A long-term power market model

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Outline


- 1 Motivation
- 2 Time series models
- 3 Game theoretical models
 - Market rules
 - Algorithm


Who uses power market models?


- Government: Consequences of market rules
- Energy-intensive industry (e.g. metal industry)
- Energy companies (electricity & other):
 - Short-term pricing on markets
 - Long-term contracts
 - Evaluation of investments
- → Cooperation with Statoil


Why are time series models popular?


- Uses historic data to predict future
 - → Extrapolation in the widest sense
- Historic market rules & characteristics encoded in data
 - → High detail without explicit model
- Prediction "inside" (or "near") cloud of data points: very good
- ? Prediction outside of data cloud?











Why we don't use time series models


- Prediction outside data cloud: not good
- → Time series models use hidden assumption: "The market situation will stay similar"
 - But the market already changes!
- → In a long-term model, we're really interested in situations far away from the data cloud


What do game theoretical models offer?


- + Do not need historic data
- Use market principles to predict the future
- Single major assumption:

"All players act rationally with the goal of maximizing their profit."


- Market rules and situation modeled explicitly
 - ightarrow + We can model arbitrary market situations
 - → + We can analyze different market scenarios







Market outcome at intersection of supply & demand




Market outcome at intersection of supply & demand























Statements from game theory

Game Theory predicts*

- The process converges towards an equilibrium.
- The equilibrium is unique.
 I.e. the initial supply function and the nature of the improvement do not matter, as long as the goal stays the same.
- * under some simplifying but natural assumptions

How to improve strategy?

- Maximize company's profit under last market conditions
- → Unit Commitment problem
 - Characteristics of our model
 - Price dependent on company's production
 - Uncertainty of wind power production
 - Minimal production for every unit
 - Accurate start-up costs
 - 5 Production-dependent efficiency
 - 6 Minimal up- and downtime

Profit optimization model

$$\max \sum_{k \in K} \left[\left(\mathsf{Demand}^k - \sum_{g' \in G \setminus \{g\}} \mathsf{Supply}_{g'}^k \right)^{-1} \left(\sum_{j \in J} \rho_j^k \right) \sum_{j \in J} \rho_j^k - \sum_{j \in J} \left(\mathsf{cp}_j^k - \mathsf{cu}_j^k - \mathsf{cd}_j^k \right) \right]$$

$$\begin{split} & v_j^k \leq t_j^k = t_j^{k-1}(1-\mathsf{T}_j^\downarrow) + v_j^k \cdot \mathsf{T}_j^\downarrow + \mathsf{L} \cdot h_j^{k-1} \\ & \underline{\mathsf{P}}_j v_j^k \leq p_j^k \leq \overline{\mathsf{P}}_j v_j^k \\ & \overline{p}_j^k \leq p_j^{k-1} + L \cdot \mathsf{R} \mathsf{U}_j v_j^{k-1} + \mathsf{S} \mathsf{U}_j (1-v_j^{k-1}) - \min\{\mathsf{S} \mathsf{U}_j, \underline{\mathsf{P}}_j + L \cdot \mathsf{R} \mathsf{U}_j\} \cdot (1-v_j^k) \\ & p_j^k \geq p_j^{k-1} + L \cdot \mathsf{R} \mathsf{D}_j v_j^k - \mathsf{S} \mathsf{D}_j (1-v_j^k) + \min\{\mathsf{S} \mathsf{D}_j, \underline{\mathsf{P}}_j + L \cdot \mathsf{R} \mathsf{D}_j\} \cdot (1-v_j^{k-1}) \\ & \overline{p}_j^{k-1} \leq \overline{\mathsf{P}}_j v_j^k + \mathsf{S} \mathsf{D}_j (v_j^{k-1} - v_j^k) \\ & \mathsf{c} \mathsf{p}_j^k \leq \left(\mathsf{F} \mathsf{A}_j \cdot \mathsf{F} \mathsf{C}_{\mathsf{F}_j}^k + \mathsf{P} \mathsf{A}_j\right) L \cdot p_j^k + \left(\mathsf{F} \mathsf{B}_j \cdot \mathsf{F} \mathsf{C}_{\mathsf{F}_j}^k + \mathsf{P} \mathsf{B}_j\right) L \cdot v_j^k \\ & \mathsf{c} \mathsf{d}_j^k \geq \mathsf{C} \mathsf{D}_j (v_j^{k-1} - v_j^k) \\ & \mathsf{c} \mathsf{u}_j^k \geq \left(\mathsf{H} \mathsf{C}_{j,k} + \mathsf{H} \mathsf{F}_{j,k} \cdot \mathsf{F} \mathsf{C}_j^k\right) \mathsf{L} \cdot t_j^k \end{split}$$

Thank you for your attention! Questions?