

1 **Germany's 9-Euro-Ticket: Impacts on**
2 **Disadvantaged Groups Using a Causal Inference**
3 **Approach**

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1 **ABSTRACT**

2 Free-fare policies have been proposed as a means to reduce emissions in the transport sector
3 and promote equitable mobility. However, their potential distributional impacts on disadvantaged
4 groups remain uncertain. Using data from Germany's 9-Euro-Ticket, we analyze the effects of
5 nearly free transit on individuals with a low economic status, women and individuals with a dis-
6 ability. To offer a comprehensive evaluation we include the effects on activity participation, use of
7 public transport and financial relief in our analysis. Relying on observational data where users self-
8 select the treatment rather than being randomly assigned, we utilize a quasi-experimental method,
9 Propensity Score Matching, combined with weighted regression models. This doubly robust ap-
10 proach enables us to identify causal effects. Our findings indicate that the 9-Euro-Ticket increased
11 public transport use across all groups and improved activity participation, particularly among eco-
12 nomically disadvantaged individuals. However, the program did not seem to offer targeted finan-
13 cial relief for economically marginalized individuals, and its benefits were less pronounced for
14 women and people with disabilities. These results underscore the positive impact of low-fare pub-
15 lic transport on economically marginalized individuals but also highlight its limited effectiveness
16 in addressing barriers faced by other disadvantaged groups. The findings have important impli-
17 cations for policymakers and transport planners seeking to make public transport more accessible
18 and equitable.

19 *Keywords:* Transport Equity, Propensity Score Matching, Public Transit, Fares, Policy Evaluation,
20 9-Euro-Ticket

1 INTRODUCTION

2 Free fare policies have been discussed as an instrument for sustainable development, seeking to
3 promote public transit, increase ridership, reduce the negative externalities of car traffic and im-
4 prove mobility for all (1). The 9-Euro-Ticket that was introduced by the German government
5 between June and August 2022 allows to evaluate the effects of nearly fare-free transit for all. The
6 ticket cost nine euros (around 10 USD) per calendar month and was valid on all local and regional
7 buses and trains throughout Germany. It was part of a federal relief package in reaction to the war
8 in Ukraine that negatively affected the German economy, aiming to provide financial relief. Next to
9 the economic aspect the 9-Euro-Ticket was also meant as an incentive to switch to climate-friendly
10 public transport and save fuels (2). The total of the funds for three months, amounting to 2.5 bil-
11 lion euros (around 2.8 billion USD), was derived from the forecast of the lost ticket revenue of the
12 federal states. Overall, fifty-two million tickets were sold from June to August 2022. Additionally,
13 around 10 million subscribers received the ticket automatically for the period of its availability (3).

14 While economists generally agree that optimal pricing of public transport should equal
15 its marginal costs, this principle is only applicable if all other transport prices are also based on
16 marginal cost pricing (4). Transit subsidies are furthermore typically justified on three grounds:
17 to guarantee the provision of a public service that is often unprofitable for the operators, to secure
18 the positive externalities of public transport and to redistribute income to specific groups (5). Ac-
19 cording to German Law, public transport is considered a public service that the state must provide
20 to ensure its citizens' mobility. To fulfill this obligation, the state secures the necessary funding
21 (6). In contrast to targeted fare subsidies, the 9-Euro-Ticket was available to purchase for all travel
22 users reducing overall administrative costs for the government. However, as the ticket was a blunt
23 policy instrument, it remains unclear whether all social groups could benefit. Decisions regarding
24 the transportation system greatly influence people's lives by decreasing or creating access to a wide
25 range of opportunities, impacting individuals' life chances and agency (7). How transport policies
26 affect social groups with different transportation abilities and needs is thus also a question of equity
27 (8). Transportation equity has been conceptualized as improving accessibility to social and eco-
28 nomic opportunities, especially for marginalized groups (9). Vertical equity is used as a concept
29 in transport planning to promote the mobility of disadvantaged groups (10). As most transporta-
30 tion interventions cause costs and benefits, it is crucial to analyze the differential social impacts
31 of the 9-Euro-Ticket (11). A subsidized fare mainly addresses the price of public transit and not
32 additional barriers faced by women, namely fear of harassment (12–14) and hate crimes and in-
33 accessibility affecting individuals with a disability (15–20). Therefore, we expect those who are
34 disadvantaged due to their gender or a disability to gain less mobility compared to economically
35 marginalized persons for whom the cost of transportation is the main barrier (21–24).

36 One challenge in quantifying the social impacts of nearly fare-free transit is that few stan-
37 dardized methods exist, and insecurity remains which social impacts to include (25). In the past,
38 most studies focused on analyzing social welfare benefits of transit subsidies (26, 27). While some
39 studies found low-income households to benefit most (28, 29), others found most forms of subsi-
40 dies catering more to higher income individuals (30, 31). Most previous research takes into account
41 the taxation source of the subsidy and the distribution of public resources for different modes of
42 transit that are used by different income groups (32). Different transit pricing strategies, such as
43 flat fares, distance-based fares or mode-dependent fares are also found to cater to different income
44 groups (33–35).

1 However, analyzing the effect of fare subsidies from a welfare perspective often only fo-
2 cuses on direct monetary benefits. Furthermore, aggregated metrics can conceal relevant infor-
3 mation (36). In our paper we want to expand the scope to include other benefits, such as activity
4 participation and public transport usage, taking into account the literature on transportation equity
5 and mobility justice (37–42). Furthermore, we do not only analyze the distribution of benefits
6 according to economic status but also to gender and ability. When evaluating policies, conduct-
7 ing randomized controlled trials to determine causal impacts is often infeasible because of ethical
8 concerns (43). Randomized treatment assignment would imply in the case of the 9-Euro-Ticket,
9 that only a randomly chosen group received the ticket. Relying on observational data, treatments
10 are selected rather than assigned (44). In terms of the 9-Euro-Ticket, participants chose to buy the
11 ticket or not. The participants will generally buy the ticket if the expected benefit is higher than
12 the associated costs. Treatment and control groups can thus not be directly compared because we
13 might assume that the two groups differ fundamentally in their baseline characteristics (45). Even
14 in the absence of the 9-Euro-Ticket, the two groups would potentially have differing outcomes.
15 In order to estimate causal effects in the presence of non-random treatment assignment we use a
16 quasi-experimental approach, Propensity Score Matching. Propensity Score Matching has been
17 used in other transportation policy contexts (46).

18 This paper presents three contributions. Firstly, it extends beyond considering economic
19 status and addresses other factors in the context of transport-deprivation such as gender and abil-
20 ity (22). Secondly, instead of focusing solely on net monetary benefits, this study explores the
21 effectiveness of subsidized fares in benefiting disadvantaged groups in a broader sense. The bene-
22 fits evaluated in this study cover activity participation, public transport usage, and financial relief.
23 Lastly, this research seeks to identify the causal effects of almost fare-free public transport using
24 a causal inference method. The effects of the 9-Euro-Ticket are estimated using Propensity Score
25 Matching, and weighted regression models. This doubly robust approach reduces the bias of the
26 estimates compared with traditional models, such as Ordinary Least Squares (44).

27 The paper is organized as follows. We first describe our data and methodology. Then we
28 present the results from the weighted regression models. Finally, we discuss our findings and give
29 an outlook on future research. The research design is displayed in Figure 1.

30 **DATA AND METHODOLOGY**

31 The data used is part of the *Mobilität.Leben* study with a total of 2,569 participants. More informa-
32 tion on the study design can be found in earlier publications (47–49). 1650 participants (64.2%) are
33 part of a study focusing on the Munich Metropolitan Region, the rest of the sample (919, 35.8%)
34 were recruited nationally. The non-Munich sample is representative. The Munich Metropolitan
35 Region comprises different types of spatial structure, covering both rural and metropolitan areas to
36 represent different mobility behavior, furthermore all genders and ages are represented (47). Until
37 July 2023 there have been six survey waves. We will draw on data from the first three waves,
38 the timing of the distribution is depicted in Figure 2. The first survey was completed by 2,141
39 participants and the second survey by 1,733 participants. Completion rates were higher in the na-
40 tional sample than in the Munich sample. 117 observations were discarded as unreliable because
41 of implausible completion times. Table 1 describes the variables used in the analysis.

TABLE 1 : Variable Description

Variable	Role	Type	Survey Question	Answer
Person with a Disability	Covariate	Binary	Are you limited by a health problem in activities of daily living?	Yes, very limited/ Yes, somewhat limited
Ticket: Bad Idea	Covariate	Binary	Please indicate your agreement with the statement: "The 9-Euro-Ticket is a good idea!"	Completely disagree/ disagree
Ticket: Neutral	Covariate	Binary	Please indicate your agreement with the statement: "The 9-Euro-Ticket is a good idea!"	Neither agree nor disagree
Ticket: Good Idea	Covariate	Binary	Please indicate your agreement with the statement: "The 9-Euro-Ticket is a good idea!"	Completely agree/ agree
Access to Public Transport	Covariate	Continuous	What public transport options are available within a 5-minute walk of your home?	Number of selected options (bus, S-Bahn, tram, U-Bahn)
Activity Level	Covariate	Continuous	On average, how many days do you travel to different locations in a week?	Sum of answers for work, leisure, and errands
Mode of Transport: Often (May)	Covariate	Binary	How often do you use the following modes of transport in a week?	Daily/ 4-5 days a week
Mode of Transport: Sometimes (May)	Covariate	Binary	How often do you use the following modes of transport in a week?	2-3 days a week/ Once a week/ Less than once a week
Mode of Transport: Never (May)	Covariate	Binary	How often do you use the following modes of transport in a week?	Never
Economically Marginalized Person	Covariate	Binary	How does your household cope with price increases? How much does the following statement apply to you? "Because of the increased prices, I have to forgo many things in my life." Which statement about saving applies to your household in a typical month?	At least one of the following: Very bad, Completely true, The household must draw on savings or borrow money
Savings	Outcome	Binary	How strongly do you agree with the following statement? "I can spend the money saved from the 9-Euro-Ticket on more useful things."	Completely agree/ Agree
Activity Level: Leisure (Jul/Sep)	Outcome	Continuous	On average, how many days do you travel to different locations in a week?	Answer for "leisure"
Activity Level: Errand (Jul/Sep)	Outcome	Continuous	On average, how many days do you travel to different locations in a week?	Answer for "errand"
Public Transport: Often (Jul/Sep)	Outcome	Binary	How often do you use public transport in a week?	Daily/ 4-5 days a week
Public Transport: Sometimes (Jul/Sep)	Outcome	Binary	How often do you use public transport in a week?	2-3 days a week/ Once a week/ Less than once a week
Public Transport: Never (Jul/Sep)	Outcome	Binary	How often do you use public transport in a week?	Never
9-Euro-Ticket	Treatment	Binary	Did you purchase the 9-Euro-Ticket for the month of June/July?	At least once "yes"




FIGURE 1 : Research Design

1 Research Design

2 To estimate the effects of the 9-Euro-Ticket, the treatment and the relevant population must be
 3 defined. The results of the second survey wave that was distributed at the end of July are used to
 4 compute the effects. Therefore, the treatment is defined as *purchasing the 9-Euro-Ticket at least*
 5 *once in June and/or July*. Participants who only bought the 9-Euro-Ticket in August were therefore
 6 not included in the treatment group. Furthermore, it must be considered that 543 participants (33.7
 7 %) had already owned a transport subscription in May. While the 9-Euro-Ticket will lead to a
 8 cost reduction for this group, their habitual travel behavior will plausibly remain unaffected (50).
 9 Nearly all participants with a previous public transport subscription (96.3 %) received or bought
 10 the 9-Euro-Ticket. In terms of experimental designs, this group is pre-treated as they had already
 11 been subject to the treatment of having a public transport subscription. This is also in line with
 12 the policy objective of the 9-Euro-Ticket to cater primarily to new public transport users. Hence,
 13 the treatment effects are estimated for those without a public transport pass in May 2023 (N =
 14 1,067). All further statements will apply to this subset of the data. We conducted moderation
 15 analyses using subgroups based on economic status, gender, and ability. Economic status was
 16 determined by identifying individuals experiencing economic pressure, with the specific survey
 17 questions provided in table 1. Disability was defined broadly as limitations in activities of daily
 18 living due to health issues, in line with previous research (51). One participant with a diverse
 19 gender was included in the analysis and categorized under the female participants.

1 Propensity Score Matching

2 When estimating the effects of an intervention, one is interested in the different outcomes of an
 3 individual under each treatment state. However, researchers can only ever observe one outcome
 4 per individual, the other (potential) outcome remains counterfactual and exists only in theory.
 5 Therefore, causal effects cannot be estimated for individual units (44). Thus, experimental research
 6 designs are used to estimate treatment effects: Participants are randomly assigned to the treatment
 7 or the control group. As policies are usually directed at certain parts of the population, the Average
 8 Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) is of special interest.

9 However, randomized controlled trials are often infeasible for policy evaluation because of
 10 ethical concerns (43). In the case of the 9-Euro-Ticket, it was not randomly assigned but partici-
 11 pants decided whether to purchase it taking into account the expected benefits and the associated
 12 costs. Therefore, treatment and control groups can not be directly compared because we might
 13 assume that the two groups differ fundamentally in their baseline characteristics (45). Even in
 14 the absence of the 9-Euro-Ticket, the two groups would potentially have differing outcomes. One
 15 possible approach for observational data is conditioning the sample on a set of variables (X) that
 16 predict treatment assignment. This implies that the potential outcomes of treatment and control
 17 group are independent of the treatment assignment (D) given their observed characteristics (X)
 18 (52).

$$Y^0, Y^1 \perp\!\!\!\perp D | X \quad (1)$$

19 If this assumption holds, a robust ATT estimate can be calculated in the presence of a non-randomly
 20 assigned treatment.

$$E[\delta | D = 1] = E[Y^1 | D = 1, X] - E[Y^0 | D = 1, X] \quad (2)$$

21 Conditional on X, there are no systematic differences between treatment and control group. X
 22 is thus a straightforward balancing score $b(x)$ that is specified so that the conditional distribution
 23 of X given $b(x)$ does not differ between the treatment and the control group (45). However, due
 24 to the "curse of dimensionality", it is oftentimes not feasible to match units from treatment and
 25 control group on all covariates contained in X. Rosenbaum showed that the propensity score can
 26 be used as a balancing score (45). The propensity score is the estimated probability of taking the
 27 treatment, modeled as a function of covariates predicting the treatment assignment. The true form
 28 of the propensity score is unknown when working with observational data. Therefore, propensity
 29 score estimations are used (44).

30 The Propensity Score Model

31 When selecting the covariates to be included in the matching process, the goal is to satisfy the
 32 assumption of "strong ignorability", which means that conditional on the observed covariates, there
 33 are no unobserved differences between the control and treatment group. There is little cost in
 34 including unnecessary variables, i.e. variables that are unrelated to the treatment assignment. They
 35 may slightly increase the variance of the model (53). In contrast, omitting relevant confounding
 36 variables will significantly increase bias. It is therefore advisable to include all variables that could
 37 influence treatment assignment and/or outcome (53). This is also true for the 9-Euro-Ticket, where
 38 several factors influence the decision to purchase the 9-Euro-Ticket and the outcomes. Table 1
 39 shows the relevant dependent variables (outcome and treatment) when choosing which variables
 40 to include in the propensity score model.

1 Vincent Kaufmann's concept of motility provides a framework for considering the space in
 2 which mobility decisions are situated (54). The categories provided in the motility framework are
 3 taken into account when selecting the variables for matching. Table 2 presents an overview of the
 4 categories and their corresponding variables in the propensity score model. It should be noted that
 5 the categories are interdependent and therefore variables could potentially fit into different cate-
 6 gories. For example, the socioeconomic variables included may affect all three categories. Because
 7 the data can only be matched on observed characteristics, some variables such as "knowledge of
 8 PT" or "preference" are proxied by past behavior.

TABLE 2 : Motility and Variables used for PSM

Motility Categories	Variables Included in the Propensity Score	Variable Name in the Model
Access		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Options (Transportation, Services) Conditions (Costs, Logistics, Constraints) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public Transport Access, Regiostar Classification (German Classification of Regional Type) Other Socio-Economic Variables (Age, Gender, Economic Status, Employment, Household Size, Children) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PTAccess, RegiostarClassification Age, Gender, EconomicStatus, Employment, HouseholdSize, Children
Competence		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Physical Ability Acquired Skills Organizational Skills 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disability Driving License Knowledge about PT (e.g., About Schedules; Proxied by Experience Through Past Use) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disability License ModeUsage
Appropriation		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Needs Plans Aspirations Understandings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Attitude towards Climate Change, Political Attitudes, Attitude towards the 9-Euro-Ticket Preference (Proxied by Previous Activity Participation and Mode Use) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AttitudeClimateChange, PoliticalAttitude, AttitudeTicket ActivityLevel

The propensity score $b(x)$ is specified in the following way:

$$\begin{aligned}
 b(x) = Pr[D = 1 | X] = & \quad (3) \\
 & \beta_0 + \beta_1 PTAccess_i + \beta_2 RegiostarClassification_i + \beta_3 Age_i + \beta_4 Gender_i + \beta_5 EconomicStatus_i \\
 & + \beta_6 Employment_i + \beta_7 HouseholdSize_i + \beta_8 Children_i + \beta_9 Disability_i + \beta_{10} License_i \\
 & + \beta_{11} ModeUsage_i + \beta_{12} AttitudeClimateChange_i + \beta_{13} PoliticalAttitude_i + \beta_{14} AttitudeTicket_i \\
 & + \beta_{15} ActivityLevel_i + \varepsilon_i
 \end{aligned}$$

1 Figure 2 shows the propensity score distribution depending on ticket purchase, a logit
 2 model was used. The "common support" assumption implies that the treatment and control groups
 3 overlap substantially in their propensity score distribution. The density of the distribution may dif-
 4 fer (53). As shown in Figure 2, the range of propensity scores is similar between the two groups.
 5 In the group without the ticket, lower propensity scores are estimated; in the group with the 9-
 6 Euro-Ticket, more propensity score estimates are closer to one. No estimates are exactly 0 or 1,
 7 allowing the propensity score to be used for matching.




FIGURE 2 : Distribution of the Propensity Score $b(x)$

8 **Matching**

9 Testing various matching methods, a combined propensity score with exact matching on economic
 10 status, ability and gender (55) using optimal full matching resulted in the most balanced matched
 11 sample. The R *matchIt* package was used for matching (56). Figure 3 shows the effectiveness of

1 PSM in reducing covariate imbalance between the control and treatment group. The commonly
 2 used threshold for the standardized mean difference of 0.1 is displayed. For almost all variables,
 3 matching reduced the standardized mean difference between treatment and control group, although
 4 perfect balance was not achieved. The sample size after matching is 567 in the treatment group
 5 (ESS: 69.66) and 260 in the control group. Since full matching was used no observations were
 6 discarded. As logistic regression requires complete observations, the sample available for matching
 7 decreases in size compared to the original sample.

8 **Weighted Regression Models**

9 Propensity Score Matching does not estimate effects by itself, but must be combined with other
 10 models such as linear regression (53). Regression after matching can further reduce bias due
 11 to remaining imbalances in the matched data (44). Weighted regression models provide less bi-
 12 ased estimates by accounting for individual-level heterogeneity between the treatment and control
 13 group. The weights used are propensity score estimates (44). Because the weighted regression es-
 14 timates condition on the covariates twice (both in the matching process and in the regression), the
 15 results are said to be doubly robust (44). All treatment effects were estimated using g-computation
 16 and cluster-robust standard errors with the *marginaleffects* R package (57). The following model
 17 specifications were used to estimate the ATT in weighted regression models using linear models.

Outcome =

$$\beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Treatment} + \beta_2 \text{PropensityScore} + \beta_3 \text{Covariates} + \beta_4 (\text{Treatment} \times \text{Covariates}) + \beta_5 (\text{Treatment} \times \text{PropensityScore}) + \varepsilon_i \quad (4)$$

18 The propensity score was added to the regression model to increase robustness (58). In addition,
 19 to minimize the impact of any remaining imbalances in the matched data, all covariates used for
 20 matching were included as controls in the model, including the interaction effects with the treat-
 21 ment variable. Subgroup effects were estimated based on gender, economic status, and ability.
 22 Some survey questions were only addressed to those who purchased a ticket. For these outcome
 23 variables, logistic regression models were fitted to the subset of the treatment group, including all
 24 covariates used for matching as controls.

25 **RESULTS**

26 In this section, we will present our results using weighted regression models to estimate the ATT
 27 and logistic regression models for outcomes concerning only the ticket users.

28 **Activity Participation**

29 Two models were estimated with the average number of days per week participants participated in
 30 leisure activities and ran errands as outcomes. The results are presented in Table 3. The results
 31 indicate a significant positive effect of the 9-Euro-Ticket on participation in leisure and errand ac-
 32 tivities for the entire sample. The moderation analysis shows that the effect varied across subgroups
 33 depending on the activity. The 9-Euro-Ticket had a significant positive effect on leisure activities
 34 for men, those not economically marginalized, and those without disabilities with effect sizes up
 35 to 0.54. This indicates, that the 9-Euro-Ticket led some groups to participate in leisure activities
 36 on one additional day every two weeks. No significant effects were observed for the other groups.
 37 Women, the economically marginalized and those without disabilities experienced an increase in
 38 the number of days running errands. The results suggest no increase in activity participation for




FIGURE 3 : Covariate Balance in the Original Sample and the Matched Sample.

1 people with disabilities in any category.

TABLE 3 : Effect of the 9-Euro-Ticket on Activity Participation

	ATT: Avg. Days with Leisure Activities	ATT: Avg. Days with Errand Activities
All	0.34** (0.14)	0.30* (0.16)
Female	0.20 (0.25)	0.84*** (0.27)
Male	0.44*** (0.17)	-0.03 (0.20)
Economically Marginalized	-0.35 (0.40)	0.99*** (0.33)
Not Economically Marginalized	0.52*** (0.15)	0.13 (0.18)
Person with a Disability	-0.31 (0.34)	-0.53 (0.32)
Person without a Disability	0.54*** (0.15)	0.56*** (0.18)

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The difference in leisure activity participation is not significant between the genders.

The difference in leisure activity participation is significant between (non) economically marginalized persons on the 0.05 level.

The difference in leisure activity participation is significant between persons with a disability and those without on the 0.05 level.

The difference in errand activity participation is significant between the genders on the 0.01 level.

The difference in errand activity participation between (non) economically marginalized persons is significant on the 0.05 level.

The difference in errand activity participation is significant between persons with a disability and those without on the 0.01 level.

2 In addition, the survey asked participants whether they participated in more activities be-
 3 cause of the 9-Euro-Ticket. Since this question is only relevant for the ticket holders, a logistic
 4 regression model was fitted to the subset of the treatment group. Table 4 shows the significant re-
 5 sults of the analysis. Economic status was the only identity marker influencing the binary outcome,
 6 with economically marginalized individuals more likely to report increased activity participation.

7 Use of Public Transport

8 The results displayed in table 5 suggest that the 9-Euro-Ticket had a positive effect on the proba-
 9 bility of using public transport often and led to a decrease in the probability of never using public
 10 transport, both for the entire sample and for all subgroups. The ticket seemed to be most effective
 11 in reducing the probability of never using public transport, with the treatment effect being a reduc-
 12 tion of 49 percentage points for the whole treated sample. However, the effect size varied across
 13 subgroups, with people with disabilities experiencing a significantly smaller reduction than those
 14 without disabilities. Furthermore, the 9-Euro-Ticket impacted the use of public transport after its
 15 validity period for certain subgroups. Men, economically marginalized people and people without
 16 disabilities were more likely to use public transport often in September if they had bought the 9-
 17 Euro-Ticket. However, the effect size was small and no effects were found for the other groups.

TABLE 4 : Logistic Regression: More Activities Because of the 9-Euro-Ticket (Excerpt)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	More Activities
Working	-0.47* (0.27)
Ticket: Good Idea	0.91** (0.36)
Male	0.02 (0.19)
Economically Marginalized	0.66** (0.31)
Person with a Disability	-0.14 (0.29)
Constant	-1.09 (2.32)
Observations	566
Log Likelihood	-359.83
Akaike Inf. Crit.	791.65
McFadden's Pseudo- R^2	0.06

Note:

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

1 The 9-Euro-Ticket also reduced the probability of never using public transport after its validity
 2 period for all groups except the economically marginalized. Overall, the results indicate that the
 3 9-Euro-Ticket had a limited effect on public transport usage after its validity period.

4 **Financial Relief**

5 The effect of the 9-Euro-Ticket on financial relief was also studied using two models. The first
 6 model estimated the treatment effect on participants' agreement with the statement "I can spend
 7 the money saved by the 9-Euro-Ticket on more useful things". This statement was presented
 8 alongside other hypothetical statements for participants to indicate their agreement. Table 6 shows
 9 the results, which indicate that the ticket had a positive effect on the agreement rates for most of the
 10 treated subgroups. However, no significant effect was observed among economically marginalized
 11 individuals who purchased the ticket, significantly differing from the estimate for individuals with
 12 a higher economic status.

13 The survey also included a question asking participants whether they could benefit finan-
 14 cially from the 9-Euro-Ticket. To analyze this question, a logistic model was fitted to the treatment

TABLE 5 : Effect of the 9-Euro-Ticket on Public Transport Usage

	ATT: Public Transport Often (During)	ATT: Public Transport Never (During)	ATT: Public Transport Often (After)	ATT: Public Transport Never (After)
All	0.10*** (0.02)	-0.49*** (0.05)	0.02*** (0.01)	-0.25*** (0.04)
Female	0.08*** (0.03)	-0.56*** (0.06)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.25*** (0.06)
Male	0.11*** (0.03)	-0.44*** (0.06)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.24*** (0.06)
Economically Marginalized	0.15*** (0.04)	-0.30** (0.12)	0.08*** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.10)
Not Economically Marginalized	0.09*** (0.02)	-0.54*** (0.05)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.30*** (0.05)
Person with a Disability	0.10*** (0.04)	-0.31*** (0.11)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.35*** (0.08)
Person without a Disability	0.10*** (0.02)	-0.55*** (0.06)	0.03*** (0.01)	-0.21*** (0.05)

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

In the first column, there are no significant differences in the subgroup effects.

In the second column, the difference in effect estimates is significant between persons with a disability and those without on the 0.10 level; the difference in effect estimates between economic status is significant on the 0.10 level.

In the third column, the difference in effect estimates is significant between (not) economically marginalized persons on the 0.01 level; the difference in effect estimates between the genders is significant on the 0.05 level.

In the fourth column, the difference in effect estimates is significant between (not) economically marginalized persons on the 0.05 level.

TABLE 6 : Effect of the 9-Euro-Ticket on Agreement to the Statement: "I can spend the money saved by the 9-Euro-Ticket on more useful things"

	ATT: Agreement to the Statement
All	0.13*** (0.05)
Female	0.18** (0.07)
Male	0.10* (0.06)
Economically Marginalized	-0.16 (0.10)
Not Economically Marginalized	0.20*** (0.05)
Person with a Disability	0.09 (0.12)
Person without a Disability	0.14*** (0.05)

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The difference in effect estimates between (not) economically marginalized persons is significant on the 0.01 level. For the other groups, there are no significant differences.

1 group subset, including all covariates used for matching. Table 7 summarizes the regression re-
2 sults, displaying the significant variables and the subgroup characteristics. The results suggest that
3 gender, economic status, and disability did not significantly influence the outcome.

4 **DISCUSSION**

5 Overall, our results suggest that the effect of the 9-Euro-Ticket varied across indicators and sub-
6 groups. Our main findings include:

7

- 8 • increased public transport use for all groups during the ticket's validity period
- 9 • an increase in activity participation especially for economically marginalized individuals
- 10 • no targeted financial relief for economically marginalized individuals
- 11 • less benefits for women and individuals with a disability

12 **Economic Status**

13 A logistic regression showed that the economic status is a significant factor in explaining whether
14 9-Euro-Ticket users could participate in more activities because of the 9-Euro-Ticket. This finding
15 supports that the cost of mobility presents a major barrier for economically marginalized individ-
16 uals and that a discounted price can improve their mobility. The effects on transport use after the

TABLE 7 : Logistic Regression: Financial Benefit Because of the 9-Euro-Ticket (Excerpt)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Financial Benefit
Age	-0.02* (0.01)
Regiostar 72	-0.70* (0.43)
Driving License	1.19** (0.51)
Concerned about Climate Change	0.12* (0.06)
Car: Sometimes	0.77*** (0.29)
Car: Never	1.18*** (0.46)
Male	-0.11 (0.23)
Economically Marginalized	-0.46 (0.36)
Person with a Disability	-0.19 (0.33)
Constant	13.32 (613.79)
Observations	566
Log Likelihood	-271.59
Akaike Inf. Crit.	615.17
McFadden's Pseudo- R^2	0.10

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

1 validity period support this interpretation. While all other groups reduced the probability of never
2 using public transport after the intervention, there was no significant effect for the economically
3 marginalized. At the same time, the probability of using public transport often after the 9-Euro-
4 Ticket increased. This suggests that some economically marginalized people may have continued
5 to use public transport because it has allowed them to participate in activities they could not be-
6 fore. However, a certain proportion of this group could only afford to use public transport at a
7 reduced fare and has become restricted again in their mobility. The data suggest that economically
8 marginalized individuals used the ticket primarily for errands. For this group, the new mobility
9 offered by the 9-Euro-Ticket may have been used mainly for essential daily tasks before increasing
10 leisure activities (59). Leisure activities may also be less accessible for economically marginalized
11 individuals due to the additional costs associated with them, such as entrance or participation fees.

12 The evidence on whether economically marginalized individuals also benefited financially
13 is mixed. The treatment effect of the 9-Euro-Ticket on agreement with the statement "I can spend
14 the money saved by the 9-Euro-Ticket on more useful things" was not significant for this group.
15 This may be because economically marginalized individuals had used public transport less fre-
16 quently before the 9-Euro-Ticket. The ticket allowed them to be more mobile but did not lead to
17 savings. Also, economic status was insignificant in a logistic regression predicting the financial
18 benefit of the 9-Euro-Ticket. Collectively, these findings indicate that individuals facing economic
19 marginalization did not receive focused financial relief.

20 **Disability**

21 In contrast to economically marginalized individuals, people with a disability had a significantly
22 smaller reduction in the probability of never using public transport than people without a disability.
23 This may suggest that additional barriers related to accessibility or fear of victimization prevented
24 people with a disability from switching to public transport. Also, individuals with disabilities did
25 not experience an increase in activity participation across all activity categories. Given the concept
26 of the "accessible trip chain" (17), barriers may be associated with both transportation and the
27 activity itself. Since the data show that people with disabilities were more likely to use public
28 transportation with the 9-Euro-Ticket, this finding suggests that the challenges to participating in
29 the activity may be due to the accessibility of the activity or other limitations. This would imply
30 that people with disabilities used the 9-Euro-Ticket to reach their usual destinations, but did not
31 increase their overall level of activity.

32 **Gender**

33 The effect of the ticket on women was also mixed. In contrast to men, they were not more likely
34 to use public transport more often after the intervention. This finding suggests that while they may
35 have tried to use public transport during the ticket's validity period, they were not convinced to
36 make a more permanent switch, possibly due to other barriers they encountered when using public
37 transport. In terms of activity participation, women used the ticket primarily for errands, while
38 men used it more for leisure. Traditional gender roles may explain this pattern. Women typically
39 spend more time on housework than men (60).

40 **Limitations**

41 There are several limitations of this study. The (effective) sample size is relatively small and
42 conclusive survey weights have not yet been calculated. Therefore, it is uncertain whether the

1 results are representative of the entire German population. Due to the sample size, the moderation
2 analysis was also limited to gender, ability, and economic status as monolithic categories. It is
3 plausible that the effect might further differ, for example, between women with a disability and men
4 with a disability, given the intersectional nature of identity categories (61). More subgroups based
5 on different identity markers could be created and analyzed in a larger sample. In addition, because
6 PSM relies on observed variables, it may be subject to omitted variable bias. Another limitation is
7 that the dependent variables were based on self-reported behavior, which may be subject to bias.
8 Participants may have over-reported their use of public transportation during the validity period of
9 the 9-Euro-Ticket because they wanted to demonstrate a desired behavior or a psychological wish
10 to justify their investment. In addition, activity participation was measured as the number of days
11 per week that participants participated in a specific activity, which may not capture multi-purpose
12 trips. This could particularly affect the treatment effect for women, as they are reported to use trip
13 chaining (62). It is possible that the 9-Euro-Ticket led to increased participation in activities, but
14 these activities were bundled rather than spread over several days. Trip chaining would then lead
15 to an underestimation of the increase in activity due to the 9-Euro-Ticket.

16 CONCLUSION

17 The 9-Euro-Ticket was a German nationwide policy initiative that introduced an almost fare-free
18 public transport system for a period of three months. Using Propensity Score Matching and
19 weighted regression models on study participants without previous public transport subscriptions,
20 we showed that economically marginalized people benefited most from the almost fare-free transit.
21 In contrast, the effects on women and persons with disabilities were mixed. The results suggest
22 that there was no targeted financial relief for the economically marginalized. Overall, therefore,
23 the policy seemed to have been effective in addressing the most important barrier for economically
24 marginalized persons: the cost of public transport. It also motivated some individuals to continue
25 using public transport after the intervention. These results can be valuable for other countries
26 that seek to increase public transport ridership and improve access for individuals with a low eco-
27 nomic status, especially in the presence of an otherwise accessible public transport service. Despite
28 these impressive effects, the 9-Euro-Ticket was not a cure-all. Structural barriers for marginalized
29 groups, such as victimization or lack of accessibility, still exist. To fulfill every citizen's basic
30 mobility needs is in line with the understanding of public transit as a public service and normative
31 conceptions of transport equity and mobility justice. This justifies government subsidies to make
32 public transport more accessible. Additional policy instruments are needed to implement a public
33 transport system that enables public transport use and activity participation for all while providing
34 targeted financial relief to economically marginalized individuals. While this research explored
35 the effectiveness of the ticket, in the next steps we will include the costs in a comprehensive policy
36 evaluation in the form of a cost-benefit-analysis or cost-effectiveness-analysis. Furthermore, we
37 plan to analyze the effects of the recently introduced 49-Euro-Ticket to explore the impact of a less
38 subsidized fare with the data we collected as part of our study.

39 AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

40 The authors confirm contribution to the paper as follows: study conception and design: Isabella
41 Waldorf, Allister Loder, Stefan Wurster, Klaus Bogenberger; data collection: Allister Loder; anal-
42 ysis and interpretation of results: Isabella Waldorf, Allister Loder; draft manuscript preparation:
43 Isabella Waldorf. All authors reviewed the results and approved the final version of the manuscript.

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