatures or created spaces. They investigated processes with complex historical

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<sup>7</sup> See also: Stanford, Center for Deliberative Democracy: What is Deliberative Polling? Available at: <https://cdd.stanford.edu/what-is-deliberative-polling/> Consulted: 17 January 2022.

circumstances. For instance, the Canadian Constitutional Debate of the late 1980s and early 1990s to endorse the constitution by the ten provincial legislatures and the Canadian federal government. As Chambers (1995) described, the 1989 Canadian constitutional amendment failed because it was perceived as being subject to elitist bargaining and governmental interference. Another attempt in 1992, which also failed to be endorsed due to a referendum, successfully achieved a fair, discursive, and inclusive process.<sup>8</sup> This second attempt allowed citizens, groups of citizens, elites, and underrepresented groups to deliberate in fora and conferences. This process included deliberative ideals in established democratic institutions and complemented other direct democracy mechanisms like referenda.

The empirical research on deliberation focused on deliberative mechanisms and cases like the 'Deliberative Poll,' constitution-making, or legislatures. During this third stage of deliberative democracy research, scholars took stock of their accumulated theoretical developments and lessons drawn from their copious empirical analyses. Deliberative democracy in this stage underlined at least two theoretical and practical challenges of scaling deliberative processes. First, deliberative democrats noted the tendency to emphasize small-scale mechanisms of deliberation to the detriment of the inclusion of the public in the deliberation (Chambers, 2009). Second, deliberative democracy scholars underlined the need for a systemic perspective to understand the extent to which large-scale democratic decision-making could be achieved through a decentralized network of deliberative processes (Parkinson and Mansbridge, 2012).<sup>9</sup> In sum, during this stage, deliberative democracy scholars of this

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<sup>8</sup> The proposed amendments to the Constitution of Canada in 1992 were submitted to a public referendum, but 55 percent of Canadians rejected the agreement known as "The Charlottetown Accord."

<sup>9</sup> Parkinson and Mansbridge's 2012 book builds upon the concept of 'deliberative systems,' which describes a network of interconnected deliberative forums and practices that collectively

period underlined at least two points. First, democratic deliberation was not exclusive to a narrow group of well-informed and educated elites or exclusive to mechanisms like a 'Deliberative Poll.' Second, they highlighted the need to take deliberation beyond mechanisms like the 'Deliberative Poll' to the public sphere and probably at the country scale.

Furthermore, the systemic perspective enables a gauging of deliberative democracy contributions to functioning democracies far from single established institutions like a legislature or new deliberative processes such as 'Deliberative Polls.' This perspective's advantage was observing deliberation and other activities that enabled deliberation occurring in different places or mechanisms that are part of a more extensive system. Isolated working mechanisms are not precisely about deliberation, like protests, but also fulfill a function within the same deliberative system, like directing the public attention to ignored issues of public interest. Another advantage of this perspective was to assess the deficits and positive effects of mechanisms contributing to the deliberative system and suggest solutions. For instance, because the media creates, curates, and distributes public information, it has political and democratic implications for the deliberative systems approach. In particular, such effects are related to the role of the media in enabling or hindering the flow of information among different actors within the deliberative system, giving or taking advantage of their counterparts.

The systemic approach also proposed three features to assess deliberative systems: ethical, epistemic, and democratic characteristics. If deliberation was to be used for decision-making, analyses should weigh its contributions to the deliberative

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contribute to democratic decision-making at a larger scale than, for example, processes like the 'Deliberative Poll.'

system by gauging the processes using those variables. For instance, the process had to be informative and enhance the information available by boosting the epistemic gains. Deliberation shall also respectfully allow the participants to contribute to the process and not hijack the process. Moreover, deliberation had to be democratic by allowing equal chances of participation and influence and all those affected by the process. Besides those elements, the deliberative processes had to strive to achieve a working process generating good results, that is, results that everyone could accept or not reasonably reject.

Finally, the systemic approach to deliberative democracy is not the latest research effort in studying deliberation or analyzing the broader adoption of deliberation in politics and society. For instance, about the challenges of embracing more deliberation in democratic institutions and society, deliberative democrats have underlined that citizens might feel discouraged from engaging in deliberation due to its perceived lack of policy impact and politicians' reluctance to employ deliberative practices (Bächtiger and Wegmann, 2014). More recently, deliberative democrats have highlighted the theoretical and empirical robustness of deliberative democracy research and the challenges of empirical research, such as the entanglement of concepts and empirical tools at different levels of analysis (Bächtiger and Parkinson, 2019).

Thus far, I have presented the development of participatory and deliberative democracy in the last two subsections. I intended to introduce the reader to these two strands of research and have them as a backdrop when describing the development in the research on DIs.

## 2.3 Democratic Innovations (DIs)

In the same way, as with the relationship between participatory and deliberative democracy research development, I do not consider DIs study a continuation of or departure from participatory and deliberative democracy scholarship. On the contrary, I regard their relationship as symbiotic for two reasons. First, I underline the extent to which participatory and deliberative democracy's ideals inform DIs' theoretical and empirical research. Second, I highlight that while mapping and analyzing DIs in the real world, DIs scholars find original cases illustrating participatory and deliberative democracy theories and, at the same time, inform theorists about new or unknown DIs. I argue that these two activities create an interrelationship among the three research strands.

On these grounds, I underscore that research on DIs has typically centered on cases and designs of deliberation and citizen participation. However, more recent studies have also focused on mapping DIs to compare cases and understand the effects of different and similar DIs on democratic institutions. Along the same lines, in my dissertation, I seek to show the benefits of complementing DIs research with theoretical and empirical analyses of the political-economic drivers of DIs. Arguably, supplementing DIs research with such empirical and causal analysis should also reflect on participatory and deliberative democracy.

As I explain in my dissertation, a research gap in DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy, is the testing of causal theories. On these grounds, I posit that my research contributes to DIs research by providing causal explanations, only possible after DIs scholarship focused on mapping and creating DIs databases such as LATINNO (Pogrebinschi, 2017) or Participedia (Fung and Warren, 2011; Smith et

al., 2015). I provide to DIs, participatory and deliberative research four contributions related to explaining the rise of DIs in Latin America. First, I theorize and test hypotheses about the rise of DIs and institutional change at the continental level. Second, I provide a longitudinal analysis of the effect of great sociopolitical and economic effects on democratic institutions. Third, I underscore political equality's relevance and positive impact on continuing the democratization of democratic institutions and processes in modern democracies. Fourth, I highlight the effects of sociopolitical and economic events triggering DIs emergence.

In this regard, the theoretical-causal explanation of DIs adds to the symbiotic relationship I mentioned previously. That is to say, the symbiotic relationship blurs the limits between theorists and empiricists of the research strands mentioned above. My rationale here is that theorists and empiricists are somehow engaged with complementing or ameliorating some of the contemporary deficiencies of modern democracies, like political equality, legitimacy, or informed decision-making. Hence, DIs researchers and practitioners implementing and theorizing about DIs contribute significantly to the work of deliberative and participatory democracy scholars and vice-versa. However, a closer look at the literature on DIs, as well as participatory and deliberative democracy, reveals a still open question about the extent to which modern democracies innovate.

In general, besides the symbiotic relationship and as mentioned above, I underline that DIs' research development can be divided into three periods covering research on participatory and deliberative democracy ideals, case studies, and mapping DIs. For example, DIs research focused on participatory and deliberative ideals centered on institutional design and mechanisms of participation and deliberation. The latter empirically complements the theoretical work of deliberative



and participatory democracy researchers. An example of the latter is the study of mini-publics, particularly the analysis of their characteristics, goals, and factors influencing their functioning and complementarity with established institutions of representative democracy and others of direct democracy like referenda (Setälä, 2011). Another example of theoretical motivation is the analysis of the effects of the political system on the promotion, use, and outcomes of deliberative mechanisms such as consensus conferences (Dryzek and Tucker, 2008). In general, I mean that deliberative and participatory democracy scholars work, inform, and motivate DIs scholars due to the theoretical implications of DIs like mini-publics in the real world.

Furthermore, by incorporating participatory and deliberative ideals, DIs face similar challenges conjectured by such democratic theorists and practitioners on the ground. For example, renewing existing democratic institutions like the 'US Electoral College' and creating new processes like 'Deliberative Poll' implies benefits and costs. Likewise, enhanced participation and deliberation entail, for example, in a constituent assembly, an increase in the information available to decision-makers. Furthermore, the latter also implies the need for better information management to benefit from increased information availability. Besides the aforementioned needs, the challenges list related to implementing participatory and deliberative ideals is long, for example, self-selected participants, output legitimacy, participants' accountability, or replication.

Moreover, continuing with the symbiotic relationship, I contend that DIs research informs deliberative and participatory democracy scholars' theoretical work by suggesting theoretical refinements and empirical consideration of current theories of democracy and their surrounding concepts. In particular, DIs scholars' work informs theoretical designs with empirics, especially the complementarity of DIs to modern democratic institutions and their relationship with other theories of democracy (Smith,

2009; 2019; Elstub and Escobar, 2019a; O'Flynn, 2019). For instance, academics might design processes or institutions creating the right conditions to enhance participation and foster deliberation, but empiricists grasp the actual costs of the design in time and monetary terms. Hence, I contend that DIs scholars' work is crucial to find examples of the crystallization of participatory and deliberative theories and problems derived from their application. Empirical work on democratic processes like constitution-making (Cruz Ruiz, 2021) or new democratic institutions like 'Deliberative Poll' (Fishkin, 1991; Luskin et al., 2002; Fishkin, 2003) are two examples of how implementing participatory or deliberative ideals in the real world pushes theoretical work forward.

In general, I posit that participatory and deliberative democracy and DIs scholars' work informs decision-makers about creating new and reforming current democratic institutions and processes. Mainly, by testing participatory and deliberative ideals in the real world, DIs scholars' work triggers reconsiderations on the meaning and significance of representation, political equality, and the goals of democratic processes and institutions. Along these lines, particularly my chapters on 'collective mandates' (Cruz Ruiz, 2023b) and the 2016 Mexico City Constitution-Making (Cruz Ruiz, 2020; 2021; 2023a) complement DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy by informing theoretical and empirical research how democratic innovation occurs in the 'Global South.'

Additionally, I posit that my dissertation contributes to DIs research, as well as participatory and deliberative democracy research, by building upon DIs databases like Participedia (Fung and Warren, 2011; Smith et al., 2015) or LATINNO (Pogrebinschi, 2017). As previously explained in the paragraphs above, one of the significant developments in DIs research was mapping DIs and creating DIs

databases. Such achievement is helpful for different reasons. For example, DIs mapping helps find DIs outside the academic realm. The latter underlines the possibility that political actors innovate democracy and reform institutions independently of DIs practitioners and theorists. Political actors innovate processes and institutions of democracy, perhaps fostering participation and deliberation on their own and without participatory and deliberative democracy agendas. This sporadic innovation underpins the necessity of mapping DIs, emerging in the real world, perhaps without the label of 'democratic innovation.' In other words, mapping DIs is probably one of the main contributions of DIs research to participatory and deliberative democracy. This enterprise has not been ignored in this strand of research. Graham Smith<sup>10</sup> mapped for the first time examples of institutional reforms and innovative institutions that included deliberation and participation in decision-making processes (Smith, 2005a; Smith, 2009). In fact, Smith coined the term 'democratic innovations' by defining the concept and offering a detailed analysis of different types of DIs developed and implemented in various contexts for the first time.

Since my research builds upon mapped cases and databases, I underline that my research, particularly the main chapters comprising my dissertation, is cutting edge in DIs, as well as participatory and deliberative democracy research. Yet, I acknowledge the challenges of mapping DIs, particularly regarding concept and existence. First, the concept, meanings, and conceptualizations are still debated (Smith, 2019; Elstub and Escobar, 2019a; O'Flynn, 2019). Scholars researching DIs still disagree on whether DIs are institutions, processes, ends, or means of democracy.

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<sup>10</sup> Smith's 2009 book has proven to be useful for the works of practitioners and scholars of DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy.

The lack of an ecumenical or more clear-cut definition makes it hard for empiricists to go to the shop floor and map DIs since there might be plenty of unique cases.

The second challenge is to understand more fully DIs' existence and temporality. For example, mapping DIs requires scholars to have expertise in the context in which DIs emerge. That expertise might encompass at least awareness of the political system, political actors, and historical context since those factors shape the DI. About temporality, I contend that it is crucial to contextualize the mapped cases and our sense of success and failure, perhaps by modeling causal relationships and using historical narratives (Büthe, 2002). However, despite the challenges, DIs research has found exceptional cases and focused extensively on their research. An example of this successful mapping is the participatory budgeting of Porto Alegre<sup>11</sup> because several studies have researched not only the mechanism and its outcomes but also the context and time in which such mechanisms occurred (de Sousa Santos, 1998; Baiocchi, 2001; Sintomer et al., 2008; Souza, 2001).

Whether surpassed or not, I see benefits for DIs research in considering those challenges, for instance, to discern whether a DI remains an innovation or stops being considered an innovation, for instance, when it becomes part of a given institutional democratic arrangement. The latter also highlights that some DIs might not be considered an innovation in one context but can be considered in another. Those two considerations highlight the challenges in mapping existing DIs worldwide, their temporality, and probably the lack of institutionalization. Nevertheless, mapping DIs does not come at no cost. For instance, DIs scholars have signaled that DIs analysis

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<sup>11</sup> A mechanism boosting citizen participation and deliberation in decision-making to decide how public resources should be spent.

underlines a great appetite for researching successful cases, hindering our ability to learn from failures (Spada and Ryan, 2017).

Additionally, as I underscored above, the recent shift of DIs research towards creating DIs databases like LATINNO or Participedia allows research beyond comparative analyses on DIs' implementation, creation, and aims (Pogrebinschi, 2017; Font et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2015; Fung and Warren, 2011). As I previously mentioned, I contend that DIs databases are helpful to DIs, participatory and deliberative research for various reasons. For instance, due to additional contextual information gathered while mapping DIs, scholars can, for example, make causal analyses of DIs' emergence and theorize about the sociopolitical context shaping DIs' design, political actors, and interests in their creation and success or failure.

However, to provide causal explanations, for instance, on the rise of DIs, a different concept of DIs is needed to empirically and systematically test hypotheses on the rise of DIs. By a different concept, I mean that it is required to understand DIs beyond the seminal work of Smith (2009), where he defines DIs as "institutions that have been specifically designed to increase and deepen citizen participation in the political decision-making process" (p.1). As I mentioned at the outset of this introduction, I conceptualize DIs in my dissertation as *'institutional changes'* in modern democracies to explain their emergence, but most importantly, to capture the effect of sociopolitical and economic circumstances on democratic institutions, and to be able to understand the political struggles of political actors. I will explain more about my concept and research contribution in the sections below.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> In general, I use my DIs concept instead of that of Smith (2009) due to two main reasons. First, I aim to include not only 'new' DIs but other less novel or less innovative cases. Second, my definition, by being more general, also covers 'innovations' created within established

### 3. My Research Contributions

After this brief literature review, I underline the following observation: even though theoretical and empirical democracy research has pointed to the fact that institutions could and should continue to innovate, the fact is that democracies have not adopted DIs such as mini-publics more extensively. For example, although democratic theorists have justified incorporating more citizens and deliberation in democratic processes like constitution-making to craft informed and legitimate constitutions, such processes remain closed to the public in most cases. Likewise, although practitioners have developed mechanisms like 'Deliberative Polls' to account for citizens' opinions and preferences about important decisions and to foster citizenship, in the last couple of decades, the world has witnessed the resurgence of authoritarianism and populism. These examples highlight the need for DIs since it seems that the future will need more democracy to face problems like global warming, overpopulation, or others derived from the development of new technologies like artificial intelligence. Such problems need more collective decision-making, participation, and deliberation to make better informed and legitimate decisions.

With this backdrop in mind, it is difficult to understand or find the reasons why modern democracies do not incorporate deliberation and citizen participation more broadly into their institutions and processes, for instance, through more deliberation in

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democratic institutions. For example, democratic 'changes' such as constitutional reforms or amendments, which, although generated within established political institutions, might achieve the same goals as 'innovative' or 'disruptive' DIs generated by actors such as the civil society. Smith's definition might not disregard the example before, though other more innovative or newer examples might be captured more easily in his categorization and classification. Finally, my goal in this dissertation is not to define anew the concept of democratic innovations, I am simply using my concept to study the political effects of sociopolitical, economic, and cultural variables on democratic institutions and processes in the 'Global South.' In sum, I use my concept due to methodological reasons, and to avoid the implicit emphasis of Smith's concept on 'innovative' or 'new' DIs limits my case selection.

democratic institutions like legislatures or broader use of 'Deliberative Polls' or 'Planning Cells.' In other research strands, for example, research on rule-making in international organizations underscores the relevance and variation of participation in decision-making at the national and international levels (Büthe and Mattli, 2011) and its significance in governance beyond the local and national levels (Pauwelyn et al., 2022). Besides, the world continues facing complex problems overwhelming democracies, international organizations, and other institutions whose activities affect the common good. With problems, I mean those derived from the technologically interconnected world, global pandemics, international wars, and the rapid and impetuous technological development that occurred in recent decades and is affecting all spheres of life.

Thus, despite theoretical justifications for renovating democracy, it seems that democracy innovates at a slower pace than the complexity of the world. Besides, something similar occurs in other realms where participatory and deliberative democracy expertise could be applied to solve other problems beyond deficiencies in modern democracies, for instance, international organizations, the workplace, or matters such as artificial intelligence. For example, international organizations face problems like elitism, epistemically weak decisions, or exclusion of the public in decision-making. Democratic institutions and others like international organizations could boost participation and deliberation for epistemic gains and increase legitimacy or complement current decision-making mechanisms. In short, there seems to be an urgency in adopting participatory and deliberative ideals in democracies and other realms of life, at least in light of the increasingly complex modern world.

I contend that this bleak perspective of a small number of institutional reforms motivates my research and stands as my overarching research question. In other

words, why do democratic institutions and processes change? Hence, I investigate the causes of institutional change in democracy in my dissertation. In particular, I focus on actors, interests, context, and temporality surrounding democracies to explain institutional change. In this understanding, I regard my dissertation as a complementing research effort to existing scholarship on democratic innovations, participatory and deliberative democracy because causal hypothesis testing and quantitative analysis are not that common in these three strands of literature. My research does not deny that such points were absent in previous research; I merely underline that they were implicitly and anecdotally present.

The causal research in DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy has recently become possible. That is, one of the main challenges of causal analyses was the availability of data. This scarcity has been the Achilles heel of research on democratic innovations, participatory and deliberative democracy. However, as mentioned in the previous section, data has recently become more available than before, facilitating causal explanations. Data was generated from at least three perspectives. First, researchers contributed to data generation by studying the feasibility of the theoretical assumptions of participatory and deliberative democracy. Second, outside of academia, activists and practitioners generated data to demonstrate that democracy is not just an activity reserved for career politicians or experts. Third, DIs researchers contributed by mapping cases.

More specifically, I argue that the compiled cases in databases have created possibilities for new and complementary research on DIs and participatory and deliberative democracy. For example, based on the LATIINO database, three examples can be enunciated to illustrate these new opportunities. First, DIs databases help compare similar DIs cases, replications, and performance in achieving goals, for



instance, the case of participatory budgeting in Latin America. Second, databases help inform scholars of DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy of unknown cases from other world regions, such as the 'collective mandates' used in Brazilian legislatures or the Mexico City 2016 Constitution-Making. Third, a DIs database facilitates causal analyses, which, as I referred previously, enable empirical research focusing, among others, on actors, interests, circumstances, and temporality surrounding democratic institutions and causing the emergence of DIs.

As mentioned above, I aim to understand why democratic institutions and processes change. Having enunciated my primary research question, the literature review, and the latest research possibilities in DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy research, I briefly present the chapters that comprise my dissertation. In the first chapter, I research the causes of DIs' emergence in Latin America. I conduct a causal analysis of DIs' rise in the continent, considering DIs the political consequences of the Latin American sociopolitical and economic transformations after the 1970s. As in the previous literature review, such theoretical and causal analyses seem recently neglected in DIs research.

In the second chapter, I examine the case of 'collective mandates,' a DI used in Brazilian legislatures to enhance citizen participation and deliberation in policy-making. In this case study, I highlight two exogenous variables affecting the inception and diffusion of democratic innovations: political ideology and electoral opportunism. Besides, in this chapter, compared to my DIs emergence chapter, I zoom in on a single country to describe how democratic innovation and institutional reform occur, not only in the executive branch of government but also in the legislative. Lastly, in the third main chapter of this dissertation, I focus on the Mexico City 2016 Constitution-Making. In this chapter I research the temporality, the actors, technological aids, and the

interests involved in the participatory writing of a constitution. In particular, my analysis of this constitution-making gauges the benefits of boosting citizen participation and fostering deliberation in this democratic process.

In the next three subsections, I give the reader more details about the chapters I briefly described in the paragraphs above.

### 3.1 DIs Emergence in Latin America

As mentioned in the last part of the previous section, I focus in this chapter on Latin America. I investigate the significant rise in the number of DIs in the continent. In general, my main argument is that political equality is the primary variable affecting the increase of DIs in the continent. More specifically, I argue that DIs are institutional changes resulting from political struggles among political actors. I posit that sociopolitical and economic changes in the continent affected power relationships due to changes in political equality. I argue that such political struggles reformed or created entirely new citizen participation and deliberation mechanisms in Latin American democracies. Likewise, I contend that this chapter contrasts with DIs' conventional wisdom, which mainly focuses on the justification and purposes of DIs and the further perfection of citizen participation and deliberation mechanisms.

I claim that my analysis goes beyond the justification or the uses of DIs in modern democracies and involves more than improving designs and feasibility problems. I claim that my analytical approach is different from current research. That is, I study DIs by considering their institutional consequences or the political effects of economic transformation and regime change. Contrary to established DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy theorists, and empiricists, I do not focus on these mechanisms as means or ends but as institutional changes resulting from

political struggles. By researching DIs from this perspective, I account for the circumstances present as DIs emerge, the intervening actors, and the interests involved. To the best of my knowledge, this type of DIs analysis has only been done at the local level.

Additionally, by researching the drivers of DIs, I extend the study of DIs as single mechanisms and instruments occurring in a vacuum. I contend that my analysis of the drivers of DIs complements DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy research by accounting for the effects of economic, political, and social circumstances on the development of democratic institutions and political power relationships. In general, I argue that to understand why modern democracies do not adopt DIs more extensively, it is crucial to analyze the circumstances around the emergence of DIs. Assuming that future democracies will face more complex problems, perhaps derived from great urban sprawls around the globe, democratic institutions and processes need to innovate more. In this sense, studying the drivers of DIs will inform theorists, empirical political scientists, activists, and decision-makers about what circumstances account for when designing democratic institutions focused on dealing with and contributing to solving societal problems. In the same sense, such accounts would help us understand the need to innovate more in modern democracies or not.

Besides, my DIs analytical approach is similar to democratization and transition to democracy scholarship, i.e., scholarship exploring the effects of economic inequality on democracy (Boix, 2003; Houle, 2009; Bartels, 2009; Ansell and Samuels, 2010; Ansell and Samuels, 2014; Houle, 2018) and the extent to which economic development affects democratization (Huntington, 1991; Remmer, 1992; Tilly, 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Treisman, 2020). However, I argue that most of the research on democratization and regime change focuses on democracy at the macro

level and not at the micro level. That is, in my analysis, I regard regime change and DIs as similar institutional changes but of a different scale. In particular, I link the two types of institutional change as follows: after regime change, democratization continues and can be accounted for in the number of DIs. Consequently, I contend that the mapped DIs in Latin America offer a unique opportunity to test this hypothesis.

Moreover, I claim to contribute to DIs research by focusing on two aspects. First, since I consider DIs institutional change, I highlight the importance of focusing this research on the role of actors, interests, and contextual factors intervening in this institutional change. Second, because I consider DIs as institutional changes occurring in a continuum between authoritarianism and democracy, I contend that the modern significance of citizen participation and deliberation is closely related to surpassing collective action glitches and striving for political power to push contemporary democratic innovations closer to ideal democracy.

In general, I consider that my DIs analysis is new in DIs, participatory and deliberative research, and complements research on single cases and systemic analyses. Unfortunately, my study of the effects of political equality on political and democratic institutions is limited due to the lack of more data to test my hypothesis under different circumstances and other realms where the primary variable shall be different from what I have tried in my chapter.

## 3.2 Collective Mandates in Brazilian Legislatures

In my dissertation, I draw attention to 'collective mandates' in Brazilian Legislatures, a novel democratic innovation from the 'Global South,' still largely unknown in the 'Global North.' This DI allows the inclusion of the public and underrepresented groups into legislatures at the local, regional, and federal levels in Brazil. This mechanism boosts

citizen participation and fosters deliberation in policy-making and decision-making in Brazilian legislatures. This DI was first used in 1994 but became more used and promoted by politicians running for office after 2010. In this chapter, I analyze and explain the effects of political ideology and political opportunism on the widespread interest in 'collective mandates' in 2010-2020. My results show the effects of left political ideology on democratic innovation and institutional reform and the extent to which political opportunism speeds up the two previously mentioned.

In this chapter, I describe this DI's main constitutive elements, participatory and deliberative features, and how this mechanism enables collective decision-making and policy-making collaboration between citizens and legislators. Building upon a recent mapping of 'collective mandates' in Brazil, I show how this DI coordinates diverse activities among politicians, citizens, civil society organizations, and members of underrepresented groups (Gomes and Secchi, 2015; Secchi et al., 2019; Secchi et al., 2020; da Silva et al., 2021). I underline that the mapped cases of this DI show that every case is different from the others, but they remain committed to achieving collaborative legislatures, enhancing representation, and shortening the distance between citizens and representatives in Brazilian legislatures.

In general, this 'collective mandates' analysis complements my chapter on DIs' emergence in Latin America for two reasons. First, I focus on one democratic unit, Brazil, and second, I closely analyze exogenous drivers and political actors' interplay producing 'collective mandates.' Specifically, I contend that this case informs DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy scholars about the extent to which these mechanisms are demanded by citizens but promoted, used, and institutionalized at

the top of representative institutions. For example, the 2017 proposal<sup>13</sup> presented to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies for the Amendment of the Brazilian Constitution to allow 'collective mandates' in Legislative positions in the country, i.e., councilor, state, district, and federal deputies and senator. Besides, this case depicts the extent to which entrenched politicians aim to make democracy work for social justice and political equality and mainly occurs at the local level. I posit that this analysis is especially relevant for DIs research underlining that DIs in Latin America are initiated mainly by politicians (Pogrebinschi, 2021) or similar arguments highlighting that institutional reform starts at the top in the realm of public policy-making (Warren, 2009).

In this chapter, I show the effect of political ideology and electoral opportunism on 'collective mandates.' I underline how, since this DI was used for the first time in 1994, politicians, particularly from the left side of the political spectrum, have used and promoted this DI. I also show how political opportunism has hastened this use and promotion, particularly after 2010, when the political power and popularity of the left started to fall, and its counterpart started to rise in Brazil. In particular, I pinpointed and described how political ideology explains the steep rise in the number of politicians declaring to use 'collective mandates' in Brazilian legislatures after 2010. Indeed, the relationship between political ideology and DIs has been explored previously in DIs research. For instance, Font et al. (2014) have found positive effects of left political ideology (i.e., political ideology of the ruling local government) on participatory mechanisms when analyzing the causes of local participation in Italy and Spain.

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<sup>13</sup> Proposal 379/17 of the federal deputy for the state of São Paulo and president of the political party Podemos, Renata Hellmeister de Abreu Melo. (Consulted 22 March 2021). See: <https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=2162014>

Moreover, I contend that the case of 'collective mandates' is an example of the kind of DIs that can be mapped by looking beyond the Anglo-Saxon world. Along these lines, this case informs DIs, participatory and deliberative research, at least in two regards. First, it informs us about where most DIs occur. For instance, most mapped 'collective mandates' cases already working and adopted are found at the local level (Secchi et al., 2019; Secchi et al., 2020). This particularity underscores the complexity of DIs mapping and the need for research collaboration. Second, the 'collective mandates case' underlines the goals of DIs in the 'Global South.' For instance, while in the 'Global North' DIs like citizen assemblies are focused on communication and deliberation (Farrell et al., 2020), the goals of their counterparts in the 'Global South' mainly focus on democratizing legislatures, enabling citizens' voices and influence in policy-making.

Furthermore, the mapping mentioned above and the fieldwork complementing it indicate that 'collective mandates' aim to make democracy work, achieve political equality, and strive for social justice (Gomes and Secchi, 2015; Secchi et al., 2019; Secchi et al., 2020; da Silva et al., 2021). The documented cases, particularly their aims and goals, show the extent to which these cases strive to balance disproportioned economic power over the political agenda. As for political equality, and considering the recent past of Brazil after the 'Third Wave of Democratization,' the documentation of this mechanism's goals pinpoints its use to balance two opposing forces, namely 'de facto' and 'de jure' political power. The latter means that the promoters of such mandates contend that these mandates provide political opportunities to underrepresented groups like the poor, afro descendants, or the illiterate, whom more affluent sections of society have traditionally displaced.

In particular, 'collective mandates' mappings report that these DIs are more inclusive than traditional mandates in Brazilian legislatures. For instance, in the case of the 2020 local elections, the profile of politicians using and promoting 'collective mandates' favored young, black, and women, observable among candidates and elected politicians (Secchi et al., 2020). The same mappings indicate that the participants collaborating in the mandates aim for social justice. The mapped mandates aim to make better decisions to counterbalance the side effects of uneven economic growth and development and find solutions for Brazil's poor districts and neighborhoods. In general, most leaders are engaged citizens who want to improve the conditions of their localities and the people living in them. Most of these mechanisms emerge from highly populated areas that generally suffer from significant levels of segregation and are unequal and poor. Most of the concerns of these mechanisms are precisely the urgency of change and to make democratic institutions work.

### 3.3 Mexico City Constitution-Making

In this chapter, I analyze the 2016 Mexico City Constitution-making. Based on the analysis of this case, I seek to contribute to DIs, participatory and deliberative research by underscoring two points. First, this case is an example of a DI from the 'Global South,' and contrasts with other cases focusing on national processes. Second, this case is an example of the extent to which circumstances and actors play a crucial role in the management and success of democratic processes.

In general, I assess the inclusiveness, deliberation, use of technology, and political circumstances affecting this metropolitan constitution-making (Cruz Ruiz, 2021). In particular, I center my attention on the input, throughput, and output



legitimacy of the process (Cruz Ruiz, 2020). In this chapter, I highlight particularly citizens' inputs and influence on its crafting. In the coming paragraphs, building upon the empirical results of these two papers, I further detail the extent to which this case is relevant to understanding the effect of circumstances on democratizing democratic processes. Likewise, I explain how the case showcases the role of intervening actors in the conception, management, and success of deliberative and participatory processes and institutions like constitution-making and constituent assemblies.

Notably, I posit that the empirical analysis of this case contributes to expanding our understanding of the following three points relevant to DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy. First, I highlight in this analysis the role of political actors, their relationships, and the circumstances before and during the constitution-making and the constituent assembly. I underline in this empirical analysis the effects of the political negotiations among different government levels. Mainly, I underscore, about the Mexico City case, how political circumstances positively affected the start of the process, and the inclusion of underrepresented groups in crafting the Mexico City Constitution. By focusing on political actors' interplay before and during this constitution-making, I pinpoint the effect of political interests in the process and time needed for institutional change. Besides, with the assessment of this case, I seek to complement my analysis on the rise of DIs in Latin America, in which I made a similar argument but approached the role of actors and the interests involved theoretically and abstractly. In sum, by empirically analyzing this constitution-making case, I underscore the relevance of actors, interests, and circumstances in successful democratic innovations.

Second, aware that most DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy research focuses on design, I assess the extent to which the design of Mexico City

Constitution-Making is similar and comparable to other cases. The results of my empirical analysis focused on input, throughput, and output legitimacy, confirm that this constitution-making case is sufficiently different from similar cases. For instance, this Constitution-Making case is comparable to others, like the Icelandic case, in terms of inclusiveness, legitimacy, and the use of technological aids to contribute to crafting the constitution (Landemore, 2015; Elster, 2016; Elster, 1995; Elster, 1998; Elster, 2012). However, the design of Mexico City Constitution-Making differs from others in the timing in which participation was enhanced and deliberation was fostered. Hence, I argue that this case complements similar studies and previous research. For instance, because Mexico City is a metropolis, this case supplements the analysis of national constitution-making like the Icelandic case (Landemore, 2015; Elster, 2016). Second, my empirical results provide valuable insights into how normative research in constitution-making could account for the effects of timing and circumstances when enhancing inclusion and fostering deliberation in such a democratic process (Elster, 1995; Elster, 1998; Elster, 2012). Mainly, the results of this case shed light on the relevance of design and timing in tandem when enhancing participation and allowing citizens to voice concerns and influencing the entire constitution-making.

Third, I claim that this case is an example of the successful use of technology to write a constitution through a participatory and deliberative process. I argue that technological aids positively increased citizen participation and deliberation, in this case, by managing their inputs and publicizing the entire constitution-making. In the analysis of this case, I describe how, among others, the digital platform 'Change.org' and the website 'ConstituciónCDMX' enabled the collection of citizen proposals and the collective writing of the constitution. Besides, based on my input-throughput-output analysis, I show how important the use of technology during the input phase was when

the citizen contributions to their constitutional text were more intense and active than at the throughput or output phase. In general, I highlight the contributions of technology in facilitating the collection and management of citizens' inputs. In particular, I claim that technology was instrumental and critical in complementing citizen participation and deliberation to the Mexico City constituent assembly and the entire constitution-making.

Finally, I highlight in my empirical analysis the extent to which the political actors coordinating this process aimed to increase the participation of politically underrepresented citizens and compensate for the exclusion created by technological aids. In particular, the process organizers strive to include traditionally excluded groups and other minorities like indigenous peoples and members of the LGBTTI community. Considering the differences in access to technology among Mexico City's citizens, I described how the organizers minimized the exclusion created by implementing digital aids during the constitution-making, namely through massive surveys and public events.

# CHAPTER I

## Political Inequality and Democratic Innovations in Latin America after the 1980s

### 1.1. Introduction

This chapter is about democratic innovations (DIs), namely processes and institutions that boost citizen participation and foster deliberation in decision-making, policy-making, and other processes of modern democracies. Examples of DIs are the widely replicated Brazilian participatory budgeting (PB) (de Sousa Santos, 1998; Souza, 2001) and the crowdsourced constitution-making of Mexico City (Cruz Ruiz, 2021). The latter innovated democratic processes by enabling citizens' voices and influence in crafting a constitution, and the former allowed citizens to decide how and where to allocate public spending.<sup>14</sup>

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\* I am thankful to Tim Bütke and André Bächtiger for the insightful and assertive comments to improve this chapter and enable my Ph.D. research project in numerous ways. Tobias Rommel guided and structured my thinking as much as he could to improve my quantitative analysis – Thank you! In the same vein, Sergiu Gherghina, Dániel Oross, and Maija Setälä's gave me valuable perspectives on DIs research. Besides, I appreciate the valuable criticisms I received on past versions of this chapter at international conferences and academic sojourns: 2021 APSA Seattle, 2019 IPPA4-Montreal, 2019 ECPR General Conference Wrocław, 2019 CA17135 Barcelona, 2021 CA17135 Ljubljana, 2020 University of Turku Research Sojourn (COST funded) and 2021 Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest Research Stay (BAYHOST funded). Additionally, Thamy Pogrebinski and Melisa Ross shared valuable information enriching this chapter and invited me to present my Ph.D. project at the LATINNO closing event in 2021. Lastly, I am grateful to the IR-Chair Team at the Technical University of Munich and other participants at our weekly meetings for helpful comments over the years: Cindy Cheng, Tobias Rommel, Zlatina Georgieva, Abdel fattah Alshadafan, Vella Kigwiru, André Isidro, Timm Betz, Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald, Luca Messerschmidt, Milan Chen, Juan Carlos Medina Serrano, Svanhildur Thorvaldsdottir, Charlotte Franziska Unruh, Henrike Sternberg (and many others). This research was funded by ' *Der Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst e. V. (DAAD)*.'

<sup>14</sup> The PB is a decision-making method that allows citizens to decide how to spend public money in their communities by boosting citizen participation and deliberation among citizens; the process allows citizens to collect ideas on how to spend the public money by developing

However, this chapter is not about a single case study. I focus on an open flank in DIs research: the causes of DIs. I start by observing that most DIs scholarship has focused mainly on the justifiability, feasibility, and the complementarity of DIs to modern democratic institutions and their relationship with other theories of democracy (Smith, 2009; 2019; Elstub and Escobar, 2019a; O'Flynn, 2019). Besides, I underline the recent interest of DIs scholars in mapping DIs worldwide (Fung and Warren, 2011; Smith et al., 2015) and world regions (Pogrebinschi, 2017). Indeed, some have pinpointed that institutional changes and democratic deepening in modern democracies have emerged recently in the realm of governance, perhaps due to the collaboration between citizens and politicians in dealing with complex problems of the modern world and, for example, not precisely due to social movements (Warren, 2009). My focus in this chapter about DIs emergence is akin to Warren's (2009) rationale on the political effects of economic and social development. For instance, economic growth creates challenges for modern democracies like urbanization or economic inequality. However, democracy also gives political actors abilities and capacities to contest and contend for political power, which pushes the democratization of democracy further.

Hence, I introduce in this chapter a theoretical and an empirical contribution to DIs research and, to a certain extent, participatory and deliberative democracy scholarship. First, my theoretical contribution is to conceptualize DIs as 'institutional changes' in modern democracies and explain their emergence by pinpointing political inequality as the primary driver of DIs' emergence. Second, my empirical contribution

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proposals, voting them and lastly selecting the projects to be funded. Furthermore, the Mexico City constitution-making is an example of how citizens can collectively draft a constitution via online websites, participate in the activities of the Constituent Assembly, monitor the debate of the constitution-making, participate in public consultations, and lastly legitimate the constitution.

builds upon recent efforts mapping DIs and shows the feasibility of quantitative research in DIs scholarship beyond analyzing the functioning of DIs. My contributions specify a more realistic side of DIs research by focusing on the demand and supply of DIs, the actors, and the interests involved in their creation. With this set of analyses, I aim to complement the work by scholars of democratic innovations, participatory and deliberative democracy.

Furthermore, although my arguments and contributions relate to broader debates on democratic innovations, participatory and deliberative democracy research, I focus on Latin America and the LATINNO database of DIs for various reasons. First, Latin America went through significant sociopolitical and economic reforms in recent history, which, I argue, affected democratic institutions and processes. Second, I build upon the DIs mapping of the LATINNO team because it focuses on Latin America and covers more than a century,<sup>15</sup> which distinguishes it from other databases such as Participedia,<sup>16</sup> Cherry-picking,<sup>17</sup> or The Brazilian Participatory Budgeting Census.<sup>18</sup>

In particular, I use the LATINNO database to test my theoretical expectations related to the effect of the sociopolitical and economic circumstances of the Latin American context on democratic institutions.<sup>19</sup> First, I aim to test the effect of

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<sup>15</sup> As of 5 February 2022, data available in their website. LATINNO team focused their final report on the period 1990-2020 (Pogrebinschi, 2021). In my quantitative analysis, I only use data from 1980 to 2014 due to the significant variation in the number of DIs during this period.

<sup>16</sup> See: <https://participedia.net/> (Last accessed: 04.10.2021).

<sup>17</sup> See: <https://cherrypickingproject.wordpress.com/home/> (Last accessed: 04.10.2021).

<sup>18</sup> See: <https://www.spadap.com/data-collection-projects/the-brazilian-participatory-budgeting-census/> (Last accessed: 04.10.2021).

And: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/EDSNJS> (Last accessed: 04.10.2021).

<sup>19</sup> I mainly selected this database due to its time and regional coverage, particularly for the recent decades.

sociopolitical and economic circumstances on the number of created DIs after the 1970s, and the database has documented sufficient cases to do that analysis. Second, I want to determine whether DIs in the continent are initiated top-down or vice-versa.<sup>20</sup> Third, the data contained in the database is longitudinal, which is particularly useful for testing my theoretical expectations. These three features allow me to test my theory and analyze the rise of DIs quantitatively by focusing on sociopolitical and economic circumstances affecting democratic institutions, processes, political actors, and agendas.<sup>21</sup>

My primary argument explains the DIs created in Latin America as a top-down process by contending that upper-middle classes and higher vie for political power and change institutions and processes of democracy.<sup>22</sup> Additionally, I also examine a bottom-up explanation to contrast my top-down theory: I include in my analysis the variable 'trust in government' to gauge the extent to which citizen demands affect the rise of DIs, as has been to a certain extent argued in work on the crisis of democracy (Geissel and Newton, 2012) and on the rise of mini-publics (Farrell et al., 2013).

In section two, I spell out further details about DIs research conventional wisdom, this chapter's puzzle, and DIs emergence analysis. In section three, I provide a brief historical account of the sociopolitical and economic context in Latin America, which informs and justifies the selection of the variables used in the quantitative


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<sup>20</sup> At the outset of my research for this chapter, I suspected they are top-down initiated. After reviewing the data, I noted that it seems that the DIs LATINNO mapped are mostly top-down initiated. The latest research report, issued by LATINNO, confirmed my original suspicion (Pogrebinski, 2021).

<sup>21</sup> I assume that these agendas are democratic, but I am also certain of the possibility that political actors might have undemocratic agendas. Yet, authoritarian agendas are not discarded, but it is not part of this chapter.

<sup>22</sup> I elaborate further on the concepts of political power in section 1.4, *The Path Towards Democratic Innovations.*

analysis. In section four, I explain my argument in greater detail, develop working definitions, and discuss the theoretical implications of seeing political inequality as the key driver of DIs emergence. In section five, I present and give more details on the data to be used in the statistical analysis to test the effects of political inequality on the reform and creation of democratic institutions. Section six covers the analysis method, and section seven presents and discusses the statistical analysis results and presents an alternative explanation.



*Figure 1. Counted DIs in Latin America 1980–2014*

Total number of DIs in 18 Latin American countries per year from 1980 to 2014 (not cumulative count; 'newly implemented' DIs, i.e., DIs per year as they started). Author's calculation and graph using collected data by LATINNO (2017).



## 1. 2. The Rise of Democratic Innovations in Latin America

### 1. 2. 1. The Puzzle

The central puzzle of this chapter is the increase in the number of DIs in Latin America after the wave of democratization in the 1970s (see Figure 1). A possible explanation for that jagged increase could be the difficulty of mapping DIs before the 1980s due to a lack of records. Nevertheless, I contend that such emergence of DIs is context-dependent, i.e., the result, among others, of the demographic, regime, and economic change. Section three explains why political inequality drives DIs' rise and emergence in Latin America.<sup>23</sup> However, before jumping into the context description, I briefly explain the established research and understanding of DIs and later clarify to what extent this chapter's approach is different from that conventional wisdom.

### 1. 2. 2. The Status-Quo of Research on Democratic Innovations

I argue that DIs research has an intertwined relationship with participatory and deliberative democracy, observable in the emphasis on participatory and deliberative mechanisms in the existent literature. I will show in this section that the DIs' conventional wisdom cannot explain the rise in the number of DIs in the region nor tell us more about the creation or replication of DIs in different contexts.

I contend that such conventional wisdom can be observed in four stages. First, pioneer and mainly normative research argued in favor of updating contemporary

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<sup>23</sup> I do not reject other explanations, and I am aware of the limitations of this explanation and generalizability to other regions. For instance, the role of international organizations or the democratic entrepreneurs. Yet, my main purpose in this chapter is to test a hypothesis and explain the theoretical rationale behind this hypothesis. Future studies and other researchers might improve this hypothesis or test new ones; for that to happen, more data on DIs needs to be collected first.

democracy and creating new mechanisms to incorporate more voices into the decision-making process (Pateman, 2012; Pateman, 1970) and, later, enable and foster the right conditions for deliberation (Bohman, 1998; Parkinson and Mansbridge, 2012; Fishkin, 1991). This normative research emphasized the epistemic benefits of deliberation, the educative effects of citizen participation, and the complementarity of both to representative democracy.

Second, focusing on participatory and deliberative democracy ideals, the research on DIs centered on specific mechanisms of deliberation and participation, for instance, planning cells (Dienel, 1989), mini-publics (Dryzek and Tucker, 2008; Setälä, 2011; Farrell et al., 2020), deliberative polls (Luskin et al., 2002; Gerber et al., 2018), participatory budgeting (Souza, 2001; Sintomer et al., 2013), citizen assemblies (Warren and Pearse, 2008; Farrell et al., 2013), etcetera. This second wave of research related to DIs shifted from normative perspectives to real-world examples, testing the feasibility of boosting citizen participation and enhancing deliberation under particular conditions and in various real-world contexts.

A third body of DIs research focused on the consequences of DIs for legitimacy and governance (Fung, 2006; Fung, 2015), epistemic gains of more inclusive processes (Stevenson, 2016; Chambers, 2017; Landemore and Elster, 2012), or their role in curing democratic ailments (Geissel and Newton, 2012; Dryzek et al., 2019). This third wave of research focused on matters beyond the design of mechanisms and their internal benefits for democratic processes. It analyzed the outcomes of citizen participation and deliberation mechanisms in more detail, e.g., better governance or more informed policies.

Fourth, the latest stage of DIs research has created databases like LATINNO or Participedia to allow researchers to be more inquisitive about the outputs of participatory processes, the comparability of DIs, their successes or failures, etcetera (Font et al., 2018; Spada and Ryan, 2017). Participedia, for instance, has expanded beyond the academic realm and included in their crowdsourcing sourcing platform activists, policymakers, and in general, anyone interested in democratic innovations and including the public in decision-making. In the same vein, LATINNO aims to reach the broad public by making the database as user-friendly as possible. However, despite these examples of research, there is minimal discussion about the drivers and the causes of DIs.

To date, researchers have pinpointed the sociopolitical and economic complexity of the world as the driver of institutional reform and further democratization (Warren, 2009). Other scholars have underscored the role of activists and interested actors in reforming the public sphere as the main drivers in reforming democratic institutions (Fung, 2003). In particular, researchers examining innovations of participatory processes at the local level suggest, among others, that choices (to decide to enact participatory practices) play a prominent role in creating participatory policies and mechanisms (Font et al., 2014). Similarly, researchers focused on the diffusion of DIs like participatory budgeting, citizen initiatives, referenda, and mini-publics argue that some of the factors causing their adoption are the size of the polity and ideology (Pradeau, 2021).<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, other researchers have found that different national political systems have a differentiated effect on DIs like mini-publics,

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<sup>24</sup> This author, after reviewing the existing literature, argues that “four critical conditions emerge as enabling factors for the adoption of democratic innovations: the number of residents in the jurisdiction, the ideology of the implementers, the electoral competition and the presence of neighbours adopting comparable public participation instruments.” (p. 381).

suggesting a narrative and factor influencing the success, failure, or limitation (Dryzek and Tucker, 2008).

The research mentioned in this last paragraph underscores that developing causal or correlational explanations for the emergence of DIs is a remarkable exception in the literature on DIs. Unfortunately, the few efforts explaining the rise or diffusion of DIs mentioned at the end of this section do not use databases like LATINNO or Participedia. Hence, I underline that existing databases' regional and time coverage, like the case of LATINNO, offer researchers opportunities beyond comparing cases and pinpointing DIs' causes and context.

### 1. 2. 3. The Original Contribution of this Chapter

I propose in this chapter the analysis of DIs drivers in a region. To start with, I define DIs as '*institutional change*' in modern democracies. I define DIs that way because I consider that political actors reform institutions as they struggle for political power to put their political agendas forward. With this definition and drawing upon LATINNO's database, I aim (1) to describe the context surrounding DIs occurrence and (2) to identify and theorize the causal drivers of DIs' emergence.<sup>25</sup>

My working definition does not cover the effects of such institutional change but acknowledges and builds upon other researchers' theories and empirical evidence about the positive contributions of DIs to decision-making legitimacy (Smith, 2005a; 2009), as a possible cure for the 'democratic malaise' (Geissel, 2009; Geissel and

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<sup>25</sup> In this chapter, I do not extensively discuss my DIs definition vis-à-vis those of other authors. Yet, I acknowledge that the concept is still debated (Smith, 2019; Elstob and Escobar, 2019; O'Flynn, 2019). I concede that DIs scholars still dissent on the understanding and conceptualization of DIs as institutions, processes, ends, or means of democracy.

Newton, 2012; Merkel, 2014), improvement of the quality of democracy<sup>26</sup> (Pogrebinschi, 2017), etcetera. In contrast to this previous research, I mainly focus on the number of DIs, circumstances, interests, and actors' role in creating them. I have a particular interest in DIs quantity due to its implications for the evolution of democracy and because I regard them as a reflection of political struggle. My theoretical expectations are simply that the more DIs, the more democratic evolution.

This chapter is the first attempt to examine the rise of DIs quantitatively in a world region and across time. Additionally, my chapter is unique due to my DIs definition mainly covering 'institutional change' in modern democracies to analyze the rise of DIs in Latin America. My DIs definition certainly contrasts with others centered on mechanisms to boost citizen participation and deliberation in democratic institutions.

Furthermore, researching the rise of DIs complements past and recent research on DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy by contextualizing their emergence and naming actors and interests involved. I posit that such a description is needed at least for two purposes. First, to analyze DIs' replication, failure, and success, and second, due to the broader implications of citizen participation and deliberation in democracy.

### 1. 3. The Latin American Context

In general, I argue that the sociopolitical and economic context present in Latin America created favorable conditions for the remarkable rise of DIs in the continent. I refer to the political effects of economic crises, dictatorships, coups (Smith, 2005b),

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<sup>26</sup> I.e., rule of law, political inclusion, responsiveness, accountability, and social equality

the relationship between economic growth and democracy (Lipset, 1959), and political regime change (Huntington, 1991; Hagopian and Mainwaring, 2005). In particular, I maintain that sociopolitical and regional economy's integration into the global neoliberal economy affected the conditions of state institutions, demographics, democratization, and consequently, actors, their political agendas, and their capability to change democratic institutions. I detail my rationale further in section 4 and its implications for democracy and DIs.

In this section, I describe two main sets of circumstances affecting political equality in Latin America after the 1980s, which, I posit, influenced the emergence of DIs in the continent. The first set is the sociopolitical context and includes feeble Latin American states, regime change, and other sociodemographic factors like demographic explosion and urbanization. The second set entails economic variables and includes the economic transformation of countries in the region, comprising industrialization, macroeconomic reforms, and the Latin American region's integration into the global economy.

In short, in this section, my objective is twofold. First, I seek to identify the contextual factors typical of Latin American countries and relevant to the adoption of DIs.<sup>27</sup> My rationale is that sociopolitical and economic factors underscore the relevance of analyzing 18 Latin American countries as a group. Second, I identify several factors inherent to Latin American countries due to their implications on the

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<sup>27</sup> I suspect that this factors are different to other regions of the world; probably different to *the 'Global North'* and somehow reminiscent to the somee countries in the *'Global South.'*

likelihood of DIs, although, at the country level, such factors might affect the rise of DIs differently.<sup>28</sup>

### 1. 3. 1. Sociopolitical transformation

#### 1. 3. 1. 1. State Capacity

DIs in Latin America rose in a world region with a historical context characterized by an elite interplay in implementing state-building projects (Soifer, 2015) and institutional transformation struggle as Portugal and Spain ceased to be the colonial powers in the continent (Coatsworth, 2008). While far-fetched, I contend that these historical elite struggles continue in the contemporary Latin American context, even after more than 200 years of independence. I posit that the creation of DIs in Latin America has taken place in a region where state capacity has been influenced by ruling groups' monopolization of economic and political power and internal and external conflict (Cárdenas, 2010).<sup>29</sup>

I consider state capacity a crucial contextual factor in the rise of DIs in Latin America due to its effects on political actors struggling for political power and the political and economic benefits of keeping or losing this power. State capacity has implications, among others, for political order, political stability, and good governance. More precisely, state capacity increases regime stability (Andersen et al., 2014), and the state is crucial for democracy to thrive (Fortin, 2011).<sup>30</sup> Besides, in temporal terms

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<sup>28</sup> Because Latin American countries might differ vis-à-vis each other and over time, regarding the variables I am introducing in this section, I am including them as control variables in my statistical analysis. I will explain and elaborate more on this in section five.

<sup>29</sup> Other bellicose and historical accounts of state development consider too the effects and implications of internal and external conflicts on the development of Latin American states (Centeno, 2002).

<sup>30</sup> Another causal claim goes the other way around: democracy has positive effects on state capacity (Wang and Xu, 2018).

and for the specific case of Latin America, state capacity had governance and political participation implications, traceable in the development of the welfare state and differences in political participation between rural and urban areas after the economic and sociopolitical reform (Segura-Ubierno, 2007; Holzner, 2007).

On these grounds, the distinct differences in the capacity of Latin American states across time, considering its historical context, and economic and political changes after the 1970s, imply political effects for actors and their interests in renewing established democratic institutions or creating new institutions to substitute or complement the role of the state where absent, or unresponsive.

### 1. 3. 1. 2. Democratization

Another contextual factor influencing the rise and emergence of DIs in the continent is the democratization of governments in the region due to, I posit, its effects on democratic institutions and political actors. I contend that most of the political effects of the 'Third Wave of Democratization' (Hagopian and Mainwaring, 2005; Huntington, 1991) were of a smaller scale than regime change and mostly unperceived right after the late 1980s. That is, national governments in the region shifted from military, authoritarian, and single-party regimes to democratic regimes perhaps more swiftly in nominal than in substantive terms.

Regarding DIs, I contend that they constitute the continuation of top-down democratization because they represent institutional change at least at two levels, i.e., an update of the current institutions distributing power among different political actors and a change of attitudes. First, DIs are the political consequences of democratization because regime change allowed, among others, political contestation, governmental accountability, cutting on clientelism, and corruption, which implies institutional reform.



Second, democratization empowered political actors in more authoritarian regimes to pursue political equality and voice their demands. For instance, as in the case of Brazil, local political actors increased their demands for more autonomy in local governments' decision-making or the creation and strengthening of oppositional political parties in Mexico. Perhaps, this attitudinal change is also closely related to different societal groups responding to national and international factors after the late 1970s and particularly dwindling authoritarian power (Remmer, 1992).

### 1. 3. 1. 3. Sociodemographic change

The social changes that occurred in Latin America during the same period also contributed to the rise of DIs in this world region. I refer specifically to the significant increase in population, the migration from rural areas to urban regions, and the consequent changes in citizens' attitudes and their demands towards their governments. I posit that such changes affected the political views and expectations of citizens who migrated from less developed or less industrialized regions in Latin America to sprawling urban areas. I expect this sociodemographic change to pressure regimes to cope with an increasing number of citizens living in urban areas and increase their political demands. In short, I expect this sociodemographic change to affect political actors and, consequently, democratic institutions.

### 1. 3. 2. Economic Shift

I suggest that the implementation of neoliberal economic reforms known as the 'Washington Consensus' sometime around the 1980s (Williamson, 1993; 2000) is another contextual factor that influenced the rise of DIs in Latin America. I argue that it created the necessary and favorable conditions affecting power relationships among

political actors. The consensus, while focused on countries' macroeconomic management and free-market policies incentivizing national markets to integrate into the global economy, had long-run effects on economic growth and development and implications for political actors; for instance, the political effects of economic growth on democratic institutions due to the expansion of the middle-class in countries in the region. Hence, I claim that the economic development after economic reforms in the 1980s affected democratic institutions. My assertion echoes past research on the effects and relationship between economic development and democracy, for instance, increased survival odds of democracy in wealthy societies (Przeworski et al., 2000). I expect this economic shift to have political effects because it provided political actors with the resources necessary to push their political agendas forward, translating into DIs. In my quantitative analysis, I anticipate finding positive effects of economic variables on the emergence of DIs.

#### 1. 3. 2. 1. Economic and Political Inequality

In general, I argue that the integration of Latin America into the global economy and the macroeconomic reforms implemented in the region in the 1980s generated economic development that, in the long run, impacted the economic and political realms and their actors to different degrees. For instance, despite the economic growth in the region, few experienced more than a modest rise in living standards (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003) to the point that some governments like those of Chile and Mexico established later on cash transfer programs to ease the increase of inequality (Teichman, 2008). I underline that the economic transformation in Latin America created income and political inequality. For example, actors who benefited more from economic growth and development had more 'economic' means to raise their voices

and demands in the political arena and influence policy-making, governance, and decision-making. Probably for those who economically benefited less and belonged to the vast majority, raising their voice, and influencing policy-making was more complicated.

I ground my last argument on research on the effects of inequality on democracy (Houle, 2009; Przeworski et al., 2000) and the effects of democracy on inequality (Balcázar, 2016; Muller, 1988; Timmons, 2010). In general, I contend that political inequality positively affects democracy and institutions because it produces contestation and struggles over political power. I build partly on that relationship due to its implications for the consolidation of democracy, regime transition, survival, and collapse of democracy and its institutions. Additionally, my claim draws on research about the effects of economic inequality on decision-making, undermining the balance among different societal groups (Christiano, 1990; Manza, 2015).

### 1. 3. 3. Institutional Change

In sum, I argue that the sociopolitical and economic contextual change influenced the emergence of DIs by changing actors' political relations and shaping their political agendas. I argue that the particular context of Latin America, i.e., democratization, state-building, integration into the global economy, and demographics, played a significant role in political power relationships affecting or producing institutional change.

The participatory budgeting of Porto Alegre is an example of how sociopolitical transformation and economic shift affected the power relationship between regional and national government, enabling local actors running the government and with commitments to democratic participation to include the public in informing and

deciding how to spend public money (Souza, 2001). Likewise, more recent cases like the constitution-making of Mexico City involved underrepresented groups in its crafting after years of political struggle between regional and national political actors and when the balance and dynamic of political power among them led to this DI (Cruz Ruiz, 2021). More specifically, the last two examples occurred when the sociopolitical and economic context changed and produced differences in the accumulation of economic and political power that broke the previous balances and allowed a reform or update of democratic institutions.

In general, I contend that out of the contextual factors mentioned in the subsections above, DIs emerged and rose in Latin America after the 1970s. In particular, I posit that the main factor triggering the rise of DIs is political inequality due to its relationship with income inequality in altering actors' political agendas and its political implications, such as contestation and political action. I build my claims upon other researchers highlighting the effects of context in the formation of opportunities for institutional change (Kriesi, 2004), political participation (Leighley, 1995; Payne and Woshinsky, 1972; Kitschelt, 1986), technological change (Dosi, 1997) and the context and relationship between state and democratization (Carbone and Memoli, 2015).

More fundamentally, and regarding the effect of economic shifts on democracy, I draw upon classic research pinpointing the effects of economic growth on authoritarian regimes' transformation showing the possible outlines and paths towards political change (Huntington, 1991; Inglehart, 1997), and more recently on the political consequences of wealth distribution (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), elites struggle for political power (Ansell and Samuels, 2014), and state capacity development (Soifer, 2015).

## 1. 4. The Path Towards Democratic Innovations

My broad argument is that sociopolitical and economic transformations impacted democratic institutions by affecting political actors' distribution of political power, i.e., political inequality. Before explaining the actual effect of political inequality on the creation and rise of DIs, I explain the working definitions of democracy and DIs to explain later in this section the role of actors in changing existent democratic innovations to put their agendas forward.

### 1. 4. 1. Democracy and DIs

My working definition of democracy<sup>31</sup> considers it as a set of rules and institutions distributing political power among political actors,<sup>32</sup> allowing political contestation and fostering political equality.<sup>33</sup> I use this working definition to later develop a theory about the effects, for instance, of the 'Third Wave of Democratization' (Hagopian and Mainwaring, 2005; Huntington, 1991) and economic reforms such as the 'Washington Consensus' on democratic institutions. Then, I define DIs as changes in institutions and rules of democracy, i.e., institutional change, aiming to create new or make existent democratic institutions more open to citizen participation and deliberation.

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<sup>31</sup> This working definition draws upon the works of Robert A. Dahl, '*On Democracy*' and '*A Preface to Democratic Theory*,' and it leans towards the concept of '*actual democracy*' rather than '*ideal democracy*.' This working definition underlines the benefits of including individuals and groups of individuals in decision-making, making informed decisions, distribute power among different political actors, foster the inclusion of underrepresented individuals, and allows contestation.

<sup>32</sup> By '*political actors*' I mainly mean incumbents and opposition, but it could also be understood as government and opposition, elected politicians and constituents, insiders and outsiders in policy-making, ruling elites and lay citizens, etcetera. By '*power*,' I mainly mean '*political power*,' which I considered to be the ability to change policies and decisions in a polity.

<sup>33</sup> The last two characteristics are distinctive of democracy and differentiate it from other forms of government like a dictatorship or a monarchy, which also are about rules and institutions distributing power among political actors.

Furthermore, because of the Latin American context, I consider DIs the continuation of democratization, i.e., a form of democratization but of minor magnitude than regime change.<sup>34</sup> The rationale for that conceptualization is that after the transition to democracy, many countries in the region kept reforming established institutions and creating new ones, more participatory institutional designs bringing citizens and politicians together in decision-making.

#### 1. 4. 2. Types of political actors and contention

In my theory, I consider two main actors: incumbents and contestants. I classify both types of actors as belonging to the low, middle, or high socioeconomic classes. I use the socioeconomic classification to spot the effects of changes in the sociopolitical and economic context. I argue that economic growth and development reflect in the socioeconomic classes. Politically, I classify actors as incumbents and opponents to capture the effects of the transition from authoritarianism to democracy and the increase of political contestation and vie for power.

#### 1. 4. 3. De Facto and De Jure Political Power

I consider two forms of political power, i.e., '*de facto*' and '*de jure*'.<sup>35</sup> I conceptualize the former in this chapter as the accrued economic means needed for political action,

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<sup>34</sup> '*Regime change*' was a democratization event of big dimensions, whereas DIs are small increments pushing towards '*ideal democracy*.' I presume that a regime change is more visible than a democratic innovation.

<sup>35</sup> My classification of political power is not unique. For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), too, consider '*de facto*' and '*de jure*' political power as sources of political power or what they consider '*actual political power*.' They define '*de facto*' political power as "...*what a group can do to other groups and the society at large by using force*" (p. 21). Besides, they understand '*de jure*' political power as "...*political power, allocated by political institutions*..." (p. 21). Besides, for these authors, '*political institutions*' are "...*the social and political arrangements that allocate de jure political power*..." (p. 21), and in their theory of regime

such as lobbying or achieving collective action. The latter is simply the type of power found in political democratic institutions and rules.<sup>36</sup> I build upon those two concepts of power to argue about the struggles over changing democratic institutions and creating new ones. The two types of power highlight as well the interests involved in changing institutions or making new instruments of decision-making.

#### 1. 4. 4. Political Agendas and Political Struggle

I consider that every group of actors has a different set of political preferences. I contend that the agendas are mostly democratic and not undemocratic or authoritarian due to the costs of transition to authoritarianism and the broader benefits of democracy for political actors. As Dahl (1971) noted before, in competitive regimes, the net costs of repressing opponents are higher than the costs of toleration, or the net benefits of tolerating are more than the benefits when repressing. This conceptualization of the democratic political agendas is an element on which I base my claim on the effects of sociopolitical and economic context on political actors.<sup>37</sup>

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change they consider democracy and nondemocracy as two different types of political institutions determining who gets to take part in political decision-making.

<sup>36</sup> In a broader sense, democracy is surely for theorists and practitioners more than political institutions distributing political power among different actors. The use of democracy as an adjective is useful to incorporate democratic values such as political equality, fairness, or justice in different processes beyond governments.

<sup>37</sup> Another concept related to political agenda is state-projects. With that, I refer to Soifer (2015) and his theory about the variation of state capacity in Latin America, which considers interaction between different political actors when developing a state, along with explanations about political actors looking for their particular political agenda, interest, ideologies, and long-term perspectives on the fate of the state. The entire book theorizes about the emergence of the state in Latin America, success, and failure.

## 1. 4. 5. Political Inequality and DIs Rise in Latin America

For two reasons, I hypothesize that political inequality is the primary driver of DIs in Latin America in the selected study period. First, historically, different types of inequality, such as economic, social, and political, have characterized Latin American societies. I assume that this situation shaped the political agenda of political actors, probably favoring political actors' preferences for democracy. Second, despite possible equality improvements in the cited realms, political inequality continued increasing and exacerbating political struggles over political power, perhaps because certain social groups accrued sufficient economic means necessary to put their political agendas forward. I suggest that certain social groups profited more than others from the benefits created by the 'Washington Consensus' and the 'Third Wave of Democratization.' By certain groups, I mean political actors different from those who traditionally had political power. Along these lines, and considering the Latin American historical context, I assume that the newly affluent sections of society challenged the most affluent social classes that traditionally had the most '*de jure*' political power.<sup>38</sup> My rationale is functional, and I contend that political actors engage in putting their political agendas forward as they accrued sufficient material resources. Theoretically, I expect the most affluent socioeconomic strata to achieve collective action or afford activities like lobbying since they possess the necessary resources.

In particular, I hypothesize that the newly '*de facto*' politically powerful societal groups that arose after the sociopolitical and economic changes in the 1970s took up the political struggle for '*de jure*' political power because of their political preferences

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<sup>38</sup> The existence or creation of new affluent sections of society does not necessarily mean a decrease in inequality. A society might remain relatively unequal despite a reduction of inequality. As for my theory, minimum increases in equality might translate into more political struggle.



over democratic institutions. By and large, I suppose that the affluent socioeconomic class allowed the opposition because repressing the challengers would also deprive the traditionally affluent class of *their* benefits from democracy. Besides, I assume that incumbents and opponents tolerate each other because undermining democracy is more costly than supporting (or at least tolerating) it and might cut the benefits for everyone. As a whole, I posit that the results of that power struggle are democratic innovations.

Before the economic and political reforms in Latin America, few actors engaged in political contestation despite available institutional opportunities to shape democracy, mainly due to its costs. I contend that before the sociopolitical and economic shift, the wealthier strata of society had more '*de facto*' and '*de jure*' political power. That situation changed on the continent due to the previously mentioned economic shift. Hence, I assume that newly or recently '*de facto*' powerful actors contended for '*de jure*' political power after gaining the material and financial resources to vie for political power. The rationale is that participation costs dwindled due to the self-reinforcing process of democratization and economic shift by extending participation beyond traditional hierarchical channels, promoting democratic values, and giving actors the monetary means to put their agenda forward in institutions and the public realm.

Hence, I argue that political inequality positively incentivizes the creation and updating of democratic institutions. My argument is akin to others testing the effects of economic development on the transition to democracy, i.e., emerging new elites demanding protection from the state (Ansell and Samuels, 2010; 2014) or redistributive demands by the public (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). I do not neglect the ability of other political actors like single citizens, groups of citizens, or

low classes to compete and oppose incumbents, but I stress the importance of economic means to contend for political power. Besides, I focus on economically powerful political actors on the logic that they have the necessary means to put their political agendas forward and engage in collective action.

Finally, about political actors' agenda, I assume that it includes objectives such as achieving fair and responsive institutions to the public and deterring authoritarian elites, but more fundamentally, because democracy offers opportunities to participate in institutions, and such opportunities were limited or inexistent in Latin America under authoritarian regimes. However, I am also aware of the possible use of '*de facto*' political power to advance undemocratic agendas or even non-political action to continue profiting economically from neoliberal reforms, their wealth, and an underdeveloped state. Yet, as I mentioned before in this chapter, I assume that once democracy is established, the costs of undermining it are higher than the costs of supporting it. In sum, I hypothesize that political inequality positively affects the emergence of DIs in Latin America (*hypothesis one – H1*).

## 1. 5. Political Inequality and DIs: A Quantitative Analysis

I focus on '*political inequality*' in my quantitative analysis due to my theoretical expectations about the political effects of the socioeconomic and political transformation of Latin America after the 1980s on democratic institutions. Hence, I test the effects of political inequality on democratic institutions by operationalizing the latter as DIs and the former as differences in political power accumulated by socioeconomic groups. I expect the quantitative analysis to show whether political inequality positively affects the reform or update of democratic institutions.

## 1. 5. 1 Dependent Variable

This chapter builds upon the LATINNO dataset (Pogrebinschi, 2017), which documented 3,019 DIs<sup>39</sup> in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela from 1918 to 2020 (as of 24 January 2021).<sup>40</sup>

LATINNO collected information from every DI, including context, institutional design, and impact (Pogrebinschi and Ross, 2019). Some components of such categories are the duration of the DI, location, type of organization starting the DI, type of participants, ends, means, impact level, etcetera. Besides, for each country, the database documents the total number of DIs, the number of times each DI was implemented, and the total number of participants.<sup>41</sup> I selected the period 1980-2014

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
<sup>39</sup> As of 7 May 2022, 3,744 DIs are documented on the LATINNO website.

<sup>40</sup> Four Latin American countries are not included in the database: Haiti, Cuba, Belize, and Puerto Rico. The LATINNO team, Melisa Ross, explained via email that Belize and Puerto Rico were not included in the database since the former is part of the Commonwealth, and the latter is an unincorporated territory of the United States (email exchange on 27 May 2021). In the same vein, she mentioned that Cuba and Haiti were not included in the database due to a lack of available and reliable sources of information. I assume that excluding these countries shall not affect my quantitative analysis, and I understand LATINNO's decision to exclude Cuba and Haiti due to a lack of reliable information sources. Nevertheless, despite that unfortunate exclusion, the absence of countries like Puerto Rico, Belize, and perhaps others like the French Guiana, Guyana, and Suriname might be detrimental to my quantitative analysis. However, I guess that the effect of excluding them in my quantitative analysis might not be as impactful as if Brazil were excluded. I mean, for example, that the exclusion of a hypothetical number of counted DIs in French Guiana, Guyana, and Suriname, with a short history of independent statehood, might not be as high as in the case of Brazil.

<sup>41</sup> LATINNO defines total number of participants as 'Total Volume of Participation,' which in LATINNO's website is defined as "*The sum of all individual participants in all cases. In cases of collegiate bodies of permanent or sporadic character, where participants or representatives regularly intervene and/or are the same individual, they are counted only once.*" (consulted on 07 May 2022).

from the database, which includes the most significant increase in the number of DIs in the region (2,152 DIs in the period 1980-2014).<sup>42</sup>

My dependent variable for my quantitative analysis is the number of newly implemented DIs per country in a given year (the year of the DI's start date). LATINNO also records DIs' status (i.e., ongoing or ended). I did not accumulate or deduct active from concluded DIs over the years since, in this chapter, I am investigating the effect of political inequality on DIs' emergence and not their demise.



*Figure 2. Distribution of Counted DIs*

Figure 2 Distribution of the counted DIs for the period 1980-2014 in 18 Latin American. Author's calculation and graph using collected data by LATINNO (2017).

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<sup>42</sup> The period 1980-2014 was selected based on the great number of documented DIs in it and its step rise. Before 1980 the number of documented DIs was meager and after 2014 the great increase started dwindling. The data contained in the database is still under revision and might change, particularly for the period after 2014.

## 1. 5. 2. Independent Variable

To measure political inequality, I use the variable '*power distributed by socioeconomic position*' (*v2pep*)<sup>43</sup> included in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (Coppedge et al., 2020). The variable '*v2pep*' captures how wealth and income translate into political power. The variable assesses to what extent socioeconomic position turns into political power. I selected '*v2pep*' as my independent variable for the period 1980-2014. The variable, for which complete data is available for the 18 countries included in this quantitative analysis, captures the distribution of political power among political actors, assuming that their political power can be observed in democratic institutions like voting, civil society organizations, representation in government, political agenda-setting, political decision-making, and implementation (Pemstein et al., 2019).

The variable '*v2pep*' compares the political power possession of wealthy, average, and low-income members of a polity and captures the extent to which wealthy people have more political power than middle and low-income people by classifying this relationship in a range in which wealthy people have a monopoly of political power (in the dataset designated with value '0'), to the other end when economic groups have more or less the same political power (value of '4').<sup>44</sup> I use

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<sup>43</sup> The full designated code is '*v2pepwrses*' (Pemstein et al., 2019).

<sup>44</sup> I rescaled the variable for easier interpretation. For the rescaled variable, as used in the analyses below, '0' means that wealthy people have a monopoly of political power and '-4' that economic groups have more or less the same political power. After the rescale, higher values of this variable imply more unequal distribution of political power. I rescaled the variable because of my theoretical expectations, and because I am interested in measuring the effects of political inequality on democratic institutions, specifically whether positive increases of political inequality have positive effects on the emergence of democratic innovations in Latin America.

'v2pep' to understand the effects of political equality on the emergence of DIs in Latin America in the selected period.

Empirically, the dataset contains specific values for each year and country, based on survey responses with ordinal values, later converted to interval values. For instance, in the rescaled variable I use in this quantitative analysis, the value of the variable per country per year could range between the values of '0' (wealthy people have a monopoly of political power) and '-4' (economic groups have more or less the same political power).<sup>45</sup> I expect countries with higher values of this variable (unequal distribution of political power; values closer to '0') to have more DIs. In the analysis, I expect political inequality to affect the rise of DIs in the continent positively. The data I have for these variables, per country and year, is not disaggregated enough to explain the differences or gaps, for instance, between groups. In other words, I cannot say how big the gap is between the newly emergent middle class and the traditionally powerful affluent classes. However, the variable helps me assess the effects of political equality on the rise of DIs in Latin America.

### 1. 5. 3. Control Variables

I consider other variables affecting democratic institutions and their innovation in Latin America: gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita), income inequality, urban population (percentage of the total population),<sup>46</sup> state authority over the territory, and state fiscal source of revenue.

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<sup>45</sup> The actual values of these variables range from -2.6700 to 3.0480. See table 1.

<sup>46</sup> Data available in the World Bank, and collected and smoothed by United Nations Population Division. Urban population is defined by national statistical offices, and the concept in general refers to people living in urban areas. Countries classify population as 'urban' or 'rural' based on their preferred terms.

I selected GDP per capita to measure economic growth and urban population to gauge demographic change.<sup>47</sup> I chose both variables to account for the effects of political and economic changes in Latin America after the 1970s.<sup>48</sup> In particular, I assume that GDP per capita implies effects on 'de facto' power<sup>49</sup> and urban population growth effects on political struggle and governance.<sup>50</sup> I expect positive effects of both variables on institutional reform because more 'de facto' power implies means to push political agendas forward and an increasing polity, particularly in an urban setting,<sup>51</sup> governance problems, and opportunities to innovate institutions.

Drawing on the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt, 2020),<sup>52</sup> I integrate income inequality into my statistical analysis due to its implications for political equality. I assume that the political effects of economic shifts are also observable after sociopolitical and economic reform. In my theory, political actors' accumulation of 'de facto' power precedes and affects income/economic and political inequality, exacerbating political struggle. As mentioned before, I assume that DIs emerge out of that political struggle. On these grounds, in this quantitative analysis, I aim to find out whether income inequality affects the rise of DIs in Latin America.

Besides, drawing on data from V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2020), I include the control variables '*state authority over territory*' ('v2sv')<sup>53</sup> and '*state fiscal source of*

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<sup>47</sup> Urban population (percentage of total population) and GDP per capita in current US dollars.

<sup>48</sup> Modernization theorists like Lipset argued similarly about the positive effects of economic development on adopting and sustaining democracies. That is to say, as countries develop economically, they are more likely to adopt and keep democracy working. See Lipset (1959).

<sup>49</sup> I explicitly mention implies since I am aware that increasing GDP does not inherently increase 'de facto' power, although it surely provides political actors with additional resources.

<sup>50</sup> I use data from the World Bank, available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/>

<sup>51</sup> See Soifer (2015) for more details about urban primacy and the fragmented and regionally dispersed political power in Latin American countries across their history. I selected urban population following that logic.

<sup>52</sup> SWIID Version 9.2, December 2021.

<sup>53</sup> In the V-Dem dataset the variable code is: v2svstterr .

*revenue*' ('v2st')<sup>54</sup> as measures of state capacity. The two variables account for the political order and the functioning of the state administrative system. In my theory, the two variables have implications for political actors, who might consider them opportunities to advance their political agendas. The variable 'v2sv' is a percentual estimation of the supremacy of state authority over its territory, and 'v2st' captures the preeminence of different sources of revenue to finance the activities of the state.

The data I have for state authority is survey responses assessing state authority, available per year, and country. The percentual estimation of state authority does not estimate the perfect control of the state on its territory or compare it to another. The estimation assesses two qualities of the state; first, how the state is acknowledged as superior authority; second, when necessary, whether the state is able to assert its control over other political actors refusing its authority. Besides, the data I have assessing state revenue is also survey responses, available per country and year. Survey respondents use the coding '0' to '4' (*ordinal scale*) to evaluate the state's fiscal source of revenue. The state's revenue sources are coded from '0' representing the state's null capability to raise income to fund itself, and '4' represents a more complex form of funding, such as sales, income, corporate, and capital taxes. The other three funding sources are external, state control over economic assets, land taxes, and customs duties.<sup>55</sup>

I expect this pair of control variables to incentivize the rise of democratic innovations differently. For instance, I expect preeminent state territorial authority to incentivize actors' interactions within a polity, particularly their coordination in

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<sup>54</sup> In the V-Dem dataset: v2stfiscap.

<sup>55</sup> The scale of the variable is ordinal and the cross-coder aggregation follows a Bayesian item response theory measurement model.



reforming their political system, because they might want to democratize excessive state power. Regarding the ability to collect taxes, I use this variable as a proxy for the state's capacity to perform administrative tasks and fund its activities. Political actors might want to intervene to improve the state's performance when the ability of the state to fund itself is low and less sophisticated since it implies less ability to fund activities like policing or managing public services. These expectations are based on my theoretical framework about political actors' intrinsic volition to change democratic institutions. Hence, I assume that political actors create more DIs when the state has preeminent authority over its territory and an unsophisticated working government administration.

#### 1. 5. 4. Alternative Explanation: Mistrust in Government

My approach in this chapter about DIs emergence has been top-down. I have contended that DIs are created at the top level of the political hierarchy, similar to one of LATINNO's DIs mapping main findings, i.e., most DIs are initiated by the government (Pogrebinschi, 2021). I have argued that most DIs are created out of political struggles between affluent political actors. I assumed that this struggle was more frequent after the sociopolitical and economic shift in the 1970s since, after this period, political actors accrued enough '*de facto*' political power to challenge incumbents to achieve '*de jure*' political power. My DIs' emergence argument might be a bit cynical due to limiting citizen capacities to change institutions. However, I posit that the most affluent socioeconomic strata might have it easier to achieve collective action since they can fund political action or other money-intensive activities such as lobbying.

Suppose DIs are not top-down-initiated but bottom-up-supported, demanded, and created by the less affluent socioeconomic group to which the vast majority of citizens belong.<sup>56</sup> Less affluent sections of society might be aware of political inequalities but perhaps are more impelled to collective action by their mistrust of government. My rationale is that, like the most affluent sections of society, the vast majority has a democratic agenda, but perhaps their main concern is the government's performance. In this scenario, the vast majority of the population might be more sensitive to government performance, reflecting their trust or mistrust in the government. So, despite not having sufficient resources to fund activities such as lobbying or similar, their mistrust in government might be sufficient to demand collectively institutional reforms via protests, social movements, or revolutions. This interpretation implies that citizens' mistrust of government drives the emergence of DIs in Latin America. Hence, I hypothesize that mistrust in government positively affects the rise and emergence of DIs in Latin America (*hypothesis two – H2*).

To test the hypothesis above, I add to my quantitative analysis the variable '*citizens' levels of trust in government*' or '*mistrust*' to test its effect on DIs emergence in Latin America. I suspect that '*mistrust*' in government could be a more plausible explanation of DIs' rise in other world regions, e.g., Europe or the US, where an

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<sup>56</sup> I assume that the majority of Latin American citizens do not belong to the most affluent socioeconomic sections, or as I described before, the benefits of the sociopolitical and economic transformation in the past did not translate into socioeconomic great benefits for the less affluent. For instance, according to CEPAL, 33% of the Latin American Population is living in poverty, and 13.1% in extreme poverty (see: <https://bit.ly/3LWk2Hw> - accessed 8 May 2022). In particular, according to Statista, Latinamerica's poverty rate in the region increased by 3.2 percentage points between 2019 and 2020, arguably due to the political and economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemics. According to Statista, 33.7% of Latin Americans found it impossible to cover their basic needs in 2020 and approximately 12.5% lived in extreme poverty. (see: <https://bit.ly/3weWRIO> - accessed on 8 May 2022).

increase in income inequality<sup>57</sup> might translate into a deteriorated citizens' perception of prosperity and performance of government since the population is generally more affluent than in Latin American countries. In Europe and the US, the increase in income and political inequality might translate into two effects: 1) less political struggle among affluent socioeconomic groups due to diminishing '*de facto*' political power of newly affluent and traditionally affluent political actors, and 2) generalized demands for government responsiveness in light of dwindled citizens' prosperity perception. Another implication could be that those ruling elites are more sensitive to citizens' demands, which contrasts with the Latin American logic, in which inequality has remained historically high, and in which affluent socioeconomic classes, after having increased their '*de facto*' political power, contend for '*de jure*' political power and increases political struggle.

I include the variable '*mistrust*' in my quantitative analysis and draw on Latinobarometro data (Latinobarómetro, 2018),<sup>58</sup> particularly on the question 'confidence in government' (P15STGBSC.E).<sup>59</sup> This question asks interviewees: "*Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions...*" (in this case, the government). "*Would you say you have a lot (1), some (2), a little (3), or no trust in (4) ...?*" I purposely selected the answer '*no trust*' to capture the '*mistrust*' in government.

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<sup>57</sup> It might be an increase in violence; I mentioned income inequality as a mere example of factors influencing citizens' trust in their government.

<sup>58</sup> I obtained the data from Latinobarómetro 'Online Analysis' section, available at the Latinobarómetro webpage (<https://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp> - accessed 1 September 2021). I downloaded the available data available per country and per year, covering the period 1995-2018, and available for the 18 countries I am researching in this chapter. According to the time covered by this chapter, I selected the years in the period 1995-2014, and I interpolated the missing values from 1980 to 1994.

<sup>59</sup> Survey question to be found in Latinobarometro 2018 Codebook (Study # LAT-2018, v20190707).

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Count	Mean	StdDev	min	25%	50%	75%	Max
<b>DIs</b>	630	3.4159	4.5453	0	0	2	5	26
<b>Political Inequality *</b>	630	0.2950	1.0506	-2.6700	-0.1950	0.3840	0.9990	3.0480
<b>GDP per capita **</b>	630	3,568.10	3,142.43	241.87	1,392.17	2,477.13	4,410.26	16,973.6
<b>Income Inequality</b>	630	0.4713	0.0434	0.3527	0.4430	0.4754	0.5047	0.5616
<b>Urban Population ***</b>	630	66.1194	15.3910	34.8700	53.5503	65.0775	79.1540	94.9450
<b>State Authority Over Territory</b>	630	89.8182	8.1770	62.0000	85.0000	90.5820	97.2500	99.7500
<b>State Fiscal Source of Revenue *</b>	630	1.0096	0.8419	-1.4580	0.5620	0.9680	1.8430	2.3100
<b>Trust in Government****</b>	630	0.2848	0.1162	0.0400	0.2100	0.2660	0.3643	0.7400

\*The survey scale is ordinal and later converted to interval values based on the V-Dem methodology measurement model. \*\*Current US dollars.

\*\*\* Percentage of the total population. \*\*\*\*Original variable.

## 1. 6. Estimation Method<sup>60</sup>

I employ in this chapter the PanelOLS regression method with fixed effects to evaluate the impact of political inequality on the number of counted DIs in a year per country (unit of observation) in the selected period of observation (1980-2014). I employed this method to control for overlooked variables that differ from one country to another, for example, democratic values that do not entirely or very slowly change over time. I ran five different country-fixed effects models with country-clustered covariance (see Table 2). The five models use a treated version of the dependent variable, which adds one unit to the dependent variable and uses a natural logarithm.<sup>61</sup> Of those models,

<sup>60</sup> My statistical analysis was carried out on PyCharm 2023.2.5 (Professional Edition). PyCharm is an integrated development environment used for programming in Python. I used the following libraries: pandas, geopandas, seaborn, numpy, pyplot, matplotlib, statsmodels, linearmodels, and pycountry.

<sup>61</sup> I added a unit to my dependent variable to be able to use a natural logarithm on it. I used a natural logarithm to reduce the skewness of my dependent variable (see Figure 2) and improve the linearity between my dependent and independent variables, which, in general, benefits my statistical analyses.

model four, in addition to the country-fixed effects and corresponding covariance, also includes time-fixed effects and time-clustered covariance.

In addition, I used a negative binomial estimator for robustness checks and ran four models (see Table 3).<sup>62</sup> I re-estimated those four models using this negative binomial estimator to evaluate my central hypothesis and contrast it with the results in the PanelOLS. That is, I wanted to evaluate the consistency of the effect of political inequality on the number of DIs per year in a given country.

I selected the PanelOLS estimator since I want to evaluate the dependencies between the number of newly implemented DIs (in a year and per country) and the selected variables corresponding to the sociopolitical and economic effects in Latin America after the 1970s for the particular case of these 18 countries over 35 years. I selected fixed effects because I assume that DIs, political inequality, and the rest of the selected sociopolitical and economic variables are correlated and because my analysis requires cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis to evaluate that correlation. Besides, I used country-fixed effects to control for possible omitted variables in my panel data that differ across the selected countries but not over time. By the same token, additionally, I used time fixed effects in Model 4 (only) to control for omitted variables that are constant across countries at a given point in time. I included these two types of fixed effects, assuming that there are certain unobserved variables affecting the rise of DIs in Latin America, for instance, the case of democratic values that vary across countries but are constant over time and also other unobserved

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<sup>62</sup> This negative binomial regression does not include fixed effects. As far as my knowledge, statsmodels does not directly support fixed effects in negative binomial regression in PyCharm (as of 02 December 2023). A replication of this negative binomial regression in other statistical programs (e.g., R) might be run to check for the results I obtained using PyCharm and the mentioned libraries. By the same token, other alternative robustness checks might be possible in other statistical programs.

variables with the opposite behavior like the fact that governments and democratic institutions become more democratic than before.

In general, I chose the Negative Binomial estimator as an alternative to PanelOLS to analyze my dependent variable and, in particular, to use it as a robustness check. I decided on this estimator because it is appropriate to model count data, and it is advantageous to model its over-dispersion. In this chapter, compared to the PanelOLS estimator, a Negative Binomial is similar, but if my dependent variable had negative values, using a Negative Binomial estimator would be complicated since the estimator is proper for nonnegative values. Empirically, in this quantitative analysis, the two estimators are also similar in that they estimate the dependencies between my dependent and independent variables. The main difference lies in that the results of fixed effects estimators are more reliable than a negative binomial,<sup>63</sup> and perhaps for that, such an estimator is suitable to use as a robustness check.

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<sup>63</sup> I used PanelOLS regression as my primary estimator to control for dependencies of unobserved, independent variables on DIs. I selected the PanelOLS estimator since it is a better estimator vis-à-vis traditional linear regression models. Along the same lines, I only used a negative binomial estimator as a robustness check estimator to assess the reliability of my PanelOLS results. Besides, the results of a PanelOLS with fixed-effects may be more reliable than a negative binomial since it controls for time-invariant factors that might correlate with the dependent and independent variables. In light of the latter, a negative binomial might not compare to a PanelOLS estimator, hence, the superior reliability of the last over the former.

Table 2. Regression Results (PanelOLS)

Model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4 ‡	Model 5
<b>Political Inequality</b>	-0.5214*** (0.1535)	-0.1069 (0.0770)	-0.1071* (0.0583)	-0.0310 (0.0436)	-0.1094* (0.0594)
<b>GDP per capita</b>		7.02e-05*** (2.178e-05)	7.387e-05*** (2.154e-05)	-2.873e-05 (1.918e-05)	8.151e-05*** (2.047e-05)
<b>Income Inequality</b>		-3.6284* (1.9139)	-3.5228* (1.8215)	-0.8748 (1.3935)	-3.7592** (1.6601)
<b>Urban Population</b>		0.0929*** (0.0141)	0.0879*** (0.0145)	-0.0088 (0.0120)	0.0855*** (0.0135)
<b>State Authority over territory</b>			0.0153 (0.0170)	-0.0108 (0.0082)	0.0135 (0.0158)
<b>State Fiscal Source of Revenue</b>			0.0519 (0.0937)	-0.0143 (0.0692)	0.0635 (0.0940)
<b>Mistrust in Government</b>					0.8648** (0.3946)
<b>No. Observations</b>	630	630	630	630	630
<b>No. Countries</b>	18	18	18	18	18
<b>R-squared</b>	0.1303	0.5723	0.5771	0.0114	0.5850
<b>R-squared (Within)</b>	0.1303	0.5723	0.5771	-0.1882	0.5850
<b>F-Statistic</b>	91.750	203.35	136.72	1.0972	121.84

All models are entity fixed effects with entity 'clustered' covariance. ‡ Model 4 includes additional time fixed effects and time 'clustered' covariance. Standard errors in parenthesis. P-values: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Dependent variable: Ln(DIs+1). SWIID Gini selected: \_1\_gini\_disp. Checked for multicollinearity using VIF, and the results are acceptable (values between 0 and 5). See table 8 in appendixes. Table 9 in the appendixes contains variables' variance results. See table 10 containing IVs correlation results.

## 1. 7. Discussion: The Effects of Political Equality on DIs Emergence

The results of my statistical analysis are summarized in Table 2. In particular, Model 1 presents the results for regressing DIs on political inequality (and country fixed effects), only. The coefficient on political inequality in this model is negative and significant, which indicates that increasing political inequality decreases the

emergence of DIs in the continent.<sup>64</sup> This estimate contradicts my main argument on the positive effects of political inequality on the number of DIs created per year in a given country, suggesting that political inequality harms the rise and emergence of DIs. Likewise, in the rest of the models, the estimates' signs suggest the same effect, even though these models include additional potential determinants of DIs emergence related to the effects of the socioeconomic and political transformation of Latin America (GDP per capita, income inequality, and urban population) and the state's political stability (state authority over territory and state fiscal source of revenue). Ex-ante, my theoretical expectation was that political inequality positively affected DIs' emergence due to Latin America's history of colonial past and marked social divide.

Furthermore, the coefficient of political inequality in Model 2 indicates a negative but statistically insignificant effect on DIs emergence. In contrast, the rest of the coefficients imply significant effects of the control variables accounting for the sociopolitical and economic transformation of Latin America. In particular, urban population and GDP per capita coefficients indicate positive and statistically significant effects of these variables on the emergence of DIs in Latin America, remaining so in Models 3 and 5. The previous effects agree with my theoretical expectations of the need for more institutional reform as polities become more affluent and urbanized.

Besides, the control variable of income inequality mirrors the effect of political inequality, namely, an increase in income inequality is associated with a negative effect on DIs emergence. This similar effect of political and income inequality contrasts

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<sup>64</sup> The correlation between democratic innovations and political inequality is:  $-0.28503160008401646$ . More about correlation values, see the appendix, particularly 'Table 10.'



with my theoretical expectations of the positive effects of inequality on the creation and emergence of DIs in the continent and anywhere else.

The regression results of Model 3 are similar to the previous model, particularly regarding the sociopolitical and economic variables. In this model, political inequality and income inequality coefficients are significant at 10% and indicate a negative effect of this variable on DIs rise. Model 3 includes the variables accounting for the state's political stability, which, although they are statistically insignificant, these variables suggest that as state capacity increases, DIs rise and emerge as well. The rationale of this inference, in a hypothetical scenario, implies that political actors might want to contend for '*de jure*' political power to influence the state, perhaps because they see it as an instrument or because they see in paying taxes a right to shape the state.<sup>65</sup>

The results of Model 4 suggest that explaining the rise of DIs in Latin America and anywhere in the world is a complex task. None of the coefficients of the variables in this model are statistically significant when including time and country fixed effects and considering a correspondingly clustered variance-covariance matrix to estimate the statistical significance of those coefficients. However, while the political inequality coefficient in this model is not significant, the sign suggests that the effect remains when accounting for omitted variables bias resulting from unobserved effects like citizens' democratic attitudes, corruption, drug-related violence, or technological change. Besides, similarly to previous models, the effect's direction of political and

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<sup>65</sup> For instance and for the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Weigel (2020), based on the examination of a field experiment on tax collection, provides evidence of enhanced citizen participation when the state tax them. Examples of that participation is attending town hall meetings or submitting evaluations of state performance.

economic inequality remains the same in this model and the other four models, while the rest of the variables switches.

Moreover, Model 5 includes the variable accounting for mistrust in government, of which the coefficient is positive and significant at 5%, indicating that increases in citizens' mistrust in the government positively affects DIs rise in Latin America. Similar to Model 3, the coefficient on political inequality is negative and significant at 10%. Likewise, the results obtained in Model 5 show statistically significant effects of the sociopolitical and economic transformation in the continent, as also indicated in Models 2 and 3. The regression results of Model 5 of the variables GDP per capita and urban population agree with my theoretical expectations and echo the conventional understanding of the prerequisites of economic growth for democracy and the need for better governance and democratic institutions as populations grow. Regarding income inequality, as underlined in previous paragraphs, the effect follows that of political inequality and suggests that this variable has a negative effect on the emergence of DIs in Latin America and probably anywhere else.

Table 3. Regression Results (Negative Binomial)

<b>Model</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>
<b>Political Inequality</b>	-0.3610*** (0.045)	-0.1688*** (0.056)	-0.1896*** (0.057)	-0.1974*** (0.058)
<b>GDP per capita</b>		0.0002*** (1.87e-05)	0.0002*** (1.95e-05)	0.0002*** (1.98e-05)
<b>Income Inequality</b>		5.0613*** (1.194)	4.2422*** (1.310)	3.7986*** (1.310)
<b>Urban Population</b>		0.0037 (0.004)	0.0034 (0.004)	0.0017 (0.005)
<b>State Authority over territory</b>			-0.0090 (0.007)	-0.0075 (0.007)
<b>State Fiscal Source of Revenue</b>			0.0288 (0.066)	0.0106 (0.066)
<b>Trust in Government</b>				1.5062*** (0.410)
<b>No.Observations</b>	630	630	630	630
<b>Df Residuals</b>	628	625	623	622
<b>Df Model</b>	1	4	6	7
<b>Log-Likelihood</b>	-1459.7	-1393.6	-1392.8	-1386.2
<b>Deviance</b>	890.92	758.61	756.97	743.76
<b>Pearson chi2</b>	870	884	871	852

Standard errors in parenthesis. P-values: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

Lastly, I selected the Negative Binomial estimator as a robustness check to evaluate the consistency of the results obtained using the PanelOLS estimators. I was particularly interested in the reliability of the effect's direction of political inequality. As is observable in Table 3, the results across the 4 Models using the Negative Binomial estimator indicate a negative effect of this variable on the rise of DIs in Latin America as the PanelOLS estimator results in Table 2. Notably, the sign of the coefficient on income inequality across the four models suggests a positive effect on DIs emergence, contrasting with the results of the PanelOLS. While these results differ between the two estimators, the quantitative analysis in this chapter is insufficient to account for

this change.<sup>66</sup> Besides, the coefficients on GDP per capita remain statistically significant and positive when using the two estimators. Similarly, the results of the variables controlling for the state's political stability are statistically insignificant. In contrast, the coefficients for urban population were statistically insignificant but kept the same sign when using the two different estimators. Finally, the coefficients of the variable 'mistrust' in government remained positive and significant when using the two different estimators.

## 1. 8. Conclusion

At the outset of working on this chapter, I had the theoretical expectation that the highly unequal sociopolitical and economic context in Latin America positively affected the innovation of democratic institutions and processes. My rationale was that in such unequal circumstances, citizens demanded and got the reforms they deemed necessary because, in democracy, institutions and other processes allow citizens to reform this type of government. However, after considering the sociopolitical and economic transformation of Latin America after the 1970s and research suggesting that DIs are engineered and enacted at the top of democracies, I fine-tuned that expectation to a more realistic one. I theorized that DIs are institutional changes

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<sup>66</sup> I ran again two sets of analyses of the models in Tables 2 and 3. One set used only political inequality as the independent variable (results in the appendix on Table 4 and 5), and the other used only income inequality (results in the appendix on Table 6 and 7). In both sets of analyses, the signs of the estimated coefficients are the same as in the corresponding regressions in Tables 2 and 3. Besides, on Table 10 (correlation table-graph) is observable that political inequality (under the name 'scale' ) and income inequality (labeled as 'SWIID' ) are positively correlated (0.3285630267868837). Based on these results, I suspect that the unexpected divergent results in the sign of the coefficient on income and political inequality in Tables 2 and 3 could be explained by the correlations among the two variables in my regression model. In particular, these deceptive results make it hard to determine the extent to which each variable affects the rise of DIs in Latin America or to select one of the two variables.

resulting from political struggles between the most affluent sections of society. This fine-tuned theoretical expectation is based on the assumption that the sociopolitical and economic transformation of Latin America after the 1970s created new affluent social groups who challenged incumbents, thereby exacerbating political struggle and consequently crystalizing democratic innovations.

Furthermore, the results of my quantitative analysis suggested the same adjusted expectation. In particular, my results indicated a negative effect of political inequality on the rise of DIs in Latin America, which implies that political equality has a positive effect on creating new or reforming decision-making processes and institutions of democracy. This result contradicts my theoretical expectation that political inequality drives the rise of DIs in Latin America. Having this effect as a backdrop, I additionally included the variable of mistrust in government to re-approach citizen demand for DIs and account for a bottom-up perspective on the rise of DIs in Latin America. In this case, the results seem to be consistent with my theoretical expectations that citizens and their mistrust of government have a positive effect on the reform or creation of democratic institutions.

Future research might focus more closely on the harmful effects of political inequality or the positive effect of political equality on DIs emergence. The same applies to the effect of a lack of trust in government. Perhaps a good start would be to conduct a single case study investigating the effect of circumstances and the temporality at play when DIs emerge. Such analysis will shed more light on the relationship between variables such as political equality and democratic innovations and, more broadly, on democracy. For instance, a single case study could be the

emergence of collective mandates<sup>67</sup> in Brazilian Legislatures; this type of analysis could account for the effect of the political, social, and economic circumstances present in a single country, at a given point in time, on its democratic institutions. Furthermore, I foresee that such a single case study can also underline the role of political actors in the demand and offer of democratic innovations.

Finally, to the best of my knowledge, quantitative analyses of the emergence of DIs are, so far, rare in the literature on DIs or even the broader literature on participatory and deliberative democracy (though they are common in literature on regime change and democratization). This characteristic is perhaps the main contribution of this work, namely, to understand DIs beyond mechanisms and instruments of decision-making and regard them as institutional changes resulting from actors' interests and political agendas taking place in the real world as they work towards ideal democracy.

Lastly, I hope this quantitative and theoretical contribution could inform current and future analyses on increasing citizen participation and deliberation on topics such as genome editing (Dryzek et al., 2020), climate change (Giraudet et al., 2021), long-term planning (Kulha et al., 2021), and palliating the ills of a global public sphere (Curato et al., 2022). In this regard, my quantitative and theoretical contribution to DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy research underlines the role of politics and political power in enacting or rejecting new participatory or deliberative mechanisms such as citizen assemblies.

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<sup>67</sup> I will say more about this democratic innovation in the following chapter. For the time being, this innovation is about sharing political/legislative power in Brazilian legislatures. In this collective mandate, a legislative seat is shared by more than one person.

# CHAPTER II

## Political Ideology, Electoral Opportunism, and Democratic Innovation: Explaining the Use of 'Collective Mandates'

### 2. 1. Introduction

I present in this chapter the case of 'collective mandates',<sup>68</sup> a democratic innovation (DI) whereby legislators share with citizens legislative powers in federal, regional, and local legislatures in Brazil.<sup>69</sup> The promoters and users of 'collective mandates' claim that these mandates increase citizen participation and deliberation in Brazilian

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<sup>68</sup> This democratic innovation is, to a certain extent, similar to other DIs in different world regions, which put citizens at the center of politics, such as the Belgian Citizens' Council (Bürgerrat) or Ireland's citizens' assemblies. DIs, including the Brazilian case, underscore citizens' ability and capacity to participate and deliberate in decision-making and policy-making.

<sup>69</sup> 'Collective mandates' are constituted by more than one person. This type of mandate differs from regular mandates, in which a single person runs for office in political campaigns, and if successful in elections, he or she carries out all the related legislative activities.

The general goal of 'collective mandates' is to include underrepresented groups in decision-making and policy-making; the particular goals are to use that enhanced representation for epistemic gains and deliberation.

legislatures.<sup>70</sup> Although 'collective mandates' were first used in 1994,<sup>71</sup> politicians have promoted and adopted them in Brazil more actively after 2010.<sup>72</sup> Mainly, politicians from the left political spectrum of Brazilian politics have used 'collective mandates' in legislatures and political campaigns, and, more recently, aimed to cement these citizen participation and deliberation mechanisms in Brazilian law.

The origin, diffusion, and latest interest in the use of 'collective mandates' in Brazil underscore a common puzzle in democratic innovations (DIs) and democracy research, namely the causes of institutional reform. In this chapter, I approach the supply of DIs by analyzing the effects of political ideology and electoral opportunism on the use of 'collective mandates' in Brazilian legislatures and electoral campaigns after 2010 in Brazil. Specifically, I focus on politicians using 'collective mandates' when running for office in Brazil. I build upon debates over bottom-up versus top-down democratization and regime change. For instance, whether the people overthrow dictatorships via revolutions (Skocpol, 1979), whether elites make institutions more inclusive or extractive (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003), or whether or not

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<sup>70</sup> Case studies, and typologies on 'collective mandates,' refer to citizen participation and deliberation as two key characteristics of this type of mandate. For instance, Secchi et al. (2019) refers to deliberation as a decision-making form and one of the key elements of their typology of 'collective mandates.'

<sup>71</sup> As documented by Secchi et al. (2019), Durval Ângelo (of the Worker's Party) was the pioneer of 'collective mandates' in Brazil (Minas Gerais). He used this DI for six consecutive terms since 1994. His mandate was characterized by its deliberative character, understood as collective and communicative decision-making. The objective of deliberation was planning, evaluating, and forwarding proposals for the deputy's mandate (main legislative proposals). Co-parliamentarians had the power to decide the political directions of deputy Durval Ângelo too. The mandate was constituted by 20-50 members, elected in regional assemblies of the collective mandates.

<sup>72</sup> An example of the latest adopted 'collective mandates' is Bancada Ativista, which is probably Brazil's most well-known case for two reasons. First, Bancada Ativista got a seat in the Legislative Assembly of São Paulo in 2018, a large and socially complex city. Second, this 'collective mandate' attracted media attention probably due to its activist background and because they stand for progressive ideals, such as protecting political minorities like afro-descendants, indigenous people, and people with disabilities.



economic development increases the chances of developing countries to transit to democracy (Boix and Stokes, 2003).

In this chapter, I examine DIs in a top-down approach. In my analysis of the adoption of 'collective mandates' in Brazil after 2010, I underscore two approaches to democratic innovation. First, a bottom-up rationale emphasizing the development of democratic institutions toward achieving democratic ideals such as political equality or deliberation (Gastil and Wright, 2018; Fishkin, 2018). Second, a top-down focus, accounting for the effect of temporality<sup>73</sup> and external circumstances in institutional change, such as in the case of economic crises or political ideology (Font et al., 2014; Cruz Ruiz, 2023c). On these grounds, I posit that, at least in research on democratic innovations, participatory and deliberative democracy, most analyses have focused on explaining institutional reform and democratic innovation as the result of democratic development. I argue that such endogenous explanations are correct, but such analyses can be complemented by accounting for exogenous factors.

Specifically, I posit that the case of 'collective mandates' can shed more light on the exogenous drivers of DIs. Studies of democratic innovations and institutional reform have examined the effects of political ideology (Font and Galais, 2011) or sociopolitical and economic changes on democratic institutions (Cruz Ruiz, 2023c). Yet, I argue that the Brazilian case of 'collective mandates' is a unique and useful case to test the effects of political ideology on democratic institutions and processes. By uniqueness, I mean the exceptional sociopolitical circumstances of Brazil's transition

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<sup>73</sup> By temporality, I mean, for instance, the order/sequencing in time of sociopolitical and economic processes, which affect democratic institutions and processes. I posit that the study of democratic innovations, 'collective mandates' included, would benefit from an analysis not only of the effect of exogenous variables on institutional reform and democratic innovation but also by accounting for the intersection in time of exogenous variables.


from a military dictatorship to a democracy (O'Donnell, 1988) and the rise of the right in the last decade after the left rule the country (Davis and Straubhaar, 2020; Payne and de Souza Santos, 2020).

Mainly, the study of 'collective mandates' offers a unique opportunity to understand the effects of political ideology on institutional reform and the widespread interest in democratic innovations. For instance, the political orientation of the Brazilian national government in turn. More specifically, the political agendas of recent Brazilian presidents like Jair Messias Bolsonaro and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. In this regard, such political agendas, which stand as competitors, signal policy preferences, catalyze politics, mobilize political support, and accentuate institutional innovation interests.

However, there are other reasons highlighting the relevance of this study. First, this case is also a reminder that the democratization of political institutions goes beyond the executive and reaches legislative power. Second, the case of 'collective mandates' also redirects the attention to the role of citizens not only in demanding more government accountability and responsiveness but also in changing their institutions. Third, the 'collective mandates' case is a clear example of how citizens, groups of citizens, and activists assemble and overcome collective action problems to change their institutions when they are given the opportunity.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will trace and explain the rise of 'collective mandates' in Brazil. In section two, I will give the reader more details about what constitutes a 'collective mandate,' their emergence in the 1990s, and the widespread interest in their use in political campaigns and Brazilian legislatures after 2010. In section three, I will situate my research on 'collective mandates' within democracy and democratic innovations research. I will develop in section four a theoretical framework

to evaluate the case of 'collective mandates.' In section five, I will analyze the effect of political ideology and electoral opportunism on the use and promotion of 'collective mandates.' I conclude this chapter in section six, in which I highlight my findings and underline the relevance and significance of the analysis of 'collective mandates' for democracy and democratic innovations research.



*Figure 3. Collective Mandates 1994-2020*

Number of counted 'collective mandate' candidacies for Brazilian legislatures per election year, from 1994 to 2020.<sup>74</sup> Candidacies take place at the local, regional, and federal levels in Brazil; regional and federal elections occur every four years, and local elections every two years. In 2010, local candidacies occurred for the first time. Author's calculation and graph with data provided by Secchi. More in Secchi et al. (2020).

<sup>74</sup> The mapping of Secchi et al. (2020) comprises information about candidacies such as political party of the candidate, the name of the political candidate (the name of the person whose name is to be read on the ballot), the name of the legislative position, i.e., federal deputy, state deputy, district deputy, councilor, or senator (own translation), year of election, votes, municipality, state, and electoral result (e.g., elected or not elected).

## 2. 2. 'Collective Mandates' in Brazilian Legislatures

Politicians in Brazil are changing legislatures' institutional settings and work.<sup>75</sup> Legislators and politicians running for office are reforming legislatures at the local,<sup>76</sup> regional,<sup>77</sup> and national<sup>78</sup> levels in Brazil. These reforms are known in Brazil as 'collective mandates,' institutional mechanisms allowing the participation of more than one person in exercising a given mandate in a legislature. The number of collective mandates used during electoral campaigns and securing seats in Brazilian legislatures started increasing after 2010 and steeply rose after 2014 (see Figure 3). In this section, I give more details about this case, such as the main constitutive elements and their rise.

### 2. 2. 1. What is a 'Collective Mandate'?

A 'collective mandate' is a participatory mechanism in legislatures, allowing more than one person to occupy a single seat in a legislative body. In this mechanism, the elected

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<sup>75</sup> Brazil, Latin America's biggest democracy, is politically organized as a federal republic (official name in Portuguese: República Federativa do Brasil; own translation: Federative Republic of Brazil). Brazil is formed by 26 states, 5,570 municipalities, and the Federal District (Brasília). The organization of the Brazilian State is divided into legislative, executive, and judiciary. The executive power is vested in the president of the Republic (head of state and head of the government, elected by universal suffrage, together with the vice-president, every four years, allowed to be re-elected only once). Different organs and courts at national and state levels constitute the judicial power. Brazil's National Congress is a bicameral parliament constituted by a chamber of deputies and a federal senate. Brazil has a multi-party electoral system. As of 2018, there are 30 different parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies and 21 in the Senate. At the federal level, the legislative is constituted of 513 federal deputies (8 to 70 per state, total number based on population) and 81 senators (3 per state, including the Federal District). At the state level, there are 1,059 state deputies in all state assemblies (30 to 94 deputies per state). At the local level, the legislative branch comprises 51,924 municipal councilors in total (7 to 53 per municipality) (Gómez Ramírez, 2021).

<sup>76</sup> Councilors are elected for four-year terms with the possibility of unlimited re-election.

<sup>77</sup> At the regional level, legislative assemblies of Brazilian states (unicameral), are constituted by state deputies elected every four years.

<sup>78</sup> The federal senators are elected by popular vote for a term of eight years (majority basis). Federal deputies are elected by a proportional representation of votes for a four-year term.

politician does not legislate according to her individual interests, conscience, and partisan constraints, but collectively along with the other participants constituting the mandate. This mechanism strives for collective participation in the mandate, for instance, to define the mandate's political positions, discuss and vote in parliaments. Besides, 'collective mandates' also seek to boost citizen participation to contribute to policy-making by fostering a closer relationship with constituents and political actors like civil society organizations. For instance, some 'collective mandates' such as the 'Mandato Coletivo de Alto Paraíso de Goiás' reached to their constituents, community, and other political actors by organizing workshops explaining how city council works and how legislative bills are drafted.<sup>79</sup> Besides, 'collective mandates' like 'Muitas-Gabinetona' included citizens in drafting laws. For instance, citizens contributed to 25 of 48 law proposals elaborated by 'Muitas-Gabinetona' between 2017-2019 (Avelar, 2021).<sup>80</sup>

This democratic innovation is characterized by collectively informing policy-making. The participation and deliberation taking place in this DI are achieved through facilitation via tacit or explicit rules determined by the members of the mandate or the use of digital platforms like Facebook or WhatsApp (da Silva et al., 2021; Secchi et al., 2019; Secchi et al., 2020). Coordination among the 'collective mandate' members is crucial to deal with conflicts of interest or preferences arising from their legislative

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<sup>79</sup> Mandato Coletivo: Uma Nova Forma de Fazer Política. Mandato Coletivo de Alto Paraíso de Goiás (online archive). Available at: <https://mandatocoletivo.wixsite.com/mandatocoletivo> (retrieved on 20 January 2023).

<sup>80</sup> This 'collective mandate' created the 'Laboratórios Populares' (LabPops) (in English 'Popular Laboratories,' own translation), a mechanism for collective decision-making. Through LabPops, 'Muitas-Gabinetona' drafted bills and also analyzed other parliamentarians' proposals. The 'LabPops' activities comprises the identification of issues (e.g., social issues), political actors' involvement (inclusion of diverse stakeholders), hosting of workshops/meetings (with the involved stakeholders), and collective decision-making (e.g., drafting a bill, amending bills, or supporting or rejecting others). More at: <https://gabinetona.org/site/> (retrieved on 20 January 2023).

work. That coordination within the mandate is also helpful, for example, to network and work with other legislators, citizens, civil society organizations (CSOs), and members of underrepresented groups. Various interaction mechanisms enabled the coordination, e.g., regular face-to-face meetings, virtual meetings via digital platforms, instant messaging applications, or Facebook Groups (da Silva et al., 2021).

The organization and structure of 'collective mandates' vary substantially across cases but certain elements are the same across all of them. For instance, according to Secchi et al., this type of mandate consists of a 'parliamentarian,' 'co-parliamentarians,' and a sort of 'mandate pact' (da Silva et al., 2021; Secchi et al., 2019; Secchi et al., 2020). The latter is a formal or informal contract ruling the mandate, delimiting the fundamental elements, expectations, and distribution of labor. The essential feature of this type of mandate is that the 'parliamentarian,' i.e., the elected official, shares her political autonomy and power with 'co-parliamentarians.' Arguably, this power-sharing allows the 'co-parliamentarians' to influence and determine parliamentary voting or other legislative activities.

Secchi et al. (2020) found other similarities across 'collective mandates,' for instance, a significant variation in the number and kind of members, recruiting scheme, finance of campaigns, collective creation of legislative bills, connections to political party platforms, and power-sharing among co-parliamentarians. In general, the mapping of cases done by Secchi et al. indicates no standard or archetypical 'collective mandate' but great experimentalism (Secchi et al., 2020). That is to say, the members of the collective mandates develop organizational and operative structures ad hoc to the resources available to hand and their particular goals. For instance,

'Muitas-Gabinetona' developed 'LabPops'<sup>81</sup> since this 'collective mandates' was particularly interested in including citizens in drafting bills.

Politicians promoting this mandate model herald it as a solution to corruption<sup>82</sup> and lack of transparency in decision-making.<sup>83</sup> Others regard this DI as a mechanism to enhance the inclusion of underrepresented groups<sup>84</sup> and those affected by public policies, like indigenous people.<sup>85</sup> In contrast with 'collective mandates' regarded as a solution to democratic problems, Brazilian citizens' trust in politicians and government has continued dwindling over the last decade. Along the same lines, other societal problems like criminality and income inequality continue causing governance problems and negatively affecting the work of the Brazilian state and democratic institutions.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> See previous note on 'LabPops.'

<sup>82</sup> Vitrine e reação à crise política, mandatos coletivos avançam, mas ainda sob resistência. Folha de S.Paulo. 21.01.2021. Available at: <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2021/01/vitrine-e-reacao-a-crise-politica-mandatos-coletivos-avancam-mas-ainda-sob-resistencia.shtml> (retrieved on 21 March 2021). Politicians using this type of mandate in Brazil argue that citizens distrust the political system and, therefore, support innovations such as 'collective mandates.' Such politicians find, among others, corruption as a plausible explanation for the erosion of trust in the democratic system. Along these lines, politicians using 'collective mandates' find in this participatory and deliberative mechanism a form to fight corruption and differentiate from competing traditional politicians.

<sup>83</sup> Eleições 2022: Senado tem três candidaturas coletivas. Agência Senado. 31.08.2022. Available at: <https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2022/08/31/eleicoes-2022-senado-tem-tres-candidaturas-coletivas> (retrieved on 8 October 2022). Lack of transparency is often mentioned among politicians as a cause of mistrust in Brazilian democracy.

<sup>84</sup> Mandato coletivo: um caminho para ampliar a participação de pessoas com deficiência na política. Câmara Paulista para Inclusão da Pessoa com Deficiência. 30.10.2020. Available at: <https://www.camarainclusao.com.br/noticias/mandato-coletivo-um-caminho-para-ampliar-a-participacao-de-pessoas-com-deficiencia-na-politica/> (retrieved 22 March 2021).

<sup>85</sup> Propostas de mandatos coletivos são aposta para renovação na política. Brasil de Fato. 23.05.2022. Available at: <https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2022/05/23/propostas-de-mandatos-coletivos-sao-aposta-para-renovacao-na-politica> (retrieved 8 October 2022).

<sup>86</sup> See: BTI 2020 Country Report. Available at: [https://www.bti-project.org/content/en/downloads/reports/country\\_report\\_2020\\_BRA.pdf](https://www.bti-project.org/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2020_BRA.pdf) (Retrieved on 22 March 2021).

In the same vein, proponents of 'collective mandates' claim to shift political practices from political parties and single politicians to underrepresented groups and lay citizens. The latter implies that 'collective mandates' contribute to further democratizing legislatures, which are already democratic collective decision-making bodies. Besides, since 'collective mandates' seek to foster a closer relationship with their constituents and diverse political actors, those using the mandates assert that a collective knows better than one person and that modern politics is detached from real-world problems. Additionally, the advocates aim to flatten the hierarchy of traditional politics and keep using their 'horizontal politics of the streets.'<sup>87</sup> Along these lines, proponents also claim to represent black, LGBTI, indigenous, and poor people, who are the majority and have been ignored, not heard, and have not had a say in the politics that affected them.<sup>88</sup>

Activists and progressive politicians push for 'collective mandates' to restore trust in politics and focus on public problems by fostering relationships with constituents and among the mandate members (Secchi et al., 2019). For example, 'Muitas-Gabinetona' extends perspectives on issues and inputs for bill drafting by collaborating with activists, community leaders, and researchers. The latter helps 'Muitas-Gabinetona,' and arguably other 'collective mandates' concerned with restoring trust in democracy and politics in two regards. First, the collaboration among different political actors brings representatives and represented closer; second, the

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<sup>87</sup> Mandatos coletivos conquistam vagas em assembleias; entenda como funcionam. exame.. 14.10.2018

Available at: <https://exame.com/brasil/mandatos-coletivos-conquistam-vagas-em-assembleias-entenda-como-funcionam/> (retrieved on 22 March 2021).

<sup>88</sup> Monica Seixas: "É impossível matar todas nós" #EleNão - Aveso #6. Youtube. 01.10.2018 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ctWbC93S\\_4g&ab\\_channel=MauricioCosta](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ctWbC93S_4g&ab_channel=MauricioCosta) (retrieved on 22 March 2021).



same interaction among actors informs the members of the 'collective mandate' about popular struggles and a better understanding of the constituency.


Proponents of 'collective mandates' argue that this type of mandate can cope better with the more complex and increasing demands of citizens and the modern world. Proponents of 'collective mandates' highlight the limited cognitive capacity of single politicians and the limited representativeness of current legislative collective bodies. For instance, advocates contend that the increased cognitive capacity is derived from 'collective mandates' fostering relationships with constituents and among the mandate members. Along these lines, proponents claim that this type of mandate enhances members' diversity, which consequently helps bring different perspectives to decision-making processes.<sup>89</sup> The latter is possible due to agreed-upon rules of participation among the mandate members. In short, proponents' expectations seem to be derived from accounting for the increased number of co-parliamentarians, the rules of the mandate, the increased interaction with other political actors, and securing the participation and deliberation of diverse political groups.

The political participation of underrepresented groups in 'collective mandates' also contributes positively to cognitive diversity and to increasing trust in democracy and politics. For instance, members of 'collective mandates' are typically community leaders, members of indigenous peoples, or politically underrepresented groups. The latter arguably facilitates collaboration with their communities, later capitalizing on epistemic gains and representativeness. 'Collective mandates' like 'Nós Coletivo' or 'Coletiva Somos Hellen Frida' have articles about securing diversity and the defense

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<sup>89</sup> Mandato coletivo: uma nova forma de compor um gabinete. Politize! 03.09.2019. Available at: <https://www.politize.com.br/mandato-coletivo/> (retrieved 21 March 2021).

of underrepresented groups in their statutes and bylaws. Besides, such members' diversity and their network in the community allow this type of mandate to foster direct contact with their constituents, informing them of the complexity of real-world problems in Brazil and dealing with real and current information in decision-making.



*Figure 4. Political Ideology and Collective Mandates*

Percentage, according to political ideology, of the total number of counted 'collective mandate' candidacies, mapped between 1994 and 2020. Author's calculation and graph with data provided by Secchi. More in Secchi et al. (2020).<sup>90</sup>

## 2. 2. 2. The Rise of Collective Mandates

In general, politicians promote 'collective mandates' at the beginning of electoral campaigns. Politicians running for office tend to advance these citizen participation and deliberation mechanisms during their electoral campaigns. For instance, from

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<sup>90</sup> I followed the classification of political parties that Secchi et al (2020) used in their mapping of collective mandates, namely, left, center-left, center, center-right, and right. Though, for my own analysis, I added left and center-left, and right and center-right. My classification is: left, center, and right.

1994 to 2020, there were 423 'collective mandate' candidacies, and 54 of those candidates succeeded in getting elected to city councils, state legislatures, and the National Congress (da Silva et al., 2021).

Although the first 'collective mandate' was used in 1994, it was not until after 2014 that this DI became popular (Secchi et al., 2020). In 2016 and 2020, this type of democratic innovation was very popular among politicians running for office (see Figure 3). Between 2016 and 2020, 411 politicians ran for office using this type of mandate. Besides, most of the political campaigns and elections won occurred at the local level, mainly from the left side of the Brazilian multiparty political system (see Figure 4).<sup>91</sup> Most documented 'collective mandates' are used by the left (72%) in political campaigns. The center and the right did not use this type of mandate as often as the left. In short, 'collective mandates' have increased remarkably in the period 1994-2020, and most candidacies are from left political ideology.

Politicians and political parties from the left have sought to legalize and regulate 'collective mandates.' For instance, in 2017, the federal deputy for the state of São Paulo and president of the political party Podemos, Renata Hellmeister de Abreu Melo,<sup>92</sup> presented to the Chamber of Deputies a proposal for an Amendment of the Brazilian Constitution<sup>93</sup> to allow 'collective mandates'<sup>94</sup> in Legislative positions

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<sup>91</sup> Future researchers might want to find out the extent to which these results compare to the number of seats at various levels and the total number of candidates at each level.

<sup>92</sup> She is a member of the party PODE, or Podemos (Portuguese for 'we can'). This political party was previously known in Brazil as the National Labour Party, and for supporting direct democracy.

<sup>93</sup> Proposal 379/17 (Consulted 22 March 2021). Available at: <https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=2162014> (Retrieved on 22 March 2021).

<sup>94</sup> In Brazilian politics, the terms 'shared mandates,' and 'collective mandates' are used interchangeably. I use the latter since, apparently, this term is being used more commonly (as of March 2021).

throughout the country, i.e., councilor, state, district, and federal deputies and senator. The amendment and possible use of such a mandate imply that more than one person can occupy a legislative position. While the 2017 constitutional amendment proposal has been discussed but not approved, two additional modifications to the law have been put forward in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies in 2020<sup>95</sup> to regulate collective mandates in campaigns and their organization. Politicians seeking to regulate 'collective mandates' aim to officially and legally recognize such citizen participation and deliberation mechanisms in Brazilian law.<sup>96</sup> This entrenchment<sup>97</sup> and attempt to institutionalize citizen participation and deliberation in Brazilian legislatures have stagnated.<sup>98</sup>

In sum, 'collective mandates' are nothing new. They have been around for almost 30 years but have recently become more used in Brazilian Legislatures and political campaigns at different political levels. Since their inception, politicians from the left have used them more frequently than their counterparts. The remarkable increase in the use and promotion of 'collective mandates' begs questions about that rise. For instance, why do politicians opt for 'collective mandates' when running for

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<sup>95</sup> PL 4475/2020, author: João Daniel (PT-SE). Available at: [https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/prop\\_mostrarintegra?codteor=1928186](https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=1928186) (Retrieved on 22 March 2021).

PL 4724/2020, author: André Figueiredo (PDT-CE). Available at: [https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/prop\\_mostrarintegra?codteor=1932563](https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=1932563) (Retrieved on 22 March 2021).

The law proposal PL 4475/2020 aims to regulate the registry and use of 'collective mandates' in electoral campaigns. The law proposal PL 4724/2020 seeks to standardize the members of 'collective mandates' as 'parliamentarians' and 'co-parliamentarians,' governed by a mandate statute and limits it to five members.

<sup>96</sup> For instance, the law proposal PL 4475/2020, whose author is João Daniel (PT-SE) (see note above), aims to recognize legally and make official 'collective mandates' in Brazil.

<sup>97</sup> Political 'entrenchment' could have a negative connotation or be associated with unjust regimes or selfish politicians. I use the word here in a positive sense to describe how Brazilian politicians aim to entrench rights in their country to achieve, for instance, political equality and fair institutions.

<sup>98</sup> As of March 2021.

office? Why did 'collective mandates' become popular only after 2014 despite being first used in 1994? Why did politicians from the left political ideology use 'collective mandates' in the period 1994-2020?

## 2. 3. Situating ' Collective Mandates' on Democratic Research

As previously mentioned, in this chapter, I seek to explain the widespread use and promotion of collective mandates in Brazil. In this section, reviewing previous studies, I introduce the reader to endogenous and exogenous perspectives adopted by previous researchers to explain democratic innovations and their rise. In particular, I underscore why previous research is complemented by studying the use and promotion of 'collective mandates' in Brazil. By the end of this section, I pinpoint the contributions of analyzing the rise of 'collective mandates' to those two strands of research.

### 2. 3. 1. Progressive Institutional Change from Within

One can understand 'collective mandates' as a democratic innovation due to the boosted citizen participation and deliberation in the legislative process, allowing collaborative and collective policy-making. The surge of these innovations and others alike can be understood as endogenous change, i.e., democratic development explains democratic innovations. Contemporary examples of such development are the transition of the role of the citizen from mere voting in elections to participatory and deliberative practices.

Previous research has underscored this endogenous change highlighting an evolutionary process of democratic institutions from less to more participatory

practices. Scholars have vividly studied such changes, at least since the second half of the last century. For instance, this research strand has been focused on the shift from Schumpeter's (2003) understanding of democracy as an instrument to elect the elites to more participatory stances like those first pinpointed by Pateman (1970). In the same vein, a number of authors have suggested that representative democratic institutions change because new problems appear as modern societies become more complex (Urbinati and Warren, 2008).

Along the same lines of endogenous change, other researchers have also underscored a development toward more deliberative processes of democracy. In this case, democratizing democracy also includes increasing the number of citizens partaking in democratic processes like policy-making. This research strand has centered on, for instance, justifying citizen participation in democratic processes highlighting the benefits of diversity and epistemic gains (Bohman, 1998; Bohman, 2006). Besides, deliberative democracy research has underscored the relevance of deliberation for essential processes such as national and metropolitan constitution-making, climate change, political science research, or the crisis of democracy (Landemore, 2015; Cruz Ruiz, 2021; Giraudet et al., 2021; Jacobs et al., 2021; Dryzek et al., 2019).

Furthermore, democracy researchers have sampled and studied cases underscoring the evolution of democratic processes and institutions. For instance, participatory and deliberative democracy researchers and practitioners have mapped DIs, i.e., *"institutions that have been specifically designed to increase and deepen citizen participation in the political decision-making process."* (Smith, 2009; p. 1).<sup>99</sup> In

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<sup>99</sup> 'Collective Mandates' could also be considered, as Smith (2019) has more recently specified, '*participatory democratic institutions*,' a more concrete concept than '*democratic innovations*'

their mappings, DIs researchers have also documented the evolution of democracy by studying DIs as disruptive institutions, processes, mechanisms, ends, or means of democracy (Elstub and Escobar, 2019a; O'Flynn, 2019; Smith, 2019). In general, the documentation of applied cases of participatory and deliberative democracy ideals underlines the focus on the institutional evolutionary path of democratic institutions. In particular, such documentation underscores a shift in the role of citizens in modern democracies from mere partaking in elections to more engaging activities (Parkinson and Mansbridge, 2012; Fishkin, 2018).

In sum, it is possible to understand and analyze democratic innovations and political institutions' reform as the result of democratic development. Such an analysis contributes to designing new and fine-tuning existing political institutions according to democratic ideals. This type of analysis is necessary to push political institutions towards higher democratic ideals in the continuum between authoritarianism and democracy. However, I posit that democracy, as an ideal and functioning government system, should be analyzed out of a vacuum and engage with the circumstances, actors, power relationships, and temporality.<sup>100</sup> Fortunately, existing DIs research studies are engaged with the causes of democratic innovations and institutional reform beyond democratic development.

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that, among others, shifts the focus away from mainly '*new*,' '*radical*,' '*successful*,' '*innovative*' processes (Smith, 2019; p. 574).

<sup>100</sup> I argue for a study of democracy, particularly its innovations, that takes into account the effects of exogenous variables on its institutions and processes, and particularly their intersection in time. I posit that the latter is of paramount importance to explain the phenomenon of institutional change and democratic innovation, particularly when explaining why and when change occur. Including in democratic innovations analysis the context and timing of intersecting variables shaping democratic institutions and processes could contribute to understand why some DIs get to travel around the world and why others not.

## 2. 3. 2 The Effect of Time and Circumstances

It is also possible to understand the existence and rise of 'collective mandates' from an exogenous perspective. By this rationale, institutions and processes of democracy change due to the effect of circumstances surrounding them and the temporality in which they converge, e.g., economic crises, wars, pandemics, etcetera.<sup>101</sup> Similar effects have been researched by authors studying regime change and democratization. For instance, scholars have investigated the effects of economic inequality on democracy (Boix, 2003; Houle, 2009; Bartels, 2009; Ansell and Samuels, 2010; Ansell and Samuels, 2014; Houle, 2018) and the impact of economic development on democratization (Huntington, 1991; Remmer, 1992; Tilly, 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Treisman, 2020).

At the smaller scale of democratic innovation, researchers have studied the effects of regime change and economic transformation on democratic institutions (Cruz Ruiz, 2023c). Others have underlined the sociopolitical and economic complexity of the modern world affecting democratic institutions and consequently causing institutional reform and democratization (Warren, 2009). Alternative explanations have focused on the role of activists and interested actors in reforming democratic institutions (Fung, 2003; Font et al., 2014). Besides, researchers have highlighted the role of the size of the polity and political ideology in triggering the diffusion of DIs like participatory budgeting, citizen initiatives, referenda, and mini-publics (Pradeau, 2021). Along the same lines, previous research has emphasized the

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<sup>101</sup> One can research democratic innovations by accounting for the intersection in time of variables such as major economic reforms like those included in the 'Washington Consensus' and regime change as in the case of Latin America. DIs researchers could benefit from including the intersection of exogenous variables in time to understand not only why some DIs are adopted, but also how they emerge.



effects of different political national systems on DIs' success, failure, or limitation (Dryzek and Tucker, 2008).

In sum, previous research has adopted two perspectives by studying democratic innovations and their rise. The first focused on an endogenous evolution, and the second considered the circumstances affecting democratic institutions. The endogenous perspective seems to be more established than the research focused on exogenous factors causing institutional change. The endogenous perspective has provided a suitable framework for justifying and analyzing the potential for further democratizing democratic institutions. The exogenous perspective has proven useful in accounting for the relationship between democratic institutions and circumstances affecting them. For example, endogenous analyses shed light on how legislatures could be more inclusive or deliberative; exogenous analyses could explain the drivers and actors reforming democratic institutions like economic crises and politics.

After all, one can study 'collective mandates' from the two perspectives described in this section. From an endogenous perspective, one can analyze and evaluate the extent to which the institutional design of 'collective mandates' contributes to fulfilling democratic ideals like political equality or deliberation. From the same perspective, it is also possible to evaluate, for instance, the extent to which 'collective mandates' are legitimate as a political institution and whether its outputs are legitimate. In contrast, the exogenous perspective is helpful in assessing the effect of external factors in the creation, diffusion, and recent widespread interest in use and promotion. By and large, this perspective complements the endogenous perspective by accounting for the effect of external factors fostering such change. For instance, a pandemic, a war, or an economic crisis puts political institutions under stress and promotes change.

Lastly, I study 'collective mandates' in this chapter from the exogenous perspective since I seek to explain the recent interest in using these mandates after 2010 in Brazilian legislatures and political campaigns. I reckon this analysis contributes to research on the rise of DIs in Latin America, particularly the triggers or causes of democratic innovations. Such a contribution might complement future research regarding 'collective mandates' as the result of democratic development. In the next section, building upon the previous literature survey, I offer an explanation of the recent interest in the use and promotion of 'collective mandates' in Brazil after 2010.

## 2. 4. Explaining the Use of 'Collective Mandates' in Brazil

In this section, I develop my argument about the relationship between political ideology and 'collective mandates' in Brazil. Building upon previous studies, I lay out my theoretical argument on the relationship between political ideology and the widespread use of 'collective mandates' in Brazil after 2010. As explained in the previous section, I treat political ideology as an exogenous variable affecting the widespread interest in the use of 'collective mandates' in Brazil, i.e., the patterns of politicians running for a legislative seat in Brazilian legislatures claiming to use a 'collective mandate.'

In this section, I clarify how political ideology explains the steep rise in the number of politicians declaring to use 'collective mandates' after 2010. I do not neglect the merits of analyzing this DI as a result of democratic development, but I posit that an exogenous explanation seems more plausible for two reasons. First, collective mandates emerged in a relatively short time. Second, until recently, most Brazilian legislative candidates sought conventional mandates. I proceed as follows in the remainder of this section: in subsection 2.4.1. I develop my theoretical expectation

about the effect of political ideology and electoral opportunism on the widespread interest in the use of 'collective mandates.' In section 2.4.2, I offer an alternative explanation, including the electorate.

## 2. 4. 1. Political Ideology and Democratic Innovations

Prior research suggests that political ideology is a crucial cause of democratic innovations. For instance, Font et al. (2014) found two relevant pieces of evidence in their quantitative analysis of the causes of local participation in Italy and Spain.<sup>102</sup> First, political ideology matters, i.e., elected local authorities of right ideology lead conservative governments and are less interested in participatory policies. Second, they also learned that elections do not make participatory policies more prone to emerge, i.e., that politicians develop participatory processes to win elections, which might relate political ideology with the development of DIs for strategic purposes. Similarly, Ganuza and Baiocchi (2012) and Baiocchi and Ganuza (2014), in their account of the diffusion of participatory budgeting around the world, underscored that participatory budgeting was linked to the left as it emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s; and later became more neutral or less associated with the left side of politics.

Other researchers have suggested this relationship but also acknowledged the influence of other factors intervening in institutional change. For example, Vetter (2009) explains the start of political reform in local governments in Germany as a 'massive failure in governance,' public demands for reform, and changes in elite discourse towards such reforms. Besides, the same author emphasizes that the

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<sup>102</sup> The authors studied the causes of participatory processes at the local level from the regions of Catalonia, Madrid, Apulia, Tuscany, and Andalucía.

diffusion of institutional change from 1989 to 2008 was the effect of external factors, rational learning, and electoral competition.

Political ideology and its effects have been analyzed beyond the realm of democratic innovations. For instance, in more general terms, in research about the effects of political ideology on healthcare, Costa-Font et al. (2020) argue that ideology seems to affect healthcare policies. For instance, political parties from the right side of the political spectrum favor competition, the market, and private healthcare providers. In contrast, left-wing political parties support public funding of healthcare and redistributive public health policies benefiting the poor and middle classes. In short, political ideology seems to affect various political decisions, which later translate into different types of institutions or policies.

Hence, previous research suggests that political ideology plays a role in the innovation of democratic institutions. Mainly, prior studies indicate that the left is more progressive and avid in innovating democratic institutions. In other words, it is implied that the left aims to make democratic institutions more inclusive and deliberative. On the contrary, the right is more conservative than its counterpart and uninterested in boosting citizen participation and deliberation in democratic institutions. Along these lines, my theoretical expectation is that politicians and political parties from the left side of politics are more prone to promote and use 'collective mandates,' which might explain the observed pattern of legislative candidates' preferences for seeking a 'collective mandate' instead of a traditional one (more about it in section 5).

Alternatively, it might be the case that political ideology does not play any role in the innovation of democratic institutions. For example, in their quantitative analysis, Font and Galais (2011) found no effect of political ideology on the development of

participatory processes in 103 Catalanian localities. Therefore, one can theoretically expect that political ideology is irrelevant to the innovation of democratic institutions. Mainly, political ideology might not affect democratic institutions' reform or development. In this case, neither left nor right political ideology affects politicians' or political parties' interest in reforming institutions. The possible explanations for institutional reform may lie in endogenous causes or political actors' democratic agendas.

Additionally, assuming that political ideology does not affect or trigger institutional reform, it might be the case that politicians instrumentalize or see 'collective mandates' as strategic. For example, by investigating elected representatives' preferences vis-à-vis democratic innovations, Junius et al. (2020) found evidence that, among others, political ideology explains members of parliament's preferences for the use of participatory and deliberative instruments. In particular, these authors' quantitative results show that left-wing parties support more democratic innovations than right-wing parties. Junius et al. (2020) quantitative results show that representatives see democratic innovations as strategic. For instance, representatives fearing electoral defeat support DIs, and opposition politicians use more DIs. On the contrary, other studies have found evidence of elected representatives' tendency to support the institutional status quo due to the benefits derived from being incumbents (Boix, 1999; Núñez et al., 2016; Pilet and Bol, 2011).

On these grounds, regarding 'collective mandates,' it can be theoretically expected that politicians' support for 'collective mandates' may be expected to be driven in part by instrumental motivations. For example, it can be the case that politicians use this DI when running for office for strategic purposes like winning more votes in elections. In this case, politicians use this DI as an electoral gimmick to win

elections. In other words, when used for strategic purposes, as a tactic to win elections, political ideology does not play a role in the use of 'collective mandates.'

Along these same lines, there is another theoretical expectation. Politicians from the left or the right might use this DI because they might be in opposition. Regarding 'collective mandates,' the latter implies that politicians use this DI simply for electoral ends regardless of their political ideology. In particular, the Brazilian case should shed light on how the opposition uses and promotes 'collective mandates' regardless of political ideology. In sum, my second theoretical expectation is that political opportunism is the factor driving the increase in the use of 'collective mandates.' Yet, in the following subsection, I offer an alternative explanation focused on the electorate.

## 2. 4. 2. Political Ideology and the Electorate

Another, perhaps more general theoretical expectation includes the electorate. This alternative explanation centers on the electoral success of 'collective mandates' rather than their use in electoral campaigns for Brazilian legislatures. I include this alternative explanation to give credence to my explanation of the effects of political ideology and electoral opportunism on the use of 'collective mandates' in Brazilian Legislatures after 2010.

In particular, I develop this explanation since it might be the case that political ideology is a significant factor for politicians and political parties in using this type of democratic innovation but not among the electorate. For example, that the American electorate voted for President Franklin D. Roosevelt to remain in office, cannot simply be interpreted as the electorate's endorsement of the New Deal (Achen and Bartels, 2005). That electoral result arguably had much to do with the economic situation and

the electorate's perception of such reality. Similarly, Murillo et al. (2010) have highlighted that Latin American voters tend to punish incumbents in elections, regardless of political ideology and simply because of economic performance. Building upon these cases, one might expect that political ideology plays a relevant role in the supply side of democratic innovation but not on the demand side.

On these grounds, from an economic retrospective, institutional reform is related to voters' perceived economic situation. Politicians can supply 'collective mandates' in electoral campaigns and probably use such DI in Brazilian legislatures, but citizens might not demand it. The latter, along the economic retrospective lines, is due to citizens' perceived economic situation. When accounting for citizens' economic retrospective, politicians' political ideology is irrelevant for citizens when supporting or rejecting institutional change. The same logic applies to political party ideology or the use of 'collective mandates' as an electoral tactic to win an election. Taking into account voters' economic retrospective, the fate of 'collective mandates' depends on past governments' economic performance. The latter does not necessarily mean that the electorate does not support institutional reform. That is to say, from an economic retrospective, the electorate weighs and evaluates the performance of politicians based on their economic situation and rewards or penalizes the candidate. In other words, the electorate is less prone to support 'collective mandates' when the economic situation is bleak.

Along the same lines, perhaps the electorate invests its time and cognitive resources on other activities instead of economic retrospection in elections. It might be the case that the electorate does not even have the time and ability to evaluate the usefulness of democratic innovations and weigh their value when politicians or political parties supply them. Some impediments might be scant education and lack of


economic means to carry out the previously mentioned activities. For instance, Donovan and Karp (2006), analyzing the support for direct democracy, argue that citizens on the left rather than those on the right support referendums. Likewise, Bengtsson and Mattila (2009) found evidence that, in the case of Finland, citizens of right-wing ideology support less enhanced citizen participation than those from the left, particularly those less educated, less knowledgeable in politics, dissatisfied with politics, and that wanted political change. The previous results and others (Neblo et al., 2010; Bedock and Pilet, 2020; Jäske, 2017) indicate that dissatisfied citizens tend to support more DIs. Yet, as underscored by Bartels (2014), a broader comparative perspective is helpful to avoid the overinterpretation of political ideology in interpreting electoral results.

Hence, another theoretical expectation can be developed considering citizens' volition for political change. Analogously to economic retrospection, institutional reform is related to voters' perceived political situation. Specifically, it is also possible to expect that political dissatisfaction is a relevant factor in accepting or declining the use of 'collective mandates.' In this case, politicians can use 'collective mandates' in campaigns, but this supply might be irrelevant for citizens when the political situation is negatively perceived. Citizens' dissatisfaction is related to their perception of the political situation. Political retrospection includes citizens' perception of their politicians and political system. Along the lines of political retrospection, politicians' political ideology is irrelevant to citizens when they support or reject democratic innovations as 'collective mandates.' As for this case, citizens accepting or rejecting 'collective mandates' might depend on the past performance of politicians or governments. That is, political ideology does not play a role in the electorate's decision to vote for or against politicians using this type of democratic innovation in campaigns or once in



office. In other words, it is possible to expect that the electorate is prone to support 'collective mandates' when the political situation is not bleak. The latter theoretical expectation builds upon observations underscoring that in Latin America, political crises and dissatisfaction with the political and economic elites have been regular, at least since the last century, and extended to recent years.<sup>103</sup>

In sum, the theoretical expectations I spelled out in this section serve two purposes. First, I aimed to clarify my argument by building upon previous research. Second, this section serves the purpose of setting an analytical framework to use in the following section.



*Figure 5. Collective Mandates in Elections 1994-2020*

Total number of counted 'collective mandate' candidacies per election year (not cumulative count), mapped between 1994 and 2020 and classified according to political ideology. Author's calculation and graph with data provided by Secchi. See Secchi et al. (2020).

<sup>103</sup> The Rebellion Against the Elites in Latin America: A widespread sentiment of dissatisfaction and lack of fairness is driving protests across the region. The New Times. 21.01.2020. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/21/opinion/international-world/latin-america-elites-protests.html> (retrieved on 16 October 2022).

## 2. 5. Analysis and Discussion

In this section, I analyze the effects of political ideology and electoral opportunism on the use and promotion of 'collective mandates' in Brazil for the period 1994-2020 and specifically after 2010. In particular, about the latter, I focus on the patterns of politicians running for a seat in Brazilian legislatures declaring to use a 'collective mandate.' Besides, in this section, I also include an alternative explanation focused on the electorate to shed light on the demand for collective mandates and complement my main explanation. I conclude this section with some reflections on the demand for 'collective mandates.'

### 2. 5. 1. Political Ideology and 'Collective Mandates'

As figure 5 shows, it seems that politicians and political parties from the left are promoting and using 'collective mandates' more often than their counterparts from the right side of politics. For instance, in 2020, politicians from the left used this DI 253 times when running for a legislative seat, while politicians from the right used it only 23 times, and those from the center 37 times. Based on the mapping, it seems that the left is supplying more often than their counterparts this type of democratic innovation, which suggests that political ideology influences the use of 'collective mandates' in political campaigns and Brazilian legislatures.

In the case of Brazil, and focusing on 'collective mandates,' it seems that left political ideology is far more progressive regarding democratic innovation. The left used this DI for the first time and has used it in total more than politicians from the right or the center. For instance, from 1994 to 2020, the left used this DI in 304 political campaigns, while the right and the center only 39 and 80 times, respectively. These

data suggest that the left is more prone to support DIs. The latter agrees with research analyzing the effects of left political ideology on participatory policies and institutions. For instance, in the case of participatory budgeting, the left sponsored and promoted the use of this participatory mechanism in the Global South (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014; Goldfrank, 2012) and also in the Global North (Sintomer et al., 2008). In the Brazilian case, politicians and political parties from the left side of politics are more prone to promote and use 'collective mandates,' as theoretically expected and detailed in section 4.

The 'collective mandates' case sheds light on the participatory and deliberative preferences of left political ideology in Brazil, but such preferences are not exclusive to this country. For instance, in the case of Spanish municipalities, Vallbé and Iglesias (2018) found statistically significant effects of left political ideology on politicians' preferences for participatory democracy. In the case of 'collective mandates,' it seems that political ideology influences politicians' preferences for using this type of mandate in political campaigns and Brazilian legislatures. In fact, during the entire mapped period, particularly after 2010, politicians from the left and center often used and promoted this type of democratic innovation (see Figure 5). Politicians from the right side of the political spectrum did not match their leftist counterparts. Politicians from the right appear to be less interested in institutional reform, democratic innovation, and in particular, participatory and deliberative practices.

As shown in figures 4 and 5, there seems to be a relationship between political ideology and the use and promotion of 'collective mandates.' However, there might be cases somewhere else in the world for other DIs cases, in which political ideology does not play any relevant role in the use and promotion of 'collective mandates.' In such a case, the rise of such democratic innovation might be simply due to modern forms of

public administration and governance (Warren, 2009). This alternative theoretical explanation implies that institutional reforms are expected to happen since modern governments worldwide are more open to the public and include more deliberation in decision-making. The latter is an example of what I posited in the sections above about endogenous causes of democratic innovations, i.e., democratic development explains democratic innovations and other institutional reforms.

On these grounds, one might explain the use and promotion of 'collective mandates' in two ways. The first might explain innovation and reform of political institutions focusing on endogenous causes, highlighting institutional development. For example, the latter includes modern public administration or contemporary modern international governance practices. The second approach focuses on outside factors like political and economic circumstances. An example of the latter are sociopolitical changes like political extremism from which political institutions cannot be totally isolated. By this rationale, and as for the case of 'collective mandates,' the mapping of cases (see figure 4 and 5) indicate that political ideology indeed influences the use and promotion of this democratic innovation.

Other circumstantial pieces of evidence give credence to political ideology as an exogenous cause of democratic innovation. At least two cases exemplify the latter. For instance, during the last three decades after 1990, Latin American democracies, including the case of Brazil, seem to be very experimentalist and reformed political institutions at all political levels (Pogrebinschi, 2021). Another example is the left turn in Latin American democracies, which permeated democratic institutions and processes (Arditi, 2009).<sup>104</sup> Besides, the progressive hues of the left in institutional

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<sup>104</sup> The left turn, as mentioned by Arditi (2009), refers not only to the electoral success of the left in Latin America. The same author notes that this turn involves the left's ability to shape the

reform efforts in Latin America coincided with the 'Third Wave of Democratization' (Huntington, 1991; Hagopian and Mainwaring, 2005) and with the 'Washington Consensus' (Williamson, 1993; Williamson, 2000). These sociopolitical and economic reforms affected the dynamic of institutional change (Cruz Ruiz, 2023c).

## 2. 5. 2. Electoral Opportunism and 'Collective Mandates'

While left political ideology might explain the inception, diffusion, and national spread of 'collective mandates,' the pattern in the use of these mandates after 2010 in Brazilian legislatures and political campaigns deserves a separate explanation accounting for the effect of circumstances and other exogenous factors in democratic and institutional reform. The logic is that politicians used 'collective mandates' for the first time in 1994 but only became popular after 2010.

I underscore that there seems to be a relationship between the left and the use of 'collective mandates' (figure 4), which explains the inception, discussion, use, and promotion of 'collective mandates' in Brazil. Yet, I argue that the pattern shown in figures 3 and 5 is partially explained by political ideology and complemented by electoral opportunism. On its own, the latter variable could fully explain 'collective mandates' or other DIs in other polities, but for the case of 'collective mandates,' it only complements political ideology.

I argue that these two variables explain the popularity of the use of 'collective mandates' after 2010 in Brazilian legislatures and political campaigns (figures 3 and 5). I posit that the two explanations are complementary under the sociopolitical

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political agenda and redefine democratic practices. In particular, the Latin American left tends to demand equality without necessarily abolishing capitalism or international trade. In sum, the author's analysis indicates that the Latin American left is more experimentalist than conservative vis-à-vis democracy and its institutions.

circumstances in Brazil after 2010. The massive increase in the use of 'collective mandates' seems to overlap with the rise of the far right and the fall of the left after 2010. In particular, the left in Brazil lost political momentum, among others, by sprawling corruption involving its most publicly known figures. At least three moments can be highlighted: Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva handpicking Dilma Rousseff as his presidential successor in 2010,<sup>105</sup> Dilma Rousseff's impeachment in 2016,<sup>106</sup> and the prolonged corruption scandal in which ex-president Lula da Silva was involved after he left the presidency in 2010.<sup>107</sup> As for the case of the rise of the right, as Goldstein (2019) described, among others, the right succeeded in labeling the left as an enemy. In particular, the right capitalized on the fall of the left after the Great Crisis of 2008 (Payne and de Souza Santos, 2020) and also succeeded due to a mix of different factors and circumstances, including the mastery of the use of the media and social media to put their agendas forward (Davis and Straubhaar, 2020; Saad-Filho and Boito, 2016).

Having the fall of the left and the rise of the right as a backdrop, I pinpoint the significant interest of the left in using 'collective mandates' during elections (see figures 4 and 5) and the difficulty in decoupling political ideology from the pattern of politicians using and promoting 'collective mandates' after 2010. Succinctly, taking into account the fall of the left and the rise of the right, it seems that politicians' use of 'collective mandates' is an electoral strategy to win elections (see figure 5). Particularly, the fact

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<sup>105</sup> Brazil's President Works to Lend Popularity to a Protégée. The New York Times. 25.10.2022. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/americas/26brazil.html> (retrieved on 16 October 2022).

<sup>106</sup> Dilma Rousseff Is Ousted as Brazil's President in Impeachment Vote. The New York Times. 31.08.2022. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/world/americas/brazil-dilma-rousseff-impeached-removed-president.html> (retrieved on 16 October 2022).

<sup>107</sup> Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva: The Rise and Fall of a Brazilian Leader. The New York Times. 12.07.2017. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/world/americas/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-the-rise-and-fall-of-a-brazilian-leader.html> (retrieved on 16 October 2022).

that left-wing politicians use more often 'collective mandates' than right-wing politicians in elections underscores my theoretical expectation about electoral opportunism. Yet, despite 'collective mandates' were used as an electoral gimmick, political ideology influenced left-wing politicians to use and promote this new mechanism of citizen participation and deliberation.

Along the same lines, 'collective mandates' are more often used after 2010, which begs the question about the causes of such popularity, mainly since the left was in opposition, e.g., at the national level. Based on the collected data (see figures 4 and 5), it seems that being of left political ideology is closely related to the use of 'collective mandates' in Brazil, which is in line with my theoretical expectations on electoral opportunism. In particular, between 1994 and 2010, the total number of 'collective mandates' was five, i.e., only one politician used this type of mandate per election (5 elections in total). In the same period, the left was the only political ideology using this democratic innovation in political campaigns and Brazilian legislatures. In the rest of the mapping, covering five more elections between 2012 and 2020, the left used this democratic innovation very frequently (299 candidacies). In the same period, right and center politicians used this democratic innovation more conservatively (the right 39 candidacies and the center 80 candidacies). Left politicians used 'collective mandates' more often than right and center politicians. Of the total number of used 'collective mandates' in the period 1994-2020 (423 mandates), left politicians used almost three-fourths of the total number of mapped 'collective mandates' (304 mandates), while the right and the center only one-fourth of the total (119 'collective mandates').

If 'collective mandates' were solely used for opportunistic electoral purposes, one might expect that the political ideology of politicians and political parties does not play any role in the use of 'collective mandates' in Brazil. However, as I also explained

in this article section, such explanations do not consider the complementarity of political ideology and electoral opportunism, accounting for Brazil's sociopolitical circumstances after 2010. Only when considered in tandem, both political ideology and political opportunism explain the pattern in the use of 'collective mandates' after 2010 in Brazil during political campaigns and legislatures.

### 2. 5. 3. The Electorate and 'Collective Mandates'

To supplement my theory on the supply of 'collective mandates' in Brazil, I approach in this section the demand size, focusing on the electorate. This approach is a simple theoretical exercise to underscore the importance of understanding the supply and demand of DIs. I posit that the latter is crucial for a more thorough understanding of the dynamics in the creation, diffusion, and fate of democratic innovations. I focus on the demand when elections occur, knowing that judging 'collective mandates' success in terms of winning a legislative seat in elections is an unfair measure of the effectiveness of their use.

With this backdrop in mind, I argue that the fate of this democratic innovation depends on the electorate's support in elections. As the mapping of this DI shows, it seems that the electorate did not support the use of 'collective mandates' when these instruments were used as an electoral campaign promise. According to da Silva et al. (2021) and Secchi et al. (2020), in the period 1994-2020, only 54 out of 423 'collective mandate' candidacies succeeded. Of those elected, 36 politicians belonged to left political ideology, 11 to the center, and 7 to the right (a success of almost 13 percent). Besides, when it comes to the election and support of particular politicians using 'collective mandates,' I assume that the electorate pays close attention to how well or worse they are faring in electoral times. Concisely, based on the small number of



'collective mandate' candidacies that won elections (54 out of 423), the electorate apparently cared little about political ideology. It seems that the electorate does not care about political parties or politicians' political ideology, nor whether this democratic innovation is used as an electoral gimmick, but probably more about how well they are faring.

In the Brazilian case, it seems that the Great Recession of 2008 reset the economic benefits the left created as the left turn was in full swing. This situation arguably had a negative effect on how well Brazilian citizens were faring, particularly those who were mainly supporters of the left, principally the Workers Party. Under these circumstances, it seems that citizens penalized the left and favored the right in elections because they were not faring well. Now, focusing on the case of 'collective mandates,' it seems that the Brazilian electorate was less prone to support 'collective mandates' when the economic situation was bleak, which is in line with my theoretical expectations.

Likewise, at least since the first use of collective mandates, it seems that when the economic situation was well in Brazil, politicians and political parties did not supply 'collective mandates' to the public vis-à-vis when the economic situation was worse, and the right was in power. In other words, when Brazil was faring well economically from the end of the 1990s till the Great Economic Crisis in 2008, 'collective mandates' were not very popular among politicians or political parties. From the demand side, the electorate was less prone to support 'collective mandates' when the economic situation was bleak, which is in line with my theoretical expectation.

Finally, as an alternative explanation, it can be that the Brazilian electorate does electoral retrospection but emphasizes the political situation more than the economic

one. The reasons to focus more on the political side of the story rather than on the economic one are manifold. I assume that an emphasis on the political side would be related to dissatisfaction with the political circumstances. In the Brazilian case, this might be an essential factor to consider. For instance, Brazilian citizens might be dissatisfied with the public administration and their politicians. The recent political scandals involving the left might have played a significant role in triggering such apathy and penalization of politicians from the left. This situation might considerably affect rejecting certain political parties and politicians, despite offering the electorate opportunities to reform the political and democratic system.

Based on the mapped cases of 'collective mandates,' there are indications that the political situation was crucial when getting the electorate's support. Arguably, when the political situation was more or less stable, it was hard to assess whether the public would support 'collective mandates' because even politicians were not offering this opportunity to the electorate. On the contrary, as the political situation worsened, epitomized by the fall of the left and the rise of the right after 2010, politicians used and promoted this democratic innovation more, but the electorate did not respond accordingly (see Figure 3 and 5). On these grounds, there are indications that the electorate is not prone to support collective mandates when the political situation is not bleak, which disagrees with my theoretical expectations.

Lastly, as pinpointed before, democratic innovation is not monocausal. A thorough analysis helps understand why democratic institutions change or not. It surely can be the case that politicians' political ideology is a relevant factor when using, promoting, and institutionalizing 'collective mandates,' and also that voters tend to change their political views and support according to the economic performance of the incumbents. There might be many other nuances—for instance, the rise of a far-right

candidate to the Brazilian presidency. Similarly to what I described here for the rise of 'collective mandates,' Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco (2020), based on their 10-year-long ethnographic study in a low-income community in Porto Alegre, explain the support for Bolsonaro as the result of the rise and fall of the economy and political system. Nevertheless, unlike my 'collective mandates' analysis, these authors argue that the Workers Party period empowered the poor and created a sense of self-worth by including them in the formal economy. However, any positive effects created during Lulism (2002-2016), as the same authors argued, faded away as the economy fell, creating in citizens a sense of vulnerability and the perfect recipients for Bolsonaro's promises to change the situation.

The analysis of Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco (2020) sheds light on the dynamics that influence the rise of specific democratic innovations. Their analysis tells us how much citizens' opinions can change because of the political and economic situation and what is happening in the local context as democratic innovations are rising. For instance, this ethnographic study took place in Mora da Cruz, Porto Alegre, the cradle of participatory budgeting and openly left-wing that swung to the right-wing of politics in 2018. The latter shows the fragility of democracy and democratic innovations.

Moreover, concerning 'collective mandates' and the fragility of democracy and its innovations, understanding the election of Bolsonaro as more than a simple rejection of the economic and political status quo sheds light on other variables, like popular political actors, of significant relevance when supporting democratic innovations. For instance, Layton et al. (2021) underscore that right-wing candidates like Bolsonaro can still gain supporters by polarizing the electorate along gender, race, ethnicity, and religion. Again, this situation sheds light on the significance of caring

about democracy and its innovations. In turbulent times of democratic erosion, it is crucial to notice that pernicious actors can lead others toward a significant democratic failure. For instance, as Guerra Molina and Badillo Sarmiento (2021) have suggested in Brazil's case, wearing down democratic values leads to a decline in support of the democratic political system.

## 2. 6. Conclusion

I explained in this chapter the expanding interest in the use and promotion of 'collective mandates' in Brazil, a DI from the Global South, mostly unknown in the Global North. My argument developed around the relationship between political ideology, political opportunism, and 'collective mandates.' Though this DI was first used in 1994, I mainly focused on the period after 2010, when this DI was more widely used in political campaigns and Brazilian legislatures.

Building upon previous research, I developed two main theoretical expectations. The first focused on the relationship between political ideology and democratic innovation to later analyze 'collective mandates' between 1994-2020 within a political ideology framework. The second centered on political opportunism as a complement of political ideology to explain the steep interest of legislative candidates using and promoting 'collective mandates' after 2010. With the results of my analysis, I could pinpoint the relationship between political ideology and democratic innovation, mainly the influence of the former on the latter. There are two main conclusions drawn from the analysis above. First, left-wing political ideology positively influences the use of 'collective mandates' in Brazil. Second, political ideology and political opportunism explain the pattern of legislative candidacies, particularly after 2010.

Since the case of 'collective mandates' is new to DIs, participatory and deliberative research, fellow researchers might want to explore this DI further and test quantitatively the theoretical expectations I developed in this chapter. For instance, researchers might want to quantitatively test the supply and demand of these mechanisms in Brazil. Besides, regarding endogenous and exogenous causes of democratic innovations, upcoming research can compare the inception, diffusion, and fate of DIs similar to 'collective mandates' in other regions of the world. This type of research might cast more light on the differences between the Global North and the Global South when it comes to democratic innovation due to circumstantial differences affecting democratic innovation and institutional reform. Furthermore, future research might want to test whether the causes of democratic reforms or innovations in the Global North are mostly endogenous, while in the Global South, they are exogenous.

Besides, an exciting prospect for upcoming research is investigating whether being in opposition or being an incumbent plays a role in promoting and using more assiduously democratic innovations. The 'collective mandate' case hints at that possibility, but it might be a different case in other regions of the world. For instance, there might be cases in which the right pushes for more reforms when in opposition. Clearly, there is also room for further investigation of particular preferences of the left and the right on types of democratic innovations, mainly when they are in opposition. I expect that researchers interested in investigating the effect of political ideology on DIs inception and diffusion also take into account the effect of circumstances, actors, interests, and time on democratic innovation and institutional reform. This type of analysis might have been limited in the past due to few mapped cases. However, nowadays, diverse databases like LATINNO or Participedia allow for such analyses across territories and over time.

Furthermore, in this chapter, I pinpointed the case of retrospective voting in Brazil, focusing on the case of 'collective mandates.' Further research might want to test whether voters sanction incumbents when the economic situation is bleak and when trust in government is low, particularly in the case of 'collective mandates' and other DIs, as they are preferred to traditional mandates. The relationship between using and promoting DIs and incumbents and opposition is promising. Politicians and relevant political actors might have developed the best democratic innovation ever, but they need not only suitable political and economic means to put them forward but also popular support when using such new mechanisms of decision-making, popular participation, and deliberation in modern democracies.

Relatedly, I also underscored the value of including the political context in analyzing public support for democratic innovations. Future research might investigate the relationship between political dissatisfaction and the successful adoption of democratic innovations. This prospect analysis is relevant to understanding the reasons behind adopting or rejecting DIs in modern democracies. Lastly, this research exploration might also contribute to understanding why some democratic innovations get to travel the world while others do not. One can expect theoretically that 'collective mandates' will spread worldwide only after they have proven to be a success. Alternatively, they will probably not make it to other regions if they are not considered electorally successful. In both cases, an analysis of their success or failure will benefit from taking into account exogenous variables and their temporal intersections affecting DIs development, adoption, and consequent spread throughout the world.

# CHAPTER III

## Citizen's Inputs and Influence in Mexico City's Constitution-Making

### 3. 1. Introduction

The Schumpeterian view of democracy reserved for the citizen a rather simplistic democratic activity: voting in elections. Deliberative and participatory democracy scholars have challenged that view and justified a more active role of citizens in processes and institutions of modern democracies, such as policy-making. In this chapter, I add to that discussion by highlighting the contributions of boosted citizen participation and fostered deliberation in the 2016 Mexico City constitution-making.

I analyze this constitution-making to disentangle and pinpoint the intervening factors in its crafting. While similar studies focus on the design, I take a practical and exogenous approach to understanding the effects of variables outside the process affecting this constitution-making. I focus mainly on the actors, circumstances, and technological aids. Above all, in this chapter, I highlight the positive effects of citizen participation and deliberation in creating an informed constitution. To highlight those

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epistemic contributions, I approach the 2016 Mexico City Constitution-Making from a supply and demand perspective to emphasize the role of actors, circumstances, and time. Later, focusing on writing a constitution, I evaluate citizens' inputs and influence to single out the epistemic and legitimacy gains of including citizen participation and deliberation in constitution-making.

More precisely, I approach the 2016 Mexico City Constitution-Making from a DIs perspective to highlight mainly its innovativeness. Using that analytical lens, I underscore that citizens' active engagement and thoughtful input were instrumental in crafting this constitution. However, the focus of my paper differs somewhat from conventional research on DIs. For instance, most research on democratic innovations has centered on identifying and studying deliberative and participatory practices that strive to achieve democratic ideals such as political equality, transparency, inclusiveness, and open discussion (Smith, 2005a; 2009; Smith et al., 2015). Yet, the conventional DIs research and my DIs approach empirically contest the view that citizens cannot engage with political issues and influence public policy (Achen and Bartels, 2016; Brennan, 2016).

My analysis provides a comprehensive examination of the context and timeframe surrounding the 2016 Mexico City Constitution-Making. Through this analysis, I identify the key factors that contributed to its adoption and delineate the specific roles played by the various political actors involved. My approach highlights the significant implications of citizen participation and deliberation in constitution-making. Similarly, I underline the contributions of my analysis to DIs research and also to constitution-making scholarship, studying the design of constitution-making (Elster, 2012), crowdsourced methods to write such documents (Landemore, 2015; Gherghina



and Miscoiu, 2016), survival of constitutions (Elkins et al., 2009), and comparative approaches (Ginsburg et al., 2009; Ginsburg, 2012).

In general, I describe the antecedents, temporality, and conditions under which political actors allowed citizens to participate in constitution-making. I analyze the constitution-making of Mexico City from two perspectives. First, from a supply and demand approach to examine citizens and political actors' interplay to start and open this process to citizen participation, deliberation, and the implementation of digital means such as collaborative writing webpages. Second, I examine the influence of citizen participation in constitution-making by examining its input, throughput, and output legitimacy.

In section two, I present the central debates about the importance of citizen participation in democratic processes, especially in constitution-making. Then, in section three, I analyze the demand and supply of constitution-making in Mexico City. In this section, I mainly focus on the role of the actors involved in this constitution-making, describe the set of circumstances surrounding the process, and give more details about the context in which the process took place. In section four, I examine the contributions of citizens to the constitutional text by analyzing the legitimacy of the constitution-making. I conclude this chapter in section five, summarizing the theoretical contributions of this chapter to research on democratic innovations and underlying the contributions of citizen participation to crafting constitutions.

## 3. 2. Citizen Participation in Democracy and Constitution-Making

From an ideal democratic view, the inclusion of a diverse range of stakeholders and their input is imperative when it comes to constitution-making and democracy. Inclusion enhances the legitimacy of collective decision-making and demonstrates a firm commitment to political equality, as emphasized by pluralists (Dahl, 1985). Other scholars suggest that citizens' partaking in decision-making improves the quality of democracy (Morlino, 2012) or that such involvement can have some educative effects on the partakers (Pateman, 1970). Involving a diverse group of people in making decisions and constitutions is key to democracy today and in the future.

Scholars have extended the viewpoints indicating a change in the role of citizens in contemporary democracies, where they are more involved and committed to its processes and institutions (Chambers, 2003; Dryzek, 2002; Elstub, 2018; Habermas, 1996). More practically, including everyone or anyone affected by any decision-making echoes principles of political equality and enhances citizens' voice and influence in democratic decisions and institutions. I contend that such normative statements denote a rupture with traditional conceptions of democracy, probably developed after Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 2003).

The involvement of citizens in the process of creating a constitution has received significant academic scrutiny. For instance, normative analyses have centered their attention on these procedures, particularly on the constitution-making design and the stages in which citizen participation could enhance the legitimacy and the deliberation of the process (Elster, 1995; 1998; 2012) or increase the epistemic quality of democratic decision-making (Landemore and Elster, 2012). Scholars have

found that involving citizens in democratic processes can make the very same processes and institutions of democracy fairer, more thoughtful, and more democratic.

Citizen participation in democratic processes has been further justified by scholars due to its epistemic value (Bohman, 2006). This perspective emphasizes the importance of integrating more citizens into decision-making due to its contributions to widening the diversity of perspectives. Furthermore, since this procedural approach deals with enhanced participation, it has theorized about essential features of such participation and deliberation, like considered judgment. This emphasis on deliberation has led scholars to create models and devices, like the deliberative poll, to set up the right conditions to achieve the best deliberations possible (Luskin et al., 2002). Besides these epistemic analyses, scholars researching citizen participation and deliberation in constitution-making have underscored their ex-post positive effects on democracy (Eisenstadt et al., 2017), the design of constituent assemblies (Elster, 1998; Elster, 2012), and the normative expectations and the empirical challenges of including citizens in constitution-making (Fishkin, 2011; Reuchamps and Suiter, 2016).

However, enhancing and boosting citizen participation in any democratic process and institution implies increasing diverse costs. For instance, more coordination is required to maintain efficiency as participation increases. The efficiency issues have implications for democratic processes and informed decision-making, for example, those related to political equality and legitimacy (Tucker, 1980; Dahl, 2015; Fishkin, 2011; Dahl, 1967). Because of that, I emphasize in this chapter the importance of the means to funnel citizen needs and wants during the different stages of constitution-making since they are essential to assuring that citizen inputs are adequately managed and used in the constitution-making.

On these grounds, I argue that constitution-making is legitimate when citizens' inputs are well-managed and reflected in the final version of the constitutional text. Likewise, I underline the importance of adequately managing citizen inputs toward achieving an informed constitution and the success of the process. In this regard, I argue that technology can contribute to the constitution-making by enhancing its efficiency and transparency, as shown in the constitution-making of Iceland whereby citizens could read, comment, and make proposals online to the work of the constitution-making Council (Elster, 2016; Ingimundarson et al., 2016; Landemore, 2015) or the Romanian constitutional reform attempt of 2013 in which citizens had the opportunity to participate in making their constitution via an online platform akin to the Icelandic case (Gherghina and Miscoiu, 2016). However, as the Icelandic or Romanian case show, regardless of the democratic size or political context, technology implementation does not secure that a constitution gets enacted.

Therefore, I assess the legitimacy of the constitution-making of Mexico City and pinpoint citizen influence in constitution-making following a similar analytical framework to the 2013 Romanian constitutional reform (Gherghina and Miscoiu, 2016). This framework analysis is similar to others drawing on the analytical framework of input, throughput, and output legitimacy to scrutinize constitutional reforms (Reuchamps and Suiter, 2016). The threefold approach highlights the need for decision-making or constitution-making processes to be responsive and effective according to citizen needs and demands while keeping an open, transparent, efficacious, and inclusive approach. I proceed this way to shed light on how citizen participation played a central role in the constitution-making of Mexico City. I aim to highlight whether the process' design achieved inclusiveness, transparency, accountability, and reliability.

### 3. 3. A Supply and Demand Approach to Constitution-Making

I posit that constitution-making benefits from citizen participation and deliberation in legitimacy and information terms. I contend that such contributions go beyond normative commitments and expectations. For example, in modern complex societies, democratic processes and institutions like constitution-making benefit greatly from enhanced participation and deliberation due to contemporary problems society faces, such as pandemics and international wars. Nevertheless, despite justified normative expectations and practical intentions, modern democratic institutions and processes have not included as much deliberation and citizen participation to catch up with the extraordinary complexity of modern societies.

I posit that this lack of institutional reform, or democratic innovation, is partly explained by the role of political actors pushing for this type of change. To illustrate my argument and examine the participatory implications of Constitution-Making, I analyze the Mexico City case by focusing on the involved actors, the circumstances around the processes, temporality, and briefly describing the process of drafting and approving. I start my description of this constitution-making by enumerating the types of actors and degrees of intervention in the constitution-making of Mexico City. As mentioned, I do so to understand this process's demand and supply side.

#### 3. 3. 1. Actors Partaking in Constitution-Making

I identify three types of actors crafting the Constitution of Mexico City. I use this classification to distinguish the prevailing partakers and correspond chiefly to the stage they joined the process. The first-level actors are the President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto (in office 1 December 2012 – 30 November 2018), the Mayor of Mexico

City, Miguel Ángel Mancera Espinosa (in office 5 December 2012 – 29 March 2018), and officials working for the legislative powers at the national and local level (Government of Mexico City). The second-level actors are Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), and the third-level includes all individual participants who took part in any of the processes collecting input for this constitution. The role of such actors varies; for example, first-level actors opened the constitution-making, third-level actors contributed to making an informed constitution, and second-level actors enabled the coordination between the first and the third-level actors.

I contend that the role of first-level actors was indispensable to making the process participatory, deliberative, and inclusive. For instance, this constitution-making started in 2013 when Mexico City Mayor delivered the Mexico City political reform initiative to the National Mexican Congress of the Union. Since then, he began consulting with citizens and diverse stakeholders on the content of the new constitution. Additionally, other first-level actors like the presidents of the leading Mexican political parties<sup>108</sup> and the President of Mexico propitiated this constitution-making as they signed in 2012 the 'Pacto por México' (2013),<sup>109</sup> a political agreement including the political reform of Mexico City and other political matters in halt during several years due to lack of political agreement (Gobierno de la Ciudad de México, 2016a).

Consequently, I argue that the 'Pacto por México' formalized the collaboration of first-level actors and empowered the Mayor of Mexico City to open and legitimate

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<sup>108</sup> At the time, the main political parties in Mexico were the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Spanish: Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI), the National Action Party (Spanish: Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (Spanish: Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD).

<sup>109</sup> The pact included Mexico City's political reform among other 95 political agreements.

constitution-making by involving citizens, politicians, underrepresented groups, and CSOs in crafting an informed and long-lasting constitution (ASJ, 2013; Romero Sánchez and Bolaños Sánchez, 2013; Gobierno de la Ciudad de México, 2016c). Furthermore, I underscore that the smooth collaboration of first-level actors emerged out of a national context of renewed democratization field (RRG, 2018), probably because the PRI returned to the presidency after being 12 years out of office.<sup>110</sup> I argue that political actors had incentives to collaborate and push their political agendas forward in such a panorama of political transition.

Later as the process continued, first-level actors conceded their leading role to second-level actors during the drafting of the constitution by creating a couple of groups to draft the constitutional texts. I underline that CSOs and representatives of interest groups like businesspeople and academia gathered inputs on the constitution's content and raised awareness of the process during this stage. I highlight that this participation was beneficial in the later stages of the process since some of the invited CSOs belonged to underrepresented groups in Mexico City and the country, e.g., indigenous people. I underline that this stage allowed citizens and all-interested to shape the agenda of the process, which was particularly relevant and vital for underrepresented groups and minorities. In general, I contend that this first opening of the process benefited in participatory and legitimacy terms later stages of the writing of the constitution by publicizing the 'open' process and the political will to make the process inclusive, participatory, and deliberative.

Finally, the third-level actors were more dynamic in the primary stages of the process, probably because the first-level actors established rules to funnel their

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<sup>110</sup> From 1921 to 2000, the PRI dominated Mexican politics, controlling the presidency, numerous state governorships, and seats in both federal and state legislatures.

participation, and second-level actors coordinated the process. Examples of those rules and mechanisms are the instruments to gather, process, and make the most out of citizen inputs. For instance, first-level actors propitiated and implemented rules to make citizen inputs significant to the constitution-making process and its content. Specifically, during the drafting period, these actors embraced technology to collect and process citizens' inputs for the constitutional text and legitimate the draft to be discussed and amended by the Constituent Assembly. Actors adopted technological and more conventional means, such as surveys and stands located at different points in the city, to enable citizen participation and deliberation.

### 3. 3. 2. General Conditions Under Which Inclusion is Engendered

My analytical framework of DI supply and demand emphasizes the crucial influence of political actors, as well as the sociopolitical and economic conditions in play. Examining the motivations behind these actors' institutional innovations requires a holistic approach beyond their role. In the case of Mexico City's 2016 Constitution-Making, the first-level actors played a vital role in opening up the process to more participation and deliberation. However, it is equally important to consider the various interests involved.

In this section, I explain the circumstances that existed before and during the creation of the constitution for Mexico City. I argue that these circumstances were favorable and unique for making the process highly participatory since such circumstances are irreplicable. Therefore, I discuss in this section the important factors that allowed for citizens to be involved in the democratic process and how they influenced the content and creation of the constitution. I analyze the crucial elements that were in place during the initial implementation of this democratic process.



To understand the opening of the 2016 Mexico City Constitution-Making, it is crucial to underline that Mexico City's political and economic landscape underwent significant transformations in the thirty years preceding the writing of its constitution. A significant shift occurred in the political arena, with citizens demanding more political rights. Previously, citizens were stripped of their right to vote or choose their representatives since Mexico City was a federal district under the control of the Federal Mexican Government. Nonetheless, this changed in the late 1980s when the federal government had to respond to the citizens' clamor and allow local elections.

I argue that such recently acquired rights motivated citizens to elect innovative over traditional governments. This preference partially explains why governments in this city have been mostly from opposition parties, less akin to the PRI and its political agenda. I underline 'partially' because Mexico City citizens have long embraced social activism and political and public participation. The open constitution-making shows how important it is for first-level actors to listen to politically engaged citizens.

Besides, political actors' attitudes towards constitution-making might have been shaped by their perception of its impact on the current political and economic status quo and vice versa. For instance, the latter half of the 20th century witnessed significant economic growth in the country, which likely contributed to this perspective. Mexico City played a pivotal role in driving the economic and political transformations that occurred during this period, buoyed, among others, by Mexico's integration into the global economy. For example, theoretically, the integration of Mexico into the global realm brought in foreign investments and led to a shift in democratic, cultural, and political practices.

To summarize, I propose that the national political and economic circumstances during the creation of the constitution influenced the beliefs of primary actors, leading to the decision to open up the constitution-making process. I emphasize that changes in political and economic practices had a beneficial impact on encouraging actors to negotiate and work together across different levels of government and opposing political factions. In short, opening the constitution was possible thanks to socioeconomic and political circumstances.

### 3. 3. 3. The Context of Mexico City's Constitution-making

In the section above, I argued that the timing and circumstances surrounding this constitution-making affected actors' decisions and choices to make it more open and participative. I argued that writing this constitution became urgent due to the saliency of the political circumstances present in the country and the capital city at the time. I posit that the Federal Mexican Government's change of preferences was reflected in the 'Pacto por Mexico' (2013). The relevance of this pact is evident by looking at the number of previous and failed attempts of the Mexico City Government to reform the political organization of its territory (Gobierno de la Ciudad de México, 2016a).

In particular, I posit that the return of the PRI to the Mexican presidency was the main reason why the political reform of Mexico City was accepted, and citizen participation was enhanced. The PRI was to increase its legitimacy, and its strategy was to build consensus because the circumstances were not favorable for this party, particularly after the 12 years that the presidential office was lost to the PAN. In 2012 the PRI was back in the Mexican presidency but had a minority in the legislatures, the general elections were contested, and public opinion was not favorable for the party. In this context, the PRI had to negotiate with the opposition to govern, and the 'Pacto

por México' was created, which improved the political relations and negotiations among Mexican political parties at national, regional, and local levels.

Moreover, studies on constitution-making at the national level argue that the crafting of constitutions occurs in moments of crisis (Elster, 1995). For instance, the Icelandic constitution-making did occur after the financial crisis of 2008 (Landemore, 2015). Another example is the Romanian attempt to reform the constitutions in 2013, predicated on diverse political conflicts such as presidential impeachments (Gherghina and Miscoiu, 2016). In the case of Mexico City, social movements and other political-related events preceded the writing of its constitution, although not acute. Those peaceful events took place when the Mexican presidential regime flaunted political, economic, and military power in the Mexican territory, with no preference, at least from a purely observational point of view, for regime change in the Mexican capital. However, that federal power started to dilute as tragic events in 1968 and 1971 related to student movements triggered political reforms to foster political pluralism and more civic participation. Other events, such as the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, also contributed to that detriment by showing the failure of the Federal Government to react fittingly and efficiently to humanitarian catastrophes in Mexico City. In the instances mentioned above, events arguably prompted citizens to be more critical of the federal government and demand more civil liberties. Besides, CSOs and opposition parties made those claims part of their political agenda.

Moreover, the Federal Government changed its preferences towards the capital after coming back to power, probably due to a tendency to uphold political support and gain political legitimacy due to very competitive national elections. In particular, the restricted power of the PRI when returning to power made it change preferences, set strategies, and negotiate with other political parties to put its agenda further. This

change in the variable 'political power' at the national level affected the relationship with the local governments. Subsequently, the local government of Mexico City profited from this scheme and put forward its agenda of political reform, which had precedents that failed in the past. Altogether, the PRI's return to power in 2012 changed the preferences of the actors involved in the political reform of Mexico City. Simultaneously, the decision to reform the Federal District strengthened the power position of the local government over the federal government, and the former benefited from this situation and opened the process further.

In sum, in this section, I tried to simplify the complexity of the context in which the Mexico City constitution-making process started in 2012. I drafted the reasons behind the opportunities to participate in the democratic process and influence the constitutional text. Through this contextualization, I accentuated the political circumstances' saliency to explain the boosted citizen participation and openness of Mexico City's constitution-making. Finally, after focusing on the last sections about the actors, circumstances, and context, I describe the actual constitution-making in the following two sections. I portray the constitution's drafting and amendment approval and describe the instruments implemented to manage and use citizens' inputs in both moments and the last version of the constitution.

### **3. 3. 4. The Drafting and Approving of Mexico City's Constitution**

In this section, I describe the mechanisms used to make and approve the Constitution of Mexico City. The crafting started unofficially in 2013, right after Miguel Angel Mancera Espinosa presented to the Congress of the Union Mexico City's Political Reform Initiative (Gobierno de la Ciudad de México, 2016c). Since then, for more than three years and before the official draft of the constitution, broad consultation,

participation, and deliberation occurred between 2013 and 2016 during 500 meetings held with societal organizations like trade unions, business associations, indigenous peoples, human rights activists, international institutions, etcetera, to collect ideas to be included in the soon to be written constitution (Gobierno de la Ciudad de México, 2017).

In January 2016, based upon the 'Pacto por México,' the Congress of the Union approved Mexico City's political reform, whose process design did not include participatory mechanisms, and it granted to Mexico City's Mayor exclusivity in drafting the manuscript. However, the Mayor opened the process to craft a deliberative, participative, and informed draft constitution to be sent later to the Constituent Assembly for its discussion, amendment, and approval (Laboratorio para la Ciudad, 2018). To that aim, in February 2016, the Mayor formed a Working Group to elaborate a draft constitution based on citizens' inputs and an Advisory Group to supervise the former. Both groups consisted of representatives from civil society, academia, and experts, and their goal was to gather opinions and proposals of citizens and social organizations of Mexico City to craft an informed constitution (Laboratorio para la Ciudad, 2018).

The drafting process was participative, deliberative, and inclusive in the 23 plenary sessions of the Working Group and the 500 meetings before the drafting period with various stakeholders representing minorities and CSOs (Gobierno de la Ciudad de México, 2016c). Furthermore, the Mayor of Mexico City instructed the 'Laboratorio para la Ciudad' (LabCDMX), Mexico City's government department of civic and urban innovation, and the Legal Department of Mexico City's Government to support the Working Group to increase citizens' inputs and deliberations to the draft constitution. Their strategy lastly translated into the use of internet platforms and a

survey (Laboratorio para la Ciudad, 2018), grouped and hosted on the website 'ConstituciónCDMX,' plus 300 mobile stands to approach citizens with limited or no access to the internet (Gobierno de la Ciudad de México, 2016b). The instruments were a writing platform, an online petition system, a massive survey, and a website to post information about citizen meetings and the results of their deliberations. In general, 'ConstituciónCDMX' enabled different instruments to engage citizens, concentrate their ideas through participation and deliberation, to include them in the draft Constitution later (Gobierno de la Ciudad de México, 2016a).

The process managers used at least four technologically enabled means to gather citizens' inputs and foster deliberation. First, LabCDMX collaborated with the MIT Media Lab to allow a collaborative writing platform called 'PubPub' to efficiently incorporate citizen inputs on the proposals of the Working Group. Second, LabCDMX partnered with Change.org to gather proposals from citizens regarding the constitution's content. Third, LabCDMX encouraged open participation through both online and offline surveys. Fourth, citizens could share their own organized events related to constitution-making on 'ConstituciónCDMX,' allowing for greater participation and the opportunity to publish the outcomes of their discussions.

The constitution-making organizers successfully combined online and offline methods for citizen participation and deliberation in crafting the 2016 Mexico City Constitution. Two of the significant success were the crystallization of citizens' voices in the constitutional text and the achieved political equality. Regarding citizens' inputs, the final constitutional text included 12 proposals gathered through Change.org,<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> The proposals outlined a range of critical areas, including transparency, accountability, anti-corruption measures, smart city development, animal rights protection, green city initiatives, sustainable mobility, digital rights, and the provision of free and universal internet access.

which received over ten thousand signatures of support (Cities of Service, 2018). In terms of political equality, the diverse range of instruments and designs effectively incorporated minorities and underrepresented groups into Mexican politics (Laboratorio para la Ciudad, 2018).

Furthermore, regarding the constitution approval, in September 2016, the Working Group delivered the drafted constitution to the Constituent Assembly of Mexico City, which is responsible for amending and approving it. One hundred members formed the Assembly, sixty of which were voted by citizens and forty were appointed by the President of the Republic (six), Chamber of Deputies (fourteen), Senate (fourteen), and Mexico City Mayor (six) (Secretaría de Gobernación, 2016a). The Assembly's work comprised, among others, the discussion and deliberation of 544 initiatives of deputies and constituent deputies, 978 citizen proposals, and mechanisms to hold public hearings, an audience of more than ten thousand people, and one consultation with indigenous peoples (Gobierno de la Ciudad de México, 2017). Besides, the Assembly debated the citizen proposals from the drafting period in plenary sessions and on Working Commissions. The Assembly 'Open Parliament' regulation, which included principles of transparency, publicity, and access to information, allowing citizens and social organizations to be received and heard in the Constituent Assembly; info points strategically located in the city, contributed to further the discussion, amendment, and approval of the constitution of the city (Secretaría de Gobernación, 2016b; Nava Polina, 2018).

The Assembly adopted transparency measures like creating a website where transcripts of the debates and records were available to citizens and everyone

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Furthermore, the proposals were designed to actively promote inclusiveness, safeguard women's rights, and provide support to the rights of the LGBTI community.

interested (Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión, 2016). Citizen contributions to the draft constitution and the Constituent Assembly influenced the work of the appointed members of the Working Group and Advisory Group and the Constituent Assembly's activities. The diversity of citizen contributions was such that the debates of the Constituent Assembly's members of different political parties oscillated on the consolidation of participatory democracy, market regulation, poverty, inequality, etcetera (Encinas Rodríguez, 2017). Lastly, the Constituent Assembly finished its task in January 2017, and the new constitution entered into force in September 2018.

### 3. 4. The Legitimacy of the Process

The last sections depicted the circumstances and the context under which first-level actors decided to increase participation and deliberation in constitution-making to craft a participatory, deliberative, inclusive, and informed constitution. Likewise, the previous sections described how these actors opened this process and used technological aids like collaborative platforms to efficiently funnel and manage citizens' inputs and pinpoint those contributions.

Yet, the reasons why political actors decided to open this constitution-making might not be that obvious to citizens. In fact, citizen's focus could be other than strategic politics among first-level political actors. Citizens might only be interested in contributing to the constitution-making reflected in the last version of the constitutional text. If that does not happen, citizens might regard the entire process as illegitimate. At the same time, there were risks: once the constitution-making is open to broad participation, mismanagement could hinder its crafting and legitimacy. If participation



were mishandled or ignored, the process and the constitution would be delegitimized, and in the case of citizens, they would be alienated.

Therefore, I hypothesize that first-level actors offer opportunities for participation when they pursue making an informed constitution, i.e., that diverse inputs are gathered, debated, and included in the constitutional text. If so, second and third-level actors influence the process by funneling their wants and needs by the means offered. Besides, first-level actors provide opportunities for participation when they pursue to legitimate a constitution. If so, second and third-level actors influence the process by increasing their participation. Given the complexity of the constitution-making and future implications of the constitutional text, I also hypothesize that if opportunities to participate in constitution-making are available, second and third-level actors use those opportunities when they are accessible and easy to use.

In sum, the general implications of the last hypotheses are that first-level actors with preferences in legitimizing and crafting an informed constitution are more prone to open constitution-making to a broader variety of stakeholders, including citizens and underrepresented groups. Consequently, when those actors are committed to enhancing citizen participation and underrepresented groups in constitution-making, they incorporate deliberative, participatory, and technological tools to increase the efficiency of input gathering, processing, and transparency of the process, thus, creating a favorable environment for citizens to voice and influence democratic processes.

On these grounds, I gauge the process's legitimacy in the following sections using the input, throughput, and output legitimacy framework to show whether or not the process was mismanaged and to pinpoint citizen influence in constitution-making.

In particular, I highlight features like effectiveness, openness, transparency, efficaciousness, inclusiveness, and responsiveness to citizen requests and demands (Gherghina and Miscoiu, 2016; Suiter and Reuchamps, 2016). Finally, I draw upon Geissel and Gherghina's (2016) analysis design to gauge the extent to which the process was innovative and indicate if the process design was altered to highlight ex-ante and ex-post conditions of the process.

### 3. 4. 1. Input

Inclusion and representation are crucial factors during the input stage in constitution-making to inform the entire process and set the agenda (Gherghina and Miscoiu, 2016; Geissel and Gherghina, 2016). The decision to open this stage is particularly relevant for a democratic unit the size of Mexico City, which according to the official Mexican census in 2017, approximately 21 million inhabitants lived within the blurred geographic limits of the Mexican Capital.<sup>112</sup> This fact is relevant when deciding whether to include all-subjected or all-affected interests in the process (Näsström, 2011; Miklosi, 2012) due to input management and the creation of channels to funnel that amount of inputs.

First-level actors designed a process that allowed input reception, discussion, and deliberation among all those affected by the process to get the opportunity to voice complaints and shape the legislation. That broad inclusion was implicit in the first-level actors' goal to make an informed constitution. Hence, the input phase was open to all-

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<sup>112</sup> Mexico City's metropolitan area is home to 21 million people, while the actual population within the city's boundaries in 2015 was approximately 9 million. The metropolitan area's population is significant for governance purposes, as it requires coordination with other Mexican states regarding issues such as high population mobility and limited resource allocation among various political entities.

affected interests and had the necessary mechanisms to deal with many second and third-level actor inputs and deliberations. The inclusion was a primary concern for the Mexico City Mayor, and the drafting period ended up uncluttered to all participants. The ex-ante closed process was opened to a broad range of participants, including non-self-selected participants (e.g., by carrying out surveys), underrepresented groups, and sociopolitical minorities. As described in the preceding sections, the process profited from offline and online means to funnel and manage that significant amount of inputs.

The open agenda features and inclusiveness in the input stage of this constitution-making were beneficial for the entire process since the writing of this constitution was not a pressing matter in the political and legislative agenda of Mexico City or the country. The procedure did not occur in a crisis moment, which might have highlighted the urgency of the process, as observed by Elster and for the particular case of national constitutions (1995). Moreover, the lack of urgency is reflected in the push of first-level actors in Mexico City for this reform, which was rejected previously in at least nine different administrations of the City (Gobierno de la Ciudad de México, 2016a). In general, opening this constitution-making, in light of no social push for political reform, was beneficial to legitimize the process. However, there were other reasons, like the 'Pacto por México' with similar effects.

In sum, the apparent lack of bottom-up demands for political reform in Mexico City was a reason for shaping the preferences of first-level actors to make the process deliberative and inclusive. To that aim, they needed to secure the representation of minorities to avoid, for instance, self-selection. They finally managed to create a constitution-making including the representation of different groups, including minorities and underrepresented groups. The Mayor of Mexico City formed the

Working Group and the Advisory Group with representatives of various social spheres to secure inclusiveness and representation. He gave them the task of increasing representation by including underrepresented and minority groups. In other words, first-level actors allowed businesspeople, citizens, professional politicians, etcetera, to set the agenda to be discussed later in the Constituent Assembly. By doing that, citizens informed and legitimized the draft constitution.

### 3. 4. 2. Throughput

The throughput<sup>113</sup> shall be transparent, deliberative, open for participation, and have rules and, ideally, facilitators (Gherghina and Miscoiu, 2016; Geissel and Gherghina, 2016). In the Mexico City case, the Mexican Congress of the Union approved the political reform of Mexico City and set the operating rules of the Constituent Assembly (Secretaría de Gobernación, 2016b). As depicted in previous sections, both sets of rules structured the drafting period and the Constituent Assembly. Previously, rules proved to be needed and valuable during the drafting process as Mexico City Mayor opened the process and employed offhand rules to control the online and offline mechanisms to facilitate the inclusion of second and third-level actor inputs.

The 'how' in the throughput phase was essential for the entire process because the assembly work was based on an openly drafted constitution, and the Congress of the Union meticulously designed the rules. Therefore, the Constituent Assembly worked under the principle of 'open parliament,' which, among others, stipulated principles of transparency and access to information. Most importantly, the regulation

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<sup>113</sup> I use this term in a procedural sense, which includes fairness, consistency, and transparency. Gherghina and Miscoiu (2016) and Geissel and Gherghina (2016) use the concept in the same sense.

permitted all interested in speaking in front of the Assembly to present proposals and participate in the deliberations.

Moreover, the Constituent Assembly deployed an info point in the city center, held public hearings, and consulted with indigenous peoples about the constitution's content, enhancing participation and deliberation (Nava Polina, 2018). The Assembly's rule was that not only the constituent deputies were to deliberate in the process but also second and third-level actors. Thus, mostly due to the principle of 'open parliament,' anyone interested had the opportunity to participate beyond the drafting period to improve the collected inputs by the Working Group. Besides, during the Constituent Assembly, citizens could interact with constituent deputies in sessions and commissions under rules of mutual respect (Secretaría de Gobernación, 2016b). Finally, the Assembly fostered transparency, among others, by video-recording and live-streaming its sessions.

First-level actors favored participation and deliberation in the throughput phase, which was required due to the collected inputs in the drafting period representing all-affected interests. That the drafted constitution was inclusive, participative, and deliberative was arguably owed to the Major of the City. He indirectly influenced with that openness the throughput phase since the drafted constitution was the agenda to be discussed in the Constituent Assembly. Finally, it was the Congress of the Union, the first-level actor that set the rules governing the Constituent Assembly by setting the rules to vote members of the Constituent Assembly, the starting and ending dates of the Constituent Assembly work, and the deadline to approve the constitution (Secretaría de Gobernación, 2016a).

### 3. 4. 3. Output

The legitimacy evaluation of this stage focuses on the visibility of the process, perceived legitimacy, and the institutionalized and actual impact of participation on the constitution (Gherghina and Miscoiu, 2016; Geissel and Gherghina, 2016). The preceding sections in this article pointed to the open agenda-setting of this constitution-making, how citizens used offered opportunities to participate, and how online and offline platforms contributed to the proper management of those inputs. Still, how were the results perceived by participants and others not participating in the process?

For instance, a survey by *El Financiero*, conducted in February 2017 in Mexico City (Moreno, 2017), showed that the constitution-making of Mexico was a well-promoted process since eight out of ten interviewees was aware that Mexico City had a new constitution. However, the same survey identifies that most of the city's citizens cast doubt about its usefulness. Besides, even at the beginning of the activities of the Constituent Assembly (Parametria, 2016), the writing of the new constitution was not an unknown topic to the citizens of Mexico City. For instance, Mexico City citizens knew about the name change from the Federal District to Mexico City and the elected Constituent Assembly. They even had divided opinions about the integration and the number of voted members to the Constituent Assembly.

According to those polls, Mexico City constitution-making was a topic that citizens knew, possibly because of the drafting period, the massive surveys, and the Constituent Assembly, due to the principle of 'open parliament,' live-streamed its debates and plenary sessions. However, although citizens knew about the process, their opinions were not optimistic about the usefulness of the crafted document. Those

bleak arguments might not be related to the process and might reflect citizen disaffection with politics or the lack of government responsiveness to citizens' demands when the process occurred. Even under those circumstances, international organizations regarded the constitution as a document that addresses central challenges such as development, peace, and human rights, e.g., the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Sánchez Cordero, 2018). The latter remark echoes underrepresented groups' inclusion in the constitution-making and their contributions to the constitutional text. Additionally, the regulatory frameworks ruling the drafting period and Constituent Assembly fostered communication among actors participating in those two institutions and the broad public. First-level actors allowed two-way communication between themselves and engaged other actors, facilitating further communication among all-affected and all-interested actors to inform the constitutional text and legitimize the process by making it more inclusive.

Finally, the impact of citizen participation was institutionalized as first-level actors opened and set the regulatory framework throughout the process to funnel citizens' inputs into the constitution writing of Mexico City. Additionally, the second and third level actor's involvement in this constitution-making made Mexico City's constitution legitimate and informed due to their participation and contributions. The real impact of those contributions is reflected in the final result since 85% of the contents of the drafted constitution made it to the final text (Laboratorio para la Ciudad, 2018). Ex-ante, the drafting procedure was conceived as a closed process. However, it was opened to diverse stakeholder participation to increase the epistemic and cognitive benefits of participation and deliberation, and the openness continued during the work of the Constituent Assembly.

### 3. 4. 4. An Informed and Legitimate Constitution

I depicted in the last sections the context and conditions under which first-level actors opened the constitution-making of Mexico City to citizen participation and other underrepresented groups in the Mexican Capital. The constitution-making description helped reveal the preferences of first-level actors to open the process and adequately manage citizens' inputs. The threefold analysis of the last section showed how the process was legitimized and consequently created an informed constitutional text, i.e., that during the constitution-making, the constitutional text was enriched by inputs and deliberations of diverse stakeholders and citizens.

Mainly, after the input, throughput, and output analysis, sufficient evidence was gathered not to reject the hypotheses elaborated in this chapter and to sustain that the conjunction of context and circumstances influenced first-level actors' preferences to offer opportunities for participation as they aimed to craft an informed and legitimate constitution. Furthermore, second and third-level actors used those opportunities and consequently influenced the text by funneling their needs and wants and increasing their participation. Besides, first-level actors favored participation by making the process and the constitution's content accessible to the stakeholders involved.

Regarding the epistemic contributions, the process design was improved to avoid a closed decision-making process and avoid the power of elites or powerful groups displacing minorities and undermining the benefits of cognitive diversity achieved by inclusiveness. The process arguably profited from the complementarity of participatory and deliberative democratic practices. For instance, a wider diversity of perspectives was gathered by making the process more participatory. In the same vein, Mexico City's constitution-making was informed by directing the rules of the



drafting period and the Constituent Assembly towards the deliberation of citizen inputs. These deliberative and participatory features of Mexico City's constitution-making pinpoint the shift from a standard to a more active citizenry.

Furthermore, as enunciated before, mismanagement of citizens' inputs, regardless of the complexity or lack of time and funds, could have negatively affected the legitimacy and epistemic quality of the constitutional text. However, those risks were avoided by using technology while funneling and managing citizens' inputs to the process. In particular, tools like a writing platform that allowed for group collaboration, a petition system available online, and a dedicated site for sharing information about citizen meetings. If a paper-based approach was used instead of a technology-based approach, there would be a higher risk of input mismanagement. That is to say, the utilization of internet platforms, enabled by the LabCDMX, contributed to avoiding such risks.

Finally, research on citizen inclusion in democratic practices argues in favor of collective wisdom, contending that a group of minds around a problem may find better solutions than just one or a few (Landemore and Elster, 2012). Mexico City's constitution-making showed citizen participation contributions to agenda-setting and how technology increased legitimacy through inclusion. Mexico City's constitution-making is an example of a decision-making process whereby the many, rather than the few, crafted and enacted a constitution. In sum, boosted inclusiveness was essential in this constitution-making to legitimate the process and achieve an informed constitutional text.

### 3. 5. Conclusions

I examined the constitution-making of Mexico City to underline the contributions of citizens to this type of democratic process and, in general, demonstrate how citizens can do more than go to the ballot box now and then to cast a vote. I examined this constitution-making, highlighting the role of the citizen as an active member in politics and its capacity to contribute meaningfully to crafting their rules. This role contrasts with what critics and skeptics of participatory and deliberative democracy worry about: citizens are biased and unable to engage meaningfully in deliberation and other processes and institutions of democracy.

In this case study, I granted a significant part of the attention to the description of the circumstances surrounding the crafting of this constitution-making and the political actors involved. I underscored the time needed for a DI to occur and how this is the product of political struggles at different levels of political administration. By doing so, I reduce some optimism about the hype on DIs. I underline a more realistic approach to DIs when bringing normative precepts to the real world. My realist approach fully acknowledges the justifications, feasibility, and contributions of citizen participation and deliberation to modern democracies. Still, it highlights the time needed for participation and deliberation and start any process like constitution-making.

I explained how Mexico City's constitution was crafted by emphasizing the importance of actors and their interests in the democratic process, using a supply-and-demand approach. First, I identified the political actors involved in constitution-making and their relationships. Then, I underscored that while there was a strong demand for the constitution-making, powerful political actors at various levels were reluctant, and

kept the process closed. Second, by describing the interaction between various political actors I highlighted the temporality and lengthy timeframe required for a DI to commence.

The results of my analysis provide the groundwork for further research. For instance, in light of DIs research, future studies might explore the political dynamics between advocates of citizen participation and those facilitating it. Moreover, analyzing the timing and promotion of a DI can offer valuable insights into the mechanisms of institutional transformation and further democratic innovation. The Constitution-Making of Mexico City case highlights exogenous circumstances like the sociopolitical status quo and regime change affecting political actors' attitudes toward institutional reform. Future analysis, perhaps through interviews, might document such attitudinal change and volition to institutional reform.

In particular, by detailing Mexico City's case, I underscored the importance of process design in regulating the intensity and type of participation at different stages of constitution-making and positive contributions to the efficiency in handling, funneling, and systematizing citizens' inputs to avoid mismanagement. In the same vein, I showed that the rules governing the process affected the relations among actors and how the process was managed to make an informed constitution, increase deliberations, and, most importantly, include. Likewise, I underlined the importance of opening the constitution-making of Mexico City to citizens from its drafting period to influence and frame the later discussions, deliberations, and work of the Constituent Assembly.

Lastly, I showed how citizen participation impacted Mexico City's constitutional text and exemplified how this democratic process was successfully managed. I

contend that the analysis of this case underlines the importance of actors, circumstances, and context in such democratic processes. Finally, further research might quantify the contributions of citizens' involvement in making informed constitutions. For instance, a text analysis of citizens' contributions would gauge the real impact of those contributions at different stages of the constitution-making and the final constitutional text — such research would be particularly relevant to examining output legitimacy.

# CONCLUSION

## 1. Final Considerations About this Dissertation

Based on the analysis presented in previous chapters, it's evident that the democratic systems and institutions in Latin America have been greatly shaped by the temporal, societal, political, cultural, and contextual factors. Over time, these factors have impacted democratic institutions and processes, resulting in unique systems that differ from those in Europe and the United States. Hence, the 'Global South' offers a unique opportunity to analyze how societies, particularly their forms of government, develop over time and how factors such as economic growth and development influence this progress. This remark does not necessarily mean that more established or developed democracies do not continue to innovate, but according to my general theoretical expectation, they do so to a different pace and lesser extent.

On these grounds, I contend that my analysis of the emergence of DIs in Latin America, the 2016 Mexico City Constitution-Making, and the Brazilian 'collective mandates' frame the purposes of DIs beyond plain democratic development. I emphasize three purposes of DIs in the 'Global South,' perhaps not unknown in the 'Global North' but accentuated in Latin America due to their economic, historical, and sociopolitical situation. First, DIs emerge mostly locally, influenced by political and economic inequalities present in highly populated and recently urbanized regions. Second, DIs are institutionalized top-down due to politicians' explicit commitments to democratic values and serving the common good, which does not neglect bottom-up

demands but highlights the effect of exogenous factors on democratic innovation and institutional reform. Third, beyond government responsiveness and other governance-related goals, DIs in Latin America emphasize the importance of striving for political equality to achieve the common good and social justice in modern societies.

Besides, the Latin American case draws attention to the role of interests, actors, and temporality in democratic innovation. This emphasis is relevant because, in general, DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy research has pointed out that innovations start from the top-down and are not as organic as expected, for instance, by social movements scholars. Then, the Latin American case sheds light on this explanation by focusing on the effect of exogenous variables on democratic innovation and institutional change. Based on my analyses of DI emergence, the 2016 Mexico City Constitution-Making, and the Brazilian 'collective mandates', I underscored a clear and undeniable trend towards democratic innovation and institutional reform originating from the grassroots. Yet, I also underscored that it is important to acknowledge the influential role of economic, historical, temporal, and sociopolitical circumstances in exerting pressure on existing institutions and democratic processes throughout Latin America, ultimately catalyzing the demand for reform and innovation at the top.

## 2. Skeptics and the Importance of the Citizen in Democracy

In my dissertation, I emphasized the importance of active citizen involvement in promoting political and democratic reform. I highlighted that citizens' role in democracies goes beyond just voting for leaders and extends, for instance, to participate in public reasoning. However, some critics argue that citizens lack the necessary skills and motivation to contribute positively to democracy. Critics

acknowledge the importance of citizens in political and democratic processes but also note their limited capabilities. In my dissertation, I addressed some of the criticisms to citizen participation and deliberation, but in this section, I expand on critiques of DIs, participatory, and deliberative democracy. Incorporating these critiques serves the purpose of offering a comprehensive and impartial comprehension of democratic innovations, deliberative democracy, and participatory democracy.

Overall, it is worth noting that critics argue that citizens lack the necessary skills to actively engage in politics and make meaningful contributions to democracy beyond simply voting. Critics emphasize that citizens lack the skills and motivation to contribute positively to democracy, which leads to challenges like citizen apathy in electoral democracies. On these grounds, in this section, I seek to advance two points. First, I underscore that either by electing leaders or engaging in public reasoning, the citizen is the epicenter of DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy research. Second, I describe how DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy scholars, have been in the critics' spotlight. For instance, critics claim that the public lacks sufficient knowledge, holds biases, and displays disinterest in participating in democratic processes.

It is not uncommon for critics to voice their apprehensions regarding citizen apathy in electoral democracies. This is a valid concern that deserves attention and consideration. In short, this critique points to 'rational ignorance,' i.e., citizens' lack of motivation to go to the ballot box and cast a vote because they understand that a single vote cannot substantially change the fate of an election (Downs, 1957). Likewise, others have observed that when opportunities for participation increase, the more affluent and educated social classes tend to participate much more than the less affluent (Verba et al., 1978). However, my research underscored that the lack of

knowledge among some citizens or the tendency of the wealthy to be more involved in democracy should not serve as an excuse to undervalue the significance of augmenting citizen participation and deliberation in democratic processes and institutions.

Moreover, the future of democracy looks grim if we only consider citizen participation in elections. For instance, researchers have long underscored a decline in citizen participation in elections (Lijphart, 1997). Nonetheless, participatory and deliberative democrats have built upon that observation by arguing that democracy is more than elections and that more citizen participation mechanisms are available to be implemented in modern democracies. As I depicted in the literature review in my introductory chapter, deliberative and participatory democracy scholars focused their work on the justification and feasibility of including the public and engaging citizens in democratic institutions and processes. In short, it's important to note that the ballot box does not solely define democracy. Elections are just one tool in the larger toolbox of democracy.

However, detractors pointed out that even when participation and deliberation were fostered, social inequalities were replicated in this increased participation and deliberation. For instance, in societies of late capitalism, the better-off social classes seem to be more ready to participate and deliberate (Fraser, 1990; Young, 1986; Young, 2000). Likewise, related to deliberative theory, and perhaps due to a misconception of the term deliberation, some detractors pinpointed the possible adverse side effects of deliberation due to its emphasis on consensus and the detrimental effects of the benefits of plurality (Mouffe, 1999). In a similar critique, some institutionalists have highlighted the limits of deliberative democracy and deliberation



due to the ideal conditions it requires and their inexistence in the real world (Shapiro, 1999).

Likewise, on increasing citizen participation, scholars argued that boosted participation had the potential to increase problems already affecting modern democracies, such as political apathy, citizens' lack of information, ignorant public, and depoliticization (Sartori, 1987) — mostly due to the increased number of participants in democratic processes and the management efforts need it to make the best use, for example, of citizens inputs in such processes. Along these lines, previous research testing critics' arguments underlining citizens' lack of relevant political information in elections, found supporting evidence that such ignorance was somehow admissible since citizens could make use of information shortcuts to perform somehow as informed citizens would do (Lupia, 1994). The latter and scholarship underscoring citizens' limited use of information and reasoning in voting (Popkin, 1991) gives the impression that increased participation is not crucial for democracy.

Furthermore, most deliberative democracy critics have emphasized that in democracy, deliberation is not central but political competition and political mobilization (Walzer, 1999). In the same vein, other scholars researching citizens' beliefs and attitudes toward government posited that citizens were politically disinterested or reluctant to participate in politics as long as elites were trustworthy (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). Other detractors found evidence of citizens' biases leading to attitude polarization (Taber and Lodge, 2006) and suggested that citizens should care more about understanding democracy as a tool to achieve good results rather than procedure (Brennan, 2016).

Similarly, other scholars argued that increased deliberation and citizen participation blurred the limits of accountability and shifted, to a certain extent, political responsibility from politicians to citizens (Mackie, 2008; Shapiro, 2017). Finally, more recent criticisms underlined the arguable inability of citizens to participate effectively in deliberations due to arguably limited analytical capacity, communicative competence, and self-reflection (Rosenberg, 2014), to form political judgments because of partisan loyalty or group identity biases (Achen and Bartels, 2016), or indicated that deliberation and participation mechanisms like mini-publics are too idealistic and not entirely accessible to the broader public (Lafont, 2019).

With this critical backdrop in mind, I underscore that DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy scholars have engaged with these critiques, positively affecting the research on deliberation, citizen participation, and institutional reform in modern democracies. I contend that DIs, participatory and deliberative research have benefited from critics theoretically and empirically. Lastly, and perhaps more importantly, DIs, participatory and deliberative research has built upon critics' arguments to show that citizens can participate effectively in democracy, government, and politics.

### 3. The 'Global South' and 'Global North' Perspective

In my dissertation, I challenged arguments refuting the capacity of citizens to contribute to processes and institutions of democracy and contributed to explaining institutional change and democratic innovation. I studied the extent to which citizens can contribute to democratic processes and institutions, and the causes of democratic innovation and institutional reform. I argued that citizens can add meaningfully to democracy in other activities beyond elections. I approached this general debate from

the Latin American perspective to show that citizens can participate meaningfully in updating processes and institutions of democracy. I presented in the chapters making up my dissertation examples of where, when, how, and why democratic innovation and institutional reforms occur. For instance, I demonstrated the extent to which citizens contributed to constitution-making and, about democratic innovation and institutional reform, the timing, circumstances, and triggers.

Mainly, I joined the debate on democratic innovations by approaching their causes. Building upon the analysis of the Latin American case, I studied the causes of democratic innovation and institutional reform. In this analysis, I focused on the exogenous causes of DIs and extended endogenous explanations. From this analysis, I underpinned two main points. First, my analysis of democratic innovations and institutional reform focused on exogenous causes, extending traditional explanations focused on democratic development. Second, I drew attention to relatively new democratic innovations in Latin America, perhaps least known in other world regions like the Anglo-Saxon world.

In general, I argued that DIs are context-dependent and that temporality and political actors are crucial in effecting institutional change. In particular, I contended that DIs arise due to political actors' commitment to democracy and political interests involved in this institutional change. In other words, political actors revolutionize democratic institutions due to the effect of economic, historical, and sociopolitical circumstances. Similarly, I underscored the complementarity of top-down and bottom-up explanations of democratic innovation and institutional reform. I suggested that institutional reform is demanded, and perhaps created, at the bottom but institutionalized at the top. Yet, circumstances and time hasten such complementarity, elements without which democratic innovation and institutional reform are postponed.

With the theoretical and empirical examinations from the 'Global South' described implicitly and explicitly in the chapters making up my dissertation, I contributed to the current understanding of the significance of citizen participation and deliberation in modern democracies. Based on the examination of the rise of DIs in Latin America, the case studies of Mexico City constitution-making, and the 'collective mandates' in Brazilian legislatures, I drew attention to such cases primarily unknown in the 'Global North' and scholarship on DIs, participatory and deliberative democracy. Besides, with the same cases, I contributed with examples from the 'Global South' to research on legitimacy and epistemic gains, widely studied in the 'Global North.' As previously mentioned, I suggest that a more extensive collaboration between these two regions would be fruitful in fully understanding democratic innovation and institutional reform.

Furthermore, despite empirics and theory that have shown that it is normatively and empirically feasible to bring about DIs, I underscored the lack of adoption of DIs in modern liberal democracies. On these grounds, I contended that explaining this puzzle requires us to analyze the interests, circumstances, temporality, and actors allowing institutional change. Then, as an answer to the riddle, I presented the theoretical and empirical contributions of the chapters making up my dissertation. For instance, in my chapter about the emergence of DIs in Latin America, I analyzed the effect of political equality on institutional change and, in general, the effects of sociopolitical and economic transformation on democracy, its institutions, and processes. Besides, I analyzed the 'collective mandates' in Brazilian legislatures and the 2016 Mexico City Constitution-Making to show the extent to which interests and actors are the main drivers in institutional reform. In short, I contended that these cases

were examples of what constitutes a 'Global South' perspective on citizen participation and deliberation.

All in all, I argue that the complexity of the modern world and undoubtedly its even more intricate future require contemporary democracies to innovate to include more citizens in their institutions and processes. The democracy of the future will need thorough democratic ideals, empirics, and engaged citizens. To that aim, I suggest that a joint 'Global North' and 'Global South' approach is helpful to face the challenges of the modern and future world.

# Appendixes

## **Regressions excluding Income Inequality**

*Table 4. Regression Results (PanelOLS) – Only Political Inequality*

Model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4 ‡	Model 5
Political Inequality	-0.5214*** (0.1535)	-0.0997 (0.0834)	-0.1076 (0.0659)	-0.0326 (0.0454)	-0.1098 (0.0676)
GDP per capita (current US dollars)		9.235e-05*** (1.658e-05)	9.578e-05*** (1.676e-05)	-2.796e-05 (1.962e-05)	0.0001*** (1.741e-05)
Urban Population (% total population)		0.0870*** (0.0146)	0.0822*** (0.0158)	-0.0116 (0.0094)	0.0795*** (0.0149)
State Authority over territory			0.0175 (0.0176)	-0.0109 (0.0082)	0.0159 (0.0160)
State Fiscal Source of Revenue			0.0214 (0.0960)	-0.0211 (0.0722)	0.0304 (0.1009)
Trust in Government					0.8142* (0.4458)
No. Observations	630	630	630	630	630
No. Countries	18	18	18	18	18
R-squared	0.1303	0.5635	0.5670	0.0102	0.5758
R-squared (Within)	0.1303	0.5635	0.5670	-0.2242	0.5758
F-Statistic	91.570	262.02	158.99	1.1829	137.11

All models are entity fixed effects with entity 'clustered' covariance. ‡ Model 4 includes additionally time fixed effects and time 'clustered' covariance. Standard errors in parenthesis. P-values: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table 5. Regression Results (Negative Binomial) - Only Political Inequality

Model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Political Inequality	-0.3610*** (0.045)	-0.1381** (0.054)	-0.1979*** (0.056)	-0.2052*** (0.057)
GDP per capita (current US dollars)		0.0002*** (1.8e-05)	0.0002*** (1.85e-05)	0.0002*** (1.89e-05)
Urban Population (% total population)		0.0061 (0.004)	0.0040 (0.004)	0.0022 (0.004)
State Authority over territory			-0.0182*** (0.006)	-0.0158** (0.006)
State Fiscal Source of Revenue			0.1013 (0.062)	0.0764 (0.062)
Trust in Government				1.5966*** (0.410)
No.Observations	630	630	630	630
Df Residuals	628	626	624	623
Df Model	1	3	5	6
Log-Likelihood	-1459.7	-1402.0	-1397.2	-1389.7
Deviance	890.92	775.38	765.87	750.78
Pearson chi2	870	865	837	811

Standard errors in parenthesis. P-values: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## Regressions excluding Political Inequality

Table 6. Regression Results (PanelOLS) - Only Income Inequality

Model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4 ‡	Model 5
Income Inequality	-6.2819 (4.2762)	-3.5014* (1.9798)	-3.5308* (1.9072)	-0.9106 (1.3926)	-3.7652** (1.7289)
GDP per capita (current US dollars)		7.652e-05*** (2.143e-05)	7.85e-05*** (2.117e-05)	-2.768e-05 (1.999e-05)	8.616e-05*** (1.973e-05)
Urban Population (% total population)		0.0956*** (0.0138)	0.0900*** (0.0149)	-0.0093 (0.0120)	0.0876*** (0.0142)
State Authority over territory			0.0138 (0.0161)	-0.0115 (0.0083)	0.0120 (0.0146)
State Fiscal Source of Revenue			0.1086 (0.1168)	0.0014 (0.0687)	0.1213 (0.1131)
Trust in Government					0.8572** (0.4197)
No. Observations	630	630	630	630	630
No. Countries	18	18	18	18	18
R-squared	0.0340	0.5677	0.5711	0.0104	0.5808
R-squared (Within)	0.0340	0.5677	0.5711	-0.2021	0.5808
F-Statistic	21.517	266.59	161.63	1.2079	139.92

All models are entity fixed effects with entity 'clustered' covariance. ‡ Model 4 includes additionally time fixed effects and time 'clustered' covariance. Standard errors in parenthesis. P-values: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.



Table 7. Regression Results (Negative Binomial) - Only Income Inequality

Model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Income Inequality	-2.2651** (1.042)	4.5170*** (1.168)	4.4161*** (1.307)	3.9973*** (1.307)
GDP per capita (current US dollars)		0.0002*** (1.87e-05)	0.0002*** (1.95e-05)	0.0002*** (1.98e-05)
Urban Population (% total population)		0.0105*** (0.004)	0.0108*** (0.004)	0.0095** (0.004)
State Authority over territory			-0.0024 (0.007)	-0.0006 (0.007)
State Fiscal Source of Revenue			-0.0174 (0.067)	-0.0395 (0.067)
Trust in Government				1.4395*** (0.408)
No.Observations	630	630	630	630
Df Residuals	628	626	624	623
Df Model	1	3	5	6
Log-Likelihood	-1485.9	-1398.4	-1398.2	-1392.2
Deviance	943.33	768.18	767.92	755.76
Pearson chi2	860	905	901	897

Standard errors in parenthesis. P-values: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)

*Table 8. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)*

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>VIF</b>	<b>Tolerance</b>
Political Inequality	1.481934593	0.674793614
GDP per capita	1.996275073	0.500932969
Income Inequality	1.447728156	0.690737412
Urban Population	2.048129133	0.488250464
State Authority Over Territory	1.469458938	0.680522588
State Fiscal Source of Revenue	1.382504357	0.723325026
Trust In Government	1.042761767	0.958991815

Table 8. Table summarizing the variance inflation factor (VIF) of the variables used in this quantitative analysis. VIF is the ratio of the overall model variance to the variance of a model that includes only a single independent variable. VIF estimates the intensity of multicollinearity (high correlation between independent variables) in an ordinary least squares regression analysis. VIF values above five indicate a high correlation as a rule of thumb. VIF values below one mean no correlation, and between one and five indicate moderate correlation.

## Variance Table


*Table 9. Variance Table*

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Variance</b>
<b>Democratic Innovations</b>	20.65984304
<b>Political Inequality</b>	1.103833073
<b>GDP per capita</b>	9874876.975
<b>Income Inequality</b>	0.001883171
<b>Urban Population</b>	236.8839955
<b>State Authority Over Territory</b>	66.8632473
<b>State Fiscal Source of Revenue</b>	0.708715826
<b>Trust In Government</b>	0.013504117

**Table 9.** The table shows the variance of the variables. Values indicate the spread of variables' distribution; that is to say, how far the value of a given variable (squared deviation of a random variable) is spread out from their average value (population mean or sample mean.).


## Correlation Matrix

Figure 6. Correlation Heatmap




**Table 10.** Correlation matrix showing correlation coefficients between variables. A cell in the table shows the correlation between two variables. Variables' names displayed on the correlation matrix are in raw form (tag); the table below shows equivalences between tags and variables.

Figure 7. Map 1. DIs in Latin America (1918-2020)



**Map 1.** Total count of DIs across 18 Latin American countries in 102 years. Countries in darker shades had the most tallied DIs in the period, while countries with lighter ones had the least. Author's calculation and map using collected data by LATINNO (Pogrebinschi, 2017)

Figure 8. Map 2. DIs in Latin America (1980-2014)



**Map 2.** Total of DIs per country in the 18 Latin American countries covered by the study from 1980-to 2014. Author's calculation and map using collected data by LATINNO (2017).

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
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