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Operational Safety Considerations for the Type Certification of Light Unmanned Aircraft Systems

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Kurzfassung

Die Musterzulassung von unbemannten Luftfahrzeugsystemen (Unmanned Aircraft Systems - UAS) trägt dafür Sorge, dass die Sicherheit der überflogenen Gebiete und der Bevölkerung gewahrt wird. Sie ist ein Schlüsselement für den sicheren Flugbetrieb von UAS. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht operationelle Sicherheitsbetrachtungen im Rahmen der Musterzulassung von UAS. Hierzu wird die Hypothese aufgestellt, dass es nicht möglich ist, allein mit Hilfe von operationellen Sicherheitsbetrachtungen den Nachweis der Lufttüchtigkeit eines UAS Musters im Rahmen eines Musterprüfprozesses festzustellen und eine Musterzulassung zu erlangen. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf unbemannten Starrflügler-Luftfahrzeugsystemen welche eine maximale Abflugmasse von weniger als 150 kg aufweisen und über Deutschland operieren sollen.

Im ersten Schritt wurden umfassende Recherchen zu Lufttüchtigkeitsvorschriften und operationellen Risikobewertungen von UAS durchgeführt. Die Ergebnisse werden ausführlich dargestellt. Des Weiteren wird der Prozess der Musterprüfung und Musterzulassung von Luftfahrzeugen erläutert, sowie verantwortliche Behörden und Organisationen der zivilen und militärischen Luftfahrt vorgestellt. Zur Komplettierung des Bildes wird die Geschichte der unbemannten Luftfahrt kurz dargestellt. Im Zuge der Recherche wurde festgestellt, dass die untersuchten operationellen Risikobewertungen für UAS im Einzelnen häufig nicht vollständig und nur bedingt anwendbar auf die vorliegende Fragestellung sind. Basierend auf dieser Erkenntnis wurde O.R.C.U.S. entwickelt.

O.R.C.U.S. – Operational Risk Considerations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems – ist eine MATLAB™ basierte Software, welche das Ziel verfolgt, eine fundierte Einschätzung über das resultierende Risiko für das in einer Operation überflogene Gebiet und die darin lebende Bevölkerung treffen zu können, auch wenn nur rudimentäre Daten über das UAS vorliegen. Hierzu wird die geplante Operation über dem Einsatzgebiet mittels O.R.C.U.S. simuliert und es werden bewusst zufällige, technische Fehler in das fliegende unbemannte Luftfahrzeug eingespeist. Führen diese Fehler zum Absturz der Maschine, prüft O.R.C.U.S. ob Menschen zu Schaden kamen. Die Erzeugung des Operationsgebietes basiert auf frei verfügbaren Kartendaten und erfolgt nahezu komplett automatisiert durch O.R.C.U.S. Die Verteilung der Personen im Operationsgebiet erfolgt dynamisch, zeit- und ortsabhängig und basiert auf einer umfangreichen Datenbasis, die aus offiziellen Zensus- und Bewegungsdaten erstellt wurde. O.R.C.U.S. erzeugt nach Abschluss einer Simulationsreihe eine Zusammenfassung welche prägnant darstellt, wie oft pro Flugstunde Personen durch das abstürzende unbemannte Luftfahrzeug getroffen wurde und ob dies in geschützten Bereichen oder ungeschützten Bereichen geschah. Durch die Übertragung der Ergebnisse in der Luftfahrt und Musterprüfung von Luftfahrzeugen üblichen Einheit „pro Flugstunde“ kann ein direkter Vergleich zu Lufttüchtigkeitsforderungen gezogen werden.

Zur Überprüfung der Hypothese wurden im Rahmen einer Prototypen-Implementierung mit O.R.C.U.S. umfassende Simulationsläufe anhand eines exemplarischen, leichten Starrflügler-UAS über repräsentativen Gebieten in Deutschland durchgeführt. Neben der generellen Funktionsfähigkeit von O.R.C.U.S., bestätigten die Resultate der Simulationsläufe die Hypothese. Operationelle Sicherheitsbetrachtungen allein sind nicht ausreichend um die Lufttüchtigkeit eines UAS nachzuweisen, da derartige Betrachtungen immer höchst abhängig

von der Operation an sich, der Technik des unbemannten Luftfahrzeugsystems, der Methode der Risikobewertung und den angenommenen Randbedingungen sind. Ein nach den Regeln der Lufttüchtigkeit entwickeltes UAS hingegen, wird immer ein geringeres Risiko darstellen, als eines, welches sich auf operationelle Sicherheitsbetrachtungen abstützen muss.

Nichtsdestotrotz sind derartige Sicherheitsbetrachtungen geeignet um das Bewusstsein hinsichtlich des Risikos des Betriebs bei Betreiber und genehmigender Behörde zu schärfen und präventive Risikominimierung umzusetzen. Insbesondere in Anbetracht der neuen Drohnenregularien in Europa sowie der Möglichkeit der Freigabe von UAS Operationen von der spezifischen Kategorie, ist der in der vorliegenden Arbeit dargestellte Sachverhalt von Gewicht.

Abstract

Type certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) shall ensure the safety of the overflown area and the population. It is one key aspect of safe UAS operations. The present thesis explores operational safety considerations within the context of UAS type certification. In this scope, the hypothesis was developed, that operational safety considerations cannot be used as the only proof of airworthiness of a UAS in an aircraft type inspection process to achieve a type certificate. Focus is given on light fixed-wing UAS with a maximum take-off mass of less than 150 kg, which are intended to operate above Germany.

At first, an extensive research with regard to airworthiness regulations and UAS operational risk assessments was conducted. The results of this research are presented exhaustively. Moreover, the process of aircraft type inspection and certification, as well as the responsible civil and military aviation authorities and organisations are presented. For the complete picture, the history of unmanned aviation is outlined briefly. During the research it was determined that those UAS operational risk assessments are often not complete in themselves and furthermore, are only partially applicable to the issue present. Based on this outcome, O.R.C.U.S. was developed.

O.R.C.U.S. – Operational Risk Considerations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems – is a MATLAB™ based software, which aims to provide a sound estimation of the risk imposed by the UA flight operation to overflown area and inhabitants, even if only few information about the UAS are available. To achieve this, O.R.C.U.S. simulates the planned operation above an area and randomly technical failures are induced into the airborne unmanned aircraft on purpose. In case such failures causing the machine to a crash on the ground, it is checked by O.R.C.U.S. if people got harmed. The creation of the operational area relies on free available map data and is performed by O.R.C.U.S. almost completely automatic. The distribution of inhabitants within the operational area is dynamic and related to time and place, based on a comprehensive database which was composed out of official census and movement data. After completion of a simulation series, O.R.C.U.S. generates a summary which concisely presents how often per flight hour persons got hit by the impacting unmanned aircraft and if those events happened in protected or unprotected areas. By transferring the results into the term “per flight hour”, which is mutual within the realm of aviation and aircraft type inspection, a direct comparison with regard to airworthiness requirements can be made.

In order to proof the hypothesis, comprehensive simulation runs were performed within the realm of a prototype implementation of O.R.C.U.S. using an exemplary light fixed-wing UAS above representative areas in Germany. Besides the proof of concept of O.R.C.U.S., the results confirmed the hypothesis. Operational safety considerations alone are not sufficient to proof airworthiness of a UAS, as such considerations are always highly dependent on the operation itself, the technology of the UAS, the method of risk assessment and the assumed boundary conditions. A UAS developed in accordance to the regulations of airworthiness will always impose a lower risk than a UAS which has to rely on operational safety considerations.

Nevertheless, such safety considerations are appropriate to raise the risk awareness of operators and approving authorities and to implement preventive risk minimization. In particular in the view of the new drone regulations in Europe which includes the possibility of

the approval of UAS operations in the specific category, the thematic complex of the present work gains importance.

Acknowledgment

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Preface

It must be now almost ten years ago that I met Florian during a research and technology project I was in charge of. During this time, I was just before completing my professional training as an aircraft type inspector for UAS, but had already the responsibility for several UAS airworthiness projects in the German Armed Forces and was also part of a dynamic team at NATO that developed airworthiness codes for UAS. Although everyone was talking about the great potential of civil UAS in these days, they were far away from what they are today. In particular, necessary standards to enable the regular participation of UAS in the civil airspaces were not available and it seemed to be, that they maybe never will come. I was, and I still am enthusiastic on UAS, but in 2011, I guess I was even a little bit more, because of my work at NATO, my work for mission critical UAS and the good faith that things in aviation are going to change significantly by the rise of the drones. Driven by this and fascinated by the work of Florian's institute, I approached him with several ideas for a part-time dissertational thesis in the realm of UAS. And one idea resulted in the present work: Would it be possible to deem airworthiness by operational safety considerations? From my background in the military and knowledge about UAS airworthiness and the assigned challenges, I thought that this idea would be worthwhile to research, especially as many UAS around were not developed to airworthiness requirements, but required access to the airspaces. Florian agreed, and here we are.

In the beginning, I thought that I will complete this work within six years or less. Unfortunately, I was wrong. To research and to develop all the ideas I had in my mind parallel to my everyday working life, took me much longer than expected. The good thing was and is, that my regular work always benefited from the findings I had during my research and my dissertational thesis profited from my experience I obtained during my regular work. But, as I said, this costs a lot of time.

Today, many things changed, including my private and professional world. Nevertheless, I am still an aircraft type inspector for UAS, although the projects are slightly more complex and bigger now, than when I started. In parallel, civil unmanned aviation made huge steps forward and regulations are available making not regular, but at least a kind of regular, flight operations possible. However, unmanned aviation is far away from "file and fly" such as it is done in manned aviation.

I could not ignore these developments and had to include them in the present work. Unmanned aviation became dynamic in a dramatic way within the last three years. With UAS regulations which are changing almost every quarter and tons of white papers being issued, dealing all with UAS, the present thesis cannot claim to be entirely exhaustive. Nevertheless, to my best knowledge, besides my research findings and deductions, the present work gives an encompassing picture on UAS, airworthiness and operational safety considerations, enabling the reader to obtain basic knowledge about these broad and complex topics.

Oliver Hirling

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For my Mom and
for my Dad, who passed away much too early.

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Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Designation
A/C	Aircraft (manned)
ACAM	Aircraft Continuing Airworthiness Monitoring
AEH	Airborne electronic hardware
AF	Afternoon
AIB	Accident Investigation Board
AGL	Above ground level
AltMoC	Alternative Means of Compliance
AMC	Acceptable Means of Compliance
AOA	FAA Office of the Administrator
ARC	Air risk class
ATB	At building, indicates that a person is inside a building
BFU	German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung)

BMVI	Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport (Bundesministerium für Digitales und Verkehr)
BRLOS	Beyond radio line of sight
BVLOS	Beyond visual line of sight
C2Link	Command and Control Link
CAA	Civil Aviation Authority
CAAS	Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
CASA	Civil Aviation Safety Authority (Australia)
CAO	Combined Airworthiness Organisation
CAT	Catastrophic
cf.	“conferatur” - compare
CFIT	Controlled flight into terrain
C.F.R.	Code of Federal Regulations
CM	Countermeasure
Cond	Condition
COU	County
CS	Certification Specification
CT	City Type
DIP	Debris impact
DOJC	Dropped or Jettisoned Components
EA	Early Afternoon
EASA	European Aviation Safety Agency
e.g.	exempli gratia, for example
ELG	Emergency landing
ELF	Emergency landing field
ELS	Electrical System
EM	Early Morning

ENG	Engine
ER	Essential airworthiness requirement
EU	European Union
EV	Evening
EVLOS	Extended visual line of sight
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAR	Federal Aviation Regulation
F	Failure
FC	Failure Condition
FCS	Flight Control System
FP	Flight Path
FS	Federal State
FTI	Flight termination and immediate impact
GMAA	German Military Aviation Authority
GRC	Ground risk class
GS	Ground speed
HALE	High Altitude Long Endurance
HAZ	Hazardous
HLSM	High Level Standardized Mitigations
i.a.w.	in accordance with
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IFD	Impact close to the flight path in forward flight direction
IGR	Impact after glide with best glide-ratio on the flight path
IRP	Impact at a random point on the map
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
LBA	Luftfahrt-Bundesamt (Federal Aviation Office of Germany)
LM	Late Morning / Noon

LOC	Loss Of Control
LOS	Line of sight
LUAS	Light UAS with $m_{UA} \leq 150$ kg or 330 lbs
LUC	Light UAS operator certificate
MAJ	Major
MIN	Minor
MO	Morning
MoC	Means of Compliance
MSS	Main Sub System
MTOW	Maximum Take-Off Weight
NavSys	Navigation System
NGE	No ground effect
NI	Night
O.R.C.U.S.	Operational Risk Considerations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems
OSM	Open Street Map
OSO	Operational Safety Objective
OTW	On the Way
PPL	People
RLOS	Radio line of sight
SC	Special Condition
Seg	Segment
SMP	Sub map polygon
STR	Structure
sUAS	Small UAS with $m_{UA} \leq 25$ [kg] or 55 [lbs]
SurM	Surrounding Map
SW	Software
TFP	Tangential to the flight path impact

TLS	Target Level of Safety
UA	Unmanned Aircraft
UAS	Unmanned Aircraft System
UCS	Unmanned Control Station
UDS	Unpremeditated Descent
UFIT	Uncontrolled flight into terrain
USAF	United States Air Force
VLOS	Visual line of sight
VO	Visual observer

Units

Unit	Designation
[/]	Unit-less
[°]	Degree
[Fh]	Flight hour
[ft]	Foot
[h]	Hour
[J]	Joule
[lbs]	Pound
[m]	Metre
[m ²]	Square metre
[m ³]	Cubic metre
[min]	Minute
[ms]	Millisecond
[s]	Second
[t]	Ton



Formula symbols

Symbol	Unit	Designation
α	[/]	Significance level
γ	[°]	Glide angle
η	[°]	Tangential angle to the forward UA flight direction
θ	[°]	Angle of inclination to horizontal
θ'	[°]	Deviating pitch angle
λ	[1/Fh]	Failure rate
μ_0	[/]	Expectation
ρ_{Air}	[kg/m ³]	Air density
ρ_{PopAir}	[PPL/km ³]	Population density of people in the air.
$\rho_{PopGround}$	[PPL/km ²]	Population density of people on the ground.
ρ_{PPL}	[PPL/km ²]	Population density: People per square kilometre
ψ'	[°]	Deviating yaw angle
A	[m ²]	General area.
$A_{City/Area}$	[km ²]	Size of a city or an area
A_{CTTF}	[/]	Percentage number of people who arrived at their destination in a specific city type and time frame
$A_{GlideImpact}$	[m ²]	Affected area in case of an impacting UA that glided into the ground.
A_{Impact}	[m ²]	Affected area in case of an impacting UA
$A_{Mission}$	[km ²]	Total size of a UAS operation area
A_p	[m ²]	Area of an average person
AR	[/]	Percentage number of people who arrived at their destination
$A_{UAFront}$	[m ²]	UA Frontal cross-sectional area

A_{UARef}	[m ²]	UA planform reference area
C_d	[/]	Drag coefficient
CE	[/]	Casualty Expectation in case of a UA crash
C_l	[/]	Lift coefficient
CT	[/]	City type
Day_{UA}	[d]	Days of the UA mission
d_{CIP}	[m]	Distance to central impact point
d_{Debris}	[m]	Maximum debris range of UA debris parts
$d_{GlideGround}$	[m]	Projected glide path on the ground
$d_{Glide h_p}$	[m]	Gliding distance from the height of an average person to the ground.
d_{max}	[m]	Characteristic UA dimension
d_{Swath}	[m]	Swath distance with regard to a gliding impact.
d_{travel}	[m]	Travelled distance
E_{Imp}	[J]	Impact energy
E_{Kin}	[J]	Kinetic energy
F_0	[/]	Initiating Failure
F_d	[/]	Force of drag
F_l	[/]	Force of lift
g	[m/s ²]	Gravitational constant
H_0	[/]	Null hypothesis
H_1	[/]	Alternative hypothesis
h_{Alt}	[m] or [ft]	Altitude above the ground
h_p	[m]	Height of an average person
l_{UA}	[m]	UA length
L/D	[/]	Lift to drag ratio: The horizontal distance travelled of the UA while the flying altitude decreased one metre.

m_{UA}	[kg], [lbs], [t]	UA mass
MC_{Debris}	[/]	Debris as a result of a mid-air collision.
n	[/]	Number of samples
$n_{Probes0}$	[/]	Initial number of samples
N_{CatFC}	[/]	Number of expected catastrophic failure conditions
N_{DayUA}	[d]	Number of UA mission days
N_{PPL}	[/]	Number of people
$N_{PPLCity/Area}$	[/]	Number of inhabitants in an area or city
N_{PPLHit}	[/]	Number of people hit
$N_{PPLMission}$	[/]	Number of people in an area or city exposed to a UAS operation
N_{SimFh}	[Fh]	Number of simulated flight hours
N_{SimDay}	[d]	Number of simulated UA mission days
P	[1/Fh]	Probability per Flight Hour
P	[/]	Probability
P_C	[1/Fh]	Probability of casualties due to a UA per flight hour
P_{CAir}	[1/Fh]	Probability of casualties in the air due to a UA per flight hour
$P_{CGround}$	[1/Fh]	Probability of casualties on the ground due to a UA per flight hour
P_{CM_k}	[/]	Probability that the k^{th} countermeasure is successful
\bar{P}_{CM_k}	[/]	Probability that the k^{th} countermeasure is not successful
P_{Col}	[/]	Probability of a collision
$P_{DetectF_0}$	[/]	Probability that an initiating failure is detected
P_{Event}	[1/Fh]	Probability that an event occurred
P_{F_0}	[1/Fh]	Probability of an initiating failure in the UAS

P_{Fat}	[/]	Probability of fatality: The probability that a person suffers lethal injuries after the person got hit by a UA.
P_{FatCol}	[/]	Fatality probability in case of an aircraft collides with a UA
P_{FMSS_i}	[/]	Probability of the i^{th} failure mode in a main sub system
$P_{FMSSCond_j}$	[/]	Probability of the j^{th} specific failure condition in a main sub system
P_{FUA}	[1/Fh]	Probability that a failure occurs within the UAS
P_{Hit}	[1/Fh]	Probability that a person got hit per flight hour
PPL	[/]	Percentage number of people
PPL_{ATB}	[/]	Percentage number of people inside buildings
PPL_{OTW}	[/]	Percentage number of people on a way/in the outside
P_{MAC}	[1/Fh]	Probability of a mid-air collision
P_{MitCol}	[/]	Mitigation measures against collision
P_{Pen}	[/]	Penetration probability
r_p	[m]	Radius of an average person
s	[/]	Standard deviation
S	[/]	Shelter factor
SA	[/]	Percentage number of people who started a way
t	[/]	t value
t_{crit}	[/]	Critical t value
t_{Miss}	[s], [min] or [h]	Mission duration
t_{seg}	[s], [min] or [h]	Time segment
t_{travel}	[s], [min] or [h]	Time travelled
t_{Seg}	[h]	Time segment
v	[m/s], [km/h] or [kts]	Velocity
V_{Air}	[m ³] or [km ³]	Airspace volume

v_{MO}	[m/s], [km/h] or [kts]	Maximum operating velocity
v_{NE}	[m/s], [km/h] or [kts]	Never exceed speed
v_{Stall}	[m/s], [km/h] or [kts]	Stall speed
w_P	[m]	Width of an average person
w_{UA}	[m]	UA width, if not otherwise described, the wingspan
\bar{x}	[/]	Mean value of samples
	AND	Logical AND gate in fault tree analysis
	OR	Logical OR gate in fault tree analysis

1 Introduction

1.1 Motivation and Background

“No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a pilot over the territory of a contracting State without special authorization by that State and in accordance with the terms of such authorization. Each contracting State undertakes to insure that the flight of such aircraft without a pilot in regions open to civil aircraft shall be so controlled as to obviate danger to civil aircraft.”

ICAO Convention on International Civil Aviation, Article 8, page 5, [1]

The above-mentioned article, quoted from the Convention on International Civil Aviation, was written more than 75 years ago. During the time the Convention was created, aircraft emerged in a rapid way. Although the creators of the convention were focused on manned aviation, they also had foreseen the possibility of unmanned flight. But probably no one of the authors had in mind that aviation will face an emerge of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) as aviation faces it today [2, 3].

Figure 1-1 shows the development of the number of passengers transported in aviation from year 1944 up to 2017. This number can be seen as an indicator for the density of aircraft in the airspace. While between the 1940s and 1980s passenger numbers increased constantly, the increase of passengers in the late 20th Century and the first decade of the 21st Century is almost of exponential nature. This significant increase is remarkable. It could be said, that the skies were empty in the late 1940s whilst in the present times the airspace is crowded. And in addition to the increasing fleet of manned aircraft, today also a fleet of UAS shall be integrated into the same airspace.




Figure 1-1. Aviation passengers from 1944 to 2017 [4, 5]

In contrast to the technological evolution of manned aircraft in their beginning, the evolution of UAS became even faster. Looking back roughly two decades, civil UAS could be seen as a niche, like a side effect of model aircraft. A toy for technical enthusiasts. The only professional users were foremost military forces. Nevertheless, the potential of civil UAS was already acknowledged and seen as one key driving element for the future of aviation [6-8].

Nowadays, civil UAS can be bought ready to use in commercial electronic markets at prices that are affordable for the broad public. No intense and challenging training is needed and anyone is able to learn how to control them in short time and start to fly almost immediately after unboxing the machine. The numbers of civil UAS for the private market are already within the range of millions and they will further increase. Besides leisure purposes, civil UAS are becoming a more and more growing factor for different professional usages. At the moment, the most important growth for UAS applications is predicted in surveying and inspecting of agriculture, buildings, energy installations, police and emergency situation or for observing regional developments. The possible economic growth and benefit of this new aviation field tends to billions of Euros. Therefore, it is not surprising that there is a lot of pressure applied by the industrial sector on the governmental entities and the regulatory authorities to enable a fast and smooth access for UAS into the national airspaces of the states across the globe [9-12].

Despite the fact that UAS are not that new on the aviation field as it might look like, the desired integration of UAS into the airspace took a long way and time to be realized and is still not completed yet. Compared to civil UAS, military UAS are in regular use within military forces since the 1960s. Currently, usual civil UAS models range foremost in the size of model aircraft only, whereas the sizes of military UAS comprise the whole spectrum one can think about: From only a few grams, up to tons of Maximum Take Off Weight (MTOW), with wingspans from a few centimetres up to more than 20 meters.

Unfortunately, the military is not yet able to operate its UAS in a comparable way to manned aircraft in the airspaces, although there is an obvious need to unlock this capability. In accordance with the articles of the Chicago Convention related to UAS and military aircraft, it takes a lot of bureaucratic work to permit flights of military UAS through the airspaces of different states. Especially for Europe, this leads to the fact that regular international flight operations from one state to another state, in sense of “file and fly”, are hardly possible for military UAS. The same applied to all civil UAS in Europe by the end of 2018.

Having recognized the great potential of UAS for aviation and also emphasized by the enormous interest of different stakeholders in the field of unmanned aviation, governments and their political leaders pushed the development of the integration of UAS continuously forward during the last decade. Eventually, this long-term continuous push led to the development of the necessary regulations to enable a successive integration of civil UAS into the airspaces. This new regulatory environment represents a sound and sophisticated set of encompassing UAS regulations. These regulations will reflect the necessary technical safety of the UAS, the qualification of the operator, the quality of the manufactures and the operation of the UAS itself, in order to ensure safe UAS operations appropriate to the specific UAS design [13-25].

The holistic approach of the new UAS regulations evolved from the acknowledgement that the four core aspects of a UAS operation, - machine, man, environment and the kind of operation itself, - must be taken into account in order to ensure safe UAS flights while concurrently creating appropriate requirements. The comprehensive contemplation of the interconnected core aspects shall serve the overall target, to maintain the safety of people, albeit UAS shall now also fly in the skies.

Safety has many definitions and varies with the related context. One very general definition is provided by the International Organization for Standardization, ISO, and the International Electrotechnical Commission, IEC:

“safety - freedom from risk [...] which is not tolerable”

ISO, IEC Guide 51 Safety aspects - Guidelines for their inclusion in standards, Definition 3.14, p. 2, [26]

This broad definition of ISO and IEC underlines that safety is always bound to current circumstances and situations, which define what is “tolerable”. ISO and IEC consequently emphasize this by their definition of “tolerable risk”:

“tolerable risk - level of risk [...] that is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society”

ISO, IEC Guide 51 Safety aspects - Guidelines for their inclusion in standards, Definition 3.15, p. 2, [26]

With respect to UAS, ICAO provided an adjusted definition of safety:

“Safety. The state in which risks associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are reduced and controlled to an acceptable level.”

ICAO Manual on RPAS, p. xix, [27]

Based on these definitions, it can be said that safety represents a function dependent upon the current situation of an individual person and the perception of the situation by the person itself. Within the context of aviation, this definition can be deduced further to the point that a safe operation of an aircraft is given when a person arrives at its destination without getting harmed and if during the flight no person on the ground was harmed by the flying aircraft.

Obviously, the most probable event that causes persons getting hurt during a flight with an aircraft is if the aircraft crashes. Either in a controlled manner during an emergency landing or in an uncontrolled manner if the pilot loses the control of the aircraft. In the latter case, the probability that uninvolved persons on the ground will be affected is higher than in the first case, under the assumption that a pilot in control will do anything to avoid injuring people on the ground in case he has to perform an emergency landing. In contrast to manned aviation, the crash of an unmanned aircraft (UA) which is out of control of the remote pilot might, but must not lead to the worst case: the death of people. In manned aviation, in case of an out of control scenario which ends in a crash, it is assumed that people on board the aircraft will not survive [28, 29].

Safety of an aircraft and the people on board and therefore, also the inherent safety of the people overflown, is formally witnessed within the Certificate of Airworthiness (CofA). The CofA is the official confirmation that the aircraft is in an “airworthy” state and therefore in a state for safe operation. The CofA is always related to the Type certificate of the aircraft design, which proves that the aircraft type has been designed in accordance to the appropriate airworthiness requirements. The Type certificate consequently confirms that the entire design of an aircraft type is safe for operation [30].

The most obvious difference between manned and unmanned aviation is the extraction of the pilot and passengers out of the airborne vehicle. Without the need to protect people onboard an aircraft, almost infinite design possibilities arise. While the airworthiness of manned aircraft is primarily focused on the protection of people in the aircraft, as long as UAS do not transport passengers, airworthiness of UA should be focused on the protection of overflown people on the ground and other airspace participants. As outlined above, upcoming regulations for UAS will take the environment where the UAS is flown as well as the kind of operation more into account. Therefore, the focus change has already been done by the competent authorities (e.g. [13, 16, 21, 23-25]).

These changes regarding design of the UA and primary protection of third parties instead of onboard passengers lead to the fact that operational safety considerations are probably becoming one of the most important factors for every UAS operation. Out of this deduction, the fundamental and driving question of the present dissertation was born:

Is it possible to prove the airworthiness of a UAS with operational safety considerations instead of traditional airworthiness requirements, in order to obtain a type certificate?

To assess this question in a systematic way, it is essential to start with a short look into the current UAS regulation approaches, which will be done in the next subchapter.

1.2 State of the Art

As outlined before, civil UAS are still seen as a relatively new field in aviation with unique features, which cannot be compared to manned aviation. The regulation authorities were forced to react on these “new” objects in the skies, in order to maintain the high level of safety in aviation which has been achieved since the promulgation of the Chicago Convention. The long development phase for UAS regulation, which will take much more years to be completed, witnesses the complexity of UAS and the handling of them. Reflecting all efforts of all regulation authorities around the globe would probably fill books. Therefore, the present thesis focuses on three civilian main players and one military main player:

- ICAO
- FAA
- EASA
- NATO

NATO already published several UAS airworthiness standards, which are harmonized and recognized throughout the alliance. The reasons why NATO was a forerunner in this field will be shown later. The current approaches of the other three stakeholders have one driving aspect in common: The obvious need to take more into account than just the aircraft and the

passengers and to encompass this in adequate regulations ensuring safe flight operations, resulted or will result in so-called *risk-based regulations*. This new approach imposes a new mindset in contrast to traditional airworthiness certification. Traditional airworthiness certification follows the strict path of clear, prescriptive requirements for which compliance must be shown in order to prove the airworthiness of an aircraft, while risk-based regulations focus on the risk which is posed to the environment when the (unmanned) aircraft is operated within this environment. This risk shall be reduced to an adequate and acceptable level for the public. To achieve this, UAS regulations need to take into account four cornerstones, which affect safe UAS operations:

- UAS design
- Qualification of the pilot of the UA
- Competence of the UAS designer
- Operational area where the UA is flown

These four cornerstones are of interacting nature and influence each other. For example, it might be acceptable to apply less severe technical requirements if the UAS is operated in an environment where it can be reasonably expected that no uninvolved person gets hurt if the UA crashes. Furthermore, instead of limiting an applicant to strict requirements which need to be fulfilled in an exact way, the applicant is given more freedom regarding the fulfilment of requirements in order to achieve the desired level of safety.

These risk-based regulation approaches in combination with a performance-based implementation are seen as a promising way forward in order to ensure an adequate and proportionate way to regulate UAS in a safe manner on the one hand while on the other hand unnecessary burdens for an evolving aviation sector are avoided. A further and much more detailed elaborated analysis is presented in dedicated chapters of this thesis, including a discussion with respect to the approach of NATO, which on first sight, followed the traditional approach in terms of airworthiness, but on second sight implicitly used a risk-based approach [23-25, 28, 31, 32].

1.3 Dissertation Objective

Based on the fundamental question if it is possible to prove the airworthiness of a UAS with operational safety considerations instead of traditional airworthiness requirements in order to obtain a type certificate, the hypothesis of the dissertation was developed:

Operational safety considerations cannot be used as the only proof of airworthiness of a UAS in an aircraft type inspection process to achieve a type certificate.

In order to obtain an answer to the fundamental question as well as a proof for the hypothesis, three main research questions were developed:

1. What are relevant operational safety considerations in the context of UAS operations?
2. How can these operational safety considerations be modelled?
3. How reliable are such operational safety considerations?

During the research, it became obvious that the three determined research questions were too broad and a more precise specification was needed. In order to further specify the three

research questions, following additional aspects were taken into account. Focusing on how every country or organisation related to aviation applies operational safety aspects might lead on the one hand to a tremendous work, but which probably would also result in a too generic work. This led to the conclusion that focus shall be given to three civil stakeholders, ICAO, EASA, FAA as well as to the military stakeholder NATO, as it was already outlined above.

In addition to this first reflection, the question arose which UAS would be beneficial for the research and therefore which kind of UAS should be taken into account. While nowadays relatively clear differentiations of UAS are available, this was not the case, when the research for this thesis began several years ago. During this time, around 2013, the civil laws for UAS of today were probably not even written as a scratch. One of the most prominent differentiation in these times could be found in European law, which mandated UAS with a MTOW of more than 150 kg to Type Certification in the regime of EASA. UAS below this mass felt under the regime of national aviation law and specific regulations without type certification, which led to an immense set of different regulations across the countries for this kind of UAS [33].

While the civil world was struggling with this burden, the military world was several steps ahead. NATO already had published one harmonized UAS Airworthiness Requirements (USAR) Standardization Agreement (STANAG) for fixed-wing UAS with a MTOW above 150 kg. Furthermore, the next two USAR STANAGs, one for rotary-wing UAS above 150 kg and one for light fixed-wing UAS below 150 kg MTOW, were on their way to official promulgation [34, 35].

In conclusion, one can say that in these past days, the civil world had not put light UAS below 150 kg MTOW under the umbrella of airworthiness, while the military world already did. This polarity resulted in the next refinement of the research questions, by focusing them on light UAS.

Additionally, it was found necessary by the author, that the research should be applied to a concrete environment. As it was outlined before, the environment where the UAS is operated becomes of more importance in the new regulation approaches. Less research was done before regarding the application of UAS operational safety considerations to Germany. Therefore, it was decided to apply the research on and the developed tool for UAS operational safety considerations UAS on Germany as example.

With these adjustments, the fundamental research question and the subsequent detailed research questions were refined as follows:

Is it possible to proof the airworthiness of a light UAS with operational safety considerations instead of traditional airworthiness requirements in order to obtain a type certificate?

1. What are relevant operational safety considerations in the context of light UAS operations in Germany?
2. How can these operational safety considerations for light UAS be modelled?
3. How reliable are such operational safety considerations for light UAS?

Based on those more precise research questions, the hypothesis was amended:

Operational safety considerations cannot be used as the only proof of airworthiness of a light UAS in an aircraft type inspection process to achieve a type certificate.

The resulting contributions of the research on these questions, which led to the present thesis, are presented briefly in the next chapter.

1.4 Dissertation Contributions

1.4.1 Contribution C1: Summary and Analysis of UAS Regulations Framework and UAS Risk Models

In order to assess the research questions, an intense literature review was conducted. Primary focus was given on the activities of the designated main stakeholders. Because in the beginning foremost only guidance and policy documents of official authorities were available, but only few official UAS regulations, attention was also given on white papers from different authors and groups. This led to an encompassing overview of the past and current state of the art on approaches, principles, directives and standards regarding the handling of UAS. By providing an extensive compassing résumé and comparison of current UAS airworthiness regulation approaches from civil and military entities, a comprehensive picture about unmanned aviation is provided.

Soon it became obvious that this lack of official UAS regulation caused many studies with respect to the UAS operational risk studies and related risk models, for example [36-50]. However, it was found that those models often missed to discuss the point if the results could be a path for determining airworthiness of light UAS. Besides, studies that specifically were focused on the determination of UAS risk assessments with respect to Germany could not be identified. The present thesis overcomes these misses and discusses exactly those points.

1.4.2 Contribution C2: O.R.C.U.S. – a Self-Developed UAS Operations Risk Model from the Scratch

To achieve the aims described afore, it was seen necessary to develop an own risk assessment tool which takes into account all relevant operational safety aspects that need to be considered for estimating the risk of light UAS operations. This decision resulted in the O.R.C.U.S. tool. O.R.C.U.S. - Operational Risk Considerations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems is a unique software simulation tool chain which is able to estimate the risk of a light UAS operation above any area in Germany. O.R.C.U.S. calculates predictions regarding the hit probability of a person in the vicinity of a UAS operation, in case the Unmanned Aircraft (UA) crashes.

The basic advantage of O.R.C.U.S. is that it enables the user to generate risk predictions of an intended operation with a light UAS over a designated operational zone in Germany by using a default model and to combine it only with elementary data about the UAS. While the studied risk models usually concentrated on the crash of a UAS itself, the benefit of O.R.C.U.S. is that a complete event chain beginning with the technical failures in the airborne UA which eventually cause the crash on the ground and the possible outcomes is included. Although the behaviour of a failed light UAS is highly dependent upon the specific UAS design, it is possible to define high level and common assumptions about the behaviour. Therefore, the default model of O.R.C.U.S. defines failure conditions based on main subsystems of the UA which might lead to different outcome scenarios.

Furthermore, in contrast to most UAS risk simulation models which have been reviewed, O.R.C.U.S. uses a time and place dependent population algorithm based on official and up to date statistics, instead of a uniform and static population density model. The application of this algorithm provides the current population density in relation to the time when the UA impacts the ground and the area where the UA crashes [51].

1.4.3 Contribution C3: Determination of a Relationship between Operational Safety Considerations and Airworthiness

Once the basic programming and testing of O.R.C.U.S. was completed, an example light UAS operation was defined and applied to several representative cities and areas in Germany in accordance with an upfront determined simulation and validation plan. After completion of each of those simulation runs, the results produced by O.R.C.U.S. were evaluated in detail with respect to the research questions and the hypothesis. To ease the evaluation, O.R.C.U.S. includes an automatic examination and validation function, which produces evaluation spread sheets. In total, the example mission was applied on fourteen cities, with 39,200 simulated flight hours in summary per city or area, leading to more than half a million simulated flight hours.

The evaluation of the simulation results from O.R.C.U.S. confirmed the hypothesis that airworthiness of a light UAS cannot be proven by operational safety considerations only. However, it was found that operational safety considerations might be used as mitigation to compensate lacking airworthiness evidences or non-compliances within a type inspection process of a light UAS in order to conduct an operation safely even with a UAS deemed not to be airworthy. Assessment tools like O.R.C.U.S., in particular the included algorithms to predict people densities in accordance to time and place, are able to increase the risk awareness of UAS operators substantially in order to avoid critical daytimes of densely people movement. Subsequently, the potential risk of overflown people might be reduced.

Nevertheless, a software-based tool like O.R.C.U.S. forms a solid base for planning specific UAS operations. For regular operations with unmanned aircraft, a UAS design, which is based on proven methods and sound development technologies in order to show compliance to the applicable type certification basis will always be superior to a UAS which needs operational safety considerations to achieve an acceptable safety level. These conclusive deductions are seen as the main contributions of the present thesis, as to the authors best knowledge, a comprehensive assessment of operational safety considerations and the relation to traditional airworthiness approaches as it was done, has not performed to the extent as it was done here.

1.4.4 Further Contributions

Besides the already outlined wide-ranging inputs, the further contributions of the present thesis are:

- C4. The present thesis includes a conclusive summary of the history of unmanned aviation as it was felt, that it is necessary to be aware about the origins of UAS in order to better understand the concept of unmanned aviation.
- C5. Open Simulation Environment for a UAS operation above Germany

The provision of a comprehensive open simulation environment for a UAS operation above Germany, allowing the assessment of different UAS failure modes, leading in worst case to an uncontrolled ground impact.

- C6. The determination of resulting risk for people overflowed in Germany, by applying different impact scenarios in combination with a time and place dependent algorithm regarding population distribution in a way that was not done before.
- C7. The possibility to estimate if a UAS operation is sufficiently safe or not in congested areas, although only few information about the UAS is available and without the need to conduct an extensive assessment.
- C8. A method to validate the results of the UAS operation risk assessment.

Much more details regarding the contributions of this thesis will be presented within the following chapters of the core text. The next and last chapter of the introduction outlines the content structure of the present thesis.

1.5 Content Structure

The present work contains ten chapters including the bibliography and one appendices chapter. After the current introduction, chapter 2 illustrates the origins of UAS in order to get an idea about the general principles of unmanned flying and where they are coming from.

In Chapter 3, the concept of aviation safety will be summarised. This includes a short summary about the four denominated key entities, ICAO, FAA, EASA and NATO with the intent to raise the awareness regarding the meaning of those entities in the context of aviation safety. One of the core aspects of aviation safety and the key driving aspect of this thesis, airworthiness, will also be elaborated in a dedicated subchapter. To provide a complete picture, the process to determine airworthiness, the so-called type inspection process (of aircraft), is also presented.

Within chapter 4, the principles of aircraft type inspection will further be applied to UAS. Due to their unique nature, certain specialities and challenges related to the type inspection of UAS are brought to the fore. In addition, the chapter contains a summary of the current UAS regulation efforts of the four designated stakeholders. The chapter will be concluded by the determination of points to be considered in order to answer research question 1.

Subsequent to the conclusion of chapter 4, chapter 5 pursues an assessment of selected UAS Operations Risk studies which were available prior to current regulations. The reviewed UAS risk assessment studies will be presented briefly. Based on the results of the previous chapter, the assessment will start with general aspects to be considered before conducting a UAS flight operation as well as special factors and challenging aspects that have to be taken into account additionally. Those derived general aspects served as guidance of the reviewed studies in order to determine advantages, shortcomings and potential mitigations. The found shortcomings and potential mitigations are then presented in chapter 6. While chapter 5 completes the first research question, chapter 6 gives the introduction to answering the second research question which will be completed by chapter 7.

Chapter 7 focuses on the UAS risk assessment tool which was created for this thesis: O.R.C.U.S. At first, the general aim of O.R.C.U.S. will be outlined, followed by a description of the capabilities of the tool, the background of the different functional capacities and the

resulting main algorithms. The chapter is completed with an illustration of the standard O.R.C.U.S. simulation based on the integrated default settings.

This depiction in the end of chapter 7 serves as entrance to chapter 8, which illustrates the application of O.R.C.U.S. in the course of the research for this thesis on operational safety considerations in the context UAS type inspection and airworthiness and shall serve as answer to research question. This includes the determination of the simulations with respect to the UAS operation itself as well as the representative areas above which the simulated UAS operation took place. Before the results of the conducted simulation series will be discussed, the approach regarding the validation of O.R.C.U.S. is reviewed.

After the presentation of the O.R.C.U.S. simulation results, these results are going to be discussed in the last subchapter of chapter 8. Within this discussion, the results will be assessed with a focus on deductions regarding airworthiness aspects in order to answer research question 3 and to substantiate the hypothesis.

Within chapter 9, which represents the last main chapter, an encompassing conclusion will be presented, summarizing the results of the research and the thesis. Furthermore, the conclusion will be complemented by an outlook of possible further developments and improvements of O.R.C.U.S.

For the sake of completeness, within the appendices that follow chapter ten, a brief O.R.C.U.S. manual, a glossary with a description of each O.R.C.U.S. function, all areas that have applied within the conducted simulation series as well as associated evaluation tables are included. The source code of O.R.C.U.S. is not part of the text itself but is stored at the Institute of Flight System Dynamics and can be retrieved there.

2 Origins of Unmanned Aircraft Systems

In January 2013 the Chinese based company DJI released the Phantom drone. The quadcopter design became iconic for the mass consumer market of drones. With the ability to fly automatically and to hold the position even in case of a complete loss of the command and control link, the UAS represented a major difference to other available consumer drones in these days. Accompanied by a control device instead of relying on users' smartphones and combined with an affordable price, one could say that the Phantom marked a game changer in the civil UAS market [52].

Although the evolution of the civil UAS market started not that long ago, the beginning of UAS started much earlier. Basically, the history of UAS begun in the mid of the 19th Century. A lot of technology enhancement in mankind's history was driven by wars and military developments. For the technology of UAS this is even more true than for other technologies as it was developed strictly for military applications only and this continued until the early 21st Century [20, 53].



Figure 2-1. DJI Phantom 4 Advanced¹, one of the latest DJIs Phantom UAS series generation.

If today a random person is asked how drones look, it can reasonably be assumed that he or she would describe either the shape of a quadcopter or the shape of a Reaper UAS from the US Forces. Like the quadcopter design of the Phantom became iconic and an immanent symbol for civil UAS to the public, so did the design of the Reaper for military UAS as well.

¹ Figure credit: DJI, retrieved from <https://www3.djicdn.com/assets/images/products/phantom-4-adv/s1/s1-img-2103a7274a03d031f129b9cd360c2ee3.png?from=cdnMap>



Figure 2-2. US Air Force MQ-9 Reaper on a mission².

Driven by the actions taken by the United States with their fleet of UAS in the global war on terror, the public reception of unmanned aviation is foremost negative. It is quite an irony of fate, that the first usage was also a military one, similar to the capabilities of today's armed UAS.

The present chapter represents contribution C4 as it outlines the history of UAS in order to provide an idea how they evolved to their current state. In the context of the research questions, this aspect was seen necessary to get an encompassing overview on unmanned aviation. By doing so, it also helps to better understand the later outlined regulation framework and therefore serves as support for contribution C1.

2.1 Unmanned Balloons and the Birth of Remote Control

During the siege of Venice by the Austrians in 1849, unmanned balloons should carry explosive devices over the lagoon to the city because the range of the Austrian artillery cannons was not enough to reach the city. The success of this attempt is not clear and the reviewed sources are inconsistent. It is obvious that unmanned balloons are highly vulnerable to environmental effects, especially wind, nevertheless there was a psychological effect regarding the death from the sky which probably supported the success of the Austrian Forces [20, 54-56].

The technology of the 19th century had not the means needed to enable flight with machines heavier than air, nor essential elements for unmanned aviation like remote control. However, in 1898 the inventor Nikola Tesla got a patent granted by the United States Patent Office on his "method and apparatus for controlling mechanism of moving vessels or vehicles" [57]. Tesla proved the concept of wireless control of vehicles and laid down one cornerstone for unmanned aviation.

A real application of a remote control for a flying vehicle was demonstrated in 1910. Thomas R. Phillips, a British engineer, showed the remote control of a model sized Airship in London. He flew it above the audience and dropped a small load of paper doves. The purpose of his demonstration was to advertise his idea of so-called Torpedo Airships, which should be able to bomb any city by remote control. Unfortunately, he had no technical solution regarding the determination when the Airship would have reached its aim. To overcome this issue, he only

² Figure credit: US Air Force, retrieved from <https://www.af.mil/News/Photos/igphoto/2000608254/>

had a vague idea what he called “telephotographic lenses”, however this idea was much ahead of technological feasibility of the early 20th Century [20, 58].

2.2 The Predecessors of Modern UAS

Also because of technological constraints and only very limited success of several projects, the further development of wireless controlled machines was quite low. This changed in 1917 when the successful first flight of the Curtiss-Sperry Aerial Torpedo took place. Developed clandestinely as “Aerial Target”, the aircraft impersonated the real first remotely piloted weaponized aircraft, which was flown successfully. With respect to common definitions of UAS of today, the unmanned aircraft was rather a very early predecessor of the modern cruise missiles than of a UAS. A short synopsis regarding the modern definitions of UAS and their origins will be provided in chapter 2.7. During the foundation years of UAS development, UAS were always close to missiles development [53].




Figure 2-3. Curtiss-Sperry Aerial Torpedo around 1918³.

Besides the remote control, the Curtiss-Sperry Aerial Torpedo included another cornerstone of UAS technology: Inertial Navigation with for these times very small gyros. This led to an impressive increase of the aircraft’s accuracy. The harbingers of the first World War pushed the development of several other UAS comparable to the Curtiss-Sperry vehicle. However, only few fulfilled the expected capacities. One of them was the Kettering Bug, shown in Figure 2-4, which was invented and developed for the US Air Force also in 1917. The technological constraints of the early 20th century concluded in the recognition that no effective UAS could be realized. Therefore, focus was given on target drones for the purpose to train antiaircraft gun operators and very early guided missiles [20, 53, 59].

³ Figure credit: Naval History and Heritage Command, retrieved from <https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/numerical-list-of-images/nhhc-series/nh-series/NH-92000/NH-92008.html>



Figure 2-4. Kettering Aerial Torpedo, nickname “Bug”, year unknown⁴.

2.3 Technological Evolution in the Dawn of and during World War 2

Whilst the UAS development saw a stagnation after the first World War, it increased again as the world had to face the rise of the German Reich and the growing threat of a second World War. After Tesla had demonstrated the capability to control vehicles wireless, and the development of gyros for inertial navigation continued, another inventor applied for a patent, which made it possible to send Torpedoes or other devices fully automatic to a target. In 1931 the patent application of the Hungarian Engineer Koloman Tihanyi about an “Automatic Sighting and Directing Devices for Torpedoes, Guns and other Apparatus” was accepted in the United Kingdom. Tihanyi closed a gap, about which no one thinks about today any more: The ability for a vehicle or aircraft to fly automatically and to detect or “to see”. However, the real benefit of this invention, the ability of the UA to see, was objected by the not yet sufficient technology to downstream the data [20, 60].



Figure 2-5. Winston Churchill upfront a Queen Bee under preparation for flight, 06 June 1941⁵.

⁴ Figure credit: National Museum of the US Air Force™, retrieved from <https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/198095/kettering-aerial-torpedo-bug/>

⁵ Figure credit: Imperial War Museums, retrieved from <https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205195356>

Although UAS suffered of this deficiency, the already started development of target drones continued. Based on the De Haviland DA.82 Tiger Moth, the DA.82B was developed, a remote-controlled version of the DA.82. The DA.82 B should become the first UAS of mass production as the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom procured around 400 of those “Queen Bees” called drones between 1934 to 1943. At the Royal Navy, the Queen Bees were used as target drones. The name “Queen Bee” is also one of the rare clear links were the relation of UAS and drone might come from. In parallel, the US American Reginald Denny, developed his remote controlled Radioplane-1. This target drone did not gain a lot of attention of potential customers at first. However, this changed with the outbreak of the second World War. Until the end of the war, more than 15,000 different drones of Reginald Denny Industries were manufactured [53, 54, 59].

But the US and UK models where not the only attempts to foster UA. In the German Reich, the Argus AS 292 reconnaissance UAS was developed. Similar to the Curtiss-Sperry Aerial Torpedo, it was developed secretly as Aerial Target for anti-aircraft Gunnery under the camouflaged name “FZG-43 – Flak Zielgerät 43”. The real purpose of this small-sized remotely piloted aircraft was to provide close range aerial photography to the German troops. Furthermore, after the successful proof of concept, the manufacturing company Argus, proposed the so-called “Fernfeuer” program. The concept foresaw a UAS controlled from another aircraft. Furthermore, it should be capable to carry one ton of disposable explosives and return to base after disposal. However, this idea remained a concept only. Nevertheless, the basic idea led to the development of the famous infamous “FZG-76”, or better known as the “V-1”.




Figure 2-6. Soldiers moving a V-1 on a transport wagon to the start ramp, 1944/45⁶.

Similar to the Aerial Torpedoes earlier, also the V-1 does not match with the modern definition of UAS. V-1 was a more advanced ancestor of cruise missile than the Kettering Bug or the Curtiss-Sperry Aerial Torpedo. Nevertheless, V-1 needs to be mentioned because this machine contained fundamental elements of modern UAS. For example, the system was comprised of an autopilot, gyroscope-based feedback mechanisms to steer the control

⁶ Figure credit: Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1973-029A-24A, Photograph by Bruno Lysiak, Original Title “V1 vor dem Start”

surfaces and to stabilize the aircraft, an anemometric system as well as transmitter to provide the position to German ground stations [53, 59, 61].

While V-1 was developed and deployed on the German side, the United States Navy started a development of UAS which should not only be able to act like a missile, but also be able to drop bombs over a target area. Based on a proposal of a Navy commander to utilize Target Drones as kind of battering ram against enemy aircraft, the development of the first Unmanned Combat Aircraft System (UCAS) emerged in 1941. The resulting TDR-1 drones should be controlled by another aircraft mothership, the TBF Avenger. They were intended to serve either as kind of guided missile or as bomb carrying transport aircraft. Test trials included a television camera and a sufficient transmitter to improve the accuracy to the most extent. The tests were successful and proofed that the television transmission worked sufficiently. Another successful test series incorporated a new radar-based guidance system, enabling all-weather operations.



Figure 2-7. Flight preparations of a TDR-1, 1944⁷.

After subsequent delays because of the technical modifications, the UAS were deployed to the battlefield in early 1944. Navigated by their motherships, the TDR-1s flew to their targets, deployed the bombs and on the way back they dove into enemy ships (formally speaking, this “one-time” usage rejects the definition as UCAS). However, the US Navy was not satisfied with the results and cancelled the program later in 1944. Notably, it is worth to say that the TDR-1s operated more than six miles away from their remote pilots and no one of the motherships and the crews was lost [53, 61].

2.4 The New Standard Role

The two World Wars caused a jump in the development of manned and unmanned aviation technology. Although seen as exotic and also hindered by the limitations of the technology in these years, UAS were already deemed as beneficial asset to armed forces. In the post-war years, development in the area of unmanned aviation continued to concentrate on target drones for training purposes as well as on guided missiles [53].

However, as the divergence of the former allies began and the Cold War manifested permanently, the need to have an effective reconnaissance in the air became apparent.

⁷ Figure credit: Naval History and Heritage Command, retrieved from <https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/numerical-list-of-images/nara-series/usn/USN-1050000/USN-1053775.html>

Another driver was the potential necessity to explore battlefields in a dirty environment, e.g. after a nuclear detonation. Consequently, it became obvious that such kind of aerial reconnaissance should be unmanned. The loss of two manned U-2 airplanes over the Soviet Union in the 1960s increased the development even more. Reconnaissance should become the new standard role for UAS remain until today [53, 54, 59].

One of the first attempt was made by the US Air Force, which planned a high-flying UAV, the B-67 Crossbow. Due to financial and insufficient performance, the program never made it to real service. Another approach was driven by the US Army, which wanted to carry out battlefield assessment. Therefore, a target drone of the Northrop Radioplane Company was modified in order to carry either a daylight or infrared night camera.




Figure 2-8. Northrop Radioplane SD-1, year unknown⁸.

Tracking of the SD-1 UAS was done via Radar while it was piloted with radio control. The UAS was able to fly 30 minutes with an operational radius of up to 65 km and to take and store up to 95 photos at daylight, respectively up to 10 at night. The SD-1 was used for many years throughout different military forces and in fact, it was one of the real first UAS for reconnaissance [53, 59, 62].

While during the Korean War UAS still remained a side-asset by the US Forces, they became much more present during the Vietnam War. The AQM-34 Lightning Bug, a series of jet driven UAS of the Ryan Company, conducted more than 3,400 missions over the territories of China, Vietnam and North-Korea. It was developed secretly and based on the former target drone models Firefly and Firebee.

⁸ Figure credit: Dr Russell Naughton, retrieved from http://www.ctie.monash.edu.au/hargrave/rpav_radioplane6.html



Figure 2-9. AQM-34L Lightning Bug, year 1969⁹.

The Lightning Bugs finally proved the benefits of UAS for the US Forces. Besides their reconnaissance function, the UAS were fitted also for Signal and Communication Intelligence (SIGINT/COMINT) and electronic warfare purposes. It should be noted that some Lightning Bugs were given credit for the down-shooting of hostile aircraft. Actually, the enemy's aircraft were lost foremost during intercepts or due to wrong guided anti-aircraft missiles of their own forces. Another remarkable attribute of the Lightning Bug system was the capability to be retained in the air by a helicopter while the UA was hanging on the parachute [53, 59].



Figure 2-10. AQM-34 - Medium Air Retrieval System illustration, year unknown¹⁰.

Another notably development was the D-21 "Tagboard". This system should act as means for strategic intelligence. The concept foresaw the launch of the unmanned aircraft from a A-12 mothership, a modified version of famous SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft. Capable of flying at supersonic speed of up to Mach 3 in high altitudes, D-21 would have been able to overcome hostile air defense. Four test flights were conducted including missions over foreign areas. However, none of them was entirely successful. This was one but not the only reason which lead to the stop of the program.

⁹ Figure credit: National Museum of the US Air Force™, photo 140114-F-DW547-004.JPG

¹⁰ Figure credit: National Museum of the US Air Force™, photo 140114-F-DW547-008.JPG



Figure 2-11. D-21 on its mothership, year unknown¹¹.

Although the United States were the forerunners in unmanned aviation, it should also be noted that there were several developments in other nations. For example, the German Army received their first reconnaissance CL-89 in the mid 1960s. The drone was developed by Canadair for the military forces of the United Kingdom and France at first. Launched by a rocket booster, the system operated entirely automatic. The successor of this UAS, the CL-289, which was very similar in its design, was flown by the German Army until the late 2000s. It should be noted that the most systems of these days did not contain a real time video imagery as current UAS provide. Usually, pictures taken by the UAS were stored in a capsule inside the aircraft, which had to be evaluated after landing of the UA [53, 59].

Like the United States, the Soviet Union as the main antagonist in the Cold War developed several UAS. However, only few information is available to the public. Known examples are the TBR-1, the Tu-123 or the Tu-143. Although the development of Soviet UAS was kind of similar to the programs in the western world regarding the linkage to target drones, it was even more linked to the development of ballistic missiles.



Figure 2-12. Rocket-assisted launch of Tu-143, 2016 ¹².

¹¹ Figure credit: National Museum of the US Air Force™, photo 151009-F-DW547-003.JPG

¹² Figure credit: Andrii Klymenko, retrieved from <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/ukraine-today-ukrainian-missile-tests-near-crimea-details-map-revealed.html>

While the TBR-1 was a smaller UAS which had a design comparable to an aircraft, the two other listed systems based on missiles. Capable of flying at supersonic speeds in order to operate behind the enemy's lines, Tu-123 ejected the sensor payload with the pictures taken, while the remaining aircraft crashed into the ground from a high altitude. Resulting in high usage costs, this deficiency ultimately led to Tu-143 "Reys", which is still used. The UA is launched with by rocket-assist and incorporates the ability to fly back to a safe landing zone and to land by parachute. Early Tu-143 had an endurance of only 13 minutes, but with a speed of around 925 km/h it still had an operational radius of roughly 100 km [53].

With the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, another stakeholder of UAS evolved. Israel, who had been observing UAS operations of other nations during the 1970s, yet not applying UAS extensively in their own forces, began to deploy tactical UAS. In contrast to the first UAS flying in Israel who were bought ready to use from the United States, these new UAS were developed and produced in Israel. The UAS were comparable to larger model aircraft and of a robust and not complicated design, but reliable and not expensive.



Figure 2-13. IAF Scout UAV illustration¹³.

One big advantage was, that those UAS carried video cameras which provided real-time video streams for the troops on the ground. The characteristic twin-boom design of the Scout UAS with the engine located between the booms should remain iconic for Israeli UAS up to today. Within the following years, the military forces of Israel increased the usage of UAS intensively, which led to the fact that Israel continued in the further development of their UAS and to become one of the UAS world market leaders. Other notably UAS were for example the Hunter with a pull and a push propeller at the fuselage or the Heron, a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAS which was able to fly 51 hours and which reached an altitude of 32,000 ft [53, 59, 63].

2.5 Wherever, Whenever

In the previous chapter, the Heron UAS was mentioned. Heron, which is still flying for several air forces, was one of several outcomes of a need to have another type of intelligence than the available manned reconnaissance measures as for example the U-2 or unmanned systems like Satellites. In the US, by end of the 1960s, research programs started with the aim to generate airborne intelligence without endangering a human pilot while in parallel ensure long endurance. Several experimental systems were tested by the US Air Force in the next decade.

¹³ Figure credit: Israeli Air Force, retrieved from <https://www.iaf.org.il/215-en/IAF.aspx>

Those experimental systems proved that the requirements could be met. For example, the XQM-93A of E-Systems or the YQM-98A of Teledyne Ryan, were able to fly more than 22 hours at altitudes above 50,000 ft. Although those aircraft proved that UAS could fulfill the required performance, no one was developed further to series production. The lack of an adequate measure to provide real time reconnaissance over long distances but also bureaucratic efforts in the US Forces hampered the development.

Roughly by the beginning of the next decade, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) took over the oversight of the development of long endurance UAS. One of the results was the funding of the Amber called aircraft from the Leading Systems.



Figure 2-14. Amber UAV, 1988¹⁴.

As can be seen in Figure 2-14, Amber had an inverted V-tail, as well as a push propeller at the back. It is not a coincidence that one might be reminded of General Atomics Predator™. Amber should become the grandfather of General Atomics Predator™ UAV. Already in this early phase, the UAS included a high-band data link for real-time transmission and the capacity to carry weapons under the wing. After several successful demonstrations, the Leading Systems decided to go one step further and started to develop the advanced Gnat-750™ UAS.



Figure 2-15. MQ-1 Predator, 2007¹⁵.

¹⁴ Figure credit: DARPA, retrieved from <https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/timeline/amber-predator-golden-hawk-predator>

¹⁵ Figure credit: US Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Brian Ferguson, photo 070511-F-2185F-595.JPG

In 1993, now under the flag of General Atomics who bought Leading Systems, the Gnat UAS conducted a 40 hours flight. Furthermore, besides daylight video, an infrared video camera system was part of the UAS as well as a satellite data link. Developed as a larger version of the Gnat-750™ in order to operate 24 hours at a range of 500 miles from the control station, the Predator™ made its' maiden take-off by mid of 1994. In 1996 the UAS was deployed to the theatre of operations in Bosnia. While the first deployed versions did not carry bombs, the following ones provided besides the ability of real-time imagery also strike-capabilities. With those capabilities Predator™ and the follow-up versions became a persistent part on the battlefields. While in 2018 the first version of the Predator™ is retired, the descendants of this UAS are still flying and will continue to fly for many forces around the globe. The most notably one is probably the MQ-9 Reaper, as already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter [53, 59, 64].

Another outcome of the DARPA take-over was the development of a UAS that should be able to operate at much higher altitudes than Amber and its successors were able to operate, while carrying very capable sensors. The aim was to close gaps in the intelligence chain which the U.S. had observed during Desert Storm. Evolved from experimental programs in the 1980s, two further UAS programs should become the solution. Therefore, a review of different designs of several manufacturers took place. The final chosen UAS designs were Northrop Grumman's Global Hawk and Lockheed/Boeing's DarkStar.



Figure 2-16. RQ-3 DarkStar, 1995¹⁶.

The design approaches of the Global Hawk and the DarkStar were completely different. While DarkStar was focused on a stealthy design, the design of the Global Hawk was a more conventional one. This two-way approach should enable operations in either very hostile airspaces or in low/moderate hostile airspace. While DarkStar on the one hand had only one third of Global Hawks performance with respect to endurance, mainly because of the stealth design, it was also pursued by mishaps and one complete loss of an aircraft. In contrast, Global Hawk showed high reliability and the desired capacity to fly lengthily at very high altitudes above 60,000 ft. DarkStar was dismissed in 1998 and Global Hawk was given from DARPA to the US Air Force. Since then, comparable to Predator, Global Hawk was developed continuously

¹⁶ Figure credit: NASA, Tony Landis, photo EC95-43303-7

further and became a versatile asset of the US Forces and the icon for the High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) UAS [53, 59].



Figure 2-17. Global Hawk in the US Navy variant MQ-4C, 2014¹⁷.

Global Hawk and Predator can be seen as role models for modern UAS applications in military forces around the globe. While in the beginning of unmanned aviation, operations of UAS were limited to the radio line of sight between Ground Control Station (GCS) and UA, Satellite Communication is nowadays state of the art, allowing worldwide operations with near real-time control. Miniaturization of complex electronic components allow to carry much more advanced capable sensors and equipment in the aircraft than it was thinkable in the beginning of unmanned aviation. Furthermore, it allows that also small UAS are set up with very sophisticated equipment and algorithms [53, 59].

2.6 Rise of the Civil Drones

One could think that civil UAS had their first appearance in the 21st century and up to this time only military appliances were present (cf. the introduction to chapter 2). This might be true for the broad civil consumer market, but for example, civil UAS were already used for decades in Japan. Since the end of the 1980s, rotary wing UAS are used in Japan for agricultural appliances [65].



Figure 2-18. Yamaha RMAX, one example for civil UAS application ¹⁸.

¹⁷ Figure credit: U.S. Navy photo by Erik Hildebrand, photo 140918-N-UZ648-008.JPG

¹⁸ Figure credit: Yamaha Motorsports, retrieved from

<https://www.yamahamotorsports.com/motorsports/pages/precision-agriculture-rmax>

Furthermore, in the field of science, a lot of effort was put into pure solar powered UAS which should enable unlimited flying at heights close to 100,000 ft in order to collect data of the atmosphere or to act as pseudo-satellites. First attempts were done in the mid of 1970s with the UAS Sunrise I. Like the conventional powered UAS of these days, the solar powered systems were also constrained by the available technology. Nevertheless, these early experimental flights set the fundamentals for later solar powered UAS like the NASA Pathfinder or Helios which were part of the NASA Environmental Research Aircraft Technology program or the QuinetiQ, later Airbus, Zephyr program.

Another noteworthy civil UAS is the AeroSonde. This 30 lbs weighing UA was designed for the purpose of weather monitoring in oceanic regions. In order to provide an advantage against weather balloons, AeroSonde was designed for very long endurance flight above 30 hours. Furthermore, in 1998 AeroSonde “Laima” was the first UA that made the first transatlantic flight [59].



Figure 2-19. AeroSonde “Laima”¹⁹.

Nowadays, civil UAS are much more present than during the times of the transatlantic crossing of “Laima”. On-going miniaturization and reduction of production costs as well as faster development led to the trend that civil UAS became much more than a niche for some model enthusiasts. This resulted not only in the mass production of UAS for hobbyists like the Phantom drone, it also led to much a lot of business cases more. These are for example power-line inspections, applications in the film industry, building inspections, forestry services, delivery services and many more [11].

2.7 UAS, UAV, RPAS, Drones

For the sake of completeness, no work about UAS is complete without a discussion of the terminology. As already can be seen by the title of this subsection there is not only one term for aircraft that are capable to fly without a pilot on-board. During the last years numerous abbreviations and designations for unmanned aircraft have been used.

The probably simplest term for unmanned aircraft is just drone. Raised during the early 20th century, this designation seems to be one of the oldest terms. But even if it is one of the oldest designations, it is apparently one of the most common definitions in mind of the broad public due to usage throughout press and media.

Around the 1980s, the expression Unmanned Aerial Vehicle became mutual. Up to now this one is still used sometimes. For the sake of political correctness, it was also tried to establish

¹⁹ Figure credit: Washington Museum of Flight, retrieved from <https://www.museumofflight.org/aircraft/insitu-areosonde-laima>

the neutral terms Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle and Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle. But these terminologies did not persist. Other known designations that at least only a short time were Remotely Piloted Vehicle - RPA and Remotely Operated Vehicle – ROA [2, 31, 46, 66].

In fact, they are all meaning the same. However, all of them are missing one major point. They are addressing only the flying vehicle, but it is not just the flying part that has to be taken into account for dealing with this kind of aircraft. It is the whole system that must be dealt with. In this attempt, the current nomenclature of Unmanned Aircraft System – UAS and Remotely Piloted Aircraft System – RPAS have been raised. The system definition covers all aspects that are necessary for handling unmanned aircraft, which is reflected by current valid definitions of different civil and military organizations.

“Remotely piloted aircraft system (RPAS). A remotely piloted aircraft, its associated remote pilot station(s), the required command and control links and any other components as specified in the type design.”

ICAO Annex 2 - Rules of the Air, 2016, page 1-8, [67]

“‘unmanned aircraft system’ (‘UAS’) means an unmanned aircraft and the equipment to control it remotely;”

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945, Article 3 (3), [23]

“A system whose components include the Unmanned Aircraft (UA), the UA control station and any other UA System elements necessary to enable flight such as a command and control data link, communication system and take-off and landing element. There may be multiple UA, UCS, or take-off and landing elements within a UAS.”

NATO AEP-4671, Edition B, Version 1, 2019, page A-5, [68]

On first sight, this seems to be just a formal aspect. But the fundamental understanding of unmanned aircraft as system raises crucial consequences, especially from an airworthiness point of view, which will be further discussed in chapter 4.

Furthermore, the system definition that includes components external to the airborne system marks one of the fundamental differences to manned aircraft. For the framework of this thesis, it was chosen to use the UAS definition of NATO as shown above including the definitions of the UAS components defined below.

“Unmanned Aircraft (UA)

An aircraft that does not carry a human operator and is operated remotely using varying levels of automated functions. Moreover a UA:

- *Is capable of sustained flight by aerodynamic means,*
- *Is remotely piloted or automatically flies a pre-programmed flight profile,*
- *Is reusable,*
- *Is not classified as a guided weapon or similar one shot device designed for the delivery of munitions.”*

NATO AEP-4671, Edition B, Version 1, 2019, page A-5, [68]

“UA Control Station (UCS)

A facility or device from which the UA is controlled and/or monitored for all phases of flight considering USAR.U2 (a).”

NATO AEP-4671, Edition B, Version 1, 2019, page A-5, [68]

“Command and Control Link

A data transmission used for control of the UA that transmits UA crew commands from the UCS to the UA (uplink) and UA status data from the UA to the UCS (downlink).”

NATO AEP-4671, Edition B, Version 1, 2019, page A-1, [68]

Already by the several definitions of UAS, it can clearly be deduced that UAS are much more than just a control station and a flying aircraft. For example, there might be different forms of the Command and Control Link (C2Link). The C2Link might be realized either by a direct radio line of sight (RLOS, Figure 1-1) connection or via a Satellite relayed connection in order to realize a beyond radio line of sight (BRLOS, Figure 2-21) connection. The UCS might be cable connected to another UCS in order to expand the range of the UAS without a Satellite (Figure 2-22) or another UA might act as relay transmitter in order to overcome physical obstacles for a RLOS like Mountains (Figure 2-23). Furthermore, the UCS must not be fixed to the ground. It could also be on a ship or in another aircraft. The main elements of a UAS can be applied in many ways. Some possible configurations are shown in the following figures which represent generic UAS architectures.




Figure 2-20. Generic UAS with a RLOS C2Link.




Figure 2-21. Generic UAS with BRLOS SatCom C2Link.




Figure 2-22. Generic UAS with a remote UCS and RLOS C2Link.




Figure 2-23. Generic BRLOS UAS with a relay UA.




Figure 2-24. Generic cable based BRLOS UAS with a remote UCS and SatCom.




Figure 2-25. Generic BRLOS SatCom UAS with a remote UCS.




Figure 2-26. Generic RLOS UAS with a remote UCS.

The depiction of the example UAS architecture concludes the present chapter. A brief recaption of unmanned aviation and the presentation of notably examples as well as the definition of the UAS terminology used in this thesis was given. By looking at the history of UAS and their military origin, as well as their “shadow” existence of manned aviation, one could say that it is obvious why unmanned aviation always lacked one step behind within the realm of airworthiness regulations. The next chapter will deal with aviation safety, the origins of it and the introduction of some key players. Focus will be given on airworthiness of aircraft and the general process how airworthiness is achieved.

3 Aviation Safety

“Every aircraft engaged in international navigation shall be provided with a certificate of airworthiness issued or rendered valid by the State in which it is registered.”

ICAO Convention on International Civil Aviation, Article 31, page 14, [1]

The quotation above outlines the fundamental need of a certificate of airworthiness for every single aircraft that is involved in international flight operations. An airworthiness certificate of an aircraft documents that the aircraft complies with the fundamental type certificate and the underlying airworthiness standards.

The fundamental significance of type certificates and the corresponding certificates of airworthiness was already introduced briefly in chapter 1.1. Because of the importance, the core statement of an aircraft type certificate shall be repeated here. The type certificate of an aircraft states, that the specific type of aircraft described in the certificate was developed and proven to be in accordance with rigorous airworthiness standards. Furthermore, this matter of fact was inspected and verified by a competent authority during the type certification process.

The type certification process can be seen basically as an interaction between two stakeholders: the authority and the applicant. Whereas the applicant designs the aircraft or an aircraft related part, the airworthiness authorities are laying down the regulations, requirements, procedures etc. that have to be fulfilled.

Type certification is one part of the concept of aviation safety. In order to achieve aviation safety for an aircraft, aviation safety must be seen as an interacting and continuing process throughout the whole life of an aircraft. This process affects internal and external stakeholders and not only the aircraft. Airworthiness is one keystone in this concept. As it was written in the chapter before and in line with the present thesis, focus will be given on this certain aspect.

But before going into the details of type certification of aircraft in general and especially the type certification of UAS, it is necessary to introduce the concept of aviation safety in general and to present some of the main organizations that represent the authorities and how they are linked to each other [2, 69]. Therefore, the present chapter is part of contribution C1, as it provides the beneficial background to better understand the roles of aviation entities who define the rules.

3.1 Organizations

The next subchapters will briefly introduce key organizations in aviation. Focus will be given on the big three as they are to the author’s best knowledge fundamental to all other aviation organizations: ICAO, FAA and EASA. Because Unmanned Aviation emerged out of the military world, a short summary regarding NATO and Military Aviation Authorities will be also presented. Additionally, a brief introduction to JARUS will be given, a group of numerous aviation authorities that became an important organization for UAS during the last decade.

3.1.1 ICAO

After the flight of the Wright Brothers in the early 20th century, aviation faced a steady development, which was boosted by the two world wars. As it became more and more obvious

that this new transportation mean would maintain, efforts were made to streamline the development on international level. A first attempt was done at the Paris Conference on Peace in 1919, which concluded in a first International Commission for Air Navigation and an International Air Convention.

In 1944, representatives of 54 nations invited by the United States came together in Chicago and created the Convention on International Civil Aviation. This milestone document set up the International Civil Aviation Organization – ICAO. Aim of this remarkable reunion was to foster the peaceful partnership between the nations by the future development of civil aviation in a safe and regulated manner. After the ratification of the Chicago Convention, ICAO became officially operational in 1947 as Specialized Agency of the United Nations. Today, 193 states are contracting members of ICAO.

Based on the aim of the Chicago Convention, the overarching aim of ICAO then and now is to promote and to ensure the safe and organised progression of international civil aviation. Driven by this aim, ICAO issues International Standards and Recommended Practices. The Standards are also known as the 19 Annexes to the Chicago Convention. Those Annexes include all aspects of aviation and represent the absolute minimum standard to ensure safe flight operations. Although ICAO is not a legislative body, the contracting states oblige themselves to follow the standards issued by ICAO and to transfer them into their national regulations [1, 2, 34, 69-71].

Seen from a top-level point of view, ICAO is composed out of four main bodies:

- ICAO Assembly
- ICAO Council
- Air Navigation Commission
- Office of the Secretary General

The Assembly is constituted by all member states and assembles at least every three years. It is a non-permanent body of ICAO. Figure 3-1 presents a generic picture of an ICAO Assembly. The entities are set up during an Assembly convention as required, marked by the dashed lines. Main powers of the Assembly are the election of ICAO Council member states, the tasking of the Council or commissions, the general review of ICAO’s work in all relevant areas and the examination of the reports of the Council. The probably most important ability of the Assembly is to approve changes to the Chicago Convention [1, 72-74].




Figure 3-1. ICAO Assembly.

In contrast to the Assembly, the Council is a permanent body at ICAO. It consists of 36 member states, elected for a three-year duration by the assembly. The member states of the Council are grouped in three parts, as shown in Figure 3-2. Besides its’ function to govern and to

provide direction to ICAO and administrative duties in the organization as well as the execution of tasks given by the Assembly, such as reporting, the Council appoints the Secretary General. A core responsibility of the Council is the approval or modification of International Standards and Recommended Practices and their inclusion as Annexes into the Chicago Convention. To fulfill this important task, the Council appoints the *Air Navigation Commission* based on nominees proposed by the member states. The Air Navigation Commission and its' sub commissions act as neutral expert working groups to further develop the International Standards and Recommended Practices [1, 75, 76].




Figure 3-2. ICAO Council.

The Office of the Secretary General, led by the Secretary General, can be seen as the working muscle of ICAO. It is shown in Figure 3-3. With its' five bureaus and in total seven regional offices, the Office of the Secretary General helps the Organization and the Member States to deploy the Standards and Recommended Practices and to foster the overarching aim. In addition, the Secretary General acts as Secretary to the Council and as President and Secretary of the Assembly until the Assembly has elected their President. [1, 77, 78].




Figure 3-3. ICAO Office of the Secretary General.

As UAS became more and more prominent within the aviation community, also ICAO started to pay attention on this topic. Consequently, ICAO did numerous steps during the past years, which will be outlined in chapter 4.5.1.

3.1.2 FAA

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which was founded in 1958 as Federal Aviation Agency, is the competent authority in the United States for aviation safety. FAAs foundation was the result of several severe aircraft incidents in the late 1940s and 1950s. By its enactment, FAA was given a comprehensive portfolio, including almost all aspects of aviation in the United States. For a very extensive description regarding the development of the FAA, it is recommended to refer to sources [79] and [80].

Nowadays, the FAA is the focal point in the United States for civil aviation and to maintain and further develop the safety of the aviation system. Figure 3-4 provides a high level organizational chart of the FAA [2, 69, 81].




Figure 3-4. FAA high level organizational chart.

As can be seen by Figure 3-4, FAA is headed by the Administrator and the Deputy Administrator who are supported by the Chief of Staff. The Administration is further divided into the Staff Offices and the so-called Lines of Business. While the Lines of Business represent the technical aspect regarding FAA's task, the Staff Offices are responsible for the management of the FAA itself and general aspects, for example communications with other authorities or the government. Lines of Business encompass the organisation of the air traffic in the US, the regulation and continuous certification of airports, the supervision of commercial space transport, as well as the regulation of hazardous material in aviation. For airworthiness, the responsible line of business at FAA is Aviation Safety AVS. In accordance with the scope of the present thesis, this area will be further elaborated [82, 83].




Figure 3-5. FAA AVS high level organizational chart.

Figure 3-5 presents the FAA AVS section. As the other lines of business, AVS reports directly to the administrator. Within AVS, the Aircraft Certification Service (AIR) conducts the type inspection of aircraft. Furthermore, AIR is also responsible for continued airworthiness of aircraft as well as the approval of design and production approvals. Therefore, AIR encompasses the complete spectrum of an aircraft lifecycle with respect to development, production and service life.

It should be noted that FAA AVS is not limited to certification of aircraft only. The business area embodies also offices for the investigation of aircraft accidents, aerospace medicine and for aircraft traffic safety. Furthermore, AVS hosts a rulemaking part for aviation standards in the regime of air transportation, licensing and airworthiness. Additionally, AVS upholds an office for the integration of UAS [2, 84, 85].

3.1.3 EASA

Until foundation of European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the entire sovereignty with respect to aviation, including the type certification of aircraft, was under the responsibility of every single nation within the EU, leading to a fragmented set of regulations, hindering a prosperous development of aviation in Europe. European Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) tried to overcome this issue by establishing the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) group in the 1970s. In their beginnings, this group had the goal to achieve mutual standards regarding airworthiness of large aircraft and engines comparable to those of the FAA. At later stages this was extended to certification of other aircraft, maintenance, personnel and operations. Although the idea of JAA was a straight-forward one, the execution turned out to be quite problematic as for example any JAA standard was only mandatory if all of the up to 35 members agreed on them. Nevertheless, the idea paved the way for the EASA, which should become the focal point for aviation safety in Europe and also should overcome the issues JAA had [2, 34, 69].

The foundation of EASA took place in 2002 by EU legislation. First limited to certification of aircraft, EASA became step by step to the competent authority for all aspects regarding flight safety in the European Union. On this way, besides the type certification of aircraft, engines and aeronautical parts, EASA took over several other tasks from the CAAs. The core tasks of EASA are, but are not limited to, the

- consultation of the European Commission and the EU Member States regarding aviation legislation and technical aspects for implementing the recommendations from ICAO
- approval of air operators, design organisations, non-EU production, -maintenance and -continuing airworthiness organisations.
- definition of the regulatory framework for aviation in the EASA regime, including airworthiness standards, acceptable means of compliance and guidance materiel.
- continuing supervision of aviation data to improve aviation safety in order to establish and maintain a very high aviation safety level.

Besides the 27 Member States of the European Union, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland are also EASA members²⁰ [2, 33, 69, 87-89].

EASA consists of five Directorates of which one is the Executive Directorate. The Agency is led by the Executive Director who also heads the Executive Directorate. Figure 3-6 shows the current organizational structure of EASA from a top-level point of view. Besides the Executive Directorate, the four other Directorates are divided into Strategy & Safety Management, Certification, Flight Standards and Resources and Support. Although the Executive Directorate

²⁰ By completing Brexit, the United Kingdom will no longer be an EASA member. Consequently, it will become a third country [86].

embodies more titles and functions than the four other Directorates, this Directorate is very limited regarding the number of people. Besides staff functions like legal or communication aspects, the Executive Directorate provides expertise and support to the Executive Director. For example, the Chief Engineer who is the highest senior technical expert and also coordinator of all senior technical experts at EASA or the Senior Military Advisor for exchange between EASA and military stakeholders at state level. It is noteworthy, that also Drones are represented in the Executive Directorate, which indicates the growing importance of this aviation field for EASA [2, 90-92]. As it was done for FAA, with respect to the scope of the present thesis, next a short summary will be provided on the EASA entity that is responsible for certification.





Figure 3-6. EASA high level organizational chart.

The Certification Directorate is the responsible entity at EASA for the certification of aircraft, engines, aeronautical parts and appliances. Figure 3-7 presents the organizational chart of this Directorate.



* Includes UAS

Figure 3-7. EASA Certification Directorate high level organizational chart.

The Certification Directorate is headed by the Certification Director, the two Deputy Directors and supported by the Director's Office and consists of six specific sections. These sections are divided between the certification sections for aircraft, propulsion and the section for Certification Strategy, which is responsible for airworthiness regulations and the Design

Organization and ETSO section, which is responsible for the approval of Design Organizations and the European Technical Standard Orders. It is noteworthy, that the General Aviation section is also responsible for UAS. The fact that the Certification Directorate is also responsible for Design Organizations and rulemaking in the realm of certification ensures a holistic spectrum in the Directorate.

EASA's Certification Directorate is similar to FAA's AVS Line of Business. Notable differences are for example that the Certification Directorate does not incorporate Flight Standards as this is an own Directorate, while AVS does include this directly. Additionally, it should be noted that there is no specific rulemaking directory at all at EASA. This follows the approach that EASA decided that rulemaking shall take place in the specific Directorates directly in order to ensure that the necessary knowledge is available [2, 90, 91, 93].

3.1.4 European Civil Aviation Authorities

For the sake of completeness, a few lines about the Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) in Europe shall be given. As most nations in the world, most nations in Europe have their own CAAs or comparable entities. Although EASA took over a vast of responsibilities from them, they are still in place and have several duties, also to support EASA, for example the approval of aircraft production organisations or Continuing Airworthiness and Maintenance Organisations (CAMO) in accordance to Part 21/G and Part M. Especially during the early years of EASA and the task transition from national aviation authorities to the agency, the national aviation were needed to maintain safety throughout aviation. All of these activities are performed in close relationship to EASA and have the goal to ensure the high level of aviation safety in Europe [2, 69].

To provide an example of a CAA, the Federal Aviation Office of Germany, the *Luftfahrt-Bundesamt (LBA)*, is presented briefly. The LBA was chosen also because of the focus of the present thesis on Germany. It was founded in 1954 as a higher federal authority and executive agency of the former German Federal Ministry of Transport, which is nowadays the German Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport (BMVI). As can be seen by Figure 3-8, the LBA is headed by a President together with the Vice President and the related Staff Unit. The authority encompasses five divisions as well as an independent office for air navigation services which is the supervising unit of the BMVI. Additionally, six regional offices across Germany belong to the LBA [88, 94-97].




Figure 3-8. LBA high level organizational chart.

The LBA divisions are divided into administrative, airworthiness, operational, personnel and aviation security tasks. With respect to airworthiness, Division T is the responsible unit. Figure 3-9 presents the organizational chart of Division T.




Figure 3-9. LBA Division T organizational chart.

As can be seen by Figure 3-9, the airworthiness division of LBA still contains a certification element. However, it should be noted that this element is only responsible for aircraft types explicitly excluded from EASA's responsibility, for example historical or experimental aircraft. Anyhow, the organizational chart of the airworthiness division of LBA obviously endorses the new focus on the supervision of aviation organizations and continued and continuing airworthiness, resulting out of the foundation of EASA [88].

3.1.5 JARUS

The Joint Aviation Authorities on Unmanned Systems (JARUS) group was founded in 2007 by an initiative of the CAA of the Netherlands after a type certification request for a light VTOL UAS. The primary goal of this group is to develop harmonized rules and recommendations with respect to airworthiness certification and operational requirements for airspace integration of UAS. To achieve this, JARUS has established the following working groups:

- WG 1 – Flight Crew Licencing
- WG 2 – Operations
- WG 3 – Airworthiness
- WG 4 – Detect and Avoid
- WG 5 – Command and Control
- WG 6 – Safety and Risk Management
- WG 7 – Concepts of Operations

Today, 61 countries are participating on voluntary basis in JARUS. Furthermore, an industry stakeholder body is part of JARUS in order to have also their expertise present in the group.

JARUS does not have legal power to issue mandatory regulations like EASA. In the course of enabling UAS operations in Europe and the United States, EASA and FAA recognized the benefits of the work of JARUS. In order to support the group and to take further advantage of the work results, EASA and FAA decided to take over more responsibilities within JARUS. Subsequently, the recommendations of JARUS have a direct influence on fundamental civil UAS regulations in Europe and the United States [98-100].

3.1.6 NATO and Military Aviation Authorities

Chapter 2 outlined the fact, that the development of UAS is indivisibly linked to military aviation. Consequently, also a very short recap on NATO and its' aviation entities as well as on the German Military Aviation Authority as an example for a military aviation authority is provided. In particular NATO has done very noticeable efforts with respect to airworthiness certification and integration of UAS into the airspace, therefore it is worth to have a short look on NATO as one key player in the field of unmanned aviation.

Before doing so, some general remarks regarding military aviation are needed. Civil and military aviation both pursue the target of mission fulfilment. To give an example, civil air operators aim to transport passengers in due time to their destination and military air operators aim to deliver supplies into a specific theatre of operation also in due time. In civil aviation, the loss of an aircraft and the subsequent loss of passenger life is reduced to an absolute minimum by a rigor set of airworthiness regulations. As military aircraft might operate with atypical functions introducing a higher risk to the aircraft, such as the opening of the tail doors in order to drop supplies, the loss of an aircraft is more probable. Although not part of the airworthiness certification, it should be considered that military aircraft also may operate in hostile areas, making the loss of the aircraft even more probable than the loss of an aircraft in the civil world.

Furthermore, military aircraft might transport weapons or operate at much more extreme conditions than civil aircraft, for example fighter jets. Although military aviation obviously also strives to reduce the risk to passengers and aircraft to the utmost, the first aim is to fulfil operational targets, which leads to the need to balance between operational and safety requirements for military aircraft. A military aircraft might comply to all requirements of the specification of an air force but might not comply to a civil airworthiness standard. In particular this is valid for features such as ejection seats that are not covered by civil airworthiness standards. Nevertheless, also military aviation converges more and more to civil airworthiness requirements. For example, in Germany, the armed forces shall provide a safety level similar to civil aviation. Despite these attempts, it must be said that in conclusion, military aviation and civil aviation, should not be seen equal, especially the aspect of airworthiness [28, 34].

Consequently, military aircraft are excluded from the Chicago Convention and subsequent basic civil aviation regulations, for example [88]. With respect to the Chicago Convention, the exemption for military aircraft is written down in article 3 of the Convention, which defines military aircraft as "state aircraft". Though, article 3 also mandates all contracting nations to have a permit from another contracting nation if a state aircraft shall be flown in another than the own airspace [1].

In order to grant sufficient safe military aircraft who also comply to the specific needs of their users, Nations, have established independent Military Aviation Authorities (MAA) within their forces or comparable entities, which are subordinate bodies to other entities of the forces. To provide an example, the structure of the German Military Aviation Authority (GMAA) is shown below in Figure 3-10. As can be seen by this organizational chart, the structure of GMAA is similar to EASA and LBA. Headed by a Major General who acts as the Director General of GMAA and by a high-ranked civil servant civil deputy, GMAA encompasses all aspects of military aviation to ensure flight safety in the German Forces. The four technical divisions are responsible for the rulemaking, certification, operations and organization approvals [101-103].




Figure 3-10. GMAA high level organizational chart.

For the scope of the present thesis, Figure 3-11 presents the structure of the Certification Division at GMAA. The Division is divided into three sub-divisions, where the Type Certification section is responsible for the issuance of Type certificates and all related documents, for example Permits to Flight. The other two sub-divisions are responsible for the type inspection of all military aircraft. They are divided into a fixed-wing and a rotary-wing section, which also includes all types of UAS [101-103].




Figure 3-11. GMAA Division 2 organizational chart.

As discussed, military aviation is very specific and there is no standard military aircraft. Furthermore, the regulation regimes of each military force might differ. Therefore, the aforementioned permit to fly in foreign nations airspaces might result in lengthy bureaucratic processes. To overcome this, GMAA and other MAAs recognize each other as competent authorities by approving the general and product specific processes, in order to approve the certification results of each other.

NATO as a key-player in military aviation recognized the benefits of such workarounds and introduced the Aviation Committee as a single point to foster recognition processes and to grant MAAs the title *NATO Recognized Airworthiness Authority*. The establishment was the result of the NATO Airworthiness Policy which pursues a holistic approach to ensure military aviation safety. The AVC reports to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) which is the political lead body of NATO.




Figure 3-12. NATO AVC organizational chart.

The AVCs' core responsibility is to counsel the NAC on all relevant aspects of aviation in the scope of NATO operations. Therefore, it is the focal point for communications between national and international aviation authorities and NATO. The two subgroups for ATM-CNS and airworthiness ensure a complete picture within in the AVC. At NATO itself, the AVC is supported by the *NATO Airworthiness Executive* and the related staff, who is mainly responsible for the inspection of MAAs and follow-on recommendation to AVC on the approval as NATO Recognized Airworthiness Authority [104, 105]

It is noteworthy that the NATO AVC is only one point on a long way of NATO to harmonize military aviation amongst the alliance. Since decades, NATO fosters harmonization across the allied nations in order to establish interoperability where ever possible. The more interoperable the nations are, the more the nations can profit from each other within military operations. One very good example are the UAS Standardization Agreements from NATO, which represent one of the first international airworthiness standards for UAS ever published [31, 32, 68, 106-109]. A further elaboration of this aspect will be given in chapter 4.5.

This summary about NATO and MAAs concludes the chapter about aviation organizations. In the next chapter, one key parameter of aviation safety will be discussed: airworthiness.

3.2 Airworthiness

As defined by Article 31 of the Chicago Convention, any aircraft intended to participate in international aviation shall have a valid Certificate of Airworthiness issued by the state of its registry. Although this fundamental document applies the term 'airworthiness', the term is not further defined within. This was overcome by ICAO in 1949 with the first publication of Annex 8 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Airworthiness of Aircraft [1, 30]. Within Annex 8, the definition of airworthiness in terms of "airworthy" can be found:

"Airworthy. The status of an aircraft, engine, propeller or part when it conforms to its approved design and is in a condition for safe operation."

ICAO Annex 8 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Airworthiness of Aircraft,
page I-1 [30]

By the nature of ICAO, the organization can only provide minimum and standards and general procedures. The transfer into nation related requirements lies within the responsibility of the contracting states. Consequently, this leads to the aspect that, although there is a common understanding about the term airworthiness or airworthy within aviation, there are several

definitions present, which are similar but slightly different. For example, the United States defines airworthy as follows:

“Airworthy means the aircraft conforms to its type design and is in a condition for safe operation.”

C.F.R. Title 14 Chapter I Subchapter A Part 3 Subpart A § 3.5 [110]

To give another example, the definition provided within the Canadian Aviation Regulations is shown below:

“airworthy, in respect of an aeronautical product, means in a fit and safe state for flight and in conformity with its type design; (en état de navigabilité)”

Canadian Aviation Regulations SOR/96-433 Part I Subpart 1 § 101.01 (1) [111]

For military aviation, the NATO definition of airworthiness can be taken:

“airworthiness / navigabilité

The ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate in flight or on the ground without significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers or other third parties.”

NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions [112]

In contrast to the other given examples, the NATO definition of airworthiness is not only related to the technical item e.g., the aircraft, and its correct functioning. The NATO airworthiness definition does directly include also the avoidance of unacceptable hazards to people on and offboard the aircraft. As this is of significant importance in particular for UAS, this will be further discussed in chapter 4.4.

Within the EU legislative act for the setup of EASA, no direct definition of airworthiness is provided. However, in Annex II of the regulation, a list with essential airworthiness requirements is provided which is valid for all aircraft other than UAS the scope of the legislative act. Annex IX of the regulation provides essential requirements for UAS, which also contains airworthiness [88].

Although the NATO definition expands the term of airworthiness to a broader range than the civil definitions, out of the different definitions it can be deduced that airworthiness is primary linked to the certified or approved aircraft design and the functional status of the aircraft and all installed or related equipment which enables a safe operation and flight. Both aspects are interrelated and determined within the process of aircraft type certification, the so-called type inspection. This process will be outlined in the next chapter [2, 69].

3.3 Aircraft Type Certification

In order to achieve and maintain the high level of safety in aviation, aircraft, engines, propellers and aeronautical equipment are subject of a rigor inspection process which builds the foundation for the issuance of the type certificate and the related certificates of airworthiness. Type certification is mandatory for aircraft, engines and propellers. Within ICAO Annex 8 and

the ICAO Airworthiness Manual the type certification process is defined in a generic way from a top-level point of view [30, 113].

The process of type certification is also known as type inspection process, in particular on the side of the authority. Type inspection processes, especially those for new aircraft types, are of comprehensive nature and may differ between the aviation authorities, nevertheless, the aim is always identical: the verification that the type design complies with the defined airworthiness requirements.

With respect to EASA, the regulatory foundation for the type certification process is laid down in European law and for FAA in federal law of the United States. The full titles of the legislative acts are named below:

- For EASA: COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 748/2012 of 3 August 2012 laying down implementing rules for the airworthiness and environmental certification of aircraft and related products, parts and appliances, as well as for the certification of design and production organisations [96, 97, 114]
- For FAA: Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Chapter I, Subchapter C, Part 21: Certification Procedures for Products and Articles [110]

The widely-used short title for both processes is called *Part 21*. For EASA, Part 21 is Annex I of the EU Regulation 748/2012. Other CAAs, for example the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) or the CAA of Singapore (CAAS), also apply a Part 21 called regulation for the certification of aircraft and aeronautical products [115, 116]. For the present text, if Part 21 is called and no further specification is given, the European version is meant.

It is important to note that Part 21 does not contain airworthiness requirements itself. The regulation contains requirements for design and production organizations in Section A, Subpart J and G, as well as requirements for aviation authorities in Section B. Only design organizations approved by the Agency are eligible to apply for a type certificate. Consequently, only approved production organizations are eligible to manufacture products in accordance to a type certificate issued by the competent authority. To highlight one difference between Part 21 in Europe and the U.S., the U.S. Part 21 does not contain a specific part for development organizations. The difference is based on the aspect that FAA focuses more on singular development projects while EASA focuses more on the general development processes within an organization. However, this shall not indicate that the U.S. Part 21 is less safe than the European version. Both Part 21 have an equal demand with respect to the quality and safety of the aeronautical product.

The underlying principle of Part 21 is the compliance to strict development and manufacturing processes within design and production organizations and the oversight by a competent authority. With respect to the scope of the present thesis, this brief summary regarding the general principles of Part 21 is deemed as sufficient. For further reading, references [2] and [69] are recommended as those provide in-depth discussions of Part 21 of the two authorities EASA and FAA. To the extent of the current text, focus will be given on an actual type inspection process. This will be done in a general way, without focusing on EASA or FAA.

It must be noted that there are differences between the two authorities EASA and FAA with regard to type certification processes. For example, FAA and an applicant define and agree a

Partnership for Safety Plan (PSP) which encompasses the entire development as well as post development activities. EASA does not know such a document, as this is covered within the development organization approval. In the process of FAA, part of the PSP is the *Project Specific Certification Plan (PSCP)* which is an equivalent to a Certification Program and which is subject to the acceptance of FAA. It can be said, that from a top-level point of view, the fundamental actions of authorities and applicants during an aircraft type certification process are similar, without regard on the specific authority [2, 69, 96, 97, 117, 118].

Figure 3-13 summarizes the first phase of a type certification process. The applicant defines the extent of the development for which a certification shall be achieved. In this context, development is related to a major change of an existing product or to a completely new type certification. Any change which is not considered as minor change is considered as major change and consequently subject to type inspection by the competent authority. Minor changes are defined as changes which only have a neglectable effect for example on the mass, structural strength, reliability, operational characteristics or other characteristics touching the airworthiness of the product. One could also say, that a minor change does not affect the airworthiness of the product²¹. Minor changes can be approved by the developer itself, if the organization has obtained the appropriate privileges from the competent authority²². After the definition as major change, the applicant needs to establish the certification program. Focal point for this task, as well as for the assessment of the change itself, is the so-called Office of Airworthiness within the applicant's organization.

The certification program is a document of fundamental nature within the process of aircraft type certification. Within the FAA regime, the certification program for a specific development is the afore-mentioned PSCP. Besides a summary of the intended development and a system description, one part of the core of a certification program are the proposed certification specifications and environmental protection regulations, which form the type certification basis. Furthermore, special conditions might be defined in case an unconventional or novel aircraft design is presented for type certification. In such a case, the intended airworthiness standards might not contain adequate requirements to prove the safety of the aircraft. Consequently, EASA needs to define appropriate specific requirements, the so-called special conditions.

Another core part within a certification program are the intended methods to demonstrate the compliance to the type certification basis. These so called means of compliance encompass statements, design reviews, analysis, laboratory tests, ground and flight tests, as well as means to qualify equipment. For every requirement that is applicable to the aircraft type design, a mean of compliance needs to be defined. The complete set of requirements and means of compliance is also called type inspection program.

²¹ Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/897 [114] § 21.A.91: "Changes to a type-certificate are classified as minor and major. A "minor change" has no appreciable effect on the mass, balance, structural strength, reliability, operational characteristics, operational suitability data, or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the product or its environmental characteristics. Without prejudice to point 21.A.19, all other changes are "major changes" under this Subpart. [...]"

²² Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/897 [114] § 21.A.263 or § 21.A.319 of C.F.R. Title 14, Chapter I, Subchapter C, Part 21 [110]




Figure 3-13. Type certification: Approval of the Certification Program.

The certification program is encompassing and of fundamental nature, as it defines the course of actions to be taken in order to achieve a type certificate. Because of its' importance, the certification program must be approved by the responsible aviation authority, which is in Europe EASA. During the approval procedure, the authority assesses at first the applicability of the proposed certification standards and proposed special conditions. Afterwards the eligibility of the suggested means of compliance (MoC) for each airworthiness requirement. If the authority finds it necessary to expand the range of tests for requirements, this will be communicated. Furthermore, in case an applicant wants to apply alternative airworthiness requirements or has a specific interpretation of airworthiness requirements, this might be documented within certification review items or equivalent safety findings. The latter applies in case of deviations to airworthiness requirements but which were proved to have still an equivalent level of safety as intended by the requirement. For example, in case new manufacturing technologies are applied, such as 3-D printing.

Another core aspect within the negotiations on a certification program is the definition of the authorities' evaluation program. The evaluation program outlines the level of involvement of the authority during the type certification. For example, it defines which tests the authority plans to witness or how substantiation documents are reviewed.




Figure 3-14. Type certification: Showing of compliance and issuance of the TC.

After official approval of the certification program has been granted, the next steps are to generate the compliance evidences, the verification of them and the final application for type certification of the applicant. The Office of Airworthiness is responsible for the orderly execution of the type certification program. Figure 3-14 concludes these steps. As can be seen by this figure, the competent authority participates in these steps as agreed in the evaluation program or the PSP agreement. On the authority side, the entire process is called type inspection process.

In this phase of type certification, the Office of Airworthiness is a key element as it has to fulfill core tasks as for example the verification and validation of the compliance evidences and the recommendation for application of type certification to the head of the design organization. Additionally, the Office of Airworthiness is the focal point for communications with the competent authority.

In particular, validation and verification of compliance evidences against the approved certification basis is complex and crucial, because almost no system installed in an aircraft can be seen as independent and free from connections to other installed systems. Furthermore, airworthiness requirements within certification specifications have usually a high level of interaction and affect each other. To proof eventually the compliance to the certification basis, a type investigation report, e.g., a compliance checklist, must be provided to the authority. Ideally, this document clearly relates any airworthiness requirement to the compliance evidence and vice versa.

Once all evidences are completed, validated and verified, the Office of Airworthiness recommends the declaration of fulfillment of the type certification basis to the responsible aviation authority by the head of the design organization. The application encompasses, besides the compliance checklist, the type design documentation, which represents all

necessary documents and data for the definition of the type design. This includes also all relevant information on continued and continuing airworthiness, manuals and operating limitations. The extent of the type design documentation must be of a kind, that it enables the production of airworthy aircraft based on this documentation. Furthermore, the applicant must submit declarations of commitment which ensures that the design organization will provide instructions for continued airworthiness to all operators of the aircraft type.

If the authority finds that the applicant has provided sufficient compliance evidence and that conformity of the aircraft type to the approved certification basis is given, the type certificate will be issued. The type certificate is the official confirmation from the authority that the aircraft type is airworthy and that the type certification basis is fulfilled. By issuing the type certificate, data submitted to the authority for achieving the type certificate becomes *approved data*. It is noteworthy, that after issuance of the type certificate, the design organization becomes the type certificate holder. For a comprehensive description of type certification processes and the principles, it is recommended to refer to sources [2, 30, 69, 110, 113, 114, 118].

Although the fundamental principles of manned and unmanned aircraft type certification processes are similar, there are some significant differences, which will further be elaborated in chapter 4. In order to provide a wider picture and a better understanding, a short discussion regarding the terms briefly used in the present chapter *airworthiness requirement*, *means of compliance* and additionally *acceptable means of compliance* will follow.

3.4 Airworthiness Requirements, AMC, MoC

As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the determination if an aeronautical design is airworthy is based on the fulfillment of airworthiness requirements, which are defined in standards, specifications or regulations. Chapter 4.5 will provide an insight into such documents with focus on UAS. However, upfront some clarifications are seen beneficial.

Assuming an entire new aircraft development. The selection of the applicable airworthiness standard can be done as soon as the kind of aircraft and basic usage spectrum is defined. For example, if a helicopter with 1,500 kg MTOW and a capacity of eight passengers including crew shall be developed, the appropriate certification specification from EASA would be CS-27 [119] or for FAA, it would be Part 27 [120].

While the airworthiness requirements from FAA are laid down in federal law, known as *Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR)*, EASA's aircraft specific airworthiness requirements are published in the *Certification Specifications (CS)* by the agency directly. These specifications consist usually of so-called books. In book 1, the *airworthiness requirements* are defined. Book 2 provides *acceptable means of compliance (AMC)*. The AMC are means to show compliance to a requirement acceptable to the authority. If the applicant applies such an AMC, the authority will not discuss if the mean is appropriate or not. It is up to the applicant to follow the AMC. Alternative MoC (AltMoC) can always be suggested, but in such a case, discussions are necessary if the AltMoC is appropriate or not. For FAA, the AMC are defined in extra documents outside the CFR, the *Advisory Circulars (AC)*. It is noteworthy, that besides the AMC included in the different CS, EASA also publishes additional AMC documents to several EU aviation and airworthiness regulations. In addition, both authorities issue *Guidance Material (GM)*, which shall support the application of airworthiness requirements and AMC.

An applicant must propose Means of Compliance, MoC, which define the methods to prove the fulfillment of requirements and AMCs. This will be discussed now as conclusion of the present chapter. A brief example is given how airworthiness requirements, AMC and MoC can be linked within a type certification program. Table 3-1 quotes an airworthiness requirement from CS-25, the certification specification for large aeroplanes. Note that the requirement is identical within FAR 25, however no explicit AC is provided [121].

<i>Airworthiness Requirement</i>	<i>AMC</i>
CS 25.609 Protection of structure (See AMC 25.609) Each part of the structure must - (a) Be suitably protected against deterioration or loss of strength in service due to any cause, including – (1) Weathering; (2) Corrosion; and (3) Abrasion; and (b) Have provisions for ventilation and drainage where necessary for protection. [Amdt No: 25/18]	AMC 25.609 Protection of Structure The comprehensive and detailed material standards accepted in the member states will be accepted as satisfying the requirement of CS 25.609.

Table 3-1 Example for an airworthiness requirement and an AMC [29].

In order to show compliance to the example requirement, the applicant will need to adequate Means of Compliance (MoC). For the MoC, there is a common code definition, which is shown in Table 3-2. However, the applicant can also choose another code for the MoC.

<i>MoC code</i>	<i>Designation</i>	<i>Related compliance documents</i>
0	Compliance statement	Type design documents; recorded statements
1	Design review	Descriptions; drawings
2	Calculation/Analysis	Substantiation reports
3	Safety assessment	Safety analysis
4	Laboratory test	Test program;
5	Ground test	test report;
6	Flight test	test interpretation
7	Design inspection/audit	Inspection or audit reports
8	Simulation	Test program; test report; test interpretation
9	Equipment qualification	Separate process which might contain all other MoCs

Table 3-2 MoC code quoted from Appendix to AMC 21.A.20 (b) in [122].

The MoC code shown in Table 3-2 will be used in Table 3-3 for the example airworthiness requirement. This table shall provide an idea how airworthiness requirements are related to MoC within a certification program. Note that Table 3-3 is only an example. It is up to the applicant how the type certification program is set up and which MoCs are proposed.

Airworthiness Requirement	MoC										Compliance Evidence
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
CS 25.609 (a)	X	X	X								Declaration on design materials Aircraft design description Material analysis
CS 25.609 (b)		X						X			Aircraft design description Aircraft inspection report

Table 3-3 Example for airworthiness requirement and MoC relation in a type inspection program.

Within a certification program, all airworthiness requirements must be related to MoCs and a reference to the compliance evidence to be generated should be given. The extent of type certification programs, especially for entire new aircraft types, can become very extensive. It is important to note that, for example several compliance evidences might be needed to show the compliance for one requirement, or that compliance evidences might be linked to each other or might be in succession. As discussed before, this is a challenging aspect, in particular for the CCL. Therefore, a sound requirement tracing indispensable. If this is not given, showing of compliance and the necessary documentation can become uncontrollable, leading to delays in the type certification process and in worst-case, this might lead to a failed type certification process [2, 69].

These notes about requirement tracing in the light of showing compliance to airworthiness requirements, the present chapter is concluded. The next chapter will discuss UAS type certification and the differences to manned aviation, which have to be considered and which consequences arise out of these differences.

4 UAS Type Certification

The present chapter will discuss the characteristics of a UAS type certification. As the preceding chapter, it is also part of contribution C1. First, the differences between manned and unmanned aircraft certification will be assessed. Afterwards two concepts of achieving airworthiness will be debated: airworthy by design and airworthy by operation. In particular the latter one has become of growing importance for UAS. The chapter concludes with a review of UAS airworthiness regulations, published so far by the civil authorities ICAO, EASA and FAA. Additionally, NATO's regulation efforts will be presented, in order to cover also military aviation.

4.1 More than an Aircraft

Since their invention, aircraft evolved constantly regarding their capabilities and characteristics. Consequently, the complexity of aircraft increased and aircraft became system of systems. The same applies to unmanned aviation as can be deduced out of the historical development of UAS given in chapter 2. However, since the beginning, UAS could not be seen as unmanned aircraft only. Based on the fact that at least one UA, one UCS and one C2Link form a UAS, they had to be seen as a system of systems right from the start (cf. Figure 2-20 to Figure 2-26). These characteristics of UAS have a significant influence on the type certification.

In order to proof a UAS type design as airworthy, all components of the system must be assessed with respect to their influence on airworthiness of the overall system. This also incorporates ground-based equipment like the UCS or components of the C2Link, which leads to the fact that components which cannot fly and which will not be an installed part in the airborne component also have to comply with aeronautical standards. Furthermore, aspects like link latencies, in particular for satellite based C2Links, must be taken account. The consequence of this overall system approach is a much more complex system that needs to be assessed within a type certification process then it would be in case of the type certification process of a manned aircraft. By considering this, it should not be forgotten that the UA itself, e.g., within MALE or HALE UAS, has a similar complexity as a commuter aircraft or even as a large aircraft. Subsequently, potential failure sources that might cause a hazard within the UAS leading to an accident are a priori potentially higher than in a manned aircraft. Such potential failure sources and resulting failure conditions are of fundamental importance within the design and the type certification of UAS. The next chapter will discuss this aspect as it is one key component for an airworthy design [2, 27, 46, 68, 106, 107].

4.2 Airworthy by Design

One design driver within the design process of an aircraft, no matter if manned or unmanned, are the intended functions of the overall system and the various sub systems. During the safety assessment process, each function needs to be classified with respect to loss or failure of the function, an undetected loss or failure of the function, or an unintended function execution and the resulting condition on the aircraft. Although there might be different paragraph numberings across the various airworthiness standards, the safety related airworthiness requirements and AMCs are best known as the so-called 1309 paragraphs.

The classification of failure conditions is done in accordance to the severity of the potential outcome for aircraft, people on board, third parties and property. Table 4-1 presents the definitions of the five failure conditions from CS-25 as representative for a manned airworthiness standard and from AEP-4671 and AEP-83 [68, 107] as representative airworthiness standards for UAS.

As can be seen by Table 4-1 the potential outcome of each failure condition increases from *no safety effect* to *catastrophic*. While the outcome at first does not have any consequences, the last outcome is always related to fatalities. These qualitative definitions are also related to quantitative probabilities, which represent the acceptable probability per flight hour a specific failure condition occurs. The quantitative numbers are also described in terms throughout different airworthiness codes. Additionally, the functional failure conditions are assigned to the so-called functional development assurance levels (FDAL), that define the development level of rigor for software and complex electronic hardware which may cause functional failures. Table 4-2 provides the relation between the descriptive terms of quantitative numbers and their relation to the qualitative failure condition while Table 4-3 provides an example of quantitative safety numbers.

In addition to the failure conditions and the related acceptable failure probabilities, AEP-4671 as well as other STANAGs for UAS airworthiness, specify a requirement for the aggregated probability of all catastrophic failure conditions in a UAS. The so-called P_{CumCat} is defined as:

“The cumulative probability resulting from the probabilities per flight hour of all Individual Catastrophic Failure Conditions caused by all system.”

AEP-4671, Annex A to USAR Introduction: Glossary, page A-4

As presented in Table 4-3, the acceptable failure condition probabilities in AEP-4671 are separated by an MTOW value of 5,670 kg. In the same way, it is done for P_{CumCat} , shown in Table 4-4.

It is noteworthy that quantitative probabilities of failure conditions vary across the numerous airworthiness standards. Besides the common linkage to MTOW, there are also other drivers for the probability requirements. For example, AEP-83 [107], the NATO airworthiness code for fixed-wing UAS below 150 kg MTOW, pursues an approach which is based on P_{CumCat} , the MTOW and the expected number of catastrophic failure conditions. By this approach, the acceptable failure probabilities become more flexible and the airworthiness code does not oblige from all UAS of this class the same safety requirements and therefore, provides a balanced approach. This aspect is of significant importance in particular for light UAS as they cannot be compared that easy to manned aircraft as for example MALE or HALE UAS. For example, a light UA with a very low MTOW but a high number of catastrophic failure conditions must fulfil similar probability requirements as a light UA with a high MTOW and a low number of catastrophic failure conditions. Table 4-5 to Table 4-7 illustrate the AEP-83 approach and give some examples for resulting acceptable failure probabilities.

<i>Failure condition</i>	CS-25	AEP-4671 / AEP-83
No safety effect	Failure conditions that would have no effect on safety; for example, Failure Conditions that would not affect the operational capability of the aeroplane or increase crew workload.	Failure conditions that have no effect on safety.
Minor	Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce aeroplane safety, and which involve crew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor failure conditions may include, for example, a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a slight increase in crew workload, such as routine flight plan changes, or some physical discomfort to passengers or cabin crew.	Failure conditions that do not significantly reduce UAS safety and involve UAS crew actions that are well within their capabilities. These conditions may include a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities and a slight increase in UAS crew workload.
Major	Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example, a significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a significant increase in crew workload or in conditions impairing crew efficiency, or discomfort to the flight crew, or physical distress to passengers or cabin crew, possibly including injuries.	Failure conditions that either by themselves or in conjunction with increased crew workload are expected to result in an emergency landing of the UA on predefined site where it can be reasonably expected that a serious injury will not occur. Or Failure conditions which could potentially result in injury to UAS crew, ground staff, or third parties.
Hazardous	Failure conditions, which would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be: (i) A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities; (ii) Physical distress or excessive workload such that the flight crew cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely; or (iii) Serious or fatal injury to a relatively small number of the occupants other than the flight crew.	Failure conditions that either by themselves or in conjunction with increased workload are expected to result in a controlled trajectory termination or forced landing potentially leading to loss of the UA where it can be reasonably expected that a fatality will not occur. Or, Failure conditions for which it can be reasonably expected that a fatality to UAS crew, ground staff, or third parties will not occur.
Catastrophic	Failure conditions, which would result in multiple fatalities, usually with the loss of the aeroplane.	Failure conditions that are expected to result in at least uncontrolled flight (including flight outside of pre-planned or contingency flight profiles/areas), and/or uncontrolled crash, Or Failure conditions which may result in a fatality to UAS crew, ground staff, or third parties.

Table 4-1 Definitions of failure conditions from CS-25, AEP-4671 and AEP-83 [29, 68]

	<i>Catastrophic</i>	<i>Hazardous</i>	<i>Major</i>	<i>Minor</i>	<i>No safety effect</i>
<i>Frequent</i>	Not acceptable	Not acceptable	Not acceptable	Not acceptable	Acceptable
<i>Probable</i>	Not acceptable	Not acceptable	Not acceptable	Acceptable	Acceptable
<i>Remote</i>	Not acceptable	Not acceptable	Acceptable	Acceptable	Acceptable
<i>Extremely remote</i>	Not acceptable	Acceptable	Acceptable	Acceptable	Acceptable
<i>Extremely improbable</i>	Acceptable	Acceptable	Acceptable	Acceptable	Acceptable

Table 4-2 Generic relation between quantitative terms and failure conditions.

	CS-25		AEP-4671			
	<i>P</i> [1/Fh]	FDAL	$m_{UA} \leq 5,670$ [kg]		$m_{UA} > 5,670$ [kg]	
<i>P</i> [1/Fh]			FDAL	<i>P</i> [1/Fh]	FDAL	<i>P</i> [1/Fh]
No safety effect	N/A	N/A	N/A	E	N/A	E
Minor	$< 10^{-3}$	D	$\leq 10^{-3}$	D	$\leq 10^{-3}$	D
Major	$< 10^{-5}$	C	$\leq 10^{-4}$	C	$\leq 10^{-4}$	C
Hazardous	$< 10^{-7}$	B	$\leq 10^{-5}$	C	$\leq 10^{-6}$	B
Catastrophic	$< 10^{-9}$	A	$\leq 10^{-6}$	B	$\leq 10^{-7}$	A

Table 4-3 Acceptable failure condition probabilities from CS-25 and AEP-4671 [29, 68]

	AEP-4671	
	$m_{UA} \leq 5,670$ [kg]	$m_{UA} > 5,670$ [kg]
<i>Failure condition</i>	<i>P</i> [1/Fh]	<i>P</i> [1/Fh]
P_{CumCat}	$\leq 10^{-5}$	$\leq 10^{-6}$

Table 4-4 Acceptable cumulative failure condition probabilities from AEP-4671 [29, 68]

	$m_{UA} \leq 15$ [kg]	$m_{UA} \leq 150$ [kg]
	<i>Failure condition</i>	<i>P</i> [1/Fh]
P_{CumCat}	10^{-4}	$\frac{0.0015}{MTOM}$

Table 4-5 Acceptable cumulative failure condition probabilities from AEP-83 [107].

Failure condition	FDAL	P [1/Fh]
No safety effect	N/A	$> P_{Cat} \cdot 1000$
Minor	D	$\leq P_{Cat} \cdot 1000$
Major	D	$\leq P_{Cat} \cdot 100$
Hazardous	C	$\leq P_{Cat} \cdot 10$
Catastrophic	B	$\leq \frac{P_{CumCat}}{N_{CatFC}}$

Table 4-6 Acceptable failure condition probabilities from AEP-83 [107].

MTOW	40 [kg]	80 [kg]	120 [kg]
P_{CumCat}	$3.75 \cdot 10^{-5}$ [1/Fh]	$1.88 \cdot 10^{-5}$ [1/Fh]	$1.25 \cdot 10^{-5}$ [1/Fh]
N_{Cat}	15	8	5
Failure condition	P [1/Fh]	P [1/Fh]	P [1/Fh]
No safety effect	$> 2.5 \cdot 10^{-3}$	$> 2.34 \cdot 10^{-3}$	$> 2.5 \cdot 10^{-3}$
Minor	$\leq 2.5 \cdot 10^{-3}$	$\leq 2.34 \cdot 10^{-3}$	$\leq 2.5 \cdot 10^{-3}$
Major	$\leq 2.5 \cdot 10^{-4}$	$\leq 2.34 \cdot 10^{-4}$	$\leq 2.5 \cdot 10^{-4}$
Hazardous	$\leq 2.5 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$\leq 2.34 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$\leq 2.5 \cdot 10^{-5}$
Catastrophic	$\leq 2.5 \cdot 10^{-6}$	$\leq 2.34 \cdot 10^{-6}$	$\leq 2.5 \cdot 10^{-6}$

Table 4-7 Acceptable failure condition probabilities for different LUAS from AEP-83 [107].

Functional safety represents a fundamental aspect within an aircraft type certification process. The resulting compliance evidences, in particular the Aircraft System Safety Assessment, form a cornerstone for the whole lifecycle of an aircraft as in case of changes to the type design, the SSA always will be conducted to classify the change. Even if the importance of safety airworthiness requirements is undisputed, an airworthy aircraft is not only driven by them.

To determine the airworthiness of an aircraft type, it is required to assess every aspect of the design. Consequently, airworthiness standards include requirements for all of them. The basis is defined within the essential airworthiness requirements provided by ICAO in Annex 8 to the Convention [30]. Independent of type and MTOW, the following aspects have to be covered:

- Flight: encompasses all phases of a flight, performance, stability, controllability and characteristics of the aircraft.
- Structure: structural design of the aircraft in order to withstand all loads occurring during operation.

- Design and construction: precautions with respect to design techniques, substantiation, manufacturing, layout and handling of the aircraft to ensure that the aircraft will function as intended during all foreseen operating conditions.
- Engines, powerplant: covers the integration of engines/powerplants into the aircraft. In case of helicopters this encompasses also power transmission rotors.
- Propellers: the installation of propellers within the aircraft.
- Systems, instruments and equipment: functioning, interaction and prevention of hazards of all installed equipment in relation to each other and to the aircraft itself.
- Operating limitations and information: documentation of all relevant information to operate the aircraft, including continuing airworthiness and maintenance.
- Crashworthiness and cabin safety: aspects to increase survivability of persons onboard in case the aircraft crashes²³.
- Operating environment and human factors: interaction between the ecosystem within the aircraft and persons onboard.
- Security²⁴: protection of crew and passengers against criminal threats.

In accordance to the nature of ICAO and the annexes, the requirements laid down in Annex 8 are of high-level nature and form the minimum level to ensure an airworthy aircraft design. These fundamental requirements are further detailed within the several airworthiness standards, such as FARs and CS (cf. chapter 3.4). As can be seen in the bullet list above and as well as in the definitions of failure conditions, manned aviation is focused on the protection of passengers and crew, while airworthiness of unmanned aviation is focused on third parties outside the aircraft. The consequences of this shift will be discussed in chapter 4.4. Before going into this, the approach to establish airworthiness by the operation will be presented.

4.3 Airworthy by Operation

In the afore chapter, it was outlined that the airworthiness of an aircraft is founded on the technical design and the fulfillment of the rigor and encompassing standards. Although airworthiness of the aircraft builds the fundament for a reliable and safe operation, it is not the only aspect to be considered in order to ensure flight safety. From a high-level point of view, it is moreover the interaction of machine, pilot, design-/manufacturing organization and environment which ensures the safe operation of aircraft. Figure 4-1 presents a top-level point of view of this interaction. The processes of the aircraft design and the aircraft production affect the quality of the aircraft including the required documentation directly and therefore the pilot, crew and passengers indirectly. Safe aircraft operation is only possible if the crew is well trained and has the suitable manuals available. By their actions, pilot and crew have a direct influence on the environment where the aircraft is operated. Obviously, the most influence on the environment is present in case the aircraft crashes. Although the aircraft design or production organization cannot influence the environment in a direct way, but in an indirect way, as an inferior aircraft design might cause such crashes with a higher probability [2, 28].

²³ For UAS this would be only relevant in case passengers shall be transported.

²⁴ Only aeroplanes with MTOW greater than 5,700 kg. For UAS this could be the security of the UCS or also cyber security.




Figure 4-1. Interacting elements affecting safe aircraft operation, derived from [28].

In contrast to the beginning of aviation regulations when airworthiness of the aircraft was the focal point, today flight safety or aviation safety must therefore be seen as a holistic concept. This evolution is reflected within today's regulatory regime of aviation authorities such as EASA and FAA. Table 4-8 shows an excerpt of the regulations which lay down the requirements for the four elements aircraft, design-/production organization, crew and environment. Note that this table does not claim to be exhaustive.

As the four elements are interacting, it can be deduced that in case one element is not developed to the full extent, it might be mitigated by another. A good example is the flight test phase during a type certification process. It can be said that at this stage, the aircraft is primarily known by theoretical analysis and ground tests. Consequently, compliance to all airworthiness requirements cannot be shown at this stage and there is a risk that the aircraft might not fly as expected or that, although extremely unlikely, the aircraft enters an uncontrollable state. Obviously, a flight test would not be conducted above densely populated areas as the risk for the overflow area cannot be determined to be acceptable. Therefore, the certificate of airworthiness or the permit to fly for a test aircraft would contain appropriate limitations mitigating the risk. For example, the limitation to fly only above specific test areas. By doing so, the not completed airworthiness requirements are "healed" by strict operational limitations and the aircraft can be deemed as *airworthy by operation* [2, 28, 51].

Such an approach is not very common in regular, commercial aircraft operations. However, it can be found in military aircraft more often. For example, a fighter aircraft would hardly fulfill the requirements of a large airplane, considering that the fighter conducts extreme maneuvers at high g-loads or flights at supersonic speed. To cope with this, one possibility to protect the life of the crew in case of a catastrophic failure is the installation of ejection seats. Furthermore, in order to maintain an acceptable level of safety, it is thinkable to prohibit specific flight modes in peace time. Such modes could be ultra-low high-speed flights or carrying armed weapons in non-hostile airspaces [123].

	EASA	FAA
<i>Aircraft</i>	EU 748/2012 (Part 21) [96] EU 1321/2014 [124] CS 23, 25, 27, 29 [29, 119, 125, 126]	Title 14, Chapter I, Subchapter C [110] FAR 23, 25, 27, 29 [120, 121, 127, 128]
<i>Design-/Production Organziation</i>	EU 748/2012 (Part 21) [96]	Title 14, Chapter I, Subchapter C - Part 21 [110]
<i>Pilots, Crew</i>	EU 1178/2011 [129]	Title 14, Chapter I, Subchapter D
<i>Environment</i>	EU 923/2012 EU 965/2012 EU 139/2014 EU 2017/373 [130-133]	Title 14, Chapter I, Subchapter E, F, I, J [134-137]

Table 4-8 Excerpt of regulations within the regime of EASA and FAA.

As will be shown in the following chapters, the *airworthy by operation* approach will become of more importance for UAS. However, it can already be said, that this approach will always limit the aircraft to specific operations and thus, might lead to big disadvantages compared to an aircraft shown to be airworthy by design. An aircraft shown to be airworthy by design and fulfilling the appropriate type certification basis usually will not have such strict limitations as the residual risk which the aircraft poses to crew, passengers and the environment including the inhabitants where it is operated is acceptable low.

4.4 The 1309 Paradigm Shift

The prior two chapters gave an outline on two important approaches for airworthiness. As it was shown in chapter 4.2 the classification of failure conditions foremost laid down in the 1309 paragraphs is of fundamental importance as this determines the acceptable likelihood of fatalities.

Within manned aviation, it must be assumed that in case an aircraft crashes, people onboard will suffer lethal injuries. Subsequently, the definitions of failure conditions for manned aircraft are focused on the people inside the aircraft. One could say, any airworthiness standard for manned aircraft serves primarily to protect people in the aircraft by reducing any intrinsic technical risk to the acceptable probability.

Without regard of possible future developments, the current main difference between manned and unmanned aircraft, is as the name says, the fact that no man is onboard the aerial vehicle. This obvious difference has an impact on the definition of failure conditions which shall not be underestimated. While manned aircraft safety in terms of airworthiness is focused on the onboard inhabitants and therefore the space to be protected is limited, unmanned aircraft safety in the realm of airworthiness must go further.

In case a UA impacts the ground in an uncontrolled manner, fatalities might occur but in contrast to manned aviation, this must not be always the case. As no man is onboard the UA, the only potential fatalities besides the personnel in the vicinity of the UA are the inhabitants in the impact area, the so-called third parties. These third parties are not in the focus of manned aviation airworthiness requirements. By shifting the focus from onboard persons in manned aviation to third parties in unmanned aviation, UAS airworthiness requirements, in particular for safety and the underlying principles, represent a paradigm shift.

There is no doubt that modern large manned aircraft are of complex nature and that a safety assessment is not trivial. However, as the focal point to protect people is set to people inside the aircraft, the influencing variables which pose a hazard are limited. Whereas UAS can be seen as a more complex machine than a manned aircraft (cf. chapter 4.1), in addition the variables which may cause casualties or fatalities are mainly driven by the environment where the UAS is operated and therefore almost infinite and non-deterministic. Consequently, a complete deterministic prediction on potential human losses or injuries as it is done within a manned aircraft system safety assessment process is not possible for the case of an uncontrolled UA impact. Chapter 5 and the related subchapters will further elaborate this discussion and assess how operational risks posed by UAS operations might be modelled and predicted. Before diving into this, it is necessary to have a look into current efforts on UAS airworthiness regulations of the different aviation organizations introduced in chapter 3.1 [6, 19, 27, 138-141].

4.5 UAS Regulations

As it was outlined in chapter 1.4, during the beginning of the research for the present thesis, only few civil UAS airworthiness regulations did exist. Within the unmanned aviation community, this was seen as one of the biggest obstacles to enable regular UAS operations [34, 35]. The following subchapters will present an excerpt of current UAS regulations and their development during the past decade from ICAO, FAA, EASA and NATO as representative for military unmanned aviation with a focus on airworthiness aspects.

4.5.1 ICAO

Chapter 1.1 presented that unmanned aircraft were already included within the Chicago Convention and described in paragraph 8 of the Convention. As UAS became more and more permanent in aviation during, ICAO decided that those new kind of flying needs more attention. Therefore, in 2007, ICAO established a study group on UAS, the UASSG. The target of the UASSG was to outline a first streamlined perspective of ICAO on UAS. This resulted in the publication of *Circular 328* in 2011 which outlined ICAO's basic position on UAS and which provided an outlook on the further development. Therefore, Circular 328 was written in a very generic level in order to capture the boundaries of the thematic complex UAS [8].

In 2014 the UASSG was superseded by the RPAS Panel (RPASP) which became a permanent panel within the Air Navigation Commission in order to develop all necessary standards and recommended practices. One outcome of this work programme was the *Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAS)*, published in 2015 [27]. This manual further elaborated the fundamental definition given in CIR 328 which differentiated between RPAS and UAS [8, 27].




Figure 4-2. ICAO UA scheme, taken from [27].

Figure 4-2 presents the scheme from ICAO for Unmanned Aircraft. Unmanned aircraft are divided into RPA, model aircraft and autonomous aircraft. The definitions are shown in Table 4-9.

<i>Remotely piloted aircraft (RPA)</i>	An unmanned aircraft which is piloted from a remote pilot station.
<i>Autonomous aircraft</i>	An unmanned aircraft that does not allow any pilot intervention in the management of the flight.
<i>Model aircraft</i>	Model aircraft designed and built for recreational purposes.

Table 4-9 ICAO definitions for the UA scheme.

Notably, ICAO also takes into account the intersections between the three UA classes in order to get the complete picture. The intersection between model aircraft and RPA is described as those RPA used for recreational purposes or model aircraft used for other than recreational purposes. In a similar manner the intersection between RPA and autonomous aircraft is described. These are RPA which execute partly autonomous flight segments or vice versa, autonomous aircraft executing remotely piloted flight segments. Although defined, autonomous aircraft are explicitly excluded from the manual, as the dogmatic expectation is that there is always a human which controls the unmanned aircraft. This also reflects the general assumption that autonomy of UAS is hardly or not certifiable at all, as certification always expects deterministic behavior [27, 142].

In the course of including UAS into the regulatory framework of ICAO, it became obvious that this will affect almost all annexes to the Chicago Convention. Today, 18 of 19 annexes are subject to changes related to UAS. Notably, *Annex 2 – Rules of the Air* and *Annex 7 – Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks* were already amended in 2012 with respect to RPAS and

the definitions. In 2018 Annex 2 was amended again, this time for the inclusion of remote pilot licences.

In 2019 the necessary amendments of *Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft* were announced by ICAO. This amendment is of particular interest, as by the distributed nature of UAS the type certificate and the related certificates of airworthiness needs to be treated differently than for manned aviation. Certificates of Airworthiness are mandatory for the participation of aircraft in international aviation. There were two possibilities under discussion. Either to link all components of the UAS within the type certification, including C2Link and UCS or to issue type certificates and certificates of airworthiness for the UA and the UCS. While the first option requires an overall system inclusion in the type certificate, but provides also an exact configuration setting, the second option offers more flexibility regarding the combination of the different items of a UAS. However, this would require that the operator ensures a compatible setting of UA, C2Link and UCS. The upcoming amendment of Annex 8 does not exclude the possibility of a type certificate for UCS, however, the preferred one is apparently the overall system approach, including the entire UAS within the type certificate [8, 27, 30, 67, 142-146].

Although ICAO is focused on international civil aviation, the organization was also forced to have a look at those UAS, which are not in the scope of ICAO. Light UAS and small UAS, those UAS which now can be purchased by any person (cf. chapter 2.6). Based on the nation's recognition of them, ICAO also recognized that these kind of UAS need to be treated other than large UAS. Therefore, an attempt to categorize the UAS in accordance to their risk they pose to the overflown people is planned to be established. Furthermore, ICAO introduced the UAS Toolkit, a comprehensive web page that encompasses how to fly UAS safely.

In addition, ICAO published advisory circulars which might be applied by countries as basis for their own national UAS regulations on sUAS. Highlights of these advisory circulars are how operations in the so-called “open” and “specific” category of UAS can be conducted, what the necessary licenses are and the authorization of organization conducting such operations. These advisory circulars were adapted from existing national regulations and then transferred into a more generic high-level document from ICAO. The next chapters will provide an introduction to the terms open and specific UAS category [145, 147-150].

4.5.2 FAA

The FAA undertook several steps to streamline the integration of UAS into the airspace of the United States in a safe manner. Therefore, the administration issued several policies, guidelines and regulations in the last years. One first step was done in 2005, when the administration released a memorandum which served as interim guidance for operational approvals of UAS. In these times, only public applicants were eligible for the issuance of a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization, which was the common way to achieve an authorization for UAS operations. Any other applicant had to undergo regular airworthiness certification processes in order to operate a UAS by an experimental airworthiness certificate in accordance to C.F.R. § 21.191.

Nowadays, a FAA UAS type certification and certificates of airworthiness can be obtained in different ways, including the possibility for special airworthiness certificates for non-public applicants:

- special airworthiness certificate in the experimental category for research and development, crew training, and market survey (C.F.R. § 21.191)
- in case of new produced aircraft and related flight tests via special flight permit (C.F.R. § 21.197)
- special class aircraft type certificate including the standard airworthiness certificate for such aircraft (C.F.R. § 21.17(b) and § 21.183)
- type certificate for special purposes in accordance to C.F.R. § 21.25 and § 21.185

This is mandatory for any UAS above 55 lbs MTOW intended to operate commercially in U.S. airspace. However, exemptions are possible. In order to support applicants, FAA published an advisory circular on the certification of UAS and optionally piloted aircraft intended to obtain a special airworthiness certificate. Operations conducted in accordance to this policy must meet an acceptable level of safety based on the foreseeable risk the operation will pose to people and environment. Subsequently, the approach for certification is a risk-based approach. In order to determine this risk, the applicant has to provide detailed information on the UAS and the planned operation. This information encompasses, but is not limited to the points outlined in Table 4-10.

UAS risk index	Risk of the UAS operations, determined by Appendix E of the policy.
Program letter	A letter that describes the intended UAS operation.
Safety checklist	A detailed technical description of the UAS design including all sub systems and a description of all flight phases, operational areas and organizational measures.
Flight test plan	A flight test plan intended to show that the UAS is safely controllable throughout the design spectrum.
Flight areas	Desired flight areas of the applicant.
Contingency planning	Description of emergency modes e.g., in case of C2Link loss.
Safety evaluation	FAA review of the provided program letter, safety check list etc. in order to proof if the requested operation can be authorized.
Spectrum authorization	Authorization of the required radio frequencies.
Operating limitations	All limitations of the UAS plus possible additional operation limitations the FAA finds necessary in order to ensure a safe operation.

Table 4-10 Excerpt of needed information for a special airworthiness certificate by FAA [151].

Within the policy, FAA attempts the overall system approach for the certification of the UAS, called “certificated as a system.” The system includes the UA and all other associated elements which are required to safely operate the aircraft. By this approach it would be possible to certify a UAS that contains several different UA and one UCS or a UAS that contains one UA and several different UCS. However, one UCS has to control one UA and the simultaneous control of different UA by one UCS is not allowed [151].

Of core importance within the application are the program letter, the safety checklist and the determined risk index as those three aspects mainly identify the UAS operation, the associated risk and potential mitigation measures. Of particular interest is obviously the risk index. FAA defines three risk categories. These categories are based on the UAS design as well as on specific operational aspects. After determination of all values, they must be summarized in order to obtain the resulting risk group. The risk categories and group definitions are shown in Table 4-11 and Table 4-12.

<i>Risk category</i>	<i>Element</i>	<i>Value</i>
MTOW [lbs]	≤ 4.5	0
	$4.5 < \text{MTOW} \leq 55$	5
	$55 < \text{MTOW} \leq 300$	10
	$300 < \text{MTOW} \leq 1,000$	15
	$> 1,000$	25
v_{Max} [kts]	< 87	0
	$87 \leq v_{Max} \leq 250$	10
	> 250	20
h_{Alt} [ft]	< 200 AGL	0
	$200 \leq h_{Alt} < 500$ AGL	5
	$500 \leq h_{Alt} < 5,000$ AGL	10
	$5,000 \text{ AGL} \leq h_{Alt} < 17,999$ MSL	15
	Class A and above	25
Flight history	Known – previous flight time > 50 [h]	0
	Known – previous flight time < 50 [h]	2
	Unknown – first flight	6

Table 4-11 Risk categories and values, taken from [151].

<i>Risk group</i>	<i>Cumulative points</i>
Group I	≤ 16
Group II	$17 \leq Points \leq 39$
Group III	≥ 40

Table 4-12 Risk groups, taken from [151].

It must be noted that in case the intended operation incorporates one of the following points, group III will automatically be applied without regard of the cumulative points-

- Night Operations
- Instrument meteorological conditions
- BVLOS and/or EVLOS
- Chase Aircraft
- Operations less than 2 miles from towered airport

The higher the risk group, the more information must be provided by the applicant to FAA. Subsequently, the level of rigor of the evaluation by the administration increases and the resulting operational limitations increase also. Within the policy, samples are provided. These limitations are for example the prohibition to conduct flights above densely populated areas or that visual observers are mandatory for BVLOS operations except the operation is conducted in areas reserved for UAS or general restricted flight areas [151].

With the inevitable emerge of UAS and in particular commercial sUAS, FAA, like many other aviation authorities, realized the urgent need to provide adequate regulations. In order to resolve this need, 2008, FAA established the sUAS Aviation Rulemaking Committee (sUAS ARC) which proposed several sets of recommendations for the regulation of sUAS. FAA was additionally pushed by the *FAA Modernization and Reform Act* enacted in February 2012 and obliged the administration to foster the integration of UAS by providing an integration plan not later than by the end of September 2015. The roadmap for this ambitious venture was published in 2013 and provides the overarching picture on UAS integration within the U.S. Since the first publication, the integration plan was updated continuously [3, 152].

Ultimately, this led to Part 107, the law within Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which covers sUAS operations and the requirements on them in the United States. Part 107 was issued in 2016 and amended vastly in 2021. Part 107 is applicable to UAS with a MTOW below or equal 55 lbs. Unlike for example Part 25, Part 107 is not focused on technical requirements of the product. It also encompasses registration of sUAS, remote pilot certification and allowed operations itself. As the latter represents the key aspect, consequently, Part 107 became part of subchapter F *Air Traffic and General Operating Rules* and not part of subchapter C *Aircraft* like Part 23 or Part 25.

Being aware that sUAS will hardly fulfil traditional airworthiness requirements and that probably manufacturing companies cannot be treated in the same manner as those regulated under FAR Part 21, the technical requirements on the sUAS are performance based high level requirements and those on the manufacturers are not considered. Notwithstanding, safe UAS operations are ensured by very strict operational requirements and licence requirements. For

example, FAA mandated that no sUAS shall be flown out of VLOS and above any not in the UAS operation participating person or unsheltered persons. Furthermore, it is mandatory that the UAS shall only be piloted by a licenced remote pilot or the acting pilot must be under the supervision of a licenced one [25, 153, 154].

While the first version of Part 107 of 2016 did not differentiate between sUAS type and operation, the 2021 version provides a differentiation regarding these two aspects. By overcoming the origin one size fits all approach, the current version of Part 107 allows more operational freedom but safety to overflown people and property is still ensured by appropriate limitations. Specific aspects like the mandatory remote pilot licence or to operate only in VLOS remain, hence, by introducing four categories which combine technical and operational aspects, a suitable regulation was introduced. Table 4-13 and Table 4-14 summarize highlights of Part 107 and the related Advisory Circular.

As can be seen by Table 4-13 to Table 4-16, the operational requirements and limitations are very strict, yet there are only few technical requirements and those requirements are of non-prescriptive nature regarding the sUAS design. A remarkable aspect is that although FAA differentiates between restricted and unrestricted access areas on the ground above which the sUAS operation takes place, there is no obvious difference other than that Category 3 sUAS are only allowed to perform transit flights in case non-participants are present in the overflown non-restricted access area. In general, a primary driver are the participants of the UAS operation. Either they are classified as *direct* or *indirect* participants. Only those persons are classified as direct participants which are needed for the safe operation of the sUAS [155].

	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4
<i>MTOW</i>	≤ 0.55 [lbs] ≤ 0.250 [kg]	≤ 55 [lbs] ≤ 25 [kg]		
<i>v_{Max}</i>	≤ 87 [kts] ≤ 44.76 [m/s]			
<i>E_{Imp}</i>	N/A	≤ 11 [ft – lbs] ≤ 14.9 [J]	≤ 25 [ft – lbs] ≤ 33.9 [J]	i.a.w. FAA airworthiness certificate
Design	The UA shall not contain any exposed rotating parts that would lacerate human skin on impact with a human being.			i.a.w. FAA airworthiness certificate
Safety	N/A	sUAS shall be designed, produced, or modified such that it does not contain any safety defects.		i.a.w. FAA airworthiness certificate
Equipment	For night operations only: Anti-collision lights that can be seen for 3 statute miles with a flash rate sufficient to avoid collisions.			i.a.w. FAA airworthiness certificate
Operational manual	N/A	yes		Approved flight manual
Maintenance instructions or instructions for continued airworthiness	N/A	yes		
Product support and notification process	N/A	yes		i.a.w. FAR 21
Declaration of compliance based on FAA accepted Means of Compliance	N/A	Yes	Yes	No, but Airworthiness Certificate
Marking	N/A	Cat 2 label	Cat 3 label	i.a.w. FAR 21

Table 4-13 FAA sUAS technical requirements [25, 153, 155-157].

Category	General requirements
all	Only VLOS (either by remote pilot or visual observer)
	In case of a loss of control of the sUAS it shall not pose no undue hazard to other people, other aircraft, or other property for any reason.
	The sUAS must be in a safe condition prior to the operation. This must be verified by a preflight check.
	In case a failure occurs during flight, the operation shall be aborted.
	Maximum allowed flight altitude above ground level: 400 [ft].
	sUAS visibility of three miles must be given.
	Distance to clouds: 500 [ft] below and 2000 [ft] horizontal.
	No operation in the vicinity of airports without permission of the aircraft.
	No reckless operation. Dropping of objects is not allowed.
	No more than one UA shall be piloted by one remote pilot.
	Requirements for night operations
	Operational anti-collision lights.
	Advance remote pilot competence test.

Table 4-14 FAA sUAS general operational requirements [25, 153, 155-157].

Operations above or within in restricted access areas		
<i>Category</i>	<i>Direct participants</i>	<i>Indirect participants</i>
1, 2	Allowed	Allowed, except for sustained flights above over open-air assemblies of persons, unless the operation meets the requirements of standard remote identification or alternative remote identification of UAS.
3	Allowed	Must be notified about the operation.
	Category 3 sUAS shall not fly above open air assemblies of people in general.	
4	Allowed	I.a.w. operating limitations of the approved flight manual or otherwise prescribed by FAA. No sustained flights above over open-air assemblies of persons, unless the operation meets the requirements of standard remote identification or alternative remote identification of UAS.
Operation above or within unrestricted access areas		
<i>Category</i>	<i>Direct participants</i>	<i>Indirect participants</i>
1, 2	Allowed	Allowed, except for sustained flights above over open-air assemblies of persons, unless the operation meets the requirements of standard remote identification or alternative remote identification of UAS.
3	Allowed	Transit flights only, no sustained flights.
	Category 3 sUAS shall not fly above open air assemblies of people in general.	
4	Allowed	I.a.w. operating limitations of the approved flight manual or otherwise prescribed by FAA. No sustained flights above over open-air assemblies of persons, unless the operation meets the requirements of standard remote identification or alternative remote identification of UAS.

Table 4-15 FAA sUAS operational requirements for sUAS operations above people [25, 153, 155-157].

Operation over moving vehicles over or within restricted access areas		
<i>Category</i>	<i>Direct participants</i>	<i>Indirect participants</i>
1, 2, 3	Allowed	Must be notified about the operation.
4	Allowed	I.a.w. operating limitations of the approved flight manual or otherwise prescribed by FAA.
Operation over moving vehicles over or within unrestricted access areas		
<i>Category</i>	<i>Direct participants</i>	<i>Indirect participants</i>
1, 2, 3	Allowed	Transit flights only, no sustained flights.
4	Allowed	I.a.w. operating limitations of the approved flight manual or otherwise prescribed by FAA. No sustained flights above over open-air assemblies of persons, unless the operation meets the requirements of standard remote identification or alternative remote identification of UAS.

Table 4-16 FAA sUAS operational requirements for sUAS operations above moving vehicles [25, 153, 155-157].

It should be noted that the maximum allowed kinetic impact energies for category 2 and 3 are much less than the mutual 66 J criterion. The 66 J criterion is deemed as the lethality for blunt impacts on human bodies and which is applied for example in AEP-83 [107]. To calculate the kinetic impact energy, in accordance to [155], FAA requires to apply the following equation:

$$E_{KinImpact} = 0.0155 \cdot m \cdot v_{MaxImpact}^2 \text{ [ft - lbs]} \quad (4-1)$$

To transfer the result from equation (4-1) into SI units, it is necessary to multiply the result with the gravitational constant, the conversion value of foot to metre and with the conversion value of pound to kilogram.

$$E_{KinImpact} [J] = C \left[\text{kg} \frac{\text{m}^2}{\text{s}^2} \right] \cdot E_{KinImpact} = 1.356 \cdot E_{KinImpact} [J] \quad (4-2)$$

The allowance of only very low impact energy values indicate that FAA does not give high confidence on the reliability of these UAS and rather relies on conservative limitations in order to provide a balance between the technical uncertainties and the necessary safety for the overflown area and inhabitants. FAAs primary tool to determine safety of aircraft is type certification, as it is for every other aviation authority. Consequently, in case a sUAS obtained an airworthiness certificate from FAA, less limitations are possible.

Another noteworthy point is the aspect that FAA does not provide a definition regarding *open-air assemblies of people*. Within the updated AC for Part 107, it is noted that this aspect is mainly dependent on a case-by-case analysis and in particular on the density of people not directly participating within the UAS operation. Some examples are mentioned, e.g. concerts, football games etc., however no clear definition is given, which leads to a residual vagueness.

In conclusion, by the 2021 update of Part 107, although limited, FAA enables regular operations with sUAS above people which is a significant step forward on the integration of UAS into the national airspace of the U.S. [2, 13, 25, 110, 152, 155-161].

4.5.3 EASA

Before outlining the UAS regulation attempts of EASA, it is necessary to point out, that the Agency was not responsible for the type certification of all UAS from the beginning. In the foundation years of EASA, UAS and in particular light or small UAS were not that prominent as they are nowadays. When EASA was established in 2002, the agency was only responsible for type certification of UAS with a MTOW of greater than 150 kg. For all other UAS, the national aviation authorities in Europe were responsible for type certification. Yet arbitrary, this weight limit had a significant influence on the development of UAS regulations, as can be seen for example in [68, 106, 107]. In any case, the fact that the European national aviation authorities were responsible for a substantial portion of UAS led to a fragmented regulation regime across the EASA member states. For example, if a UAS operator was authorized to conduct a mission with a specific sUAS in France, the same operator with the same sUAS might be declined to conduct an operation in Austria [87]. This unsatisfactory situation should remain until 2018. In 2018, with the second amendment of the Basic Regulation, EASA became responsible for the regulation of all civil UAS without regard of MTOW in order to establish harmonized rules for UAS across the member states [33, 88].

Prior to this remarkable change, in 2009, EASA published a policy regarding the airworthiness certification of UAS with a MTOW above 150 kg [162]. It based on a work from JAA and EUROCONTROL from 2004 [6]. Primary aim of the policy is to provide guidance for applicants how to establish a type certification basis for a UAS. Such a guidance was necessary as there were no civil airworthiness standards available similar to CS-23 or CS-25. Notably, while the present thesis was written, besides several special conditions for UAS (for example [163-165]), there are still no official airworthiness standards for UAS from EASA which are comparable to CS of manned aircraft available. In the words of EASA the policy from 2009 was intended to become the first step on the way to establish an encompassing regulatory scheme for UAS in Europe. Subsequently, the policy contains several determinations, which laid down the fundament of today's UAS regulations in Europe.

Primary goal of the policy is to maintain the high level of aviation safety in Europe. Therefore, it defines that no UAS shall be less safe than a comparable manned aircraft in order to ensure the safety of overflown people. However, it is also stated that UAS airworthiness requirements shall not be more rigid than requirements for manned aircraft. Furthermore, it is defined that Part 21 is applicable to UAS. To determine which airworthiness standard is applicable to a UAS, an approach based on the kinetic impact energy is pursued within the policy. The basic calculation for the kinetic energy of the UAS is shown in equation (4-3).

$$E_{KinImpact} = \frac{(m[\text{kg}] \cdot v[\text{kts}]^2)}{10^9} \quad (4-3)$$

The kinetic impact energy must be calculated in relation to the type of the UA and for two scenarios. One scenario is an unpremeditated descent, for example in case of loss of thrust. The other scenario is a loss of control scenario, assumed to result in a high-speed impact.

Table 4-17 summarizes the velocity determination for the different UA types and the different scenarios.

UA type		Unpremeditated Descent	Loss of control
Aeroplanes	v	$1.3 \cdot v_{Stall}$ With MTOW and landing configuration.	$1.4 \cdot v_{MO}$
Rotorcraft	v	Scalar value of the autorotation velocity vector	Terminal velocity with rotors stationary
Airships/balloons	v	Combination of the terminal velocity resulting from the static heaviness, and the probable wind velocity	Terminal velocity with the envelope ruptured/deflated to the extent that no lifting medium remains

Table 4-17 Velocity definitions quoted from EASAs' UAS airworthiness certification policy [162].

Equation (4-3) returns a value which needs to be inserted into two given figures within the policy document. These figures are shown below.




Figure 4-3. Kinetic energy and related airworthiness codes taken from [162].

Once the appropriate Certification Specification has been identified, the applicant shall tailor the requirements in an adequate manner. If the deduction leads to more than one airworthiness code, the applicant shall combine these codes suitably. It should be noted that EASAs' UAS airworthiness certification policy states that also AEP-4671 might be an acceptable airworthiness standard as long as the deduced civil airworthiness code would not require stricter safety numbers within the 1309 paragraph than AEP-4671. Within [34] an intense review and analysis on the application possibilities of AEP-4703 for LUAS in accordance to EASAs' UAS airworthiness certification policy was performed. Core result of this review was that AEP-4703 would be an appropriate airworthiness code for the type certification of a broad range of LUAS [68, 107].

Six years after the publication of the airworthiness certification policy, during a conference on Riga, the European Commission officially recognized the importance of UAS for the future aviation and declared their willingness to foster the integration of UAS into European airspace in a harmonized way. In the aftermath of the Riga declaration, EASA published an opinion on the future handling of UAS, including those below 150 kg MTOW. By this publication, EASA outlined the idea of a risk-based categorization system in order to regulate UAS in an adequate manner and not to slow down the development by inappropriate regulations. However, to adopt these proposed regulations, at first it was necessary to amend the EASA Basic Regulation in

order to grant the Agency the responsibility to regulate all UAS. This step was done in 2018 as described above. The amendment of the Basic Regulation included the adoption of an annex which contains the essential requirements for UAS. This annex covers all aspects that have to be considered in case of UAS operations shall be conducted. They include high level requirements on technical, design/manufacturing, organizational and personnel aspects, which together form the core foundation of safe UAS flight operations. This holistic approach was introduced in chapter 4.3 and shown in Figure 4-1. Figure 4-4 expands this concept to UAS and is presented below.




Figure 4-4. Interacting elements affecting safe UAS operation, derived from [28].

Until the publication of the amendment of the EASA basic regulation, EASA conducted several iteration steps in accordance to their rulemaking process in order to further develop the opinion of 2015 and to transfer it into the European Aviation laws. Finally, these efforts led to the EU Delegated Regulation 2019/945 which defines requirements for the design and manufacturing of UAS and the EU Implementing Regulation 2019/947, which defines the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft [15, 19, 23, 24, 88, 166-170].

The two regulations plus the already published amendments and AMC must be seen as complementary and as such, the following summary will treat them as one set of regulations. EU and EASA differentiates between three categories of UAS operations: *open*, *specific* and *certified* operations. UAS that fall under the open operations category are those, which are deemed to pose such a low risk that they do not need any official authorization. UAS related to the specific operations category are such UAS operations that pose a higher risk to the overflowed area and people and therefore require a specific authorization by a competent authority. The last category, certified operations, are expected to pose the highest risk to ground and air and are similar regarding complexity as manned aviation.

While this thesis was written, the European regulations for UAS were focused on the *open* and *specific* category. In particular for the open category, the regulations can be divided into four aspects: UAS design requirements, UAS functional requirements, required documents and

personnel requirements. Operations in the open category are divided into three subcategories: A1, A2 and A3 which conclude the four aspects within the operational limitations for each operation [28]. Table 4-18 to Table 4-21 present extracts of the primary design and functional requirements on UAS of class C0 to C6, the required documentation and marking for UAS as well as the resulting operational limitations and further requirements for conducting UAS operations in the open category. Note that C5 and C6 class UAS are for operations under the specific category only, which will be discussed later in this chapter [23, 24, 166-170].

Requirement	Unit	C0	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6
MTOW	[kg]	< 0.25	< 0.9	< 4	< 25	< 25	< 25	< 25
E_{Imp}	[J]	-/-	< 80	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-
v_{Max}	[m/s]	≤ 19	≤ 19	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	< 50 GS
Selectable low-speed mode	[/]	-/-	-/-	X*	-/-	-/-	X**	-/-
d_{max}	[m]	-/-	-/-	-/-	< 3	-/-	< 3	< 3
Sound pressure (4 years after publication)	[dB(A)]	-/-	MTOW < 0.9 [kg]: < 81 0.9 [kg] < MTOW < 4 [kg]: $81 + 18.5 \cdot \lg(m/900)$ *		Indication label *	-/-	Indication label *	Indication label *
Lighting	[/]	-/-	X	X	X	-/-	X	X
Electrically powered only	[/]	X	X	X	X	-/-	X	-/-

* If not a fixed-wing sUAS.
** If not tethered.

Table 4-18 EASA sUAS extract of design requirements [23, 24, 166-170].

As can be seen by Table 4-18 to Table 4-21, the European regulation compendium for sUAS within the open category is more prescriptive than the one of FAA. Furthermore, it appears more complex because of the several interactions between the EU drone regulations [23, 24, 166-168]. Nevertheless, the regulations are similar. The core of the regulations can be summarized to a MTOW of less than 25 kg, operations within VLOS only, no operations above assemblies of people and in safe distance to people. It is noteworthy that assemblies of people are not defined by an exact number, but as the inability of the gathered people to escape or go away because of surrounding mass of people²⁵. Furthermore, it should be noted that the primary means to ensure safety of people on the ground is the limitation to VLOS and the assumption that an operator keeps sufficient distance to uninvolved people. However, in case a UAS of the open category encounters a critical, technical malfunction, for example loss of the flight control system or a software error, the operator cannot do anything else than warn potential bystanders. It is questionable if limitations like VLOS are really sufficient to cover such malfunctions.

²⁵ Article 3 (37) Regulation (EU) 2020/1058 [168].

<i>Function</i>	<i>C0</i>	<i>C1</i>	<i>C2</i>	<i>C3</i>	<i>C4</i>	<i>C5</i>	<i>C6</i>
Safely controllable	X	X	X	X	X***	X	X
Structural integrity	-/-	X	X	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-
Hazard minimizing design	X	X	X	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-
Attainable height ≤ 120 [m]	X	X	X	X	-/-	-/-	-/-
C2Link loss procedure	-/-	X	X**	X**	-/-	X**	X**
Electronic identification system	-/-	X	X	X	-/-	X	X
Geo-awareness system	-/-	X	X	X	-/-	-/-	-/-
Flight termination	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	X**	X
** If not tethered.							
*** No automatic control modes allowed except stabilization.							

Table 4-19 Functional requirements for C0 to C6 UAS [23, 24, 166-170]

<i>Document/marking</i>	<i>C0</i>	<i>C1</i>	<i>C2</i>	<i>C3</i>	<i>C4</i>	<i>C5</i>	<i>C6</i>
Manual	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Class identification label	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Serial number on UA	-/-	X	X	X	-/-	X	X

Table 4-20 Document and marking requirements for C0 to C6 UAS [23, 24, 166-170]

	<i>Operation</i>			
<i>Requirement</i>	A1	A2	A3	
<i>General</i>	VLOS only			
<i>Altitude</i>	< 120 [m]			
<i>Allowed UAS</i>	C0 Privately built UAS < 0.25 kg	C1	C2	C2, C3, C4, Privately built UAS < 25 kg
<i>Flight over people</i>	May overfly uninvolved people.	Mission shall be conducted in a way it can reasonably be expected that no uninvolved person will be overflown.	No overfly of uninvolved people. At least 30 m horizontal distance to uninvolved people (may be reduced to 5 m in case of active low-speed mode).	Mission shall be conducted in an area where it can reasonably be expected that no uninvolved person will be overflown during the entire mission time. At least 150 m horizontal distance from residential, commercial, industrial or recreational areas.
	No overflight of assemblies of people.			
	Safe distance to people must be maintained.			
<i>Active and updated remote identification and geo-awareness system</i>	N/A	Mandatory	Mandatory	Mandatory for C2, C3
<i>Remote pilot</i>	Familiarized with UAS instructions	Familiarized with UAS instructions Completed online training course	Familiarized with UAS instructions Completed online training course	Familiarized with UAS instructions Completed online training course

Table 4-21 Open category: Allowed operations and operational requirements [23, 24, 166-170].

For the present thesis, this recap on the European UAS open category is deemed to be sufficient. A detailed analysis with respect to this category, including the development background of the regulations, the principle how the aspect organization and the related product quality shall be ensured as well as the limited application of the open category for the military can be found in [28].

In case a UAS does not meet the requirements for the open category, either because of design or because of intended operation, the specific category needs to be applied. While operations in the open category do not need any authorization by a competent authority, it is basically mandatory to have an operation authorization before conducting an operation within the specific category. Competent authorities for such authorizations are the national civil aviation authorities in the state of registry.

Exemptions are applicable in case the operator holds a Light UAS operator Certificate (LUC) with the adequate privileges or in case the operator has submitted a declaration of compliance with a standard scenario. An entire discussion on the specific category with all possibilities would be out of scope of the present thesis. Therefore, focus will be given on the operational authorization by a competent authority and the declaration of compliance to a standard scenario. Regarding the latter, Table 4-22 provides a summary with respect to the primary operational requirements for the two standard scenarios STS-01 and STS-02.

One of the biggest differences between the standard scenarios and the open category is obviously the possibility to conduct an operation above populated area in accordance to STS-1 or to conduct an operation beyond visual line of sight within the STS-2 scenario. Furthermore, the design requirements for C5 and C6 class UAS allow much more performance and design possibilities than the C1-C4 class (cf. Table 4-18). However, by looking closer at the details, it must be noted that such additional freedom is granted only under very rigorous operational limitations. This can be seen for example by the definition of the “controlled ground area”:

“controlled ground area” means the ground area where the UAS is operated and within which the UAS operator can ensure that only involved persons are present;”

Article 2 (21) Regulation (EU) 2020/639 [167]

Such a definition requires sound measures to control the ground area and to prevent uninvolved people entering the area. Nevertheless, it is possible to perform such operations and to maintain the requirements. For example, in case of an overflown populated area, which is seen as areas that extensively used for residential, commercial or recreational purposes²⁶, it is thinkable that the UAS operator informs the inhabitants personally and gives clear advice regarding the safety precautions, so that those people become involved persons. Another possibility would be to separate the operational area by blockades from the remaining area in order to avoid the entrance of uninvolved persons, similar to movie shoots. However, such actions will always require a lot of preparational work. Consequently, instantaneous flights as they can be performed in manned aviation (“file and fly”) or as it is possible in the open category, are not possible. It is questionable if such standard scenarios of the specific category will be applied that often so that it is justified to keep them within the regulations or not.

²⁶ Article 2.3.1 (f) ED Decision 2020/022/R [170].

	Operation	
<i>Requirement</i>	STS-01	STS-02
<i>General</i>	VLOS	BVLOS
		If no VO is present, maximum 1 km distance between remote pilot and UA.
		If VO(s) present, maximum 2 km distance between remote pilot and UA.
		Maximum 1 km distance between UA and closest VO.
	At least 5 km visibility.	
No more than one UA shall be piloted by one remote pilot.		
No operation from moving vehicles.		
No hand-over of UA between different UCS.		
<i>Altitude</i>	< 120 [m]	
<i>Airspace</i>	Controlled or uncontrolled, with low risk of encounter with manned aircraft.	
<i>Allowed UAS</i>	C5	C6
<i>Active and updated remote identification and geo-awareness system</i>	Mandatory	Mandatory Active system that prevents the UA from leaving the designated airspace.
<i>Ground area</i>	Controlled ground area in a populated environment.	Controlled ground area entirely located in a sparsely populated environment.
<i>Flight over people</i>	Only above involved people within the controlled ground area.	
<i>Remote pilot</i>	Certificate of appropriate competency i.a.w. operational authorization and the standard scenario defined Accreditation of completed practical skill training. Familiarized with UAS instructions of the manufacturer.	

Table 4-22 Specific category: STS-1 and 2, operational requirements and limitations excerpt [23, 24, 166-170].

While the standard scenarios are prescriptive in the operation, the general specific category gives the applicant the possibility to apply for operational authorizations that enables the operator to conduct the operation in a way as exactly needed. To obtain an operational authorization for an operation in the specific category, besides administrative information on the UAS operator or that adequate insurance is given, the applicant shall provide to the

competent authority the operational risk assessment, a list of mitigation measures and an operation manual.

The operational risk assessment is of fundamental importance for obtaining an authorization. Such an operational risk assessment must include at least the elements shown in Table 4-23.

<i>Element</i>	<i>Description</i>	
Operation	Characteristics and purpose of the operation Operational safety objectives proposal Complexity of operation Proposed target level of safety, equivalent to manned aviation.	
UAS	Type of UAS Technical features and performance	
Environment	Overflown ground area and population. Intended types of airspace where the UA.	
Personnel	Competence, experience, licenses etc. of the personnel conducting the operation.	
Risk identification	Resulting <i>unmitigated ground risk</i> and <i>unmitigated air risk</i> based on the elements operation, UAS, environment and personnel.	
	<i>Unmitigated ground risk</i>	<i>Unmitigated air risk</i>
	-VLOS or BVLOS -Population densities -Will assemblies of people be overflown? -UA characteristic dimension	- Precise airspace volume to be used - Airspace volume needed for contingency measures - Airspace class - ATM measures
Risk mitigation	TLS shall be met. Considerations should be given to <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - containment measures for people on the ground - strategic operational limitations e.g. time and place of operation, airspace regulations, - ability to resolve inadvertent operational conditions incl. avoidance of mid-air collisions - organisational aspects, e.g. maintenance, personnel competence, human error - design aspects of the UAS for mitigating risks (e.g. fail-safe design, frangibility, etc.) 	

Table 4-23 Key elements of an operational risk assessment i.a.w. [24, 169, 170].

Because of the criticality of the operational risk assessments for the specific category and in order to ease the creation on the side of the applicants as well as to ease the validation of them on the side of the authorities, EASA defined the SORA methodology developed by JARUS as AMC for the conduction of an operational risk assessment [24, 166-171]. An in-depth presentation of SORA would be far beyond the scope of the present thesis. Instead, a brief summary on the underlying concept will be provided and specific aspects that are now part of the EASA regulations will be outlined. It should be noted that JARUS has published much more than only the SORA concept. JARUS also developed several recommendations for the nations to cover all aspects of unmanned aviation [172]. Selected aspects will be introduced in the further text, but focus will be given on official regulations, published by EASA.

The underlying concept of SORA is of holistic and qualitative nature. It focuses on the two primary risks that the UA operation might harm other airspace users or people on the ground. Therefore, a basic model is defined, which depicts the ground and air as areas and associates the two risk models for ground and air. Figure 4-5 presents this model.




Figure 4-5. Illustration of SORA basic model, provided in [169-171].

The intention of the basic model within SORA is to cover a potential *loss of control of the operation* scenario during a specific operation and to show that the residual risk is acceptable low. Once the total risk of the operation is identified, the adequate *Operational Safety Objectives* need to be deduced. They are based on a given table within the AMC for operational risk assessments. Afterwards the UAS operator must summarize the OSOs within the safety portfolio and provide this as part of the operational risk assessment to the competent authority. These OSOs are not to be confused with operational safety considerations outlined in the introduction chapter 1. In order to determine the key element ground and air risk which define the extent of the OSOs to be applied, first the parameters of the UA designated for the specific operation needs to be entered into Table 4-24.

<i>Parameter</i>	<i>Values</i>			
d_{Max} [m]	≤ 1	≤ 3	≤ 8	> 8
E_{Kin} [kJ]	< 0.7	< 34	$< 1,084$	$> 1,084$
VLOS/BVLOS above controlled ground area	1	2	3	4
VLOS above sparsely populated area	2	3	4	5
BVLOS above sparsely populated area	3	4	5	6
VLOS above populated area	4	5	6	8
BVLOS above populated area	5	6	8	10
VLOS above assemblies of people	7	Not allowed		
BVLOS above assemblies of people	8			

Table 4-24 SORA intrinsic ground risk determination, provided in [169-171].

After the intrinsic ground risk has been determined, the potential mitigations present within the UAS or within the operation can be considered in order to determine the final risk numbers. The final ground risk class (GRC) number is important because this number is greater than seven, the operation cannot be approved for the specific category and must be shifted to the certified category. Table 4-25 shows the three mitigation measures, quoted from [169-171].

#	<i>Ground risk mitigation</i>	<i>Robustness</i>		
		<i>Low/None</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>
1	M1 – Strategic mitigations: E.g. number of people at risk is reduced.	0: None 1: Low	-2	-4
2	M2 – Ground impact effects are reduced: E.g. impact energy of the UA is reduced, for example by a parachute.	0	-1	-2
3	M3 – Emergency response plan is in place, the UAS operator is validated and effective.	1	0	-1

Table 4-25 Mitigations measures for the final ground risk class, taken from [169-171].

JARUS also works on an additional annex to SORA for the justification of the GRC [173]. As this annex is neither finalized nor included within the EASA regulations, it will not further be discussed here. However, the annex was reviewed as part of the assessment of selected risk approaches, that will be presented in chapters 5 and 11.

Once the final GRC number is defined and lower or equal than seven, the air risk class (ARC) number can be determined. For determination of the ARC, the path diagram shown in Figure 4-6 must be executed. The ARC defines the risk to other airspace users based on the type of

airspace where the operation shall take place. This risk of mid-air collisions increases from ARC-a to ARC-d, whereas ARC-a would be for example a segregated airspace reserved for the UAS operation only and ARC-d could be a zone of high manned aircraft traffic, the proximity to a hospital with a lot of emergency helicopter operations. Dependent on the result of the execution, the applicant might need to apply tactical mitigation performance requirements or might be forced to by the competent authority.




Figure 4-6. ARC determination i.a.w. SORA basic model, taken from [169-171].

After the determination of the final GRC and ARC are completed, the *specific assurance and integrity level (SAIL)* can be deduced. The SAIL will ultimately lead to the OSOs which need to be fulfilled by the operator in order to have a chance for operational authorization. Based on the resulting SAIL, the required OSOs provided in Table 4-27 can be identified. Note that the OSO table shown here is only a quotation from the summary within [169-171]. Within appendix E of AMC1 [169, 170] to article 11 of [24] a detailed description of every OSO can be found.

GRC	ARC-a	ARC-b	ARC-c	ARC-d
≤ 2	I	II	IV	VI
3	II	II	IV	VI
4	III	III	IV	VI
5	IV	IV	IV	VI
6	V	V	V	VI
7	VI	VI	VI	VI
> 7	Certified category operation			

Table 4-26 SAIL determination, quoted from [169-171].

OSO #		SAIL					
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI
<i>Technical issue with the UAS</i>							
OSO#01	Ensure the UAS operator is competent and/or proven	O	L	M	H	H	H
OSO#02	UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity	O	O	L	M	H	H
OSO#03	UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity	L	L	M	M	H	H
OSO#04	UAS developed to authority recognized design standards ¹	O	O	L	L	M	H
OSO#05	UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability	O	O	L	M	H	H
OSO#06	C3 link performance is appropriate for the operation	O	L	L	M	H	H
OSO#07	Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) to ensure consistency with the ConOps	L	L	M	M	H	H
OSO#08	Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to	L	M	H	H	H	H
OSO#09	Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation	L	L	M	M	H	H
OSO#10	Safe recovery from a technical issue	L	L	M	M	H	H

<i>Deterioration of external systems supporting UAS operations</i>							
OSO#11	Procedures are in-place to handle the deterioration of external systems supporting UAS operations	L	M	H	H	H	H
OSO#12	The UAS is designed to manage the deterioration of external systems supporting UAS operations	L	L	M	M	H	H
OSO#13	External services supporting UAS operations are adequate for the operation	L	L	M	H	H	H
<i>Human error</i>							
OSO#14	Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to	L	M	H	H	H	H
OSO#15	Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation	L	L	M	M	H	H
OSO#16	Multi-crew coordination	L	L	M	M	H	H
OSO#17	Remote crew is fit to operate	L	L	M	M	H	H
OSO#18	Automatic protection of the flight envelope from human error	O	O	L	M	H	H
OSO#19	Safe recovery from human error	O	O	L	M	M	H
OSO#20	A human factors evaluation has been performed and the human machine interface (HMI) found appropriate for the mission	O	L	L	M	M	H
<i>Adverse operating conditions</i>							
OSO#21	Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to	L	M	H	H	H	H
OSO#22	The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them	L	L	M	M	M	H
OSO#23	Environmental conditions for safe operations are defined, measurable and adhered to	L	L	M	M	H	H
OSO#24	UAS is designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions	O	O	M	H	H	H
¹ For experimental UAS, the non-compliance to recognized standards may be accepted.							
O <i>Optional</i> L <i>Low robustness</i> M <i>Medium robustness</i> H <i>High robustness</i>							

Table 4-27 Operational safety objectives, quoted from [169-171].

As can be seen by Table 4-27, the higher the SAIL the higher the amount of OSOs to be fulfilled. Additionally, the level of robustness increases with higher SAIL numbers. Levels of robustness are linked to levels of assurance within SORA. They are achieved by a combination of the level of integrity of each mitigation measure (called “safety gain”), the related evidence to assure that the mitigation will work (called “method of proof”) and the associated compliance statement of the UAS operator Table 4-28 and Table 4-29 present the robustness level determination as well as the qualitative and general description of the levels of assurance.

	<i>Low assurance</i>	<i>Medium assurance</i>	<i>High assurance</i>
<i>Low integrity</i>	Low robustness	Low robustness	Low robustness
<i>Medium integrity</i>	Low robustness	Medium robustness	Medium robustness
<i>High integrity</i>	Low robustness	Medium robustness	High robustness

Table 4-28 Robustness level determination, quoted from [169-171].

<i>Level of assurance</i>	<i>Description</i>
Low	Simple declaration of compliance that the level of integrity is fulfilled.
Medium	Evidences are provided, for example tests of technical mitigations or documented experience in case of human-based mitigations.
High	The declared level of integrity is verified and found to be acceptable by a competent third entity.

Table 4-29 Assurance level description, taken from [169-171].

The appendices to SORA included within the AMC1 [169, 170] provide further extensive guidance regarding the substantiation of the levels of robustness by the levels of integrity and assurance. Although of qualitative nature only, Table 4-27 to Table 4-29 show that the OSOs and their achievement are not trivial, in particular as soon as the operation enters SAIL III or higher.

In particular OSOs #04, #05, #10, #12, #18, #19 and #24, if applicable to the specific operation, should not be underestimated as their substantiation require a sound design of the UAS. Furthermore, dependent on the requested specific operation authorization, the competent authority can define additional OSOs not listed in Table 4-27 which need to be fulfilled. In conclusion, the entire set of OSOs reflects and takes into the interaction of the four elements of that affect a safe UAS operation shown in Figure 4-4.

On top of the applicable OSOs, SORA requires that the UAS addresses the risk of a loss of control situation adequately by safety requirements which shall ensure the containment of the UA within the operational volume (cf. Figure 4-5) in order to protect the adjacent area and airspace. This remarks also the target level of safety, which was noted in Table 4-23. The containment is divided into a *basic containment* and an *enhanced containment*.

Basic containment should be safeguarded by the requirement, that no probable failure within the UAS or by any the operation supporting element should cause the UA to leave the

operational volume. To show compliance on this requirement, an assessment of the complete UAS design and the intended operation must be provided and verified.

Enhanced containment should be given by the UAS for example in case the proximity area to the operational volume is inhibited by assemblies of people, or if the residual air risk class is ARC-d or if the controlled ground area is populated. Enhanced containment shall be substantiated by the three safety requirements shown in Table 4-30.

	<i>Requirement</i>
<i>Design</i>	In accordance to appropriate standards, recognized by the competent authority.
<i>Safety</i>	Probability that UA leaves the operational volume: $P_{Leave} < 10^{-4}[1/Fh]$
	No single point of failure within the UAS or by any the operation supporting element should lead to the UA leaving the ground risk buffer.
<i>SW/AEH</i>	Software (SW) and airborne electronic hardware (AEH) that might cause the UA to leave the ground risk buffer should be developed to a standard or method recognized by the competent authority.

Table 4-30 Enhanced containment requirements [169-171].

Some remarks on the requirements for basic and enhanced containment. The term “*should*” is used because the requirements are laid down within an AMC and not within the regulation itself. So, they are basically not mandatory and an applicant might propose alternative means of compliance. However, it is very likely that the competent authority insists on the application of the requirements.

Requirements as shown in Table 4-30 are typical airworthiness requirements (cf. for example AEP-4671 USAR.1309 and AMC.1309 [68]). The substantiation of the safety requirement and the need to identify SW and AEH which might cause the most-feared event that the UA leaves the ground risk buffer zone, makes an in-depth system safety assessment indispensable. This could be done for example in accordance to ARP4761 and the identified SW and AEH could be developed in accordance to DO-178C and DO-254 [174-176]. The compliance proof is comprehensive and probably expensive for the UAS operator as it can be deduced by looking at the exemplary standards which is further increased by the proof of compliance for the other OSOs.

Furthermore, it should be noted that for SAIL V and VI a verification by EASA is mandatory, with the aim to achieve a type certificate or restricted type certificate. In these cases, EASA acts as the competent third entity as described in Table 4-29. EASA also issued guidance material regarding the design verification for SAIL III and IV classified UAS, defined as medium risk. The reason for this is laid down within AMC1 [169, 170] to article 11 of [24] where it is recommended that the national authorities should seek design verification by EASA. Also, the UAS operator might apply on voluntary basis for a type certificate or restricted type certificate by EASA. Before these verification guidelines have been published, by end of 2020 EASA issued a special condition [165], which outlined airworthiness requirements for such UAS. Notably, within the final document, no AMCs including safety numbers were presented. Based the recommendations within [24, 169, 170], one could say that EASA sees the specific

category from SAIL III onwards critical and fraught with risk and therefore, needs to be handled close to certified aircraft in order to mitigate the risks.

It is undisputable that a full type certification will require more than the requirements outlined in Table 4-30. Nevertheless, taking into account the necessary efforts to generate the required evidences for SAIL III or higher classified operations under the aspect that only very limited operations are possible, the question arises, if such an effort is justified or if the conduction of a full type certification process would not be more efficient on a long-term view. However, these are project or business wise decisions which need to be taken case by case. This summarizing estimation shall conclude the recap of the specific category and as last part of the present chapter, a short look at the certified category will be done.

While this thesis was written, EASA was in the rulemaking process for establishing adequate certification specifications for those UAS that will fall under the certified category [177]. In accordance to Article 6 of Regulation (EU) 2019/947 these are all UAS whose operation includes either the flight above assemblies of people, transportation of people or the carriage of dangerous goods [24].

Nevertheless, as it was described in the beginning of the current chapter, EASA already published a policy on the certification of UAS, which is, to the author’s best knowledge, still applicable to define an adequate type certification basis. In addition, EASA published several special conditions, clarifying specific aspects of airworthiness of UAS if an applicant attempts the agency for a UAS type certification in accordance to the UAS certification from 2009 [162, 178]. Of particular interest are the clarifications regarding the definitions of the failure conditions and the related acceptable occurrence probabilities, which were proposed by EASA in three special conditions: SC-RPAS.1309-01 in 2015, SC-RPAS.1309-03 in 2018 and SC Light-UAS Medium Risk 01 [163-165]. Table 4-31 and Table 4-32 present the definitions for the different failure conditions and the acceptable failure probabilities. In order to get an encompassing picture and to get an indication if the requirements from the two special conditions are more or less rigorous, a comparison is done with the military UAS airworthiness code AEP-4671 [68].

<i>Failure condition</i>	<i>AEP-4671 / AEP-83</i>	<i>SC-RPAS.1309-01 / SC-RPAS.1309-03</i>
No safety effect	Failure conditions that have no effect on safety.	Failure conditions that would have no effect on safety. For example, failure conditions that would not affect the operational capability of the RPAS or increase the remote crew workload.

<p>Minor</p>	<p>Failure conditions that do not significantly reduce UAS safety and involve UAS crew actions that are well within their capabilities. These conditions may include a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities and a slight increase in UAS crew workload.</p>	<p>Failure conditions that would not significantly reduce RPAS safety and that involve remote crew actions that are well within their capabilities.</p> <p>Minor failure conditions may include a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a slight increase in remote crew workload, such as flight plan changes.</p>
<p>Major</p>	<p>Failure conditions that either by themselves or in conjunction with increased crew workload are expected to result in an emergency landing of the UA on predefined site where it can be reasonably expected that a serious injury will not occur.</p> <p>Or</p> <p>Failure conditions which could potentially result in injury to UAS crew, ground staff, or third parties.</p>	<p>Failure conditions that would reduce the capability of the RPAS or the ability of the remote crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be a significant reduction in safety margins, functional capabilities or separation assurance.</p> <p>In addition, the failure condition has a significant increase in remote crew workload or impairs remote crew efficiency.</p>
<p>Hazardous</p>	<p>Failure conditions that either by themselves or in conjunction with increased workload are expected to result in a controlled trajectory termination or forced landing potentially leading to loss of the UA where it can be reasonably expected that a fatality will not occur.</p> <p>Or,</p> <p>Failure conditions for which it can be reasonably expected that a fatality to UAS crew, ground staff, or third parties will not occur.</p>	<p>Failure conditions that would reduce the capability of the RPAS or the ability of the remote crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i) Loss of the RPA where it can be reasonably expected that one or more fatalities will not occur, or ii) A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities or separation assurance, or iii) Excessive workload such that the remote crew cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely.
<p>Catastrophic</p>	<p>Failure conditions that are expected to result in at least uncontrolled flight (including flight outside of pre-planned or contingency flight profiles/areas), and/or uncontrolled crash,</p> <p>Or</p> <p>Failure conditions which may result in a fatality to UAS crew, ground staff, or third parties.</p>	<p>Failure conditions that are expected to result in one or more fatalities.</p>

Table 4-31 Comparison of failure conditions definitions, quoted from [68, 163, 164].

	AEP-4671				SC-RPAS.1309-01		SC-RPAS.1309-03	
	$MTOM \leq 5,670$ [kg]		$MTOM > 5,670$ [kg]		$MTOM \leq 750$ [kg] ¹ $MTOM \leq 600$ [kg] ²		$MTOM \leq 8,618$ [kg] ³	
Failure condition	P [1/Fh]	FDAL	P [1/Fh]	FDAL	P [1/Fh]	FDAL	P [1/Fh]	FDAL
No safety effect	$> 10^{-3}$	E	$> 10^{-3}$	E	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Minor	$\leq 10^{-3}$	D	$\leq 10^{-3}$	D	$< 10^{-3}$	D	$< 10^{-3}$	D
Major	$\leq 10^{-4}$	C	$\leq 10^{-4}$	C	$< 10^{-4}$	C	$< 10^{-4}$	C
Hazardous	$\leq 10^{-5}$	C	$\leq 10^{-6}$	B	$< 10^{-5}$	C	$< 10^{-6}$	B
Catastrophic	$\leq 10^{-6}$	B	$\leq 10^{-7}$	A	$< 10^{-6}$	B	$< 10^{-8}$	A
P_{CumCat}	$\leq 10^{-5}$	N/A	$\leq 10^{-6}$	N/A	No requirement	N/A	No requirement	N/A

¹If the UAS type certification determined i.a.w. EASA UAS certification policy results in CS-VLA [162, 179].
²If the UAS type certification determined i.a.w. EASA UAS certification policy results in CS-VLR [162, 180]
³If the UAS type certification determined i.a.w. EASA UAS certification policy results in CS-23 level 3 [125, 162]

Table 4-32 Acceptable failure probabilities comparison of AEP-4671 and SC-RPAS.1309-01/03 [68, 163, 164].

Regarding the definitions of failure conditions Table 4-31 it can be seen that the definitions are very similar. The *Major* failure contains a notable difference, as the definition of AEP-4671 requires that no injury of third parties shall reasonably occur, while the definition given within the two SC-RPAS.1309 does not include this. Consequently, the AEP-4671 definition is more conservative in this specific case. Another notable difference can be seen within the *Catastrophic* failure condition definition. Within AEP-4671 the definition includes besides fatalities also the total loss of control with subsequent uncontrolled crash of the UA, whereas within the two SC-RPAS.1309 the definition is focused on fatalities only. Basically, both are similar regarding the worst-case consequence which is the loss of life. However, again, AEP-4671 is basically more rigorous as already the uncontrolled crash and the probable complete loss of the UA which not necessarily causes a fatality is treated as *catastrophic*. Despite these slight differences, the definitions of both approaches are almost identical.

In contrast to the similarity of the failure conditions, the acceptable failure probabilities differ in an outstanding way. On first sight the numbers are also identical, for example, within *minor* and *major* throughout the three documents there is no difference and also the numbers for *hazardous* are quite comparable. Furthermore, in every one of the documents it is required that no single point of failure shall lead to a catastrophic event. However, besides these similarities, the numbers for the *catastrophic* failure condition incorporate a range of two orders of magnitude. This becomes even more significant on second sight, if the weight limitations are considered.

As can be seen in Table 4-32, within AEP-4671, a weight-break-point is present at 5,670 kg requiring a one order of magnitude increase for heavier UA with an upper limit of 20 t. In fact, EASA proposes this also, however, the weight-break-point is set already at 750 kg. This leads to the consequence, that an exemplary UA with a MTOW of 1,000 kg which is subject to a type

certification under the umbrella of the EASA UAS certification policy would have to fulfill more severe safety probability requirements than a 10,000 kg UA which is subject to a type certification under AEP-4671 [68, 162-164].

Obviously, there will be always discussions regarding weight-based limitations and the relation to airworthiness standards. For example, why does a 601 kg rotary wing need to be certified in accordance to CS-27 and why cannot it be certified to CS-VLR [119, 180]? For manned aviation this might always be answered by referring to a reasonably increased passenger capacity and increased complexity of heavier and bigger aircraft. However, for UAS this rationale is not valid. While the increase in safety numbers within AEP-4671 seems to be proportionate and additionally secured by the additional P_{CumCat} requirement, the increase within the two SC-RPAS.1309 seems not to be proportionate. Moreover, one could get the impression that requirements from manned aviation have been directly applied.

Nevertheless, as EASA is still working on certification standards for UAS, the safety requirement for UAS of the certified category might face changes until the final publication. In the eyes of EASA a CS-UAS needs to cover all type of UAS and should not be limited to specific aircraft types, such as for example CS-VLR or CS-23. Furthermore, light UAS need special attention and probably will get their own CS. The afore mentioned special condition for UAS classified as medium risk within the specific category outlines a first draft of such a CS for light UAS. It is recognized that the special condition is basically not intended for UAS of the certified category, nevertheless, as it addresses airworthiness requirements, it is seen as an appropriate example [165].

A first impression on how a future CS-UAS might look alike can be found within the JARUS recommendation CS-UAS [181]. The CS-UAS recommendations document is intended for fixed-wing UAS with MTOW $\leq 8,618$ kg and UAS with VTOL functionality and a MTOW $\leq 3,175$ kg. CS-UAS covers all aspects of a UAS and is similar to other CS with regard to the layout. Table 4-33 presents the content of both proposed airworthiness codes. As can be seen within the table, both are following basically the content structure of a certification specification but they are expanded with UAS specific aspects, such as “ancillary systems” or “remote crew information”.

Regarding CS-UAS and the SC Light-UAS, it is remarkable that both are objective based. This means the requirements are not written in a prescriptive way as they are written for example in CS-25. Subsequently, the UAS designer has much more freedom as the requirements state *what* needs to be achieved but not *how*. For example, the structural requirements do not prescribe specific loads to be substantiated with regard to symmetric or asymmetric loading conditions during flight as it is done in AEP-4671²⁷. However, it is required that such factors must be determined by the applicant and that such conditions shall not lead to a structural failure²⁸.

²⁷ E.g. USAR.337 [68]

²⁸ CS-UAS.2215 [181]

<i>SC Light-UAS Medium Risk</i>	<i>JARUS CS-UAS</i>
<i>Subparts</i>	
A General B Flight C Structures D Design and Construction E Lift/Thrust/Power System Installation F Systems and Equipment G Remote Crew Interface and other Information H C2 Link	A General B UAS Operation C Structures D Design and Construction E Power Plant Installation F Systems and Equipment G Crew Interface and other Information H Ancillary Systems
<i>AMC</i>	<i>Guidance Material</i>
Not available yet.	A General B UAS Operation C Structures D Design and Construction E Power Plant Installation F Systems and Equipment G Crew Interface and other Information H Ancillary Systems

Table 4-33 Content of SC Light-UAS Medium Risk and JARUS CS-UAS [165, 181].

A second remarkable aspect observed within the JARUS CS-UAS recommendation are the so-called *High Level Standardized Mitigations (HLSM)*. HLSM are contained in a separate annex and have the aim to reduce the degree of necessary certification actions if the UAS is operated under them. The four HLSM are

- HLSM.1: Operations over unpopulated areas
- HLSM.2: Operations over areas with a low population density
- HLSM.3: Operations in segregated airspaces
- HLSM.4: Harm-reducing or harmless UAS design

Obviously, by applying the HLSM in the course of a UAS certification would make a step-wise certification approach from specific category to certified category possible. For example, if an applicant wants to achieve a restricted type certificate under SAIL V and applies CS-UAS from the beginning. In such a case, it is thinkable that the applicant begins with operations above unpopulated areas only. The necessary substantiation evidences for the specific operation could be used as basis for the full type certification and the type certification basis could be fulfilled stepwise while in parallel the applicant gains experience with the UAS as it can already be operated. The idea to incorporate such an approach within a CS is seen as very beneficial and it could encourage UAS operators to apply for type certificates.

This summary about the SC Light-UAS and JARUS CS-UAS recommendation completes the chapter about EASAs regulation efforts for UAS. Please note that an assessment of specific national UAS regulations in the EASA regulatory area is not deemed to be necessary, as the EASA member states are obliged to transfer the European drone regulations into their national aviation law system (cf. chapter 3.1.3 and chapter 3.1.4). Although there might be slightly differences between the different civil NAAs regarding, for example within the application of the specific category, the core requirements defined in the EU regulations 2019/945 and 2019/947 will be identical [23, 24, 166-168]. The next subchapter will provide a short but detailed review on the NATO UAS airworthiness standards, which have been mentioned already often within the present thesis.

4.5.4 NATO

Equipment and machinery that follows harmonized standards enables NATO to interact and exchange material and data between each member state without the need put an interpreter in the middle. In conclusion, harmonization is of key importance for NATO [108]. Chapter 3.1.6 provided an introduction to this concept and underlined the reasons why NATO is keen on establishing standards with respect to airworthiness of UAS that are accepted amongst the allied nations.

Chapter 2 outlined the historical evolution of UAS and their military origin. From a side product of manned aviation primary used as target drones, UAS became an indispensable and highly valued core capacity for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and also strike capabilities across military forces and consequently also for NATO. The rapid increase of military UAS and subsequent operations by the end of the 20th century led to the foundation of the *Joint Capability Group on UAV (JCGUAV)*. The name was changed to *JCGUAS* to take into account the “system” nature of UAS. JCGUAS acts as focal point for UAS within NATO for operational and technical aspects. In order to forward the harmonization with respect to UAS and to get eased access to the airspaces across the alliance, JCGUAS established the *Flight In Non Segregated Airspace (FINAS)* group, which set up expert working groups covering the fields airworthiness, human factors and sense and avoid with the aim to create standards that enable the integration of UAS into non-segregated airspaces and to foster the acceptance of them within the foremost civil controlled aviation environment [34, 182].

Before taking a look into the results of the work of the FINAS airworthiness expert groups, the general NATO UAS classification will be presented in order to get a general idea how NATO categorizes UAS.

Class	Category	Normal employment	Normal altitude h_{Alt} [ft]	Normal mission radius	Example UAS
Class III $MTOM > 600$ [kg]	Strike/Combat	Strategic/ National	$\leq 65,000$ MSL	Unlimited, BRLOS	GHTP
	HALE	Strategic/ National	$\leq 65,000$ MSL	Unlimited, BRLOS	Global Hawk
	MALE	Operational/ Theatre	$\leq 45,000$ MSL	Unlimited, BRLOS	Gray Eagle
Class II $150 < MTOM < 600$ [kg]	Tactical	Tactical formation	$\leq 18,000$ AGL	200 [km] RLOS	Watchkeeper
Class I $MTOM < 150$ [kg]	Small $MTOM > 15$ [kg]	Tactical unit	$\leq 5,000$ AGL	50 [km] RLOS	LUNA
	Mini $MTOM < 15$ [kg]	Tactical sub-unit (manual or hand launch)	$\leq 3,000$ AGL	25 [km] RLOS	Skylark
	Micro $E_{Imp} < 66$ [J]	Tactical sub-unit (manual or hand launch)	≤ 200 AGL	5 [km] RLOS	Black Widow

Table 4-34 NATO UAS classification, taken from [183].

The NATO UAS classification scheme presented in Table 4-34 differs significantly from the civil classification scheme which is nowadays present at FAA or EASA. NATO does not differentiate between certified, specific or open class. Instead, the classification is focused on the operational characteristics shown in the category column and employment. This can be traced back to the necessary focus of military aviation which is mission accomplishment (cf. chapter 3.1.6). However, in order to achieve high mission reliability, sound aircraft design is inevitable, which motivates the need to have airworthy military UAS and consequently requires adequate UAS airworthiness standards.

One of the first notable publications from FINAS and airworthiness working groups was STANAG 4671, nowadays known as AEP-4671, which was released in 2009. It covers fixed wing UAS, which have a MTOW of more than 150 kg but less than 20 t (class II and class III UAS). The work on the first edition of AEP-4671 began in 2007 and based on a French draft called USAR 3.0 which relied on the initial version of CS-23 [184] as main input. This heritage is still visible in AEP-4671 as the airworthiness code contains a cross reference table with regard to the requirements of CS-23 that have been transferred into USARs [31, 68, 162]. Subsequently, AEP-4671 is quite similar to the layout of the various CS from EASA of these days. It consists of two books, where book 1 contains the airworthiness requirements and book 2 contains the AMC. Table 4-35 outlines the content of AEP-4671.

Meanwhile, AEP-4671 was updated twice and while the first update was primary an editorial amendment, the second update which led to edition 3, introduced significant changes, in particular with regard to system safety as it introduced the weight-break point that already has been briefly introduced, for example in chapter 4.2 and 4.5.4.

While the AEP-4671 underwent the ratification process across the NATO member states, FINAS decided that it is also necessary to cover other than those UAS which are fall under the scope of AEP-4671. Therefore, FINAS set up two further working groups which had the aim to develop an airworthiness code for fixed-wing UAS with a MTOW below 150 kg (LUAS) and an airworthiness code for rotary wing UAS with a MTOW above 150 kg. The two expert groups completed their work by 2011 and after a lengthy ratification process, the two new airworthiness standards were published by the NATO Standardization Organization in 2014 as AEP-80 for rotary wing UAS and AEP-83 for fixed-wing LUAS. AEP-80 as well as AEP-83 have faced already updates in 2016 [32, 106, 107, 109].

The core input for AEP-80 was CS-27, consequently and identical to AEP-4671, the content follows the same layout as it is known from manned aviation airworthiness certification specifications. Table 4-35 presents the content of AEP-80 in the right column.

<i>AEP-4671</i>	<i>AEP-80</i>
<i>Book 1 – Airworthiness Code</i>	<i>Book 1 – Airworthiness Code</i>
<i>Subparts</i>	
A General	A General
B UA Flight	B UAV Flight
C UA Structure	C Structure
D UA Design and Construction	D Design and Construction
E UA Powerplant	E Powerplant
F Equipment	F Equipment
G Operating Limitations and Information	G Operating Limitations and Information
H Command and Control Data Link	H Command and Control Data Link – Communication System
I UA Control Station	I UAV Control Station
<i>Appendices</i>	
C Basic landing conditions	A Instructions for continued airworthiness
D Wheel Spin-up Loads	C Icing Certification
F Test procedure for Self-Extinguishing Materials	D HIRF
G Instructions for continued airworthiness	F Test procedures for Self-Extinguishing Materials
K Other Aspects of Transportation and Factors to consider	
L HIRF Environments and Equipment HIRF Test Levels	

<i>Book 2 – Acceptable Means of Compliance</i>	
A General	A General
B UA Flight	B UAV Flight
C UA Structure	C Structure
D UA Design and Construction	D Design and Construction
E UA Powerplant	E Powerplant
F Equipment	F Equipment
G Operating Limitations and Information	G Operating Limitations and Information
H Command and Control Data Link	H Command and Control Data Link – Communication System
I UA Control Station	I UAV Control Station

Table 4-35 Content of AEP-4671 and AEP-82 [68, 106].

While AEP-4671 and AEP-82 follow a traditional approach as they contain prescriptive airworthiness requirements to be fulfilled by the UAS design, AEP-83 pursues a more flexible approach. This is a result of the working groups recognition that LUAS cannot be treated in the same way as large UAS. Fixed wing LUAS are very broad regarding the design possibilities. Additionally, it must be considered that a non-neglectable part of the design companies of those UAS are not traditional aircraft companies.

Therefore, AEP-83 pursues a hybrid approach which shall ensure an adequate level of enough safety by defining *essential airworthiness requirements (ER)* that need to be fulfilled by so-called *detailed arguments*. Essential airworthiness requirements within AEP-83 are the military version of the civil essential airworthiness requirements that can be found for example in [33, 88]. The detailed arguments can be seen as a mixture of requirements and AMCs, which are appropriate to show compliance to the specific mandatory essential airworthiness requirements. If no valid argument by an applicant is provided why a detailed argument does not to be fulfilled, compliance must be shown. In addition, AEP-83 features also for almost all detailed arguments *means of evidence* in order to support the UAS designer within the creation of substantiation evidences for the type certification of the LUAS. The requirements within AEP-83 are grouped as follows:

- ER.1 System integrity
 - ER.1.1 Structures and materials
 - ER.1.2 Propulsion
 - ER.1.3 Systems and equipment
 - ER.1.4 Continued airworthiness of the UAS
- ER.2 Airworthiness aspects of operation
- ER.3 Organisations

The overall layout of AEP-83 is basically a table with three columns, that set aside essential airworthiness requirement, detailed argument and means of compliance. Therefore, it differs vastly from AEP-4671 and AEP-80 and a direct comparison of requirement paragraphs is very difficult [32, 34, 107].

Discussing every single aspect of the three published AEPs would be far out of scope of the present thesis. Therefore, focus will be given on the safety requirements. As it was already seen within the civil UAS regulations, a cornerstone within airworthiness requirements are the acceptable safety numbers in relation to the failure condition. Table 4-36 provides a conclusive table on the acceptable failure probabilities of AEP-4671, AEP-80 and AEP-83.

	AEP-4671		AEP-80	AEP-83	
	<i>MTOM</i> [kg]	$\leq 5,670$	$> 5,670$	$\leq 3,175$	≤ 150
<i>Failure condition</i>	<i>P</i> [1/Fh]				
No safety effect	$> 10^{-3}$	$> 10^{-3}$	$> 10^{-3}$	$> P_{Cat} \cdot 1000$	
Minor	$\leq 10^{-3}$	$\leq 10^{-3}$	$\leq 10^{-3}$	$\leq P_{Cat} \cdot 1000$	
Major	$\leq 10^{-4}$	$\leq 10^{-4}$	$\leq 10^{-4}$	$\leq P_{Cat} \cdot 100$	
Hazardous	$\leq 10^{-5}$	$\leq 10^{-6}$	$\leq 10^{-5}$	$\leq P_{Cat} \cdot 10$	
Catastrophic	$\leq 10^{-6}$	$\leq 10^{-7}$	$\leq 10^{-6}$	$\leq \frac{P_{CumCat}}{N_{CatFC}}$	
P_{CumCat}	$\leq 10^{-5}$	$\leq 10^{-6}$	$\leq 10^{-5}$	$\frac{0.0015}{MTOM}$	$\leq 10^{-4}$

Table 4-36 Acceptable failure condition probabilities AEP-4671, AEP-80 and AEP-83

With respect to Table 4-36, the following should be mentioned. Unlike AEP-4671 and AEP-80, which require within the AMCs that no single point of failure shall lead to a catastrophic event, AEP-83 does allow single point of failures which might lead to catastrophic failure conditions if they are shown to be extremely improbable. The concept of calculating the acceptable cumulative catastrophic failure probability as a function of the MTOW and the acceptable probabilities for the individual failure conditions based on the expected number of catastrophic failures in AEP-83 was already outlined in chapter 4.2. In addition to the remarks there, it is noteworthy to outline that this approach ensures a smooth transition of P_{CumCat} between AEP-83, AEP-80 and AEP-4671, making them consistent in the safety requirements and resulting in appropriate safety requirements for the individual UAS. Figure 4-7 presents a graphical illustration of the function and the described smooth transition.




Figure 4-7. P_{CumCat} transition between AEP-83 and AEP-4671 [68, 107].

Furthermore, AEP-83 outlines that UAS with an impact energy of less than 66 J are not lethal. Consequently, no hard requirements are put on them. However, an appendix is included that provides guidance for the certification of them in case such a UAS shall be operated within non-segregated airspace.

NATO covers with AEP-83, AEP-80 and AEP-4671 almost all types of UAS present in the alliance. However, LUAS that have VTOL capabilities or pure VTOL LUAS are not covered yet. Therefore, it was decided by FINAS to set up an additional working group who shall develop an appropriate standard for these kinds of LUAS. In order to be efficient and effective and also to harmonize the LUAS codes to the utmost, the VTOL team works in close cooperation with the AEP-83 team [28, 34, 182, 185].

By its efforts to harmonize all aspects of unmanned aviation amongst the allied nations in order to grant an optimized interoperability, NATO JCGUAS achieved a status as a forerunner. In contrast to the civil world, the military has already gained decades of experience in the fields of UAS design, UAS airworthiness, UAS operations, crew licensing and cross border operations. While in the beginning of JCGUAS, a lot of fundamental work had to be done in order to build a solid basis, the group can be seen now as fully operational ready to further develop what already has been achieved. One example for this transition, is the issue that the NATO nations also have to resolve how legacy UAS which were not developed in accordance to the AEPs can be flown in foreign allied airspaces. Another aspect for the transition from fundamental to routine work is the beginning of the regular operation of the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance system, a fleet of Global Hawks RQ-4D, which were procured by NATO in order to ensure strategic surveillance capacities [182, 185].

By this conclusion, the present subchapter is completed. The next subchapter will outline operational safety considerations based on the findings in chapters 4.1 to 4.5 and which shall serve as start for the review of UAS operational risk assessments in chapter 5.

4.6 Operational Safety Considerations in the Context of UAS Operations

The afore chapters presented the concept of UAS as overall system that needs to be considered with all its elements, including the ground-based ones, in the context of airworthiness. In this course, two fundamental paths to achieve airworthiness were presented: airworthy by design and airworthy by operation. While the first path is state-of-the-art in civil manned aviation, it was shown by the review of current available UAS regulations, that the second path became a key to determine airworthiness of unmanned aviation or, in other words, to determine that an operation with a UAS is safe. A good example for this can be found within the open and specific category of the EU drone regulations and the related EASA AMC and GM.

Though open and specific category, in particular SORA, apply a lot of restrictions in order to achieve a safe operation, either by limitations given in the applicable regulation upfront or as a result of the OSOs to be applied, the operational safety considerations under research within this thesis aimed towards another direction. Operational safety considerations in the sense of the present text were researched in order to proof if by taking such considerations into account, airworthiness of a LUAS can be determined in general and therefore, a type certificate could be achieved. SORA instead, if not applied in the realm of standard scenarios, will always result in a specific and singular type of mission without the possibility to deviate. Whereas the idea of operational safety considerations was that they can be applied in general, with no limitation on a singular mission.

By this conclusion and by the review of current UAS regulations and the inherent paradigm shift regarding safety, it can already be said that certain aspects needs to be considered, which also answers partly the first research question: What are relevant operational safety considerations in the context of UAS operations? Relevant operational safety considerations are but not limited to: failures in the UAS and their effects, the operational environment, in particular population density, fatality probabilities and impact areas. A deeper outline of the identified general operational safety aspects to be considered will be provided in the next chapter.

5 UAS Operations Risk Assessment

In chapter 3 and chapter 4, the concept of aviation safety and airworthiness was presented. Furthermore, the two concepts of *airworthy by design* and *airworthy by operation* was presented. Based on these discussions, in the next step a review will be provided, on the aspects that need to be considered to assess the risk of a UAS operation. After this generic assessment, several concrete UAS operation risk assessments were analysed in order to obtain practical examples. By this, the present chapter is the logical follow-up within contribution C1, as it expands the big picture on UAS by operations risk assessments.

5.1 General Aspects

As it was discussed in the chapters before, one key driver in the airworthiness certification of aircraft is the assessment of inherent hazards within the aircraft and the adequate control of those hazards, in order to obtain an acceptable risk level for the occupants and subsequently for the operational environment. In contrast to manned aviation, where the risk assessment is focused on the technical system, unmanned aviation needs to be expanded as the primary concern is the risk to people on the ground.

The most obvious expansion is the inclusion of the operational area. However, while the expansion on the operational area itself contains several challenges, there are additional aspects that need to be considered if a comprehensive risk UAS operations risk assessment shall be performed. The summarizing term for this expansion is the casualty probability. While in UAS that are certified for example in accordance to [68], the overall casualty probability can be set equal to P_{CumCat} it can also be seen as SAIL, where it is of qualitative nature. However, it can also be described as summation of the probabilities that casualties might occur in the air and on the ground due to the UAS operation, which is shown in equation (5-1).

$$P_C = P_{CGround} + P_{CAir} \quad (5-1)$$

P_C Probability of casualties due to a UA per flight hour.

$P_{CGround}$ Probability of casualties on the ground due to a UA per flight hour.

P_{CAir} Probability of casualties in the air due to a UA per flight hour.

The components of equation (5-1) are containing several variables for which the determination is crucial for any UAS operations risk assessment. In the next chapters, the variables and the related core challenges will be discussed briefly [2, 68, 174].

5.2 Failure and Failure Effects

In chapter 4, the iconic 1309 safety paragraph was presented. While compliance to this specific airworthiness requirement is shown by a systematic safety assessment of the technical manned or unmanned aircraft system, a UAS operation risk assessment must take into account the possible effect of failures of such a system in a similar way, but from another point of view. Instead of assessing the failure entry probability and the confirmation that this probability is sufficiently low, like it is done for P_{CumCat} , a UAS operations risk assessment must consider that a failure occurred within the UAS and the possible effects on the UAS and on the

environment where the UAS is operated. For the purpose of the present text, this variable shall be called P_{FUA} . This probability includes also the probability that the airborne UA is not controllable anymore and therefore might endanger other airspace users.

This consideration might be very generic, for example: In case of an onboard failure in the airborne UA it is assumed that the UA will always crash. Or a more detailed consideration might be given, for example: There is an onboard failure in the UA, affecting the Flight Control System. Is the failure detected or not? If it is detected, are there possible countermeasures?

Several levels of consideration are thinkable. These levels are always dependent on the available knowledge about the UAS. UAS operations risk models which take into account only broad and generic considerations, might be easily applied, but on the other hand they might result in too conservative or too optimistic assessment results. Conversely, a UAS operations risk model that requires a lot of technical information about the UAS might be not applied because not always every information needed is available. Therefore, an adequate balance regarding the implementation of UAS failures and their effects is necessary [28, 34, 45, 186].

5.3 Operational Environment

The operational area or operational environment is of significant importance in a UAS operations risk assessment because the inhabitants of this area are endangered in case of failed UAS. Dependent upon the operation, the area is divided into the airspace and the ground space.

Within a non-segregated airspace, a failed UA will endanger other aircraft operating in the same airspace. Such a risk can be easily minimized by limiting the specific airspace to the UA itself or to UAS in general. An example can be already seen in the current altitude limitations for small UAS in the regulation regime of EASA or FAA. The risk for other manned aircraft will become much more immanent as soon as MALE UAS operations in international air transport ascend.

In any case, a failed UA which enters an uncontrolled state resulting in a crash will put people and infrastructure on the ground in danger. Consequently, a UAS operations risk model must incorporate a possibility to shape the ground space sufficiently. As it was discussed in the remarks on failures and failure effects of the UAS, this can include several levels of consideration.

While more simple models might contain only the overflow map, more sophisticated models contain further categorization within the map, for example water or built-up areas. The more sophisticated the model, the more details will be contained within the representation of the ground area. On the highest level, such a ground model could include a complete set of ground and building elevations as well as a detailed information about the shelter capacity S of the buildings within the area. Shelter capacity is of importance as it indicates the capacity of a building to protect the inhabitants by not collapsing in case of an impacting UA.

Subsequently, a more complex ground model will lead to a more complex UAS risk assessment, requiring much more data input. Especially, the shelter capacity S is one of the most challenging aspects, as it requires lot of information regarding the buildings and construction material of them [186].

5.4 Population Densities

Besides a sufficient modelling of the infrastructure in the operational area, one of the most important aspect is the inclusion of the people which populate the air and ground space of the operational area. The population density in the air ρ_{PopAir} can be represented as people who are sharing the same airspace together with the airborne UA. Based on the fact that while this thesis was written UAS operations in non-segregated airspaces were not allowed per definition, the variable ρ_{PopAir} could be easily neglected by assuming a segregated airspace.

However, the inclusion of the ground population density $\rho_{PopGround}$ is inevitable and must be included in a UAS operations risk model. The mutual unit for population densities is people per defined area, e.g. people per square kilometre.

Ground population densities can be included in a UAS operations risk model in various ways. For example, as a beginning point, only an assumed number of people in an overflow area could be applied. While such broad assumptions are useful for first estimates, a more realistic model needs to consider that population densities vary locally. Census data from statistic authorities are useful data for this aspect.

Furthermore, besides the pure local number of people in an operational area, another point to consider within the modelling of a population density is the distribution of the people. Taking into account only local variations will result in static and assumed uniform distributions. Although such a population model gives a closer comparison of reality, an additional component needs to be considered: the temporal component. Each day, people are in move, for example if they go to work or if they go from work to their home. Population densities do not vary only locally they also vary in time. Therefore, in order to generate a realistic representation, a UAS operations risk model should also incorporate the temporal distribution component of population densities. Conversely, this is the most challenging part, as temporal movement data of people is crucial to determine.

In summary, the modelling of ground population densities needs to be performed with care. The modelling of population density is of key importance within a UAS operations risk model, as it is the fundamental variable that defines how many people might get hit in case of a UA crash [2, 186].

5.5 Impact Area

To determine the amount of people who are affected by a UA that hits the ground, the potential impact area of the UA A_{Impact} must be defined. People within the impact area are assumed to be hit and to suffer injuries which also could be lethal. The combination of population density and impact area form the final prediction regarding the hazard potential of an airborne UAS in a UAS operations risk assessment.

The review of several UAS operation risk assessment has revealed that there is no mutual resolution how to calculate the impact area of a crashing UA. Basically, two methods were identified in general: Geographical method and empirical method, which is usually found on the UAs weight.

Both methods should be seen as hypothetical. This might be contradictory, especially for the empirical method. However, the observations which led to the specific impact area equations are foremost based on manned aircraft, which cannot be compared directly to UAS, in particular to light UAS. On the other hand, the geographical method is based on pure physical aspects of the UA and does not take into account historical data.

An impact area of a crashing UA will always be highly dependent upon the design of the UA and the failure condition that led to the crash. Consequently, the calculation and prediction of impact areas are probably the biggest uncertainty in a UAS operations risk assessment. UAS operations risk models should consider this aspect and not be fixed on one specific method. However, it must also be admitted that there must be one starting assumption [186].

5.6 Fatality probability

After UAS failures and failure effects, the operational area including population densities and distributions as well as the impact areas have been discussed, it is necessary to have a look at P_{Fat} , the fatality probability of people who are in the vicinity of a crashing UA. This probability should not be confused with casualty probability P_C .

The fatality probability explicitly determines how reasonable it is that a person will suffer lethal injuries after being hit by a crashing UA or parts of it. Therefore, the range of P_{Fat} lies between zero and one. Whereas casualty probability represents the conclusive probability of a person being hit by a crashing UA per flight hour as it was shown in equation (5-1).

In order to quantify the probability of a fatality, the transfer of kinetic energy from the crashing UA into impact energy and further transfer to the human body has become the common metric. Blunt trauma studies in the early 20th century have shown that a fatal injury can already occur by an impacting object of 66 J. Although such studies were focused on point damage and did not cover aspects like distributed energy or possible UAS specific design features, for example frangibility, newer studies did not lead to results that could justify an increase of acceptable higher impact energies. This has been already reflected in regulations, for example the European Regulations for Drone Operations in the EU, which does not strictly focus on the 66 J UA impact energy E_{Imp} as boundary for flying above uninvolved people.

Because of its nature, the fatality probability must be seen as medical variable. If a person suffers lethal injuries after being hit by UA, strongly depends on how the person was hit and if life-critical organs were injured. For example, if a rotor cuts a finger, it probably does not lead to a fatality, however, if the same rotor severs an artery, the fatality probability tends to one.

To conclude, P_{Fat} represents a function of high uncertainty because it depends on the individual hit case which is subject of at least the UA design, the impact velocity, the impact angle and the body area of the person struck. Consequently, the inclusion of any P_{Fat} equation into a UAS operations risk assessment which tries to predict the injury level of an individual person or assemblies of people imposes also a level of ambiguity and an additional uncertainty. Therefore, predictions of P_{Fat} in UAS operations risk assessment should be handled with caution [24, 28, 186].

5.7 Review of Selected UAS Operations Risk Assessments

While in the beginning of the research for the present thesis, such works were quite rare, nowadays there are many more available. In 2017, Washington [186] analysed 33 different approaches focused on UA ground impact. Since then, much more were published. Therefore, besides the already presented regulation approaches of Aviation Authorities, it was decided to limit the review on selected UAS risk approaches with respect to the considerations outlined in chapters 5.1 to 5.6.

The following chapters will summarize the review for all studied UAS Operations Risk Assessments at once. More details regarding the specific models can be found in chapter 11.1.

5.7.1 Failure and Failure Effect Models

The vast majority of the models under review did not consider root causes in the UAS that might lead to a crash or mitigation measures that might avoid the crash or limit the outcomes [36-40, 42, 44, 46, 47, 187-189]. Most of the models assume a constant failure rate for P_{FUA} . Although the works of Breunig et al. [48], La Cour-Harbo [50] and Kaya [190] took into account that there are failures inside the UAS with different probabilities and linked them to hazard reference systems, they did not further assess the origin of the failures in the UAS. Only Barr et al. [191] performed an extensive root-cause analysis comparable to the methods of a preliminary system safety assessment for sUAS (cf. [174]). However, applying this blueprint on a specific UAS under review would make in-depth knowledge of the UAS design indispensable. Furthermore, SORA requires for certain SAILS that the cumulative probability of a loss of control scenario is below a certain threshold (cf. chapter 4.5.3), which can be seen as another term for P_{CumCat} . Additionally, the considerations regarding the justification of the GRC do require to include the probability of a loss of control state due to the systems of the UAS. Both requires to perform a system safety assessment in accordance to accepted standards in order to achieve justified rationale for the probability number [24, 166, 167, 169, 170, 173].

By applying a Barrier Bow Tie Model, Clothier et. al. [49] assessed the aspects of UAS internal mitigation measures as well as failure detection capacities in a qualitative manner. Hence, no further mathematical deduction was made which could provide a quantitative probability statement.

Several models applied Target Level of Safety approaches. TLS approaches are founded on combining the aspects discussed in chapters 5.1 to 5.6 into one equation. One common combination is provided in [192] and shown in equation (5-2).

$$CE = P_{FUA} \cdot \rho_{PopGround} \cdot A_{Impact} \cdot P_{Fat} \cdot S \quad (5-2)$$

CE Casualty Expectation in case of a UA crash

The TLS is defined by an acceptable CE . By rearranging equation (5-2) an acceptable P_{FUA} can be determined. This is shown in equation (5-3).

$$P_{FUA} = \frac{CE}{(\rho_{PopGround} \cdot A_{Impact} \cdot P_{Fat} \cdot S)} \quad (5-3)$$

If P_{FUA} is known, equation (5-2) can also be used to determine allowable populations densities to be overflowed by the UA, while the defined acceptable CE is maintained.

$$\rho_{Pop_{Ground}} = \frac{CE}{(P_{FUA} \cdot A_{Impact} \cdot P_{Fat} \cdot S)} \quad (5-4)$$

Application of the TLS approach in different ways can be found in for example in [36-40, 46, 47, 169-171, 173]. The TLS approach is a mutual way to assess an acceptable level of risk posed by a UAS operation. However, most of the reviewed models which used TLS did not include a root-cause analysis. As written above, a constant failure rate was assumed in most cases.

5.7.2 Operational Area Models

A notably number of the reviewed approaches applied a very broad and generic representation of the operational area only, e.g. populated or not-populated areas or built-up or non-built-up areas [36-38, 50, 169, 170, 187, 189].

In [42] and [44], Waggoner and Lum included the density of structures as well as the average height and size of buildings in the operational area model which can be seen as improvement compared to the generic representations. Melnyk provided a detailed consideration of the overflowed infrastructure in order to get a realistic representation of the infrastructures shelter capacity S to withstand the kinetic energy of an impacting UA [47]. However, the application was limited to the United States.

It is noteworthy to point out that the modelling of the shelter capacity S marked the greatest variance within the reviewed approaches. While Melnyk's advanced approach linked kinetic energy and building material data in order to determine shelter effectiveness, the assessment of Weibel only assumed different levels to withstand penetration without further deduction of origin. Dalamagkidis included such a penetration probability, combined with the probability that it is possible for exposed people to take shelter as well as a fatality probability if the shelter is hit. Within the work of JARUS several approaches are suggested for the modelling of the operational environment, including the inclusion of obstacles influencing shelter capacity and furthermore shelter is defined as function of people exposed to the UAS operation [36, 46, 47, 173].

One notable approach was found in the work of Kaya [190]. The operational model is founded on a GIS database and augmented by real-time sensor data of the airborne UA, allowing an online updating of the risk posed by the UA to the overflowed environment. Although this represents a very sophisticated approach, it can only be applied entirely during an active UA operation.

A further interesting aspect for the operational area model was observed in the paper of La Cour-Harbo [50]. In this approach an environmental component, wind, is included. While environmental aspects were identified as considerable aspect in general by [49] or [191], Cour-Harbo included wind as a probabilistic risk function.

As can be seen by this summary, the literature review of the different UAS operation risk assessments led to the expected findings regarding modelling levels of the operational area.

Modelling of operational areas varies greatly in detail and appliance. Especially the inclusion of shelter capacity S poses a great level of uncertainty within the different assessments.

5.7.3 Population Density Models

As discussed in chapter 5.4, population density models might encompass a broad range regarding the simulation of reality. The driving factor for population models especially for light UAS operations is the ground population, nonetheless, based on the fact that UAS will share the same airspace with manned aircraft, this airspace will also be populated and should be taken into account.

However, while this thesis was written, operations of civil UAS were usually limited to the very low airspace, e.g. below 400 ft AGL. In this airspace, regular manned aviation does not take place in general. Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that ρ_{PopAir} is a neglectable factor [23, 24, 189]. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, before the summary of the driving variable $\rho_{PopGround}$ is going to be discussed, a short recap of ρ_{PopAir} models found in the reviewed UAS risk assessments will be presented.

Upfront it is noteworthy that only a minority of the evaluated UAS operations risk assessments incorporated a model to simulate ρ_{PopAir} . In the past the population in the air was driven by manned aviation only, usually represented as aircraft per defined airspace volume. In the near future, ρ_{PopAir} will be increased significantly by the number of UA per defined airspace volume. Because this is not the case yet, ρ_{PopAir} models found are based on statistics of aviation authorities and historical data. Usually they were included by databases or by applying a general probability of mid-air collision P_{MAC} [36, 39, 42, 44, 46]. other assessments under review either provided only a recommendation that ρ_{PopAir} should be considered if the risk of a UAS operation is assessed, or, did not consider ρ_{PopAir} at all. An exemption is given by SORA, which requires that an applicant determines the risk to other airspace users by defined scheme, which leads to the expected risk level. Although the air risk has direct influence on the resulting overall risk assessment, it is only of qualitative nature (cf. Figure 4-6) [169-171].

In contrast to ρ_{PopAir} , $\rho_{PopGround}$ was considered in all reviewed UA operation risk assessments. The depth of the considerations throughout the different assessments varied greatly. On the lowest level, $\rho_{PopGround}$ was only taken into account in a qualitative manner by stating that this must be considered [49]. One step further found inside the models, was to define population classes like populated or not populated. Based on assumed $\rho_{PopGround}$ values, this differentiation was divided into further sub classes like sparsely and densely populated areas, or more even more granular sub classes [39, 40, 46, 169-171, 187, 189].

While with such assumed population densities predictions might be given for UAS operations above areas with comparable populations densities, a more sophisticated way is to apply population densities from official sources, e.g. census data. By linking such data to the place where the UAS operation takes place, more realistic predictions in case of a crash of the UA can be made. This approach was found in many of the reviewed UAS operations risk assessments [36, 37, 42, 44, 50, 173, 190].

Although applying place-dependent population densities will provide a better simulation of the real world, this approach misses to incorporate the factor of time. The pure application of

census data usually results in a constant and uniform distribution of people without taking the aspect into account that people move their position during a day.

Only few models provided a solution on the challenging aspect to simulate daily people movement. And even those range from pure basic assumption up to real time data inclusion. Le Cour-Harbo [50] for example assumed that 70 % of the inhabitants in the overflow area are in buildings during the UA operations, which therefore cannot be seen as time-dependent. Melnyk [47] suggested a promising approach which linked the local population density, area usage, mission duration and impact area, resulting in a well thought through distribution simulation. However, also this approach does not include the current daytime of the UAS operation. Within the work of JARUS suggestions are made to support population data within risk assessments by data obtained from satellite observations or data from mobile phone networks in order to get up-to-date information. However, there are only recommendations made which an applicant should consider for the determination of ground populations and no definite model is proposed [173]. Census-based data was also used as primary input for modelling $\rho_{PopGround}$ in the work of Kaya [190]. In order to overcome the fact that this data is static, it is suggested to augment the data by real-time sensor input from the UA and to amend the flight path accordingly, in order to minimize the risk of the overflowed people. Breunig [48] developed a very sophisticated model, which differentiates between pedestrian density for people moving around during the UAS operation and census-based population density for the general number of inhabitants in the area. For the pedestrian density, a database was taken as source, which provides 24 h average values of people movement data.

5.7.4 Impact Area Models

In all except one [187] of the reviewed UAS operations risk assessment models the affected area of an impacting UA, A_{Impact} , was discussed [36-40, 42, 44, 46-50, 171, 173, 188-191]. The vast majority of the considered UAS Operations Risk Assessments applied geographic methods to calculate A_{Impact} with characteristic parameters of the UA, e.g. w_{UA} and l_{UA} , as well as average dimensions of human bodies, e.g. r_p and h_p , as main input. A significant number of the different approaches took into account a direct vertical descent (the “falling object”) and the glide impact, which assumes that the UA glides uncontrolled with a given glide angle γ to the ground [38, 39, 42, 44, 46, 48, 188]. Notably, the approach in [173] applies a hybrid concept which combines glide, restitution and slide effects by incorporating the time the UA needs after impact to slow down to a velocity which results in non-lethal energy. In contrast to the these geographic approaches, probability density functions were applied in [50] and [190].

Two papers [47, 189] suggested equations based on m_{UA} which were derived from UAS data. Therefore, both claimed to be empirical and already validated. However, such approaches must be treated carefully as the statistical basis usually cannot be reproduced. With respect to the two reviewed papers here, it was found that both showed a lack regarding determination coefficients.

It is noteworthy, that Barr et al. [191] proposed to consider primary the part of a hit person which most probably will lead to lethal injuries instead of focusing on the UA as definition for the affected area. This approach is very interesting because it overcomes the aspect that there is no consensus how to calculate A_{Impact} .

As discussed in chapter 5.5, all equations for A_{Impact} are of theoretical nature. Based on the presented rationales none of them should be seen as a fundamental law.

5.7.5 Fatality Probability Incorporation

The review of the UAS operations risk assessments with respect to the probability of a fatality in case of an impacting UA P_{Fat} resulted in mixed findings. As already noted, the primary driver for determining P_{Fat} is the kinetic energy E_{Kin} and if the endangered persons are protected by a shelter factor S or not. Within the reviewed papers, inclusion of E_{Kin} and S took either place explicitly by determining clear equations, implicitly by strict assumptions or in a hybrid form that incorporates aspects of both types.

Explicit formulation of P_{Fat} can be found for example in [39, 46, 48, 50, 173, 187, 189]. In those works, P_{Fat} is formulated as function based on E_{Kin} or E_{Imp} and S and can be directly calculated or might set equal one by default.

Examples for the implicit formulation of P_{Fat} by applying strict assumptions can be retrieved from [36-38, 40, 42, 44, 47, 190]. In order to determine P_{Fat} by this way, it was observed that at first, the fundamental assumption was defined, for example the probability of fatality is always equal one within the impact area. Second, possible boundary conditions might be defined, e.g. the probability of fatality is always equal one within the impact area for any impact energy greater than 66 J.

Hybrid formulation examples were found [36, 49, 188, 191]. Those formulations can be characterized by the point that they link the fatality probability to qualitative aspects, e.g. mitigation measures that are described in non-mathematical terms or the relation to a UA.

As can be seen here, a small majority of the reviewed UAS Operation Risk Assessments applied the implicit form for P_{Fat} . The further estimation and consequences for the present thesis will be shown in chapter 6.6.

5.7.6 Casualty Probability

While the variables P_{FUA} , ρ_{PopAir} , $\rho_{PopGround}$, A_{Impact} , S and P_{Fat} were provided foremost in a relative clear way, a combined casualty probability P_C in case of an impacting UA as depicted in equation (5-1) was found seldom only. The main reason for this finding is that the risk a UAS poses to other aircraft, the probability of mid-air collision P_{MAC} , was deemed to be neglectable based on the expected airspace, in which UAS are allowed to be flown (cf. chapters 5.4 and 5.7.3).

It is noteworthy that the modelling of P_{MAC} is crucial, as there are only few valid sources regarding near mid-air collision of UAS and aircraft yet. On the one hand, it is not a surprise that available models of P_{MAC} are foremost hypothetical. On the other hand, it is surprisingly that also UAS Operation Risk Assessment which included such models, did not always combine $P_{C_{Ground}}$ and $P_{C_{Air}}$, for example [36, 39, 46].

Notably exemptions can be found in [42, 44, 171] and [191]. Those papers provided the most comparable methods to the expected determination of the casualty probability in case of an

impacting UA, either in qualitative or quantitative form. For the majority of the other reviewed papers, it can be said, that equation (5-1) can be reduced to equation (5-5).

$$P_C = P_{C_{Ground}} \quad (5-5)$$

6 Shortcomings and Potential Mitigations for a new Approach

The previous chapter showed that the reviewed UAS Operation Risk Assessment approaches have a very broad range with respect to the primary aspects that need to be taken into account. Each one has several advantages and disadvantages and there is none that should be deemed as the de-facto standard.

Assessing and summarizing the different UAS Operation Risk Assessments revealed several explicit and implicit shortcomings. Both kinds are described in the next chapters. It should be noted that these descriptions do not claim to be complete nor that they should be seen as ultimate.

The present chapter will summarize the observed shortcomings and will focus on the items that need to be addressed in a new approach. The chapter will be concluded by provision of possible mitigations how the identified items might be resolved. It is also seen as the conclusion of contribution C1.

6.1 Operational Environment

The models to simulate the operational environment are seen either as too generic or too comprehensive (for example [187] and [47]). While in the first case, quick but broad results can be obtained, the second case might provide precise results. However, this will require a lot of information upfront about the overflowed environment to perform the risk assessment and therefore, cost more time as for every operational environment the required information need to be checked if they can be applied. For example, the shelter factor is hard to obtain as it may vary greatly throughout different local regions and countries.

The model of the operational environment should be incorporated into a UAS Operations Risk Assessment in a way, that a reasonable balance of details regarding the overflowed area is maintained within the assessment. This is valid for manual as well as automated assessments.

To achieve this, it should be avoided that too much details upfront are necessary by the user, because it may force the user to take too much assumptions, leading to uncertainties in the assessment results. In particular the inclusion of shelter factors imposes a high degree of uncertainty and therefore it should not be applied in detail. A full integration and in-depth inclusion of shelter factor S will always require specific data of the overflowed buildings upfront, making huge databases indispensable. While this might be applicable for small operation areas, it will probably be very hard to obtain this for bigger areas like cities. Therefore, especially for fast but reliable UAS Operations Risk Assessments, shelter factor S should be included with valid rationales based on the UAS type under review, e.g. that the m_{UA} is too low to damage any building that it collapses, or the opposite, that any building hit by the UA collapses.

Another item to be addressed within the operational area model is the variation of the overflowed ground with respect to the different types of areas and buildings. It is a big difference if an operation takes place above a water area or above a residential area. Other examples are industrial areas, open areas, natural areas like forests or also non-public areas like military facilities. Although some attempts to do so were identified, this aspect should be given some more attention. Instead to focus the assessment on aspects like shelter factors in the overflowed

area, it is seen more beneficial to include a possibility to analyse and to cluster the overflown area by different area types in the assessment. Such a sorting would obviously help to plan UAS operations without the need to expose certain areas more than needed to the risk of a crashing UA, for example housing areas.

By taking into account those two aspects, a well-balanced model of the operational environment may be achieved. In addition to this, another driving item that needs to be addressed is the inclusion of population densities into the assessment. Furthermore, the application of static and uniform population density models, in particular with respect to the ground represent one of the biggest weaknesses in existing approaches.

Basically, this could be seen as part of the operational environment, however, because of the importance and possible impact, the simulation of population densities will be discussed as an own item in the next chapter.

6.2 Simulation of Ground Population Densities

It was shown that the inclusion of the overflown people is a key factor in any UAS Operations Risk Assessment. The population in the air is seen as neglectable for this time being as the vast majority of civil UAS does not operate in airspaces where manned aircraft operate. Nevertheless, once UAS share the airspace with manned aviation on a regular basis, this must be re-addressed. However, it is also seen as reasonable, that if this happens, UAS will be under the regime of Airspace Traffic Control and treated as any other aircraft. Assuming that UAS are subject to Airspace Traffic Control, the risk of collisions with manned aircraft will be reduced to an acceptable low level.

With respect to ground population densities, it was revealed that the inclusion and modelling of this aspect is one of the most challenging aspects amongst UAS Operations Risk Assessments. From the author's point of view, it is not sufficient to implement population densities only by taking into account census based geographical population data or take broad assumptions as for example that a certain percentage of persons is at home or not. Although geographical census-based population data will provide a good projection of the real inhabitation, it does usually not take into account the daily movement of the inhabitants during a day inside the overflown area. Moreover, this leads usually to uniform and not randomized distributions of the people on the map.

In order to mitigate this, the modelling of ground population densities should be arranged in a way that the model will provide a close reproduction of the geographical population distribution which is related to the time dependent movement of the overflown inhabitants. Additionally, it should be avoided that the distribution is uniform or completely predictable. It is obvious that for such a model the need to define several fundamental assumptions is inevitable. The assumptions which need to be defined should be based on reliable sources and be transparent and traceable.

6.3 Closed Approaches

A notably number of the reviewed UAS Operation Risk Assessments were very specific in their application, in particular if the intention is for one explicit mission only (e.g. [48], [189] or [171]).

For example, some approaches either very limited in the applicable spectrum of UAS or only applicable to a specific country.

On the one hand, this is understandable, because limiting the assessment will reduce uncertainties as it can be assumed that within the self-defined limits, most of the variables to be considered are known. On the other hand, closed approaches, cannot be adapted to other use cases, making broad comparisons within such a UAS Operations Risk Assessment hard to achieve.

Therefore, a new UAS Operations Risk Assessment approach should be designed in an open way in order to be capable to include use cases that are not part of a default setup.

6.4 Root-Cause Incorporation

In contrast to the final outcomes of a UA impacting the ground is assessed foremost, the root-cause which led to the impact was taken into account in the reviewed UAS Operations Risk Assessments only very seldomly (e.g. [171, 191]). This might be based on the fact, that for the assessment of the risk posed by the UAS operation the impact of a failed UA and the potential outcomes are obviously of more interest than the reason of the outcome.

However, the history of aviation has shown that the root-cause determination is one key factor in the inspection of aircraft accidents and incidents. As tragic as every aircraft incident is, the understanding of the reasons why the incident happened will increase safety of future aviation. Once a technical cause is known, it will be avoided in later aircraft designs. Additionally, different root-causes might result in different outcomes.

Considering those aspects, the non-incorporation of the root-cause might impose a gap in a UAS Operations Risk Assessment. Future approaches should consider this and provide a way to include root causes if needed in order to simulate different scenarios.

6.5 Application Complexity

The chapters before can be expanded as shortcoming with respect to the complexity of a UAS Operations Risk Assessment application. It was observed that the application of several UAS Operation Risk Assessment approaches tend to be either very complex or very simple. Very complex in a sense that the application is very long and a lot of data is needed. This data is not limited to the operational area, it also might incorporate in-depth knowledge of the UAS. Otherwise round, there are approaches which are simple in their application are the complete opposite to this. While in the first case quick assessments of a planned mission are not possible, the second case allows quick assessments.

The results of both assessment approaches should be questioned. UAS Operations Risk Assessment approaches that require many detailed information, especially about the UAS, are usually very limited in their application (cf. chapter 6.3). UAS Operations Risk Assessments that do not need a lot of input data are applying usually generic assumptions for the most parts of an assessment, which ultimately can only lead to generic results.

A new approach should be scalable or balanced regarding the necessary information to be provided as input for the UAS Operations Risk Assessment. This poses a crucial demand, especially if a UAS is completely unknown to the assessor. In case of a completely unknown

UAS in a known environment, this would require to simulate an infinite number of possible failure conditions and results. As this is not feasible, an average way should be established.

6.6 Impact Implications

Although the vast majority of the reviewed approaches present an assessment of the risk of a UAS operation, conclusive information on the possible implications of a UA hitting the ground or another aircraft in an airworthiness metric is not clearly visible. Additionally, it was found that a differentiation between ground and air impacts might be helpful with respect to the individual risk in the specific domain but is not really beneficial with respect to the overall risk the UAS Operation poses to the environment where it is operated and the inhabitants (for example [42, 44]).

In relation to this and in particular for the realm of ground impacts, it is seen critical that definite fatality probabilities in the form of energy barriers or similar are applied, e.g. [47] or [187]. This might result in wrong expectations regarding the real lethality in case of a person getting hit by a failing UA. For example, in case a fixed wing UA with mass of 2 kg crashes and hits a person's shoulder with the wingtip, this person might suffer light injuries. However, if the UA hits the person with its heaviest point, e.g. the engine, the person probably will die. This also works in the opposite way. A UA which is not lethal in theory, might hit a person in such an unfortunate manner, for example frontal onto the head with an overspeed because of a deep dive, this person might also suffer lethal injuries.

In addition to these aspects and as it was described in chapter 5.4 and 5.7.3, casualty expectations might be divided into the two dimensions air and ground. Although such a differentiation could provide an advantage regarding a detailed assessment on how the UAS operation affects each dimension, it is not seen beneficial if a conclusive expectation is not provided. Therefore, it is recommended to merge both casualty expectations into one, if for air and ground a differentiation of the casualty expectation is applied.

Additionally, it is suggested to avoid that within a UAS Operations Risk Assessment concrete human fatality probabilities for UA crashes are applied. Basically, this is a conservative approach, however as described above, the application of fixed fatality variables in a risk assessment tends to give misleading expectations to the assessor.

A UAS Operations Risk Assessment should focus on the aspect if a person or several persons were hit or not, instead of attempting to determine the degree of injury of the persons hit. Several of the reviewed papers already followed this attempt, but this should be emphasized by introducing a hit per flight hour variable for determining the casualty expectation.

6.7 Transparency, Traceability and Validation

The primary aim of UAS Operations Risks Assessments is to prove to a competent authority that a specific UAS operation only poses an acceptable level of risk to the environment and inhabitants where it is operated. Consequently, the means of determining this risk as well as the results of such an assessment should be transparent and traceable. Furthermore, a validation method should be provided in order to support the acceptance of the tool itself.

With respect to the reviewed approaches, it was observed that almost none of them offered means to cover the aspects transparency, traceability and validation. Although in some approaches, a basic attempt was given to support the three aspects, it was foremost not maintained throughout the whole assessment. In particular, the aspect of validation seems to be very challenging to be supported [36, 42, 44, 47, 189].

In order to improve this weakness, a new approach should provide a clear trace on how the results of the assessments were determined. Furthermore, means of validation should be provided.

6.8 Risk Awareness

To conclude the shortcomings discussed within chapters 6.1 to 6.7, one last aspect should be mentioned: Risk awareness. As an example, for this shortcoming, recall the differentiation between air and ground casualties and the related merger suggestion regarding casualty expectations. Instead of providing a clear total number of expected casualties, the users might be required to interpret the results further.

While a total number or a list of potential implication obviously would increase the risk awareness of the UAS operator before the mission, the possibility to interpret results might end up in too optimistic expectations. Especially if an operator wants to conduct a mission at all cost, willing to accept a high risk, such interpretations are dangerous. From the authors point of view, the results of UAS Operations Risk Assessments should be as much as possible clear to the user with only very limited or clearly defined room for interpretation.

UAS Operations Risk Assessment serve to assess the risk posed by the airborne UA to the overflowed ground and the air the UA flies in. The risk awareness about the potential risk is essential for operators as well as the authorization authority. Therefore, new approaches should include a capability to increase the risk awareness.

6.9 Summary

As a conclusion, it can be said, that the more variables an UAS operation risk assessment requires, the more detailed and probably more precise the result will be. However, more variables always imply more uncertainties as more assumptions need to be made, making the assessment on the one hand more exhaustive in the conduction and on the other hand more limited in its application. Furthermore, the results might be less reliable than those of an assessment with a lower grade of necessary details to be provided as the sum of all uncertainties might have a too high influence on the result.

Chapters 6.1 to 6.8 showed several observed shortcomings in existing approaches for UAS Operations Risk Assessments. To overcome these shortcomings, suggestions for mitigating measures were made. These suggestions as well as the aspects discussed in chapter 5.1 to 5.6 represent also the relevant operational safety considerations that need to be taken into account in the context of light UAS operations in Germany and therefore, providing the answer to research question number 1. In the next chapter, the practical implementation of dedicated recommendations will be described by the introduction of the O.R.C.U.S. tool.

7 Prototype Implementation by O.R.C.U.S.

The idea of developing an own UAS Operations Risk Assessment tool originated in the early beginning of the research and was driven by the hypothesis as well as the derived research question 2. Furthermore, when it was found that there were no tools to assess UAS operations above Germany this idea was pursued with more intensity. This was supported by the aspect of the very limited availability and accessibility of existing approaches. Eventually, the advent of the European UAS Risk Based Regulation implementation emphasized the development of O.R.C.U.S. additionally [51].

In the present chapter, at first the fundamental concept and aim of O.R.C.U.S. will be described, followed by a presentation of the architecture. Afterwards, a default application of O.R.C.U.S. is outlined. The last subchapter will conclude the capabilities of O.R.C.U.S. and summarize the improvements and advantages compared to existing approaches. By this, chapter 7 represents contributions C2, C5, C6, C7 and C8.

7.1 Aim and Concept

Chapter 4.6 introduced the basic operational safety aspects that should be considered, further described in detail in chapter 5 and chapter 6 provided several shortcomings in existing approaches to conduct UAS Operations Risk Assessments with respect to the identified aspects.

Based on the described points and by reminding research question 2 “How can these operational safety considerations be modelled?”, a software-based tool was found best to cope with the challenging idea to develop an own UAS Operations Risk Assessment tool. The overarching development target was to generate a tool chain that is capable to provide reliable predictions on the risk of a UAS operation even if only few technical information about the UAS are available and to relate the results to airworthiness terminology, in order to increase risk awareness of the user. To conclude, the following derived design goals were defined:

- Risk-predictions of a UAS operation shall be possible with only few information about the UAS.
- Those predictions shall be made available in an airworthiness related terminology.
- The results shall be provided in a way, that the risk awareness of the user might be increased.
- Results shall be clear and a means of validation shall be provided.
- The application complexity shall be low.
- The tool shall not encompass the impact of a UA only, it shall also encompass the technical source that led to the impact.
- The operational environment shall focus on Germany, including a non-static distribution of population densities with a place and time-related behaviour.
- Applied assumptions, equations as well as underlying data sources shall be well-defined in a transparent and traceable way.
- A module-based architecture shall be used in order to include future models and to expand the tool to other appliances.

In the next chapter, the architecture of the resulting O.R.C.U.S. tool will be presented. This includes the fundamental design decisions and principles of the software based on the design goals. Furthermore, it will be shown how the design goals were fulfilled.

7.2 O.R.C.U.S. Architecture

This chapter will present the architecture of O.R.C.U.S. Because O.R.C.U.S. contains a high number of different modules, which are called functions the software will be presented here at a glance in order to provide a better orientation and to improve the understanding of the next sub-chapters content. Every module is described in detail within the glossary provided in the appendix chapter 11.2.9.

O.R.C.U.S. consists of different types of functions, which are defined as main function, sub function or ini function. Furthermore, functions that interact or which are related to each other are organized into groups and sub groups. If one function initiates another function, the initiating function is called a parent function and the initiated function is called a child function.

Figure 7-1 shows the core function groups of O.R.C.U.S. from a top-level point of view. On this level, O.R.C.U.S. can be divided into four core fields:

- Operational Environment Generation
- Initialisation
- Mission Simulation
- Evaluation




Figure 7-1. O.R.C.U.S. core function groups.

The Operational Environmental Generation group contains all main and sub functions that are necessary to model the area for which the UAS operation shall be simulated. It will be presented in detail in chapter 7.2.2.

Within the Initialisation group all relevant data about the mission and the UAS is stored. Although the *INI* function is only one single main function, it is seen as a function group because it requires access to the UAS data. Further details regarding the UAS incorporation are shown in chapters 7.2.3.

After the initialisation is done, the parameters are handed over to the Mission Simulation group. This function group is the biggest and most complex part of O.R.C.U.S. It performs automatically the simulation of the UAS operation, based on the initialisation parameters. Within this simulation, the operational environment is dynamic with respect to the movement of people during the UAS operation. Random failures in the UAS are initiated which can lead to different impact scenarios. The cause of the simulated failures is linked to the UAS data. Based on this approach, a complete picture from technical failure until the final outcome on the

ground is given. During the simulation, all necessary data is stored in single files in order to have the possibility to analyse any aspect of the simulated UAS operation later if needed. In chapters 7.2.4 to 7.2.7, highlights of the mission simulation group will be presented.

The resulting evaluation files are used by the Evaluation function group. This function group performs a complete analysis of all evaluation files and generates a simulation summary spreadsheet. This spreadsheet links the simulation results to airworthiness terminology and therefore, the user can directly estimate the potential risk of the UAS operation. Further information on this part of O.R.C.U.S. will be discussed in chapter 7.2.8.

Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3 are showing all main and sub-functions of O.R.C.U.S. These two figures shall serve as orientation map for the next chapters in which the underlying principles of O.R.C.U.S. are going to be described.




Figure 7-2. O.R.C.U.S. Operational Environmental Generation




Figure 7-3. O.R.C.U.S. Initialisation, Mission Simulation and Evaluation

7.2.1 General Aspects and Design Decisions

MATLAB™ was chosen as programming language for O.R.C.U.S. Primary reason for this decision was that MATLAB™ is widely used in the scientific community, very versatile regarding possible applications and is quite intuitive regarding the programming of code. Because of these aspects, MATLAB™ was seen as a promising way to support the idea of a module-based architecture that can be expanded with additional modules and functions. In

addition to this, all major operating systems are supported and the developer of MATLAB™ provides regular updates [193].

With respect to the specific UAS under assessment, from the beginning of the research it was decided to focus on light fixed wing UAS with a m_{UA} of less than 150 kg. Predictions of UAS of sizes comparable to manned aviation with several tons of MTOW would make it necessary to include much more secondary effects on the ground, for example explosions, fire etc. and therefore, causing an indefinite number of uncertainties which makes the assessment and prediction not feasible. Focus on fixed wing UAS was given because in contrast to the nowadays most present light VTOL UAS, fixed wing UAS still have more capacities regarding endurance and payload carriage and therefore, were seen as the more valuable UAS to assess. More details about the default UAS model for O.R.C.U.S. can be found in chapter 7.2.3.

In addition to this aspect, in the days the research for and the development of O.R.C.U.S. started, LUAS were not regulated besides in the regime of the military. EASA was explicitly not responsible for these kinds of UAS, so it was seen as beneficial to focus on them, as for the heavier UAS the airworthiness regulations of comparable manned aircraft were applicable [33, 34, 162].

Aspects like human factors and crew training are not included, as they are seen as given. With respect to current civil UAS, it was seen as more likely that the UAS encounters a technical failure rather than that the operator can introduce such a severe failure by the controls that the UA might crash. Furthermore, it can be reasonably assumed that the remote pilot has adequate knowledge about the UAS and sufficient training (cf. chapter 4.5).

Based on the literature research and the identified shortcomings, it was decided upfront not to include a variable for the structural capability of buildings to withstand an impacting UA. It was found that such a variable would impose a too big variance and uncertainty, which could not be justified. Instead, it was assumed that the probability to penetrate a building in case of a crash is sufficiently low for LUAS in the scope of O.R.C.U.S. and does not need to be further incorporated within the prototype implementation [194].

7.2.2 Operational Environment Generation

The generation of the operational environment for the mission simulation is done by the *MapDetection* function. Based on a digital map image, the algorithm creates a structure array file, that contains all the different elements of the mission area: houses, streets, green areas etc. In total, up to 14 different elements might be part of an O.R.C.U.S. map struct. This high number of distinctive map elements allows the user to perform a very differentiated risk assessment once a O.R.C.U.S. mission simulation is complete. The differentiation is in particular important because the people distribution is not the same at all points in the operational area.

In order to identify the different map elements for the UAS operations risk assessment, the idea of using the Red, Green, Blue (RGB) colour code within the digital map image as element definition was approached. This approach has the advantage, that O.R.C.U.S. MapDetection does not need to rely on meta data provided by a map provider for classifying map elements. Furthermore, MATLAB is able to decompose an image into the three colour layers for every

pixel of an image, making the element identification very effective. However, it also requires to set up a database that assigns the different colour codes to the different objects [195, 196].

Digital map images are usually provided either as satellite image, as labelled graphic map or as hybrid map image. Figure 7-4 shows a comparison between the three types. A satellite image usually represents the reality better than a graphic map image. However, in order to use RGB codes as object identifier it is indispensable to have a fixed color coding inside the map image. This cannot be fulfilled by satellite map images because of the great variety in quality and the nature of true color images which contain millions of different colors and related RGB codes. With respect to this, it was decided that only graphic map images can be used as source for the map detection algorithm.




Figure 7-4. Munich Airport: Satellite image, labelled graphic map, hybrid map [197-199].

There are several providers of digital map data throughout the Internet, for example Google Maps, Microsoft Bing Maps or Open Street Maps. After looking more closely at these three providers, Open Street Maps was chosen as source for the necessary map data. This has several reasons. While Google Maps and Microsoft Bing are commercial providers, Open Street Maps is an open source-based project who allows the user to use the map data for free. Furthermore, the Open Street Map website provides a direct export function for maps, which is not provided by Google Maps nor Bing Maps. Another advantage of Open Street Maps is that within graphical map images single elements of interest as for example residential areas and houses are very detailed already on higher zoom levels, which is not the case for Google or Bing Maps. A comparison is shown in Figure 7-5. The three images were downloaded with a scale of ca. 1:10,000. Please note that the images are not up to scale here because of the conversion into the text file [197-199].




Figure 7-5. Labelled graphic map of TUM Bing maps, Open Street Map, Google Maps; [197-199].

For example, houses are included into one residential area within labelled map images of Google or appear in a transparent way at Bing Maps. In contrast to this, Open Street Maps

differentiates residential areas into single houses. Furthermore, Open Street Maps offers a much clearer colour disambiguation between the different areas, which is important for using RGB code as object identifier.

It could be argued that Open Street Maps does not provide the necessary precision or certainty in general regarding position of the different objects due to the open source characteristic. Obviously, Open Street Maps cannot provide a similar precision as a high-precision geo referenced maps, but this is also valid for Google Maps and Bing Maps. It may also be true that commercial providers are able to update their map data more often and in a more regular way than Open Street Maps because of their economical background and the fact that Open Street Maps relies on data acquisition by volunteers. But studies have shown that Open Street Maps is able to provide data that is not that deviating in quality from the data provided by commercial providers [200]. In accordance with the aim and concept of O.R.C.U.S and the advantages of Open Street Maps mentioned above, it was decided that the data provided by Open Street Maps is sufficient for this thesis.

The MapDetection main function is activated by the MATLAB terminal entry `[Map] = MapDetection0200()`. Once activated, all sub-functions are called sequentially. The user only has to choose the map image and to enter the resolution in dpi and the OSM scale. Resolution and scale are necessary to calculate the dimensions of the map image. Following requirements are applicable to the map image:

<i>Source</i>	openstreetmaps.org
<i>Format</i>	Portable Network Graphics
<i>Layer</i>	Standard
<i>Resolution</i>	Any (stored in image properties, 72 dpi by default)
<i>Scale</i>	Any (stored in image properties)
<i>Zoom factor</i>	15

Table 7-1 O.R.C.U.S. Digital map Image requirements.

The result of *MapDetection* is the complete *Map* struct, which forms the basis for the mission simulation by O.R.C.U.S. To describe all sub functions of *MapDetection* in detail would be far way beyond of the scope, therefore only key aspects of the *MapDetection* function and the sub-functions are described. Further details can be found in 11.2.4 and the function glossary in chapter 11.2.9.

The import of an OSM image is done by the *GetMap* sub function. This function requires the image acquisition package of MATLAB as it uses the *imread* MATLAB function. In case of O.R.C.U.S. *Imread* imports the image as an 8-bit image (*uint8* array). Because every RGB colour is composed out the combination of the three primary colours Red, Green and Blue -- *Imread* provide the image as an *m-by-n-by-z* array, with *m* = number of y-pixels, *n* = Number of x-pixels and *n* = 3 layers. Based on this, each pixel of the image can be depicted as a triplet of the three layers and is an integer within the range from zero to 255, shown in equation (7-2).

$$\underline{Map}_z = \{m \times n\}_z \quad (7-1)$$

With $z \in (1,2,3)$ for Red, Green and Blue

$$pix_z = \{pix_R \quad pix_G \quad pix_B\} \quad (7-2)$$

$$pix_z \in (0,1,2, \dots 255)$$

After *GetMap* is complete, the Map struct is handed over to the *MapScan* function. This sub function contains a database with RGB triplets that are assigned to the different possible elements of the basic O.R.C.U.S. -Map array. *MapScan* compares every pixel of the loaded Map array with the database by a logical equality equation and assigns it to an element by expanding the basis struct with 14 sub-structs.

It is important to note that the *MapScan* function, which represents the core map detection algorithm, was originally programmed for zoom level 15. At zoom level 15, the centimetre scale ranges amongst 1:11,500. In conjunction with a typical size of roughly 1500 x 1000 pixels, a 72-dpi map image covers an area of approximately 25 km², which is seen as appropriate for the operation of a light UAS. If a monitor is able to display OSM with higher sizes, the covered area will increase in accordance with equation (7-3).

$$d[m] = (2.54 / R) \cdot n_{pix} \cdot C / 100 \quad (7-3)$$

d	Distance in metres
R	Resolution in dpi
C	Scale factor
n_{pix}	Number of pixels

One note regarding the requirement to have a PNG image. Although *MapScan* would basically also work with JPEG images, JPEG does not lead to satisfying results. Main reason for this is the compression of such images, which on the one hand leads to a lower file size but on the other hand decreases the image quality. Figure 7-6 shows a high-level zoom detail of an OSM image after it was loaded with *GetMap*.




Figure 7-6. High level zoom detail of an OSM image. Left: JPEG; Right: PNG.

On the left side the JPEG version is shown and on the right side the PNG version is shown. The quality of the JPEG image is obviously worse than the quality of the PNG image. Within the JPEG image there are much more colour transitions, even in areas of the same colour than

in the PNG image. In general, it is not possible to avoid such transitions completely, especially in several objects, as it will be described afterwards. But colour transitions in the same area are distorting the result in an importable way, which denies proper object allocation. Because of these reasons, the map images obtained from Open Street Maps have to be in the PNG format.

The rate of detection is highly dependent upon the map image. OSM images with large and similar areas, i.e. harbour sites, park areas etc., will result in a detection of 80 % or more. More complicated areas which contain many small fields like pedestrian zones, small paths, hiking trails, street border lines etc., will result in a detection of amongst 55 to 60 %. The detection differences are based on the delineation of the objects inside the OSM images mentioned afore. Such objects are depicted as very thin "blurry" pixel lines. The reason for this apparently blurriness is caused by the fact that the colours of the single pixels in such lines or fields are different to generate smooth transitions in the image. This results in a vast possibility of different RGB triplets for such objects.

MapScan relies on the internally stored RGB triplets, therefore the function is not able to assign all pixels to a sub-struct, especially if the loaded image is a complicated one. Furthermore, map images include labels that can distort the results. Figure 7-7 and Figure 7-8 present two explanatory samples of the results from *MapScan* for this issue. Note: A yellow pixel indicates an identified pixel; a blue indicates a non-identified pixel.



Figure 7-7. Left: OSM image part of Hamburg harbour. Right: Basic *MapScan* result, detection rate 83.99 %.





Figure 7-8. Left: OSM image part of Munich old town. Right: Basic *MapScan* result, detection rate 45.81 %.

To store and to assign all possible RGB combinations for the elements within the *MapScan* function was seen neither promising nor feasible as the 8-bit RGB colour scheme contains roughly 16.7 million colour combinations. In addition to this, it was observed that it may happen that pixels are wrong allocated. For example, a pixel which belongs to a house is allocated to a street element. The reason for this might be errors in the image or RGB triplets which are close to each other. In order to overcome these issues, a correction algorithm and an algorithm to allocate undefined pixels were developed. Once *MapScan* is completed, the map is clustered into fourteen sub-structs presented in Table 7-2.


The *CorrectFPix* sub-function and the *MappingUndefined* sub-function form a two-step sequence with the aim to provide a high detection rate of correct allocated map elements. In the first step, *CorrectFPix* identifies wrong allocated pixels and assigns them to the correct sub-struct. In the second step, *MappingUndefined* determines all undefined pixels and tries to allocate them to a sub-struct. This is performed by analysing the surrounding area of each undefined pixels and allocate the undefined pixel to the one sub-struct with the most pixels in the surrounding. With this approach, detection rates amongst 99 percent or more are achieved. Figure 7-9 and Figure 7-10 show examples for the results of this function.

#	Name	Description
1	Streets	Common streets.
2	Trunk roads	Federal roads, might cross cities.
3	Rural roads	Country roads in rural sides, might cross towns.
4	Motor-ways	The German Autobahn.
5	Walks	Pedestrian walks.
6	Tram ways	Rail lines for trams.
7	Rail roads	Rail lines for trains.
8	Houses	Common houses with inhabitants.
9	Residential areas	Bigger areas with houses.
10	Open areas	Open spaces in a city.
11	Non-built areas	Areas with no buildings.
12	Green areas	Forests, parks etc.
13	Water areas	Lakes, rivers etc.
14	Airfields	Airports, small airfields, etc.

Table 7-2 O.R.C.U.S. map sub-structs.




Detection rate 83.99 %




Detection rate 99.87 %

Figure 7-9. Hamburg Harbour: Basic *MapScan* result (left), *CorrectFPix* and *MappingUndefined* result (right).



Detection rate 45.81 %



Detection rate 99.68 %

Figure 7-10. Munich Old Town: Basic *MapScan* result (left), *CorrectFPix* and *MappingUndefined* result (right).

After completion of *MappingUndefined*, the user may draw a polygon sub map within the map. This might be necessary if O.R.C.U.S. shall simulate a mission over a very small city that does not cover the majority of the OSM image. Because O.R.C.U.S. simulates people movement based on the inhabitant numbers of the city or area, it was found that in such a case the movement of the people outside of the small city would not be representative for the whole map. In order to solve this “small city/big map issue”, the *MapOverlay* function was developed. If the user applies this function, a sub map polygon (SMP) can be drawn to set the borders of the small city. After completion, the outside part of this SMP is defined as the surrounding map (SurM). Both, SMP and SurM are stored individually within the Map struct. Figure 7-11 shows as an example the small city Eberbach. The top part of the figure shows the complete OSM image and the lower part the drawn overlay in blue. While in the SMP the movement data of

the city is applied during simulation, the movement data of the individual federal state in which the city is located is applied.




Figure 7-11. *MapOverlay* application. Blue pixels are indicating the SMP.

In the last part of the *MapDetection* function, the *Map* struct is scaled to a variable pixel to metre ratio target scale by using the MATLAB function *imresize*. By default, O.R.C.U.S. scales the map automatically to a ratio of one, meaning that the length of one pixel equals one metre. However, this can be deactivated within the initialisation function and any ratio can be applied. It is noteworthy, that such a scaling is not error free and it may happen that some pixels are allocated with two or three sub-structs. This error might lead to implications in the later people distribution functions. The root-cause can be traced to the fact, that due to the non-integer transformation scale factors, *imresize* theoretically should produce a matrix with a non-integer number of rows and columns, which is not possible in MATLAB. Due this, *imresize* rounds the number of rows and columns. O.R.C.U.S. contains a built-in test function called *CorrectNormMap* or *CorrectNormSMPSurM*, which checks the *Map* struct after the scaling for such errors. If necessary, adequate correction means are activated.

After the scaling process, *MapDetection* is complete. In the end, a set of plots will be presented to the user which shows all sub-structs by their own, a complete picture with all sub-structs at once and an efficiency graph. Currently, the whole operational environment generated by O.R.C.U.S. *MapDetection* is a two-dimensional projection of the elements contained in the OSM image. Therefore, the height of them is only implicitly included.

A future version of O.R.C.U.S. might be expanded regarding the height of the ground elements or a terrain elevation model in general. However, this is not a trivial development, as it requires an elevation model that needs to be linked to the specific OSM image. For the first prototype implementation of O.R.C.U.S. and the scope of the prototype development, this was not seen necessary because of the high level of possible elements that are generated by *MapDetection*.

With this detailed operational environment of the map struct and people density databases as well as the movement algorithms, O.R.C.U.S. is able to provide a sufficient representation of the operational environment, allowing sophisticated assessments of the risk of the operation. Before the fundamentals of the people density databases and the movement simulation are going to be described, the next chapters will present the inclusion of the technical aspects of the UAS into O.R.C.U.S.

7.2.3 UAS Incorporation

Chapter 6.4 outlined the need to incorporate the root-cause of a ground impact of a UAS. However, it is obvious that a UAS Operations Risk Assessment which always requires in-depth technical knowledge about the UAS might not be feasible. Therefore, a well-balanced incorporation of the root cause of a failure is necessary. While the incorporation of the UAS and its parameters are done within the *INI* Function, the stimulation of the different functions during an O.R.C.U.S. simulation are done within the *UAFlightSim* and for the UA in particular in the function *TransferFcn* and the underlying subfunctions.

In order to obtain a root-cause possibility, the default fixed wing LUAS for O.R.C.U.S (cf. chapter 7.2.1) was further defined. The default configuration and assumptions followed typical UAS of this class, as for example the LUNA TUAS or the Aerosonde Fixed Wing [201, 202]. Based on the fixed wing default, the UA will not instantaneously crash in case the engine has a malfunction or is switched off unintentionally. Furthermore, the engine is assumed to be a combustion engine. Additionally, the default UA shall incorporate an immediate flight termination capacity, allowing to stop the flight at once. The complete default model shall incorporate five main sub systems: Flight Control System (FCS), Electrical System (ELS), Navigation System (NavSys), Engine (ENG) and Structure (STR). Table 7-3 summarizes these core definitions.

<i>Designation</i>	O.R.C.U.S. default LUAS
<i>Type</i>	Fixed Wing
<i>Main Sub Systems</i>	Flight Control System Electrical System Navigation System Combustion Engine Structure
<i>Assumed capacities</i>	Immediate Flight Termination Fault detection in UCS and UA Way point path plan Possibility to approach emergency landing sites if feasible

Table 7-3 O.R.C.U.S. default LUAS.

Each of these main sub systems might cause different failure cases inside the airborne UA leading to several impact scenarios. The nomenclature “main sub system” was chosen in order to emphasize the hierarchy in the UAS following the “system of systems” concept (cf. chapter 4.1). The highest level in such a system of systems is the aircraft itself, which imposes the aircraft system or just the system. Systems below the aircraft level are usually main assemblies as for example the fuel system. Such sub system might include further sub systems, which can be called “sub sub-systems”. Besides the hierarchy aspect, the term main sub system shall avoid the expectation that below this level, no further systems are present [203]. Figure 7-12 illustrates this concept by a generic UAS system hierarchy tree. Figure 7-13 applies this method to the described default UAS model of O.R.C.U.S. with focus on the UA. In addition to this, both figures show that each main sub system might cause several failure conditions within the UAS.

Furthermore, it was decided to incorporate the UCS and the C2Link not directly as a root cause for a failure case. From the authors point of view, within a robust UAS design, neither the UCS nor the C2Link will lead to a Hazardous or a Catastrophic failure condition. Nevertheless, both are incorporated implicitly as it will be shown later.




Figure 7-12. Generic UA system tree.




Figure 7-13. O.R.C.U.S. default UA system tree.

The underlying concept O.R.C.U.S. failure model is based on P_{CumCat} . As it was described in chapter 4, P_{CumCat} represents the fundamental airworthiness requirement for the cumulative acceptable probability of all catastrophic failure conditions in a UAS. Consequently, P_{CumCat} shall serve as basic probability that an initiating failure in the UAS itself emerges during a mission simulation by O.R.C.U.S. The total probability of an initiating failure F_0 is described in equation (7-4).

$$P_{F0} = P_{CumCat} \quad (7-4)$$

To define if a failure occurred during the mission in the UAS, the MATLAB™ included pseudorandom number generator *randi* is used. This function requires a maximum integer number and gives back a random number out of a uniform distribution. The maximum integer is defined by the reciprocal value of P_{CumCat} [195].

In reality, an initiating failure F_0 inside an airborne UAS might occur within a nanosecond or an even lesser time span. However, for the scope of O.R.C.U.S. it was seen as sufficient that such a failure might occur every second of the flight. Therefore, the reciprocal value for *randi* is not calculated by the $[1/Fh]$ value, but by the $[1/s]$ value. For example, if $P_{CumCat} = 10^{-3} [1/Fh]$, the resulting input number for *randi* is 3,600,000. By doing so, O.R.C.U.S. can also be applied on missions which have a very low duration, e.g. below one flight hour. If seen necessary by a user, it is also possible to transfer P_{CumCat} into $[1/ms]$ or other units.

If the result of *randi* equals one, a failure “occurred” in the simulated UAS. Lower P_{CumCat} will lead to higher reciprocal values, subsequently the possible random values returned by *randi* increase and the probability of an occurring failure decreases. O.R.C.U.S. calculates every second of the simulated UAS operation if an initiating failure F_0 occurred or not.

P_{CumCat} is composed out of the different catastrophic failure conditions identified within the Functional Hazard Assessment on the functional level and assigned to the physical failure conditions of the associated main sub systems and equipment identified in the System Safety Assessment [68, 174, 203]. The determination and verification of these safety numbers is one of the most challenging aspects during an aircraft type inspection process. To require such numbers for a fast UAS Operations Risk Assessment is not seen as feasible. Therefore, O.R.C.U.S. pursues another approach.

O.R.C.U.S. defines for every main sub system a failure probability in terms of percent. These values are defined in the *Ini* function. Once an initiating failure F_0 occurred, based on these underlying percentage values O.R.C.U.S. determines by random which main subsystem failed and which failure condition occurred. Each main subsystem might have several possible failure conditions as it was shown in Figure 7-13. The random function which forms the backbone of the failure conditions applies so-called "areas" or bands to determine which main sub system failed instead of just using the *rand* function of MATLAB. Those bands are defined by a high numerical limit number which is multiplied with the failure percentage number of each main sub system. After this distribution the *rand* function of MATLAB is applied, limited from 1 to the limit number. The result lies within one of the bands defined before, which determines the failed main sub system. In the same manner, the specific failure condition of the failed main sub system is defined. One the hand, this approach leads to a balanced failure simulation of the UAS and on the other hand, the underlying percentage probabilities for failures of the UAS are incorporated. However, at this point in the event chain, it is not clear if this failure condition will lead to an impact.

By design, O.R.C.U.S. incorporates the possibility that the failure is detected, either by the UCS or by the UA itself, if the UCS detection was not successful. If a failure is detected, several countermeasures can be performed in order to overcome the failure or to mitigate the consequences. This aspect reflects good design practice of UAS and also airworthiness requirements and therefore represent an essential aspect for assessing the operational risk [68]. Furthermore, with this feature, O.R.C.U.S. inherently considers the C2Link and the UCS and consequently simulating a complete UAS in an adequate level for the scope of O.R.C.U.S. To avoid predefined results regarding failure detection or countermeasure success, the simulation also applies a random function. In both cases O.R.C.U.S. reads out stored percentage values of detection and countermeasure probability. If the random function results in a value above the read-out percent value, the detection or the countermeasure has failed. As it can be seen the MATLAB *rand* function is used much often in O.R.C.U.S., but applied very differently which shall prevent convergence of the random results.

The described approach for the incorporation of the UAS is based on the principle of event trees, which represents a common technique for risk assessments for complex systems with a high level of interaction between the technical system, the environment and the operators [204]. From a high-level point of view, the event tree within a O.R.C.U.S. simulation can be depicted as in Figure 7-14.




Figure 7-14. High level event tree of O.R.C.U.S.

Figure 7-14 picturizes what has been described above. The whole event sequence starts with the question if an initiating failure F_0 in a main sub system occurred or not. If no failure occurred, the UA continues flying and no consequences arise. If a failure occurred, the central question is, if the failure is detected or not, either inside the UCS or by the UA. If the failure is detected, the next question is if countermeasures are possible or not and if they are successful or not. The possibility of countermeasures is dependent upon the failure condition. For example, in case of an engine out failure condition, more countermeasures are possible than in case of an engine fire. In any case, consequences of different severity will arise.

As the number of countermeasures is limited, so is the number of consequences too. These consequences are dependent upon the UAS design and the applied countermeasure. For example, they might encompass automatic recovery modes, emergency landings or also the controlled flight into terrain. Although the last one usually leads to the loss of the UA, this is acceptable if there is a chance that fatalities on the ground can be avoided. The worst-case consequence is an undetected and unmitigated failure leading to an uncontrolled flight into terrain. Figure 7-15 shows an example event tree from O.R.C.U.S. for n countermeasures.




Figure 7-15. O.R.C.U.S. example event tree with n consequences.

O.R.C.U.S. embodies the following consequences: recovery, emergency landing, controlled flight into terrain, debris impact and uncontrolled flight into terrain. These consequences might arise from the 13 main sub system failure conditions shown in Figure 7-13. The underlying event tree of O.R.C.U.S. contains 83 possible combinations that can lead to these final

consequences. Every path through the event tree with the different combinations of failure conditions, the detection success of them as well as the countermeasure success and the consequences are stored in an Excel spread sheet and can be amended if necessary. The event tree is read by the *INI* function and saved into the O.R.C.U.S. *Map* struct.

With respect to the example event tree shown in Figure 7-15, the worst-case outcome from the UAS point of is an undetected or unmitigated failure that leads to a crash of the UA. Such an event occurs, if an initiating failure F_0 is not detected by the UCS or the UA or if the failure cannot be mitigated after detection. This outcome can be modelled as fault tree, illustrated in Figure 7-16.




Figure 7-16. Fault tree for an undetected, unmitigated failure, leading to a UA crash.

A crash will occur if an initiating failure F_0 occurs and if this initiating failure is not detected or cannot be mitigated. The event “No Detection” is marked by an AND Gate and occurs if the failure is not detected in the UA (ND_UA) and also not detected in the UCS (ND_UCS). The event “No Mitigation” is defined as AND Gate with a 1 – out – of – n redundancy, based on the point, that if one mitigating countermeasure works, the failure is mitigated, or, if the countermeasure did not work, the next countermeasure (CM) is activated [204].

To calculate the probability of such an event, it is beneficial to imagine the detection of the initiating failure as a parallel structure with two elements, while the mitigation aspect can be seen as parallel structure with n elements. Equation (7-5) presents the probability that a failure is detected and equation (7-6) presents the probability calculation of a successful mitigation.

In order to determine the probability of the worst-case consequence, the crash, only the probabilities of a failed detection and a failed mitigation are applied. Therefore, the success probabilities must be subtracted from one and both must be multiplied with the probability of the initiating failure. Equation (7-7) shows this final calculation for the probability of a crash within O.R.C.U.S.

$$P_{DetectF_0} = [P_{DetectUA} + P_{DetectUCS} - P_{DetectUA} \cdot P_{DetectUCS}] \quad (7-5)$$

$$P_{CM} = 1 - \prod_i^n (1 - P_{CM_i}) \quad (7-6)$$

$$P_{Crash} = P_{F0} \cdot (1 - P_{DetectF0}) \cdot (1 - P_{CM}) \quad (7-7)$$

For example, in case failure condition „Generator failure“ happens, the UA has no longer electric energy available. Two countermeasures are thinkable: Switch to batteries and CFIT. With the first countermeasure, the UA is able to reach an emergency landing site. If this countermeasure is not working, the remaining countermeasure is only a controlled flight into terrain. Assuming that $P_{F0} = 0.01$ [1/Fh] and $P_{DetectUA} = P_{DetectUCS} = 50\%$ and $P_{CM_1} = 90\%$ and $P_{CM_2} = 80\%$, the probability of an undetected and unmitigated “Generator out” failure condition results in $P_{Crash} = 5.0 \cdot 10^{-4}$ [1/Fh] as shown in equations (7-8) to (7-10).

$$P_{DetectF0} = [0.5 + 0.5 - 0.5 \cdot 0.5] = 0.75 \quad (7-8)$$

$$P_{CM} = 1 - \prod_i^2 (1 - P_{CM_i}) = 1 - (1 - 0.9) \cdot (1 - 0.8) = 0.98 \quad (7-9)$$

$$P_{Crash} = 0.01 \cdot (1 - 0.75) \cdot (1 - 0.98) = 5.0^{-4} [1/Fh] \quad (7-10)$$

For the calculation of the consequence probability, it is not necessary to incorporate the probability of the specific main sub systems failure conditions, because they are already covered within P_{F0} which equals P_{CumCat} and therefore, all possible catastrophic failure conditions are incorporated. If unknown, P_{F0} should be assumed as conservative P_{CumCat} . Within O.R.C.U.S. any main sub system is assigned to a failure probability in terms of percentage. The sum must be equal one, as shown in equation (7-11). The probabilities of a specific failure condition which may occur in a main sub system are defined in the same manner as they are defined for the failure of a main sub system. This is shown in equation (7-12). By multiplication of equation (7-11) with the initiating failure, the percentage values are transferred into the probability per flight hour which is again, equal the cumulative probability of a catastrophic failure, shown in equation (7-13).

$$\sum_{i=1}^n P_{FMSS_i} = 1 \quad (7-11)$$

$$P_{FMSS_i} = \sum_{j=1}^m P_{FMSSCond_j} = 1 \quad (7-12)$$

$$P_{F0} = P_{F0} \cdot \sum_{i=1}^n P_{FMSS_i} = P_{CumCat} \quad (7-13)$$

$$P_{F0} = P_{F0} \cdot (P_{FENG} + P_{FFCS} + P_{FNAV} + P_{FELS} + P_{FSTR}) = P_{CumCat} \quad (7-14)$$

$$P_{FMSSCond_j} = 1/m \quad (7-15)$$

Equations (7-14) presents the application of equation (7-13) to the default configuration in O.R.C.U.S. For the default configuration of O.R.C.U.S. the percentage failure probability of each of the five defined main subsystems is set to 20 % and the failure detection probabilities and the success probabilities of countermeasures are set to 50 %. Additionally, equation (7-15) shows the determination of the percentage values of the specific failure conditions in a main

sub system in the O.R.C.U.S. default configuration. For example, the main sub system FCS incorporates four failure conditions which lead to a percentage value of 25 % per failure mode. However, these default values can be easily modified and set to appropriate values for the specific UAS. In general, O.R.C.U.S. foresees the possibility to add other failure conditions and consequences if needed. After this description on how the UAS is incorporated into O.R.C.U.S., the next chapters will outline how the flight path of the UA is simulated and how the consequences are modelled.

7.2.4 Flight Path

The flight path simulation in O.R.C.U.S. is seen as part of the operational environment generation. However, as the *UAFlightPath* function is an independent main function which is activated manually and might be amended for every O.R.C.U.S. simulation, Figure 7-3 shows it as part of the mission simulation. In line with the design decisions for the prototype implementation taken for O.R.C.U.S. (cf. chapter 7.2.1), the UAS flight path is modelled as two-dimensional projection above the operational area.

In the current version of O.R.C.U.S. the user can choose between an elliptical or a circular shaped flight path. Both with a constant altitude obtained from the mission data stored in the *Ini* function.




Figure 7-17. O.R.C.U.S. circle flight path example.




Figure 7-18. O.R.C.U.S. elliptical flight path example.

Both flight path versions are drawn automatically by O.R.C.U.S. For the ellipse the user has to set the centre point and the two vertices by graphic user interface input and to provide the ratio for semi minor to semi major axis of the ellipse. In case of the circle, besides the centre point, the user has to set up only one additionally point which marks the radius of the circle.

Once the flight path is set, the operational environment generation is complete and O.R.C.U.S. is able to perform a simulation if an *INI* function is available and executed. In chapter 7.2.8, the application of an O.R.C.U.S. simulation run will be described. However, before this will be done, it is necessary to have a look at the modelling of the different impact scenarios as well as further details in order to get the complete overview.

7.2.5 Impact Scenarios and Areas

The research on UAS operations risk assessment approaches revealed for impact areas that there is no consensus on the methods to determine these areas. To include impact areas, two general methods are present: a geographical or an empirical method. During the development phase of impact areas for O.R.C.U.S., the vast majority of UAS operational risk assessments included the geographical method. While nowadays sole approaches propagate empirical methods for determining impact areas, these approaches still impose a minority because of the non-availability of sufficient UAS impact data (cf. chapter 5.5 and 5.7.4).

Therefore, it was decided for O.R.C.U.S. to develop a basic impact area based on geographical methods. Geographical methods might be too conservative; however, they have the advantage that these methods are widely used and consequently provide a certain level of acceptance. In addition to this, geographical methods do not need to rely on external data sources for which the validity of the data must be checked.

This basic impact area A_{Impact} was defined as a circle shaped area. Centre point of this circle is the central impact point. In this area it is assumed that might get hit in case of an impacting UA. Additionally, O.R.C.U.S. defines a core impact zone, where it is assumed that people within suffer fatal injuries in case, they are present during an impact. The core impact zone forms the basis for the basic impact area. During the calculation sequence, O.R.C.U.S.

calculates the radius of the core zone at first. As can be seen by equation (7-16), this radius is the half of either the UA wingspan or the UA length, whichever is greater. The half value of the resulting maximum is rounded up to the next integer value, in order to obtain a conservative value for the radius of the core zone. By multiplying the radius of the core zone by two, the radius of the basic impact area which then becomes the entire impact area is obtained, shown in equation (7-17) and in equation (7-18).

$$r_{CoreImpact} = \lceil 0.5 \cdot \max(w_{UA}, l_{UA}) \rceil \quad (7-16)$$

$$r_{Impact} = 2 \cdot r_{CoreImpact} \quad (7-17)$$

$$A_{Impact} = \pi \cdot r_{Impact}^2 \quad (7-18)$$

It is important to note that although developed and included, the disambiguation between core impact area and entire impact area will not be further used for the risk assessment. Chapter 7.2.6 will discuss the reasons for this decision in more detail. For the further discussion, only the entire impact area will be taken into account. However, it was found necessary to provide the origin of the calculation for the basic impact zone.

In addition, it was found, that a one size fits all impact approach for all failure cases would not be sufficient for O.R.C.U.S. Thus, it was decided to develop different impact scenarios in relation to the failure condition besides the basic impact area definition which also incorporated further impact areas related to the impact scenario.

The scenarios are directly linked to the different possible failure conditions of the default setup. For example, in case of an undetected and unmitigated navigation system failure which results in the degradation of navigation data, the UA will impact the ground at any place of the overflowed area. O.R.C.U.S. contains the following impact scenarios for the default UAS. The differentiation into several impact scenarios made it necessary to define additional impact areas which will be presented within the next subchapters.

7.2.5.1 Emergency Landing

The emergency landing scenario is a countermeasure and one possible consequence which can result out of sixteen event combinations from the event tree. If the scenario is applicable, the failure condition is detected either by UCS or UA and the initiation of this countermeasure is successful. Furthermore, if an emergency landing is applicable it is assumed that the UA is always able to reach an emergency landing field, at which it can reasonably be assumed that no person gets hit. By definition, for O.R.C.U.S., these areas are green areas, water areas and non-built areas. The emergency landing field is defined as a square shaped area with the size shown in equation (7-19) and illustrated in Figure 7-19.

$$A_{ELF} = r_{Impact}^2 = [\max(w_{UA}, l_{UA})]^2 \quad (7-19)$$




Figure 7-19. O.R.C.U.S. emergency landing scenario illustration.

Figure 7-20 shows an example of the emergency landing scenario. The blue line picturizes the flight path and the red line the beeline between detection point of the failure condition and the emergency landing field. In the right part of this figure, a zoom in of the square shaped emergency landing field is shown.




Figure 7-20. O.R.C.U.S. emergency landing scenario example.

It is recognized that the emergency landing definitions are idealized, however, they are seen as sufficient for the default configuration of O.R.C.U.S. and its initial scope. Future version of O.R.C.U.S. might incorporate additional definitions for the application of an emergency landing, for example battery or fuel capacity of the UA. The source code of this scenario is stored in the *ImpactArea_EmergL* subfunction.

7.2.5.2 Flight Termination and Immediate Impact

One possibility to mitigate a failure condition that could result in a complete loss of control of the UA is to terminate the flight of the UA immediately²⁹. Nominally, this can be seen as a controlled flight into terrain. However, although such a flight termination is a system or operator-controlled action, based on the immediate aspect, there might be people within the impact zone and consequently endangered.

²⁹ Cf. USAR.U1412 in [68].

The resulting impact area is defined by the basic impact area definition, described in equations (7-16) to (7-18). For the flight termination and immediate impact scenario, the equation for the impact area can be reduced as shown in equation (7-20).

$$A_{FTI} = A_{Impact} \quad (7-20)$$




Figure 7-21. O.R.C.U.S. below flight path impact scenario illustration.




Figure 7-22. O.R.C.U.S. below flight path impact scenario example.

O.R.C.U.S. defines the immediate flight termination scenario as a controlled flight into terrain which leads to an impact of the UA directly under the flight path. This definition is similar to a UA that activates an emergency parachute or deep stall dive, leading to a UA impacting the ground shortly or directly under the point in the air where the function was activated. Figure 7-22 provides a short impression regarding the implementation in O.R.C.U.S. The blue line represents the flight path, the green dot the activation point and the red area picturizes the impact area. The subfunction which contains the necessary code is called *ImpactArea_bFP*.

7.2.5.3 Impact at a Random Point on the Map

The impact at a random point on the map scenario is a consequence out of the event tree which might occur in six cases and is an uncontrolled flight into terrain. It is performed by the *ImpactArea_anyP* subfunction. This impact scenario defines that the UA is in a stable but uncontrollable flight state. Its flight continues until fuel or energy is empty. Once energy is not available any more, the UA crashes immediately into the ground, similar to the flight termination scenario. As the impact zone cannot be predicted, fatalities are possible. An exemplified picture of this scenario is shown in Figure 7-23. The red arrow is not part of O.R.C.U.S. and was added to indicate the impact area.




Figure 7-23. O.R.C.U.S. random impact scenario example.

For this impact scenario, the impact area is identical to the flight termination and immediate impact scenario and therefore identical to the basic impact area, please refer to Figure 7-21 for an illustration of the impact area as well as to equations (7-16) to (7-18). Similar to the flight termination and immediate impact scenario, the equation for the impact area for the random impact scenario is reduced as shown in equation (7-21).

$$A_{IRP} = A_{Impact} \quad (7-21)$$

7.2.5.4 Impact Close to the Flight Path in Forward Flight Direction

Based on the default fixed wing UAS, the potential failure case of locked flight control surfaces was defined. Such a lock might lead to a deviation from the flight path in the yaw and the pitch axis by maintaining forward direction. The fundamental assumptions are that the subsequent impact is close to the flight path and that in the final stage before the impact is comparable to a deep dive. Consequently, the resulting expected impact area is similar to the impact areas

after a flight termination with immediate impact or the random impact on a map scenario and therefore equal the basic impact area as presented in equation (7-24). Figure 7-24 shows an illustration of this impact scenario.

$$A_{IFD} = A_{Impact} \quad (7-22)$$




Figure 7-24. O.R.C.U.S. impact close to the flight path in forward flight direction illustration.

Figure 7-25 provides an example for this impact scenario. As before, the blue line indicates the flight path, the circle of red dots the impact area and the red dot on the flight path the failure occurrence point. In addition to this, the half circle in yellow shows the potential impact points with respect to the deviating yaw angle ψ' . Within the current configuration of O.R.C.U.S., the deviation in the yaw angle is calculated by a random normal distribution and lies within the shown yellow half circle. This half circle is defined by the theoretical perpendicular line in relation to the basic forward flight direction. The diameter of the half circle is limited by the operating altitude of the UA. For the deviating pitch angle θ' , it is also assumed that the random deviation follows normal distribution. Consequently, the diameter of the half circle may vary and therefore, also the position of the central impact point. For the execution of this scenario, the responsible subfunction is *ImpactArea_nbFPFD* with the child functions *YawPos* and *PIZ_nbFP*. The first one calculates the deviating yaw angle and the latter one the potential impact zone.




Figure 7-25. O.R.C.U.S. impact close to the flight path in forward flight direction example.

7.2.5.5 Impact After Glide with Best Glide-Ratio on the Flight Path

For the default UAS implemented in O.R.C.U.S. it is assumed that the UA will follow its pre-programmed way-point plan until it glides into the ground in case of an engine out or engine anomaly failure case, which cannot be mitigated by any of the countermeasures. It is executed by the subfunction *ImpactArea_bFPbGR*.

The fundamental assumption of this impact scenario is that the UA cannot provide thrust anymore while all other systems are basically operating. Consequently, the UA will glide along the pre-programmed way point plan until it touches the ground. Based on the operating altitude of the UA and the lift to drag ratio, the remaining distance the UA can travel after the failure case occurred is calculated in accordance with equation (7-23).

$$d_{Glide} = L/D \cdot h_{Alt} \text{ [m]} \quad (7-23)$$

As the UA impacts the ground by gliding, the UA might also hit persons who are standing in the glide path line and not only those within the basic impact area around the central impact point. Therefore, another impact area than the basic impact area must be applied. The glide impact area is formed by equations (7-24) to (7-26) which based on Appendix D from the supplement to the Range Safety Criteria for UAV standard [192].

$$d_{Glide|h_P} = L/D \cdot h_P \text{ [m]} \quad (7-24)$$

$$d_{Swath} = 2 \cdot \max(w_{UA}, l_{UA}) + d_{Glide|h_P} \text{ [m]} \quad (7-25)$$

$$A_{IGR} = A_{GlideImpact} = 2 \cdot \max(w_{UA}, l_{UA}) \cdot d_{Swath} \text{ [m]} \quad (7-26)$$

Equation (7-24) gives back $d_{Glide|h_P}$, which is the distance the UA would glide if the altitude is equal the average height of a person. The formulation follows the same principle as shown in equation (7-23). In order to provide a buffer zone for shallow impacts and as well as to take into account the possibility of a steep, almost vertical, glide impact, $d_{Glide|h_P}$ is increased by two times of the maximum of wingspan or UA length which results in equation (7-25) and providing d_{Swath} . Within the software code several rounding steps up to the next higher integer values are done for the dimensions of glide impact area, similar to the basic impact radius (cf.

equations (7-16) to (7-18)). This provides an additional intrinsic safety buffer in order to take into account the average radius of persons, as it is done for example in [42].

Eventually, the impact area $A_{GlideImpact}$ is obtained by multiplying d_{Swath} with two times r_{Impact} in equation (7-26). Figure 7-26 presents a drawing to support the given explanation for equations (7-24) to (7-26) and Figure 7-27 provides an illustration of this impact scenario. To conclude the present segment, Figure 7-28 shows an example of this impact scenario during an O.R.C.U.S. simulation.




Figure 7-26. O.R.C.U.S. glide impact area.




Figure 7-27. Below flight path with best glide ratio impact scenario illustration.



Figure 7-28. O.R.C.U.S. below flight path with best glide ratio impact scenario example.

7.2.5.6 Tangential to the Flight Path Impact

A similar but not equal to the impact close to the flight path in forward flight direction scenario is the so called *Tangential to flight impact scenario*. In this scenario, the UA deviates tangentially from the flight path by angle η in forward flight direction and descends at best glide ratio. Such a scenario is assumed to occur in case the UA has no capacity any more to change a symmetric position of the control surfaces or if they are in a floating status. The potential range is calculated by applying equation (7-23) again.

As the UA glides into the ground, the glide impact area needs be applied. Equations (7-24) to (7-26) which were discussed in the afore chapter form the impact area. The formulation for the impact area in case of the tangential to flight path impact scenario is summarized in equation (7-28). Figure 7-29 presents an illustration the impact scenario.

$$A_{TFP} = A_{GlideImpact} \quad (7-27)$$




Figure 7-29. O.R.C.U.S. tangential deviation from flight path and impact illustration.

Figure 7-30 provides an example, in addition to the flight path and the impact area, the tangential deviation path is shown as red line for illustration purposes. The function for this scenario is called *ImpactArea_tanFP* and is also supported by the *PIZ_nbFP* subfunction.



Figure 7-30. O.R.C.U.S. tangential deviation from flight path and impact example.

7.2.5.7 Debris Impact

In order to provide a comprehensive set of impact scenarios, it was deemed necessary to include also a debris scenario. Debris occurs if the airborne UA faces severe structural damage during flight, as for example if v_{NE} is exceeded or if an engine fire occurs that cannot be extinguished. The debris impact scenario is executed by the *ImpactArea_Debris* subfunction.

Debris impacts are not trivial to approximate, because the assumptions that have to be taken into account vary greatly and are highly dependent upon the design and current status of the UA. As in the beginning of O.R.C.U.S. development not many open information on LUAS accidents existed, it was tried to develop a debris model based on public data from UAS accident reports from the United States Air Force (USAF) Aircraft Accident Investigation Board (AIB) and to support this by data from manned General Aviation accidents reports of the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) [205, 206]. The research incorporated 167 reports from the BFU and 76 reports from the AIB over the time period from 1999 to 2013³⁰. The reports were investigated with respect to structural disintegration of the aircraft in the air and the resulting splash pattern zone. Based on the dimensions of the splash pattern zone, it was tried to generate an equation that relates the splash pattern of a LUAS based on the UA parameters m_{UA} and v_{UA} . Unfortunately, resulting equations based on regression analysis did show only very low coefficients of determination ($R^2 < 0.01$). Therefore, this attempt was rejected and a very conservative model for the debris impact zone was defined based on the equations for a horizontal throw without drag.

It is defined, that the debris parts of the disintegrated UA spread away from the failure occurrence point on the flight path in forward flight direction which is approximated by the deviating yaw angle ψ' . The entire area is defined as a circle with a diameter based on the equations for the horizontal throw without drag and related to the velocity and altitude of the UA.

³⁰ Note: Nowadays the investigated reports are no longer available at the website of AIB. However, they can be found here [207].

$$t_{Impact} = \sqrt{\frac{2 \cdot h_{Alt}}{g}} \text{ [sec]} \quad (7-28)$$

$$d_{Debris} = v_{UA} \cdot t_{Impact} \text{ [m]} \quad (7-29)$$

$$r_{Impact} = \max(w_{UA}, l_{UA}, 0.5 \cdot d_{Debris}) \quad (7-30)$$

$$A_{Impact} = A_{Debris} = \pi \cdot r_{Impact}^2 \text{ [m}^2\text{]} \quad (7-31)$$

Equation (7-28) determines the duration t_{Impact} that it takes for debris parts until they impact the ground without drag of the air. Based on this time, by equation (7-29) the maximum range for debris parts are calculated, representing the diameter of the affected area. For the radius of the debris impact area, the values of UA wingspan, UA length and the half of the afore calculated diameter are compared with respect to the maximum, shown in equation (7-30). This is similar to the generic impact area approach shown in equation (7-18). The resulting maximum will be inserted into equation (7-31) for the determination of the entire debris impact area. Figure 7-31 illustrates the debris impact.




Figure 7-31. O.R.C.U.S. debris impact illustration.

Figure 7-32 provides an example for a debris impact. The impact area is obviously larger than the impact areas shown before. In the current version of O.R.C.U.S. this impact scenario arises in case of an uncontrollable engine fire, generic structural failure or wrong commands that lead to exceedance of the UA design. These failure conditions are seen as very severe and result in rapid structural disintegration and do not allow long reaction times, therefore the only mitigation could be a CFIT.




Figure 7-32. O.R.C.U.S. debris impact example.

The debris impact concludes the description of the different impact scenarios available and how impact areas are calculated in the prototype version of O.R.C.U.S. In the next chapter, implications of an impact will be discussed.

7.2.6 Impact Implications

Chapter 6.6 described identified shortcomings in the area of impact implications. In addition, the introduction of chapter 7.2.5 outlined that O.R.C.U.S. incorporates a lethal zone and the general affected zone for UA. During the first development phase of O.R.C.U.S. it was seen beneficial to differentiate between lethal and non-lethal zones. Such a differentiation has the advantage, that it might provide a smooth transition between the areas and also allows a stronger coupling between the UA and the environment. As the lethal zone is smaller than the total impact zone, predictions were deemed to be more exact and granting more operational flexibility by applying the results. In relation to the work of Feinstein [208], a quadratic distribution function was defined for the lethality with respect to the distance to the central impact point. Equation (7-32) shows the formulation and Figure 7-33 an example application for a UA with $r_{Impact} = 10$ m.

$$P_{Fat} = \begin{cases} 0 \leq d_{CIP} \leq r_{Lethal} = 1 \\ r_{Lethal} < d_{CIP} \leq r_{Impact} = \left(\frac{d_{CIP} - r_{Impact}}{r_{Impact} - r_{Lethal}} \right)^2 \\ d_{CIP} > r_{Impact} = 0 \end{cases} \quad (7-32)$$




Figure 7-33. Equation (7-32) example.

However, as it was already mentioned in chapter 6.6, such fatality probability equations must include a broad range and predictions might be entirely wrong because of the immense variety of impacts and because of the great variance of potential injuries and their severity. In addition, the prediction equations might give wrong expectations to the user of a UAS risk operations assessment and the validation of a fatality probability model within a tool like O.R.C.U.S. is challenging if not even unfeasible.

Therefore, it was concluded, that for O.R.C.U.S. although the P_{Fat} model is included in the tool, *it shall not be used for evaluation*. It shall only be evaluated whether a person got hit or not in case of a crashing UA, which is from the authors point of view, the core question for fast UAS Operational Risk Assessments. Nevertheless, O.R.C.U.S. is capable to integrate future fatality probability equations if needed, but for a prototype implementation it is not seen necessary.

In order to relate the results of an O.R.C.U.S. simulation to common airworthiness metrics, a conclusive table is generated by the tool which calculates the event per flight hour and the hit per flight hour results. Chapter 7.2.8 will present further details regarding the evaluation capabilities. In any case, these results can be compared to mutual acceptable failure probabilities of UAS, defined in airworthiness standards as for example STANAG 4703 [32]. Therefore, O.R.C.U.S. is able to provide a clear and unambiguous linkage to airworthiness terms, giving users an improved risk awareness in direct quantitative terms.

7.2.7 Time and Place dependent People Distribution Model

As for every other UAS Operations Risk Assessment, the simulation of people on the ground is essential for O.R.C.U.S. too. The self-given aim was to develop a non-static distribution of population densities with a place and time-related behaviour with focus on the default operational environment Germany.

At first, it was necessary to define adequate sources for the basic population density of a place. For Germany, the Federal Statistical Office (destatis) provides precise data regarding inhabitants of villages, towns, cities, counties and federal states in Germany. Founded on federal law, with the primary task to provide data, which is neutral and of high quality, the data provided by the Federal Statistical Office is officially recognized and can be defined as valid source. Therefore, census data used for the basic population density data base in O.R.C.U.S. was stemmed from destatis. The provided data is updated on regular basis. For the prototype

implementation of O.R.C.U.S. which was concluded in the second half of 2019, the annual census data from end of 2018 including updates until mid 2019 was used [209, 210]. The resulting O.R.C.U.S. data base contains 3,323 entries of cities and villages, including population numbers, population density per square kilometre as well as associated county and federal state, for which also population numbers and densities are provided.

Second, it was necessary to create a movement prediction of the inhabitants. By approaching this aim, it was soon found out, that a *precise* model to predict human movement during a day is only possible with extensive data input and calculation effort, as well as continuous monitoring. The German Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure started to monitor day to day movement in Germany in the mid 1970s'. One of the outcomes of this monitoring was an extensive report, generated by the German Aerospace Centre (DLR) and the Institute for Applied Social Sciences (infas), called "Mobility in Germany", which was released for the first time in 2002 and updated in 2010 and 2017 [211-215]. This report provides representative information on daily movement for five layers: individual, household, ways, cars and travel. Based on the given data in the report, it was possible to develop a movement algorithm that contains a time scheme that is related to the percentage value of people which started a way at a building and when the way was completed at their destination.

The 2008 edition of the Mobility in Germany report applied inhabitant numbers as classification. And consequently, this was done for the movement prediction algorithm in O.R.C.U.S. too. However, the update of the report in 2017 rejected this classification and aligned it to the so called *RegioStaR* regional cluster scheme, developed by the German Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure. For the sake of completeness, Table 7-4 presents the first applied city type classification scheme, taken from [211, 212] and the O.R.C.U.S. internal city type key.

City type CT	N_{PPL}	Examples
C1	$> 500,000$	Frankfurt am Main, Stuttgart
C2	$100,000 < N_{PPL} \leq 500,000$	Rostock, Braunschweig, Erfurt
C3	$50,000 < N_{PPL} \leq 100,000$	Bocholt, Rosenheim, Bayreuth
C4	$20,000 < N_{PPL} \leq 50,000$	Deggendorf, Pfaffenhofen, Forchheim
C5	$5,000 < N_{PPL} \leq 20,000$	Linsengericht, Giesen, Neufahrn
C6	$2,000 < N_{PPL} \leq 5,000$	Triptis, Bad Koestritz, Freudenberg
C7	$N_{PPL} \leq 2,000$	Bad Suelze, Usedom, Hornbach

Table 7-4 First city type typology applied in O.R.C.U.S. [211, 212].

The updated classification scheme from 2017 is based on the housing development and contains two main categories: urban and rural region. These two main categories are further divided in four sub categories and 17 spatial types. Additionally, a combined cluster is provided, with seven city types [216]. This combined cluster was applied to O.R.C.U.S. and is shown in Table 7-5.

<i>City type CT</i>	<i>City type description</i>	<i>Examples</i>
R71	Metropolitan area/Metropolis	Berlin, Munich, Leipzig
R72	Major city, urban area	Karlsruhe, Aachen, Kiel
R73	Medium-sized city, urban area	Weimar, Berchtesgarden, Troisdorf
R74	Small city, urban area	Lindau, Todendorf, Wiitingen
R75	Central town, rural area	Neubrandenburg, Bamberg, Kempten
R76	Mid-sized town, rural area	Pegnitz, Kronach, Radolfzell
R77	Small town, rural area	Iffeldorf, Biberach, Dierbach

Table 7-5 RegioStaR spatial typology applied in O.R.C.U.S. [216].

In case O.R.C.U.S. shall be used to simulate a very specific operation, for example the overflight of an open area assembly of people with a known population density of people number, it is possible to enter these values manually. If this is needed, the user may change the appropriate parameter in the *INI* file and afterwards, O.R.C.U.S. will ask for the parameters during the execution.

For each spatial type shown in Table 7-5, a table with respect to the percentage number of inhabitants which are in transit is included in the underlying O.R.C.U.S. database. The transit percentage numbers are related to eight defined time segments (t_{seg}), presented in Table 7-6.

t_{seg}	Begin	End
Early morning (t_{EM})	05:00	08:00
Morning (t_{MO})	08:00	10:00
Late morning/noon (t_{LM})	10:00	13:00
Early afternoon (t_{EA})	13:00	16:00
Afternoon (t_{AF})	16:00	19:00
Evening (t_{EV})	19:00	22:00
Night (t_{NI})	22:00	05:00

Table 7-6 Time segments within the O.R.C.U.S. people movement algorithm.

Table 7-7 shows an example of a complete movement table of the underlying O.R.C.U.S. database for the prediction of human movement. The first row contains the abbreviations of the time segments (t_{seg}) presented in Table 7-6, the second row is divided into two sub-columns of the related cell of the first row. Within these two sub-columns, the column designated as “SA” for “Start”, contains the percentage number of inhabitants of the city type, who left started their way in the specific time frame. The sub-column named “AR” for “Arrival” contains the percentage number of city type inhabitants, who arrived at their designation within

the specific time frame. As the data provided within [213-215] is based on surveys, it is also possible that for a specific day a certain percentage amount of the people surveyed, did not answer. This aspect is deemed as uncertainty and documented in the last row “No Ans”. The last column is the sum of the difference between the arrival percentage number and the start percentage number of each time segment per day. This number shows that a residual number of people might be on their way in the outside or already at home. As can be seen in Table 7-7, this number very low and therefore, it is not further applied in the software code.

R72	t_{EM}		t_{MO}		t_{LM}		t_{EA}		t_{AF}		t_{EV}		t_{NI}		t_{NoAns}		Delta
	SA	AR	SA	AR	SA	AR	SA	AR	SA	AR	SA	AR	SA	AR	SA	AR	
Monday	12	9	14	14	18	18	22	21	23	24	8	10	2	2	0	0	-1
Tuesday	13	10	12	13	18	17	21	21	25	26	8	9	3	3	0	0	-1
Wednesday	13	11	13	13	17	16	22	21	25	26	9	11	2	3	0	1	1
Thursday	13	10	12	13	18	17	22	21	25	26	8	10	2	3	0	0	0
Friday	12	9	12	13	19	18	23	22	22	23	8	10	3	4	0	1	1
Saturday	3	3	12	10	27	26	23	22	21	22	9	11	5	5	0	1	0
Sunday	2	2	11	8	24	21	29	28	22	26	9	11	2	3	0	1	1

Table 7-7 Example movement table for city type R72.

With the information contained in the movement tables, it is possible to determine an average 24-hour movement profile for each day per week for each city type CT . For these profiles, the following assumptions are considered:

The percentage of people who are in move in a specific city type and for a specific time frame is assumed to be the mean between the percentage number of people who started a way and those who arrived (equation (7-33)).

$$PPL(CT, day)_{OTW_{t_{seg}}} = \frac{(SA(CT, day)_{t_{seg}} + AR(CT, day)_{t_{seg}})}{2} \quad (7-33)$$

If the difference between the percentage numbers start and arrival of the preceding time frame is greater than zero, it must be assumed, that there is still a percentage of people left, who have not arrived at their destination. Therefore, this difference must be added to the current time frame. If the difference is less than zero, it can be assumed, that the people have arrived at their destination before the current time frame had begun. Nevertheless, this would not justify to subtract this percentage number from the percentage number of people in movement of the current time frame (equation (7-34)).

$$PPL(SA(CT, day)_{t_{seg-1}} - AR(CT, day)_{t_{seg-1}} > 0)_{NoArr} = SA(CT, day)_{t_{seg-1}} - AR(CT, day)_{t_{seg-1}} \quad (7-34)$$

$$PPL(SA(CT, day)_{t_{seg-1}} - AR(CT, day)_{t_{seg-1}} \leq 0)_{NoArr} = 0$$

If for a specific city type and day percentage numbers with respect to people who did not answer to the surveys within [213-215] are present, this shall be added as uncertainty factor by the mean of the no answer cells of the specific day.

$$PPL(CT, day)_{OTW_{NoAns}} = \frac{(SA(CT, day)_{NoAns} + AR(CT, day)_{NoAns})}{2} \quad (7-35)$$

In total, the percentage of people who are on their way in a specific city type, on a specific day during a specific time frame is composed as it shown in equation (7-36).

$$PPL(CT, day, t_{seg})_{OTW} = PPL_{OTW_{t_{seg}}} + PPL_{NoArr_{t_{seg}-1}} + PPL_{OTW_{NoAns}} \quad (7-36)$$

Figure 7-34 presents the resulting movement profile for a R72 city type on a Monday as percentage graph based on equation (7-36) and the data obtained from [213-215]. It can be seen that there is the “typical” rush hour in the early morning when people go to work. Furthermore, an increase of people in move can be observed that begins in the early afternoon until late evening around 20:00. During this time period, people typically are on their way back from work to home and also get out for shopping or to meet friends or to have dinner.

Figure 7-35 expands the Monday movement profile with a Sunday movement profile. The comparison shows a clear difference. On Sunday, the vast majority of people will not go to work. If they get out of their houses, for example to visit relatives or for lunch, they start later during the day. An increase can be observed beginning at 10:00, with a climax between 14:00 to 16:00.




Figure 7-34. People on the way profile R72 city type during a Monday.




Figure 7-35. People on the way profile R72 city type during a Monday and Sunday.

For the sake of completeness, in Figure 7-36 a complete week is shown for the example city type R72 with the movement profile for each day. As can be seen, the movement profile during the work days from Monday to Friday is very similar, while Saturday and Sunday differ noticeably.




Figure 7-36. People on the way profile R72 city type during a week.

By multiplying equation (7-36) with the census-based number of inhabitants of a city $N_{PPLCity}$ [209, 210], the current number of persons who are on a way can be obtained. Alternatively, equation (7-36) might be multiplied with the population density of the overflowed area $\rho_{PPLArea}$ and the area size A [km²] in order to obtain current number of persons who are on a way. Equation (7-37) shows the resulting equation. The result of this equation is rounded up to an integer number, as there are no half persons and as it is a conservative approach. Equation (7-37) is supported by equation (7-38) to underline the connection between number of inhabitants, population density and area of a city. The index *map* is used as synonym for *city*, *county*, or a general *area*. Note that all three variables are stored within the census-based database incorporated in O.R.C.U.S.

$$N(CT, day, t_{seg})_{PPL_{OTW}} = \left\lceil PPL_{OTW} \cdot N_{PPL_{City}} \right\rceil \quad (7-37)$$

$$N_{PPL_{Map}} = \rho_{PPL_{Map}} \cdot A_{Map} \quad (7-38)$$

For a given mission map, O.R.C.U.S. applies equation (7-38) to calculate the basic number of inhabitants in the specific simulation map. Figure 7-37 and Figure 7-38 illustrate equation (7-37) with an example for city type R72, which in this case is the Bavarian city Ingolstadt.




Figure 7-37. Number of people on the way (OTW) example Ingolstadt during a Monday.




Figure 7-38. Number of people on the way (OTW) example Ingolstadt during a Monday and Sunday.

The O.R.C.U.S. data base extracted from [209, 210, 213-215] provides the capacity to predict how many people are in move during a day for each of the defined city types. However, a precise prediction of start and end place is not incorporated, as this is out of scope of the source data and furthermore, was not seen necessary for O.R.C.U.S. The core information which is relevant for the kind of assessment O.R.C.U.S. performs, is if people are on a way and if they are in the unprotected outside, or not. People who are not on a way, are deemed to be in a building and protected. This number, $N(CT, day, t_{seg})_{PPL_{ATB}}$ is calculated as it shown in equation (7-39).

$$N(CT, day, t_{seg})_{PPL_{ATB}} = \left[(1 - PPL_{OTW}) \cdot N_{PPL_{City}} \right] \quad (7-39)$$

It is noteworthy that O.R.C.U.S. also has a feature to include an average number of tourists and increasing the basic number of inhabitants accordingly. For several regions and cities of Germany, the data extracted from [209, 210] contains statistics regarding number of touristic visits per year. Once activated by the user within the initialization file, O.R.C.U.S. searches its database for entries with respect to tourist data for the area under assessment. If an entry

exists, the data entry is broken down to tourists per day and square kilometre and afterwards added to the basic number of inhabitants. If no entry exists, the user can enter the expected number of tourists. The resulting number of people is shown in equation (7-40). This number will then be used for the distribution as shown in equations (7-37) and (7-39).

$$N_{PPL_{City}} = N_{PPL_{City}} + N_{PPL_{City}Tourists} \quad (7-40)$$

Chapter 7.2.2 described the *MapOverlay* function, shown in Figure 7-11, which is also incorporated within the people distribution functions. It cannot be assumed, that people in the surrounding of a very small town which does not cover the whole O.R.C.U.S. map move similar to the inhabitants of the town. To illustrate this, Figure 7-39 shows the difference in a movement profile between a R77 city type and the Federal State Bavaria during a Monday. Although during the night phase the difference is very small and might be treated as neglectable, the difference increases significantly during noon time.




Figure 7-39. Example for a difference between a city type and Federal State.

Therefore, in case *MapOverlay* was applied by the user, O.R.C.U.S. distributes the people outside the overlay with a data set based on the County and Federal State, in which the city is located. Because no sufficient data regarding people movement in counties was existing, the movement profile is based on the Federal State, while the number of people to distribute is based on the County inhabitants.

The underlying functions and equations for the movement of the county inhabitants are identical to those explained before for the city types. The resulting equations numbers of people to be distributed in the surrounding area of the overlay are shown in equation (7-41) and (7-42).

$$N(COU, FS, day, t_{seg})_{PPL_{OTW}} = [PPL_{OTW} \cdot N_{PPL_{COU}}] \quad (7-41)$$

$$N(COU, FS, day, t_{seg})_{PPL_{ATB}} = [(1 - PPL_{OTW}) \cdot N_{PPL_{COU}}] \quad (7-42)$$

It should be noted, that the number of people to distribute within the SMP is set equal to the number of inhabitants of the specific city which the SMP encompasses. By doing so, on the one hand a too optimistic setting is avoided, which could occur that in case the calculation of people to be distributed in the SMP would contain less people than the real inhabitants of the overflowed city. On the other hand, it is avoided that more people are distributed in the SMP than the database foresees in case the SMP drawn by the user does overlap the city territory, which would lead to an overconservative approach.

It is recognized, that the approach to deploy people in the SMP surrounding map size in relation to the county inhabitants density taken from the database imposes a conservative approach, as the inhabitants of the city are taken as an independent part with the simulation map and not taken as a part of the surrounding county. A possible solution to overcome this is presented in equation (7-45). By applying equation (7-45) instead of equation (7-38), the number of people simulated in the surrounding map of the SMP would be reduced. Such a probably more realistic yet optimistic approach might be incorporated in a future version of O.R.C.U.S. For the prototype implementation, it was seen as sufficient to strive for the more conservative approach.

$$\rho_{COU_{Mission}} = \frac{(N_{PPL_{COU}} - N_{PPL_{City}})}{(A_{COU} - A_{City})} \quad (7-43)$$

Note that if no SMP is present, no inhabitant limitation is applied. This is based on the assumption that it can reasonably be assumed, that in case the city covers the whole map image, the city area is usually bigger than the image. Therefore, the inhabitants deployed by O.R.C.U.S. will represent an adequate portion of the real inhabitants based on map image size. The simulation runs confirmed this assumption. Nevertheless, this is seen as a small weakness in O.R.C.U.S. and will also be taken into consideration for the further development of the software tool.

In order to develop an approximation of human movement in a city type, it was decided to distribute the number of people which are on the way randomly. In case a UA crashes during a simulation, O.R.C.U.S. determines the current $N_{PPL_{OTW}}$ and $N_{PPL_{ATB}}$ based on the time of day and the overflown area and distributes them randomly across the overflown map by the pseudorandom number generator *randi*.

Table 7-8 shows the possible sub-structs where it is expected that people might be on a way in the outside and therefore, entirely unsheltered. It is noted that people inside cars have a certain amount of shelter, but they are also assumed to be unsheltered. This is based on the conservative assumption that in case a LUAS crashes close to the car or on it, the driver might get that much distracted that the distraction either leads to an accident which causes injuries or that the car inhabitants get hurt by the impact itself.

#	Name	Description
1	Streets	Common streets.
2	Trunk roads	Federal roads, might cross cities.
3	Rural roads	Country roads in rural sides, might cross towns.
4	Motor-ways	The German Autobahn.
5	Walks	Pedestrian walks.
10	Open areas	Open spaces in a city.

Table 7-8 Possible sub-structs for people outside (OTW) per O.R.C.U.S. default.

Table 7-9 presents the sub-structs in O.R.C.U.S. for which it is assumed that people inside are sheltered. In case a UA crashes onto such a sub-struct and people are inside, the default definition for the O.R.C.U.S. prototype implementation is that those people will not suffer injuries.

#	Name	Description
8	Houses	Common houses with inhabitants.
9	Residential areas	Bigger areas with houses.

Table 7-9 Possible sub-structs for people inside (ATB) per O.R.C.U.S. default.

Table 7-10 summarizes the sub-structs in which no people are distributed during an O.R.C.U.S. simulation. Sub-struct #6 and #7 are excluded because it assumed that people inside a tram or a train which commute on these sub-structs are sufficiently protected. Furthermore, a prediction how many people are present there would require an additional simulation of the public transportation system, requiring additional valid data sources. Additionally, it was assumed that the probability that a crashing UA hits a train or a tram is very improbable. With respect to sub-structs #11, #12 and #13, the reasons are similar. The sub-struct #11, non-built areas, are for example fields of farmers, where it reasonably can be assumed that there are no people. Regarding green or water areas, it is expected that even if there are people, such as hikers or boat drivers, the relation between potential impact area and people is big enough, that the probability that those people get hit by a crashing UA is also extremely low. The last sub-struct, airfields, such as big airports or small airfields, prohibits people to be there by definition.

#	Name	Description
6	Tram ways	Rail lines for trams.
7	Rail roads	Rail lines for trains.
11	Non-built areas	Areas with no buildings.
12	Green areas	Forests, parks etc.
13	Water areas	Lakes, rivers etc.
14	Airfields	Airports, small airfields, etc.

Table 7-10 Sub-structs with no people per O.R.C.U.S. default.

For each person to be distributed within the sub-structs presented in Table 7-8 and Table 7-9 during an O.R.C.U.S. simulation, the default definition is, that only one person per pixel shall be allowed. This rule is in conjunction with the typical r_p found in literature (for example in [42] and in [217]) and incorporates the possibility of a virtual movement radius of the individual person if the O.R.C.U.S. standard relation between pixel and metre discussed in chapter 7.2.2. and which leads to the effect that one pixel equals one square metre. These definitions fit appropriately for regular assessments, e.g. an overflight of a city during a normal day. Nevertheless, these definitions might be changed if necessary, for example if it is necessary

to assess operations with more than one person per square metre, e.g. overflight of concerts or football stadiums.

With respect to the software architecture of O.R.C.U.S., the time and place dependent population distribution are deployed in several subfunctions. At the beginning of each simulation run, a basic allocation is done by the subfunction *RdPeopleBasicInput*. The subfunction extracts the necessary area data which is necessary for the simulation, in particular the population data from census from the database *ppiCitiesCountiesFS*. The extracted data is aligned to the adequate movement profile extracted from the database *ppiDayTime* by activating the *PeopleDayTime* and *PeopleDayTimeFS* subfunctions. In case a UA impacts the ground, the *RdPeopleLoop* subfunctions distribute the people on the map as described above.

The notes regarding the responsible functions conclude the present chapter which presented the basic characteristics of the population simulation included in O.R.C.U.S. Based on the derivatives that led to the program routines as well as the necessary assumptions, a representative time and place dependent population movement simulation for German cities which is non-static was developed. The self-given aim outlined in the beginning of the chapter was fulfilled.

7.2.8 Application, Validation and Evaluation

The application of O.R.C.U.S. is based on the data stored in the *INI* function. Table 7-11 summarizes the necessary mission and UAS parameters which must be provided within the *INI* function by the user. It should be noted that certain parameters are stored within the event tree *xlsx* file and extracted automatically by the responsible functions. Those values might be changed in accordance with the design of the UAS under assessment in the specific simulation.

Once the user has stored all parameters as needed with the *INI* function, the function can be executed. After successful execution, all necessary data items were handed over to the O.R.C.U.S. Map struct file and the file within the MATLAB workspace is ready for the simulation.

After activation of an O.R.C.U.S. simulation, the UAS mission will be simulated in accordance to the given mission parameters. For example, if the assessor wants to simulate a mission which shall take place from 10:00 am to 16:00 on a Wednesday, t_{start} would be set to ten and t_{Land} would be set to sixteen, while day_{UA} would be set to three, resulting in a simulation of the six operational flight hours. However, this would be only one simulation run or one probe of the real mission and it is more than questionable to relay only on one single probe. In order to enhance the mean of the simulation outputs, the number of simulation runs can be increased.

<i>Parameter</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Range</i>	<i>Description</i>
day_{UA}	[d]	1 – 7	Day of the UA mission
h_{Alt}	[m]	none	Altitude above the ground
l_{UA}	[m]	none	Length of the UA
L/D	[/]	none	Lift to drag ratio of the UA
m_{UA}	[kg]	≤ 150	Mass of the UA, usually MTOW
$n_{Probes0}$	[/]	none	Initial number of samples
$N_{Day_{UA}}$	[d]	none	Number of UA mission days
$N_{SimDay_{UA}}$	[d]	none	Number of simulated UA mission days
$P_{F0} = P_{CumCat}$	[1/Fh]	none	Cumulative acceptable probability of all catastrophic failure conditions
P_{MSS_k}	[%]	0 – 1	Probability that the k^{th} main sub-system fails
$P_{MSS_kFC_j}$	[%]	0 – 1	Probability of the j^{th} failure condition for the k^{th} failed main sub-system*
$P_{DetectUA}$	[%]	0 – 1	Probability that the UA detects a failure*
$P_{DetectUCS}$	[%]	0 – 1	Probability that the UCS detects a failure*
P_{CM_k}	[%]	0 – 1	Probability that the k^{th} countermeasure succeeds*
\bar{P}_{CM_k}	[%]	0 – 1	Probability that the k^{th} countermeasure fails*
t_{Start}	[hh]	1 – 24	Starting time of the UA.
t_{Land}	[hh]	1 – 24	Landing time of the UA
v_{UA}	[km/h]	none	UA mission velocity
w_{UA}	[m]	none	Wingspan of the UA
* included in event tree file			

Table 7-11 Necessary UAS and mission parameters for the *INI* function and O.R.C.U.S.

After the first stable version of O.R.C.U.S. was complete, several example missions were simulated with the aim to achieve around 10,000 simulated flight hours or more. Such a high number was seen as sufficient, although it is quite arbitrary. Furthermore, no differentiation between long and short endurance missions would be necessary. For example, a mission with ten flight hours would have to fulfil the same requirement as a mission with only one flight hour, from the simulation point of view. It is important to note, that in case the UA faces an impact during the simulation, O.R.C.U.S. will save the evaluation data and then continue the simulation and does not require a complete restart. Of course, this would not be the case in reality, however this is the advantage of a simulation. By continuation and not stopping, more simulation data can be generated in one run.

Within the further development of O.R.C.U.S. it was attempted to overcome the 10,000 simulated flight hours aim as validation mean and it was investigated, how a mean can be provided, which shows that the results of an O.R.C.U.S. simulation are valid or not. The obvious mean is the sufficient amount of simulated flight hours or entire mission simulations. However, this determination is challenging as there is no data to compare. One possibility to resolve this was found within the one-sample Student's *t*-test [218].

In general, Student's *t*-Test, which is either a one-sample or two-sample test, can provide an indication if a null hypothesis H_0 is correct or if an alternative hypothesis H_1 is correct. To apply this method, the data to be evaluated must be collected from a simple random probe and the attribute which is investigated is normally distributed. In case of O.R.C.U.S. the attribute of interest is if a person got hit or not in case of a ground impacting UA and the relation to P_{CumCat} (cf. chapter 7.2.6). Based on this, the null hypothesis H_0 is defined as the probability that a person gets hit by a crashing UA P_{Hit} is equal to P_{CumCat} and the alternative hypothesis H_1 is that P_{Hit} is not equal P_{CumCat} . Both hypotheses are shown in equation (7-44) and (7-45).

$$H_0: P_{Hit} = P_{CumCat} \quad (7-44)$$

$$H_1: P_{Hit} \neq P_{CumCat} \quad (7-45)$$

Assuming that O.R.C.U.S. simulates one UA mission n times. This simulation series shall be called O.R.C.U.S. simulation series with n samples. The definition of one sample is dependent upon how the mission is planned to be executed, are explained below. Which definition applies is defined by the user within the *INI* function.

Mission definition 1 – UAS operation on a specific day or days

The UAS operation shall take place on a random Monday and Tuesday, between 10:00 and 14:00 o'clock about a specified city. One probe would be equal the simulation of the two days. If ten probes shall be obtained, this would result in a simulation of ten times Monday and ten times Tuesday, in total twenty simulated days with 4 simulated flight hours each, resulting in 80 Fh simulated flight hours.

Mission definition 2 – UAS operation on a random week day

The UAS operation shall take place on a random day during the week, between 08:00 and 18:00. Because the day is not further specified, one probe is equal one simulated day. For this

case as a minimum, each day shall be simulated one time, leading to seven samples with a total amount of flight hours of 70.

The simple random sample criterion results from the respective O.R.C.U.S. simulation series, which has the scope n . A sample within this scope is equal to one execution of an O.R.C.U.S. simulation. As the O.R.C.U.S. simulation environment represents the population, an infinite execution of O.R.C.U.S. simulations would correlate with the real world and accordingly represent the UAS mission in real life if the UAS has exactly the same properties as described in O.R.C.U.S.

All elements defined in O.R.C.U.S. have defined probabilities and therefore, always have the same chance to occur each time a simulation is run. Each O.R.C.U.S. simulation series can therefore be regarded as a simple random sample from the population. Since the feature under investigation – “person hit or not” – refers to a normally distributed population, it can be assumed that the feature would occur also normally distributed in real world. The feature will be called “event” in the further proceeding. In order to ensure that this is true for the simulation, the minimum number of samples must be sufficient. Subsequently the minimum number of samples shall be $n_{Min} \geq 30$. In order to strengthen the validation efforts, it was decided to increase n_{Min} at least to 100. The number of samples are also the so-called degrees of freedom df within the t -test.

Core of the t -Test is the calculation of the critical t value t_{Crit} . If this number is passed for a given significance level α , the alternative hypothesis is valid and the null hypothesis can be discarded. Those values are dependent upon the degrees of freedom which are equal to the number of samples. They can be found in statistical tables, e.g. in [218]. The calculation of the t value for a one-sample t -Test is presented in equation (7-46).

$$t = \sqrt{n} \left(\frac{\bar{x} - \mu_0}{s} \right) \quad (7-46)$$

The expectation is assumed to be equal to the given P_{CumCat} .

$$\mu_0 = P_{CumCat} \quad (7-47)$$

The determination of the mean value and the standard deviation are presented in equations (7-48) to (7-50). With respect to the mean value \bar{x} of the item under assessment x_i , it should be noted that this number \bar{x} is equal to the cumulative number of persons hit during one sample. Therefore, \bar{x} is the number of people who got hit per simulated flight hour per sample. In case one sample consists of more than one simulated day, \bar{x} does not give back the absolute number of hit persons per flight hours directly. The standard deviation is necessary for the calculation of the t value. It gives back the variability of P_{Hit} for the entire simulation series consisting of n samples with respect to the mean value.

$$\bar{x} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n x_i}{n} \quad (7-48)$$

$$x_i = \frac{N_{PPLHit_i}}{t_{Miss_i}} \quad (7-49)$$

$$s = \sqrt{s^2} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})^2}{n - 1}} \quad (7-50)$$

Because every value of the item under assessment is normalized with the mission duration, it is beneficial to apply identical mission durations per mission day. Additionally, it must be considered that an event can occur, but does not need necessarily occur during an O.R.C.U.S. simulation sample. Consequently, also those samples with no events must be taken into account for the calculation of the mean value. Furthermore, based on the concept of O.R.C.U.S., it is possible that the UA hits the ground more than one time during one sample, therefore, the event “person hit” might occur also more than one time during one O.R.C.U.S. sample, which needs to be considered for the mean value calculation.

For the validation of the O.R.C.U.S. results, it was chosen to set the significance level $\alpha = 0.01$. As the t -Test is unsigned, $\alpha/2$ must be taken into account. Table 7-12 summarizes t_{crit} applied for O.R.C.U.S.

	$t_{crit} = t_{df;99.5}$
$df = n = 30$	2.750
$df = n = 120$	2.617
$df = n \rightarrow \infty$	2.576

Table 7-12 Critical t -values.

Once an O.R.C.U.S. simulation series is complete in the automatic mode, the evaluation part is activated. Within this part, a summarizing xlsx spread sheet is generated. This spread sheet contains a short overlook of the results and all events that occurred during the simulation series. Focus is given on how many people got hit at buildings and on the way. Furthermore, the t -values for the complete O.R.C.U.S. simulation series and the hit results are calculated. If the resulting t -values do not exceed the values shown in Table 7-12, the simulation series shall not be taken as valid. In addition to this, every single impact event is shown with all details: mission information, map information, time and point of occurrence, coordinates on the map, failure condition and impact implications.

With the evaluation file, the resulting risk of the simulated UAS mission can be shown with respect to relation to airworthiness terms at a glance. The evaluation file of O.R.C.U.S. enables the operator to become aware about the risk to the overflowed area and to take adequate measures in order to reduce the risk. Furthermore, the simulation results can be used for discussions with the competent authorities to achieve authorization for the desired operation. These remarks conclude the present chapter. Within the next chapter, a recap of the entire prototype implementation by O.R.C.U.S. will be provided.

7.3 Summary

Within chapters 7.2 to 7.2.8, the architecture and capabilities of O.R.C.U.S. were briefly presented. In contrast to the shortcomings of the investigated UAS operations risk assessment O.R.C.U.S. contains significant improvements.

One of the improvements is marked by the inclusion of the operational environment. Instead of requiring an immense amount of data regarding the operational area where the UAS operation takes place, O.R.C.U.S. requires an OSM image only. It is admitted that the current restriction on one zoom level of the maps limits the application, however, as it is a prototype, it is seen as sufficient. The capacity to differentiate the operational area into miscellaneous parts enables a detailed analysis and founds the basis for further developments, e.g. the incorporation of material databases of the overflowed buildings in order to represent shelter aspects better. In summary, O.R.C.U.S. operational environment generation is a well-balanced approach fitted to the scope.

By the chosen approach to include the UAS and the airborne aspect, O.R.C.U.S. is able to generate risk assessments tailored to the specific UAS or to give a quick overall assessment based on the default configuration. On the one hand, not requiring every technical detail of a UAS makes the tool quite easy to apply and imposes a further advantage. On the other hand, the more technical specifications are known, O.R.C.U.S. can be modified as required. Taking the root-cause into account permits more precise assessments, especially with respect to the possible implications, than other models which leave this aspect out. Although O.R.C.U.S. does not incorporate the risk of mid-air collisions at the moment, this is seen as neglectable as the risk for people on the ground is seen higher than in the air. Furthermore, this aspect can be covered by taking into account P_{CumCat} which also includes the risk that a UA leaves the designated flight path and therefore, endangers other airspace users.

Another big advantage of O.R.C.U.S. is given by the simulation of the people inhabitants within the operational area. While most of the assessed UAS operations risk models contain generic assumptions and fixed values only, the simulation of the population in the affected operational area done by O.R.C.U.S. is time and place dependent. It is recognized that the developed model does not predict movement of inhabitants exactly and that the model also relies on average assumptions which lead to a certain variance. However, because the developed model and the necessary boundary conditions was derived from official census data, supported by straight forward, transparent and comprehensible calculation methods, O.R.C.U.S. provides a unique, well-founded representative time-and placed population simulation.

The mentioned census data indicates a further benefit of O.R.C.U.S. The whole software package is open and transparent. Everything can be traced from top level to bottom event and vice versa. The applied data sources are taken from official entities and provide reliable data. Furthermore, in contrast to most of other assessed risk tools, a clear mean of results validation is provided, which is not self-evident for the majority of other assessed models. Therefore, O.R.C.U.S. can provide a high-level of trust upfront. Accompanied by a low complexity regarding the application itself, O.R.C.U.S. enables handling without long preparational activities.

From the author's point of view, besides the benefits described above, one substantial achievement that O.R.C.U.S. provides is marked by the direct link to an airworthiness classification. The automatic provision of detailed results or possible implications with respect to per flight hour events allows an improvement of the risk awareness before a UAS operations commences. Rejecting often seen lethality probabilities and focusing on the hit of persons or not hit aspect of persons in case of an impacting UA, O.R.C.U.S. gives clear indications without the need to discuss applied medical models. Once an accepted lethality model for impacting UA is available, this might be included within a future version of O.R.C.U.S. For the prototype implementation, the possibility to relate the risk assessment results directly to the cumulative probability of catastrophic events criterion does provide a well-founded base to accept or to deny a UAS operation above the assessed operational area.

In summary, the development of O.R.C.U.S. is seen as success. The defined design aims were fulfilled and the tool provides a lot of advantages compared to the researched UAS risk assessments. O.R.C.U.S. is therefore also seen as an answer on research question number 2, how relevant operational safety considerations for UAS can be modelled. Within the follow-up chapter, the application of O.R.C.U.S. with respect to the scope of the present thesis will be presented.

8 UAS Operation Assessment with O.R.C.U.S.

After the description of the prototype implementation in the preceding chapter, now an exemplary application will be described which was conducted in the course of the present work. In first place, the UAS operation and the subsequent determination of simulations will be presented. Afterwards, the results of the simulations will be shown, followed by a discussion of these results in the last sub-chapter of the present part. Therefore, the present chapter represents contribution C3 which will be concluded in chapter 9.

8.1 Example UAS Operation

The determination of the example UAS operation followed the primary appliance of civil UAS nowadays: surveillance [11]. It is assumed, that streets in different cities shall be surveyed in order to gather statistical data regarding the amount of traffic. The operation shall be performed during early morning until late evening. In the first phase, the flight shall take place on a random day during the week. In the second phase, the UA shall fly every day during a week. As such a mission requires long endurance capabilities of the UA, a fixed wing UA is used.

For both phases, a UAS is assumed for which only few parameters are known. In particular, the safety parameters are anticipated as unknown. Therefore, a very conservative value of $P_{F0} = P_{CumCat} = 0.01 \text{ 1/Fh}$, e.g. compared to the required P_{CumCat} within AEP-83 [107], is expected. Furthermore, this very conservative number was chosen in order to avoid too optimistic results. Further parameters of the example UAS are summarized in Table 8-2. In terms of UAS airworthiness codes for a light UAS, e.g. [32, 107], such a P_{CumCat} would not be acceptable for type certification. Therefore, the aim of the simulation series is to assess whether such a non-certifiable UAS could be granted an operational authorization or not.

<i>Parameter</i>	<i>Phase 1</i>	<i>Phase 2</i>
t_{start}	06:00	06:00
t_{Land}	20:00	20:00
Day_{UA}	Monday or Tuesday or Wednesday or Thursday or Friday or Saturday or Sunday	Monday and Tuesday and Wednesday and Thursday and Friday and Saturday and Sunday
$N_{Day_{UA}}$	1	7
$n_{Probes0}$	7	1

Table 8-1 Example UAS operation phase 1 and 2.

Because the operation shall take place on a random day in the first phase, every weekday must be simulated and each simulated day can be counted as one sample. Therefore, $n_{Probes0}$ equals seven for the first phase. In the second phase, each day must be simulated but only

the simulation of all seven days of a whole week is counted as one sample, because the assumed operation shall take place every day and not only on a random of a week.

Table 8-1 summarizes the two phases at a glance. The UAS parameters which are necessary for the simulation are presented in Table 8-2. It should be noted, that the probability values of the main subsystems represent the default configuration of O.R.C.U.S.

<i>Parameter</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Unit</i>
v_{UA}	100	[km/h]
w_{UA}	5	[m]
l_{UA}	4	[m]
L/D	8	[/]
m_{UA}	90	[kg]
h_{Alt}	100	[m]
$P_{F0} = P_{CumCat}$	0.01	[1/Fh]
$P_{MSS_k}; k = 5$	20	[%]
$P_{MSS_{ENGFC_j}}; j = 3$	33.33	[%]
$P_{MSS_{ELFC_j}}; j = 3$	33.33	[%]
$P_{MSS_{FCFC_j}}; j = 4$	25	[%]
$P_{MSS_{NavSysFC_j}}; j = 2$	50	[%]
$P_{MSS_{STRFC_j}}; j = 1$	100	[%]
$P_{DetectUA}$	50	[%]
$P_{DetectUCS}$	50	[%]
P_{CM_k}	50	[%]
\bar{P}_{CM_k}	50	[%]

Table 8-2 Example UAS parameters.

In order to determine the cities/areas to be overflowed for the simulations, the population distribution database described in chapter 7.2.7 was searched for cities who represent average population density levels. Therefore, an average inhabitant number per city type was calculated [211-215]. Afterwards cities with inhabitants close to these average values were identified and adequate OSM files retrieved. Table 8-3 presents the finally chosen cities.

Key	$\bar{N}_{PPL_{City/Area}}$	City	$N_{PPL_{City/Area}}$
R71	919,052.06	Cologne	1,080,394
R72	181,150.17	Saarbrücken	180,966
R73	19,856.04	Gröbenzell	19,835
R74	8,150.84	Arnstein	8,168
R75	52,030.56	Ibbenbueren	52,037
R76	14,576.16	Eberbach	14,578
R77	6,679.29	Georgensgmünd	6,680
C1	992,766.14	Frankfurt am Main	746,878
C2	189,574.44	Hagen	187,730
C3	67,707.47	Aalen	67,849
C4	30,044.37	Schwedt/Oder	30,075
C5	9,796.96	Kemberg	9,799
C6	3,575.55	Bad Köstritz	3,571
C7	1,435.84	Kroppenstedt	1,440

Table 8-3. Representative cities for the example simulations.

It shall be noted that for the simulations conducted in the scope of the present thesis, neither tourists were added to the population numbers nor a modulation of the population numbers were applied, in order to keep the representative character of the chosen cities. Figure 8-1 shows the O.R.C.U.S. map image for city type R71 Cologne and the projected flight path. Figure 8-2 presents the O.R.C.U.S. map image for city type R77 Georgensgmünd. As can be seen within the image, the city does cover only the minority of the map image. Therefore, the *MapOverlay* function was applied (cf. chapters 7.2.2 and 7.2.7). Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2 shall serve as an exemplary only. Chapter 11.3 contains images of all fourteen example areas with all parameters that were applied for the specific area.




Figure 8-1. Cologne with flight path for example UAS operation.




Figure 8-2. Georgensgmünd with flight path for example UAS operation.

Every example area was transferred into an O.R.C.U.S. map struct. Afterwards, the simulation runs were executed. In order to obtain valid results and also to explore the robustness of O.R.C.U.S., it was decided to set up a high initial number of samples. Therefore, for each phase $n_{Probes0}$ was set to 200 amending the values outlined in Table 8-1.

Based on the defined rules for the determination for the number of samples (cf. chapter 7.2.8), this decision resulted in a total relevant number of simulation samples per city of $n_{ProbesPhase1} = 1,400$ and $n_{ProbesPhase2} = 200$. The relevant number of samples is the basis for the resulting absolute number of simulated flight hours N_{SimFh} . Equations (8-1) to (8-3) present the calculation of this number for both phases of the example. The number of simulated flight hours will later serve as coupling to the driving airworthiness requirement P_{CumCat} .

$$N_{SimDayUA} = n_{Probes} \cdot Day_{UA} \quad (8-1)$$

$$N_{SimFh} = t_{Miss} \cdot N_{SimDayUA} \quad (8-2)$$

$$N_{SimFhPhase1} = 14 \cdot 1400 \cdot 1 = 19,600 \text{ [Fh]} \quad (8-3)$$

$$N_{SimFhPhase2} = 14 \cdot 200 \cdot 7 = 19,600 \text{ [Fh]}$$

With these remarks, the summary of the example UAS operations which were used to apply O.R.C.U.S. is completed. In the next chapter the conclusive results of all simulations will be presented.

8.2 Simulation Results

Before presenting the results of the two phases with the entire 28 simulation series, it is necessary to provide some clarification. As discussed, one driving airworthiness criterion for the overall safety of a UAS is P_{CumCat} . Therefore, one good possibility to assess the results is to calculate a relative difference between the number of events per simulated flight hour with the assumed P_{CumCat} of the simulated UAS. This dimensionless factor will be called "Delta (Δ)". In addition, the same difference can be calculated for the number of actual hits during the events. Equations (8-4) to (8-7) present the calculation method. Note that the equations include the formulation for the probability of an event P_{Event} and the probability that a person got hit P_{Hit} during a simulation series. Both probabilities have the unit [1/Fh].

$$P_{Event} = N_{Events} / N_{SimFh} \quad (8-4)$$

$$P_{Hit} = N_{Hits} / N_{SimFh} \quad (8-5)$$

$$\Delta_{Event} = \left(1 - \frac{P_{Event}}{P_{CumCat}} \right) \cdot 100 \quad (8-6)$$

$$\Delta_{Hit} = \left(1 - \frac{P_{Hit}}{P_{CumCat}} \right) \cdot 100 \quad (8-7)$$

The relative difference Delta Δ factor can be further differentiated into hits at building sites and hits of people on the way, which is shown by equations (8-8) and (8-9).

$$\Delta_{HitATB} = \left(1 - \frac{P_{HitATB}}{P_{CumCat}}\right) \cdot 100 \quad (8-8)$$

$$\Delta_{HitOTW} = \left(1 - \frac{P_{HitOTW}}{P_{CumCat}}\right) \cdot 100 \quad (8-9)$$

If Delta is a negative value, the simulation series indicated that the intended UAS mission would impose an operational risk which is of this factor worse than the estimated P_{CumCat} . If the relative difference has a positive value, the simulation series indicated that the intended UAS mission would impose an operational risk which is of factor Delta times better than the estimated P_{CumCat} .

A special case is given if no event or hit occurred during a simulation series. Consequently, equations (8-6) to (8-9) will give back the value "100". This usually can happen in the following cases:

- a) The assumed P_{CumCat} is very low, e.g. in the order of 10^{-4} [1/Fh] or less and it is unlikely that the UA crashes.
- b) The operation takes place over sparsely populated areas and it is unlikely that in case of a UA crash someone gets hit.
- c) The combination of a) and b).

In such a case, the resulting expected operational risk given by the simulation can be probably be seen as sufficiently low. Nevertheless, such a case requires a careful interpretation. The details which led to the specific Delta value should be inspected in order to avoid shortfalls.

Before entering these values, it is worth to have a look at the resulting validation parameters from the t -Test. Table 8-4 and Table 8-5 present the all parameters. The tables are further illustrated by Figure 8-3 and Figure 8-4. The two figures include two horizontal lines to indicate the two critical t -values, defined in Table 7-12, in order to show whether or not the specific simulation series has passed the critical value. Note that the standard deviation is related to the entire simulation series consisting of n samples with respect to the mean value \bar{x} .

As can be seen in Table 8-4, Figure 8-3, Table 8-5 and Figure 8-4, every simulation series passed the critical t -values. Because of the different number of probes, the t -values are in phase 1 significantly higher than in phase 2. Along with the calculation of the t -Test values, the variance was calculated for all simulation series. Table 8-4 and Table 8-5 include these values, which are differentiated again into the parts ATB, OTW and Series. With exemption for the results of Cologne and Frankfurt, the standard deviation for the validation proof of all simulation series is low.

Area	Short	t_{ATB}	s_{ATB}	t_{OTW}	s_{OTW}	t_{Series}	s_{Series}
Cologne	CGN	35.467	1.179	34.781	0.276	36.100	1.435
Saarbrücken	SBN	33.633	0.401	31.625	0.097	34.675	0.489
Gröbenzell	GBZ	33.352	0.272	28.756	0.066	33.978	0.334
Arnstein	ASN	24.356	0.189	22.561	0.036	27.424	0.21
Ibbenbueren	IBN	33.216	0.245	15.260	0.021	33.580	0.263
Eberbach	EBH	31.223	0.233	28.705	0.064	32.891	0.288
Georgensgmünd	GMD	22.456	0.067	25.408	0.043	28.927	0.103
Frankfurt a.M.	FRA	35.009	1.015	33.145	0.192	35.527	1.189
Hagen	HGN	32.555	0.31	30.998	0.101	34.168	0.398
Aalen	ALN	31.376	0.241	26.996	0.051	32.939	0.283
Schwedt/Oder	SOR	26.043	0.078	7.808	0.017	27.670	0.092
Kemberg	KBG	22.110	0.099	25.818	0.043	28.033	0.132
Bad Köstritz	BKZ	24.709	0.145	19.009	0.027	27.073	0.165
Kroppenstedt	KST	2.907	0.018	11.664	0.034	18.533	0.045

Table 8-4. Phase 1 simulation series t -values and standard deviation.




Figure 8-3. t -Test results phase 1.

Area	Short	t_{ATB}	s_{ATB}	t_{OTW}	s_{OTW}	t_{Series}	s_{Series}
Cologne	CGN	14.961	8.456	14.872	1.683	14.990	10.118
Saarbrücken	SBN	14.781	2.674	14.493	0.454	14.842	3.116
Gröbenzell	GBZ	14.807	2.101	14.468	0.362	14.849	2.457
Arnstein	ASN	13.822	0.921	13.994	0.227	14.231	1.128
Ibbenbueren	IBN	14.565	0.995	14.003	0.182	14.649	1.173
Eberbach	EBH	14.435	1.925	14.428	0.426	14.624	2.331
Georgensgmünd	GMD	14.389	0.609	14.260	0.258	14.639	0.860
Frankfurt a.M.	FRA	14.977	9.490	14.904	1.656	15.001	11.129
Hagen	HGN	14.655	1.867	14.755	0.700	14.824	2.552
Aalen	ALN	14.772	1.934	14.538	0.428	14.868	2.349
Schwedt/Oder	SOR	14.296	0.519	13.337	0.122	14.461	0.636
Kemberg	KBG	13.839	0.547	14.413	0.309	14.444	0.842
Bad Köstritz	BKZ	13.797	1.051	13.248	0.117	14.005	1.156
Kroppenstedt	KST	11.642	0.091	12.151	0.093	13.172	0.177

Table 8-5. Phase 2 simulation series t -values and standard deviation.




Figure 8-4. t -Test results phase 2.


While almost all simulation series resulted for both phases in very high t -values, it is noteworthy the series conducted above Schwedt/Oder in phase 1 resulted in a very low t -value for the ATB part and for the series above Kroppenstedt in a low t -value for the ATB part respectively. Although these t -values are lower than expected, the critical t -values were passed. Furthermore, the overall t -values for the series are more than sufficient and therefore, both simulation series can be treated as valid.

Now that it was shown that all simulation series can be treated as valid, the following tables will summarize the results with respect to the complete simulation series above the specific area. Table 8-6 to Table 8-8 show the results of the first phase of the example UAS operation and Table 8-9 to Table 8-11 show the results of the second phase of the example UAS operation.

For both phases, three tables are presented. At first the general results are shown for each phase without further disambiguation regarding aspects if a hit occurred in the outside (OTW) or in a sheltered area (ATB). In the second step, a differentiation is done with respect to the place where a hit occurred including a disambiguation if a hit occurred in the surrounding map or in the core city overflowed by the UA, if applicable.

The tables are complemented by Figure 8-5 to Figure 8-12 in order to provide a graphical illustration of the results with respect to the relative difference of events and hits shown in equations (8-6) to (8-9). Please note that the dashed lines do not represent a mathematical function, they are only for illustrative purposes.

Area	N_{Events}	P_{Event}	Δ_{Event}	$N_{HitsTotal}$	$P_{HitTotal}$	$\Delta_{HitTotal}$
	[/]	[1/Fh]	[/]	[/]	[1/Fh]	[/]
Cologne	217	$1.11 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-10.71	1,952	$9.96 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-895.92
Saarbrücken	180	$9.18 \cdot 10^{-03}$	8.16	648	$3.31 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-230.61
Gröbenzell	185	$9.44 \cdot 10^{-03}$	5.61	439	$2.24 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-123.98
Arnstein	188	$9.59 \cdot 10^{-03}$	4.08	230	$1.17 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-17.35
Ibbenbueren	175	$8.93 \cdot 10^{-03}$	10.71	345	$1.76 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-76.02
Eberbach	191	$9.74 \cdot 10^{-03}$	2.55	369	$1.88 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-88.27
Georgensgmünd	193	$9.85 \cdot 10^{-03}$	1.53	125	$6.38 \cdot 10^{-03}$	36.22
Frankfurt a.M.	188	$9.59 \cdot 10^{-03}$	4.08	1595	$8.14 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-713.78
Hagen	199	$1.02 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-1.53	523	$2.67 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-166.84
Aalen	186	$9.49 \cdot 10^{-03}$	5.10	363	$1.85 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-85.20
Schwedt/Oder	193	$9.85 \cdot 10^{-03}$	1.53	109	$5.56 \cdot 10^{-03}$	44.39
Kemberg	215	$1.10 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-9.69	152	$7.76 \cdot 10^{-03}$	22.45
Bad Köstritz	190	$9.69 \cdot 10^{-03}$	3.06	181	$9.23 \cdot 10^{-03}$	7.65
Kroppenstedt	220	$1.12 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-12.24	45	$2.30 \cdot 10^{-03}$	77.04

Table 8-6. Phase 1 simulation series general results.

Figure 8-5. Phase 1 relative difference Delta of Events.





Figure 8-6. Phase 1 relative difference Delta of Total Hits ATB and OTW.

Area	SMP/ SurM	City / Sub Map Polygon			Surrounding Map		
		$N_{HitsATB}$ [/]	P_{HitATB} [1/Fh]	Δ_{HitATB} [/]	$N_{HitsATB}$ [/]	P_{HitATB} [1/Fh]	Δ_{HitATB} [/]
Cologne	No	1,579	$8.06 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-705.61	N/A	N/A	N/A
Saarbrücken	No	519	$2.65 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-164.80	N/A	N/A	N/A
Gröbenzell	Yes	354	$1.81 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-80.61	0	0	100.00
Arnstein	Yes	160	$8.16 \cdot 10^{-03}$	18.37	26	$1.33 \cdot 10^{-03}$	86.73
Ibbenbueren	No	319	$1.63 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-62.76	N/A	N/A	N/A
Eberbach	Yes	286	$1.46 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-45.92	0	0	100.00
Georgensgmünd	Yes	70	$3.57 \cdot 10^{-03}$	64.29	0	0	100.00
Frankfurt a.M.	No	1,343	$6.85 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-585.20	N/A	N/A	N/A
Hagen	No	392	$2.00 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-100.00	N/A	N/A	N/A
Aalen	No	297	$1.52 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-51.53	N/A	N/A	N/A
Schwedt/Oder	No	90	$4.59 \cdot 10^{-03}$	54.08	N/A	N/A	N/A
Kemberg	Yes	96	$4.90 \cdot 10^{-03}$	51.02	0	0	100.00
Bad Köstritz	Yes	148	$7.55 \cdot 10^{-03}$	24.49	0	0	100.00
Kroppenstedt	Yes	16	$8.16 \cdot 10^{-04}$	91.84	0	0	100.00

Table 8-7. Phase 1 simulation series SMP/SurM ATB results.


Figure 8-7. Phase 1 relative difference Delta of all Hits ATB.

Area	SMP/ SurM	City / Sub Map Polygon			Surrounding Map		
		$N_{HitsOTW}$ [/]	P_{HitOTW} [1/Fh]	Δ_{HitOTW} [/]	$N_{HitsOTW}$ [/]	P_{HitOTW} [1/Fh]	Δ_{HitOTW} [/]
Cologne	No	373	$1.90 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-90.31	N/A	N/A	N/A
Saarbrücken	No	129	$6.58 \cdot 10^{-03}$	34.18	N/A	N/A	N/A
Gröbenzell	Yes	79	$4.03 \cdot 10^{-03}$	59.69	6	$3.06 \cdot 10^{-04}$	96.94
Arnstein	Yes	40	$2.04 \cdot 10^{-03}$	79.59	4	$2.04 \cdot 10^{-04}$	97.96
Ibbenbueren	No	26	$1.33 \cdot 10^{-03}$	86.73	N/A	N/A	N/A
Eberbach	Yes	83	$4.23 \cdot 10^{-03}$	57.65	0	0	100.00
Georgensgmünd	Yes	52	$2.65 \cdot 10^{-03}$	73.47	3	$1.53 \cdot 10^{-04}$	98.47
Frankfurt a.M.	No	252	$1.29 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-28.57	N/A	N/A	N/A
Hagen	No	131	$6.68 \cdot 10^{-03}$	33.16	N/A	N/A	N/A
Aalen	No	66	$3.37 \cdot 10^{-03}$	66.33	N/A	N/A	N/A
Schwedt/Oder	No	19	$9.69 \cdot 10^{-04}$	90.31	N/A	N/A	N/A
Kemberg	Yes	53	$2.70 \cdot 10^{-03}$	72.96	3	$1.53 \cdot 10^{-04}$	98.47
Bad Köstritz	Yes	32	$1.63 \cdot 10^{-03}$	83.67	1	$5.10 \cdot 10^{-05}$	99.49
Kroppenstedt	Yes	8	$4.08 \cdot 10^{-04}$	95.92	21	$1.07 \cdot 10^{-03}$	89.29

Table 8-8. Phase 1 simulation series SMP/SurM OTW results.




Figure 8-8. Phase 1 relative difference Delta of all Hits OTW.

Area	N_{Events} [/]	P_{Event} [1/Fh]	Δ_{Event} [/]	$N_{HitsTotal}$ [/]	$P_{HitTotal}$ [1/Fh]	$\Delta_{HitTotal}$ [/]
Cologne	223	$1.14 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-13.78	2,147	$1.10 \cdot 10^{-01}$	-995.41
Saarbrücken	217	$1.11 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-10.71	656	$3.35 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-234.69
Gröbenzell	202	$1.03 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-3.06	518	$2.64 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-164.29
Arnstein	195	$9.95 \cdot 10^{-03}$	0.51	229	$1.17 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-16.84
Ibbenbueren	203	$1.04 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-3.57	245	$1.25 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-25.00
Eberbach	184	$9.39 \cdot 10^{-03}$	6.12	484	$2.47 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-146.94
Georgensgmünd	195	$9.95 \cdot 10^{-03}$	0.51	180	$9.18 \cdot 10^{-03}$	8.16
Frankfurt a.M.	198	$1.01 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-1.02	2,363	$1.21 \cdot 10^{-01}$	-1105.61
Hagen	209	$1.07 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-6.63	537	$2.74 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-173.98
Aalen	200	$1.02 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-2.04	496	$2.53 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-153.06
Schwedt/Oder	213	$1.09 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-8.67	132	$6.73 \cdot 10^{-03}$	32.65
Kemberg	228	$1.16 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-16.33	174	$8.88 \cdot 10^{-03}$	11.22
Bad Köstritz	193	$9.85 \cdot 10^{-03}$	1.53	231	$1.18 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-17.86
Kroppenstedt	192	$9.80 \cdot 10^{-03}$	2.04	35	$1.79 \cdot 10^{-03}$	82.14

Table 8-9. Phase 2 simulation series general results.




Figure 8-9. Phase 2 relative difference Delta of Events.




Figure 8-10. Phase 2 relative difference Delta of Total Hits ATB and OTW.

	SMP/ SurM	City / Sub Map Polygon			Surrounding Map		
		$N_{HitsATB}$ [/]	P_{HitATB} [1/Fh]	Δ_{HitATB} [/]	$N_{HitsATB}$ [/]	P_{HitATB} [1/Fh]	Δ_{HitATB} [/]
Cologne	No	1,791	$9.14 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-813.78	N/A	N/A	N/A
Saarbrücken	No	561	$2.86 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-186.22	N/A	N/A	N/A
Gröbenzell	Yes	429	$2.19 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-118.88	13	$6.63 \cdot 10^{-04}$	93.37
Arnstein	Yes	182	$9.29 \cdot 10^{-03}$	7.14	0	0.00	100.00
Ibbenbueren	No	207	$1.06 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-5.61	N/A	N/A	N/A
Eberbach	Yes	395	$2.02 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-101.53	0	0.00	100.00
Georgensgmünd	Yes	126	$6.43 \cdot 10^{-03}$	35.71	0	0.00	100.00
Frankfurt a.M.	No	2,012	$1.03 \cdot 10^{-01}$	-926.53	N/A	N/A	N/A
Hagen	No	389	$1.98 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-98.47	N/A	N/A	N/A
Aalen	No	406	$2.07 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-107.14	N/A	N/A	N/A
Schwedt/Oder	No	107	$5.46 \cdot 10^{-03}$	45.41	N/A	N/A	N/A
Kemberg	Yes	109	$5.56 \cdot 10^{-03}$	44.39	0	0.00	100.00
Bad Köstritz	Yes	207	$1.06 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-5.61	0	0.00	100.00
Kroppenstedt	Yes	17	$8.67 \cdot 10^{-04}$	91.33	0	0.00	100.00

Table 8-10. Phase 2 simulation series SMP/SurM ATB results.




Figure 8-11. Phase 2 relative difference Delta of all Hits ATB.

Area	SMP/ SurM	City / Sub Map Polygon			Surrounding Map		
		$N_{HitsOTW}$ [/]	P_{HitOTW} [1/Fh]	Δ_{HitOTW} [/]	$N_{HitsOTW}$ [/]	P_{HitOTW} [1/Fh]	Δ_{HitOTW} [/]
Cologne	No	356	$1.82 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-81.63	N/A	N/A	N/A
Saarbrücken	No	95	$4.85 \cdot 10^{-03}$	51.53	N/A	N/A	N/A
Gröbenzell	Yes	73	$3.72 \cdot 10^{-03}$	62.76	3	$1.53 \cdot 10^{-04}$	98.47
Arnstein	Yes	38	$1.94 \cdot 10^{-03}$	80.61	9	$4.59 \cdot 10^{-04}$	95.41
Ibbenbueren	No	38	$1.94 \cdot 10^{-03}$	80.61	N/A	N/A	N/A
Eberbach	Yes	87	$4.44 \cdot 10^{-03}$	55.61	2	$1.02 \cdot 10^{-04}$	98.98
Georgensgmünd	Yes	50	$2.55 \cdot 10^{-03}$	74.49	4	$2.04 \cdot 10^{-04}$	97.96
Frankfurt a.M.	No	351	$1.79 \cdot 10^{-02}$	-79.08	N/A	N/A	N/A
Hagen	No	148	$7.55 \cdot 10^{-03}$	24.49	N/A	N/A	N/A
Aalen	No	90	$4.59 \cdot 10^{-03}$	54.08	N/A	N/A	N/A
Schwedt/Oder	No	25	$1.28 \cdot 10^{-03}$	87.24	N/A	N/A	N/A
Kemberg	Yes	62	$3.16 \cdot 10^{-03}$	68.37	3	$1.53 \cdot 10^{-04}$	98.47
Bad Köstritz	Yes	23	$1.17 \cdot 10^{-03}$	88.27	1	$5.10 \cdot 10^{-05}$	99.49
Kroppenstedt	Yes	12	$6.12 \cdot 10^{-04}$	93.88	6	$3.06 \cdot 10^{-04}$	96.94


Table 8-11. Phase 2 simulation series SMP/SurM OTW results.

Figure 8-12. Phase 2 relative difference Delta of all Hits OTW.

Table 8-4 to Table 8-11 and Figure 8-5 to Figure 8-12 summarized the core results the in total twenty-eight simulation series. Within the next and final chapter of this part, the results will be discussed.

8.3 Discussion

To start the discussion about the results and for the further deductions regarding the research questions, a first look is given on the general number of events that occurred during a simulation series.

For both phases, the fraction between N_{Events} and the total number of simulated flight hours N_{Fh} has a maximum relative difference of < 20 , while the majority of Delta values lie within a range of $- 8$ to 10 . For phase 1, the mean of all occurred events during all simulation runs is 194.29 leading to a Delta to the assumed cumulative probability of a catastrophic event of 0.875 only. For phase 2 the mean number of all occurred events is 203.71 , which leads to relative difference of $- 3.94$. Based on the small deviations to P_{CumCat} with regard to the simulated amount of flight hours in the individual simulation series, it can be said, that the applied algorithms to determine if a failure occurred or not within the UA worked as expected. With respect to the aspect that the mean of all simulation series is very close to P_{CumCat} this deduction is further supported.

While the Δ_{Events} remained close to the driving comparative airworthiness requirement P_{CumCat} , the relative difference between hit persons after an impact and P_{CumCat} did not. In both phases, there were significant differences between the expected number of fatalities per flight hour based on the assumed P_{CumCat} and the resulting numbers from the simulations. For example, the simulation series above Cologne resulted in a total relative difference of $\Delta_{Hits} = - 895.92$ for phase one. A UAS operation that would impose such a high risk compared to the assumed P_{CumCat} would hardly get an authorization. On second look, with respect to the ATB and OTW differentiation, $\Delta_{HitsATB}$ remained at a high negative value of $- 705.61$, and $\Delta_{HitsOTW}$ turned to $- 90.31$. By assuming the total number of hits without regard if the people hit were under shelter or not, the cumulative probability would be $9.96 \cdot 10^{-02}$ [1/Fh] instead of the expected $1.0 \cdot 10^{-02}$ [1/Fh] of P_{CumCat} . For people at buildings and therefore sheltered, this number would have to be assumed as $8.06 \cdot 10^{-02}$ [1/Fh] based on the simulation results. And for unsheltered people, the result of the simulation runs for Cologne were $1.90 \cdot 10^{-02}$ [1/Fh] instead of the expected $1.0 \cdot 10^{-02}$ [1/Fh]. All values are basically unacceptable from an airworthiness point of view if they are seen equal to P_{CumCat} , yet, especially for the OTW part, there might be room to lower this value by adequate measures.

Nevertheless, not only the phase 1 simulation series above Cologne showed such differences. But not only in a negative way. In particular, for people in the unprotected outside, the resulting values are promising for the vast majority of simulation series. The simulation series with the highest negative differences were Cologne and Frankfurt. By excluding them, the remaining results can be shown better, which are presented in Figure 8-13 and Figure 8-14.




Figure 8-13. Phase 1 relative difference Delta without CGN and FRA.




Figure 8-14. Phase 2 relative difference Delta without CGN and FRA.

The exclusion of the two extreme results from the simulation series above Cologne and Frankfurt given in Figure 8-13 and Figure 8-14 allow a focus on the most relevant aspect of people hit in the outside and the according relative difference to P_{CumCat} . As can be seen within these two figures, the resulting cumulative probabilities per flight hour of people get hit in the unprotected outside $P_{HitsOTW}$ are much lower than the assumed P_{CumCat} of $1.0 \cdot 10^{-02}$ [1/Fh].

The negative peaks of the simulation series above Cologne and Frankfurt are remarkable. However, the standard deviations of those simulation series calculated by the evaluation function gave an indication that such a difference could reasonably occur. The obvious trace-back of Δ_{Hits} for the mission areas Cologne and Frankfurt are the high population densities and high inhabitant numbers of the cities itself.

For a further interpretation of the results, it was decided to generate confidence bounds for the total mean probabilities of a hit. The confidence bounds are intended to classify the resulting P_{Hit} with respect to the extrema which still could be acceptable from a statistical point of view. Based on the number of samples, a normal distribution can be assumed. To calculate the confidence bounds, it is necessary to estimate the standard deviation of the simulation series mean. This estimation is done by dividing the standard deviation of an entire simulation series from the afore performed t-Test with the square root of number of samples. Equations (8-10) to (8-12) show these relations which are based on [218]. Note that in case a submap is present, these total values are composed out of the addition between the submap and surrounding map values. Again, α is set to 1 % in order to achieve a 99 % confidence interval. The resulting confidence bounds are shown in Table 8-12 to Table 8-15.

$$s_{\bar{x}} = \frac{s}{\sqrt{n}} \quad (8-10)$$

$$C_{Lo} = \bar{x} - z_{1-\frac{\alpha}{2}} \cdot s_{\bar{x}} = \bar{x} - 2.576 \cdot s_{\bar{x}} \quad (8-11)$$

$$C_{Up} = \bar{x} + z_{1-\frac{\alpha}{2}} \cdot s_{\bar{x}} = \bar{x} + 2.576 \cdot s_{\bar{x}} \quad (8-12)$$

Please note, that due to the confidence bound calculation equations, also negative values might occur. As probability values cannot be negative, should be treated as zero. Within the following tables and figures, for the sake of completeness, the original results are shown, including negative values.

Area	SMP/ SurM	$\bar{x} = P_{HitATB}$ [1/Fh]	$s_{\bar{x}}$ [1/Fh]	C_{Lo} [1/Fh]	C_{Up} [1/Fh]
Cologne	No	$8.06 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$8.42 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$7.84 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$8.27 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Saarbrücken	No	$2.65 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$2.87 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$2.57 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$2.72 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Gröbenzell	Yes	$1.81 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$1.95 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$1.76 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$1.86 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Arnstein	Yes	$9.49 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$1.35 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$9.14 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$9.84 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Ibbenbueren	No	$1.63 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$1.75 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$1.58 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$1.67 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Eberbach	Yes	$1.46 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$1.66 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$1.42 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$1.50 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Georgensgmünd	Yes	$3.57 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$4.76 \cdot 10^{-05}$	$3.45 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$3.69 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Frankfurt a.M.	No	$6.85 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$7.25 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$6.67 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$7.04 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Hagen	No	$2.00 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$2.22 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$1.94 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$2.06 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Aalen	No	$1.52 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$1.72 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$1.47 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$1.56 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Schwedt/Oder	No	$4.59 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$5.57 \cdot 10^{-05}$	$4.45 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$4.74 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Kemberg	Yes	$4.90 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$7.08 \cdot 10^{-05}$	$4.72 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$5.08 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Bad Köstritz	Yes	$7.55 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$1.04 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$7.28 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$7.82 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Kroppenstedt	Yes	$8.16 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$1.31 \cdot 10^{-05}$	$7.82 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$8.50 \cdot 10^{-04}$

Table 8-12. Phase 1 simulation series ATB results confidence bounds.

Area	SMP/ SurM	$\bar{x} = P_{HitOTW}$ [1/Fh]	$s_{\bar{x}}$ [1/Fh]	C_{Lo} [1/Fh]	C_{Up} [1/Fh]
Cologne	No	$1.90 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$7.37 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$3.87 \cdot 10^{-05}$	$3.80 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Saarbrücken	No	$6.58 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$2.60 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-1.09 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$1.33 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Gröbenzell	Yes	$4.34 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$1.76 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-2.06 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$8.88 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Arnstein	Yes	$2.24 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$9.50 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$-2.02 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$4.69 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Ibbenbueren	No	$1.33 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$5.62 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$-1.20 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$2.77 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Eberbach	Yes	$4.23 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$1.72 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-1.88 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$8.66 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Georgensgmünd	Yes	$2.81 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$1.15 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-1.63 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$5.78 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Frankfurt a.M.	No	$1.29 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$5.13 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-3.55 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$2.61 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Hagen	No	$6.68 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$2.70 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-2.61 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$1.36 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Aalen	No	$3.37 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$1.38 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-1.77 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$6.91 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Schwedt/Oder	No	$9.69 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$4.57 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$-2.09 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$2.15 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Kemberg	Yes	$2.86 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$1.16 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-1.36 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$5.85 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Bad Köstritz	Yes	$1.68 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$7.14 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$-1.55 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$3.52 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Kroppenstedt	Yes	$1.48 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$9.19 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$-8.87 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$3.85 \cdot 10^{-03}$

Table 8-13 Phase 1 simulation series OTW results confidence bounds.

Area	SMP/ SurM	$\bar{x} = P_{HitATB}$ [1/Fh]	$s_{\bar{x}}$ [1/Fh]	C_{Lo} [1/Fh]	C_{Up} [1/Fh]
Cologne	No	$9.14 \cdot 10^{-02}$	0.598	-1.449	1.632
Saarbrücken	No	$2.86 \cdot 10^{-02}$	0.189	-0.458	0.516
Gröbenzell	Yes	$2.26 \cdot 10^{-02}$	0.149	-0.360	0.405
Arnstein	Yes	$9.29 \cdot 10^{-03}$	0.065	-0.158	0.177
Ibbenbueren	No	$1.06 \cdot 10^{-02}$	0.070	-0.171	0.192
Eberbach	Yes	$2.02 \cdot 10^{-02}$	0.136	-0.331	0.371
Georgensgmünd	Yes	$6.43 \cdot 10^{-03}$	0.043	-0.105	0.117
Frankfurt a.M.	No	$1.03 \cdot 10^{-01}$	0.671	-1.626	1.831
Hagen	No	$1.98 \cdot 10^{-02}$	0.132	-0.320	0.360
Aalen	No	$2.07 \cdot 10^{-02}$	0.137	-0.332	0.373
Schwedt/Oder	No	$5.46 \cdot 10^{-03}$	0.037	-0.089	0.100
Kemberg	Yes	$5.56 \cdot 10^{-03}$	0.039	-0.094	0.105
Bad Köstritz	Yes	$1.06 \cdot 10^{-02}$	0.074	-0.181	0.202
Kroppenstedt	Yes	$8.67 \cdot 10^{-04}$	0.006	-0.016	0.017

Table 8-14. Phase 2 simulation series ATB results confidence bounds.

Area	SMP/ SurM	$\bar{x} = P_{HitOTW}$ [1/Fh]	$s_{\bar{x}}$ [1/Fh]	C_{Lo} [1/Fh]	C_{Up} [1/Fh]
Cologne	No	$1.82 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$8.42 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-3.51 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$3.98 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Saarbrücken	No	$4.85 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$2.27 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-9.97 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$1.07 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Gröbenzell	Yes	$3.88 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$1.81 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-7.81 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$8.54 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Arnstein	Yes	$2.40 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$1.14 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-5.31 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$5.33 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Ibbenbueren	No	$1.94 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$9.09 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$-4.03 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$4.28 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Eberbach	Yes	$4.54 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$2.13 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-9.51 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$1.00 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Georgensgmünd	Yes	$2.76 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$1.29 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-5.66 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$6.08 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Frankfurt a.M.	No	$1.79 \cdot 10^{-02}$	$8.28 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-3.42 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$3.92 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Hagen	No	$7.55 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$3.50 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-1.46 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$1.66 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Aalen	No	$4.59 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$2.14 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-9.21 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$1.01 \cdot 10^{-02}$
Schwedt/Oder	No	$1.28 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$6.10 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$-2.95 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$2.85 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Kemberg	Yes	$3.32 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$1.55 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$-6.65 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$7.30 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Bad Köstritz	Yes	$1.22 \cdot 10^{-03}$	$5.87 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$-2.88 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$2.74 \cdot 10^{-03}$
Kroppenstedt	Yes	$9.18 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$4.66 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$-2.81 \cdot 10^{-04}$	$2.12 \cdot 10^{-03}$

Table 8-15 Phase 2 simulation series OTW results confidence bounds.

To provide an improved overview of the confidence bounds, the results shown in the afore tables were plotted into diagrams with respect to the two phases and the individual P_{Hit} . As the simulations Cologne and Frankfurt lead to a distorted graph which hinders the view on the other simulations, for all graphs a second graph was generated without these two simulations. Figure 8-15 to Figure 8-18 present the comparative graphs for the ATB and OTW parts. On the left all simulation series are shown, on the right the simulation series are shown without Cologne and Frankfurt.




Figure 8-15. Phase 1 simulation series ATB results confidence bounds.




Figure 8-16. Phase 1 simulation series OTW results confidence bounds.




Figure 8-17. Phase 2 simulation series ATB results confidence bounds.




Figure 8-18. Phase 2 simulation series OTW results confidence bounds.

The graphical representation of the confidence bounds and the relation to the resulting hits show a broad range hit probabilities per hour with respect to the conducted samples which would be acceptable from the statistical point of view. As mentioned before, the negative values in the figures as well as in the tables must be treated as zero. But also, by having this in mind, the range is still broad. Obviously, in particular for the two simulations above Cologne and Frankfurt this range is very high. Noteworthy is the aspect that all resulting P_{Hit} lie within the confidence bounds. Based on the sample definition for the two phases and the resulting number of samples, the first phase shows a lower and narrower standard deviation for the mean values than the second phase does. Consequently, the confidence bounds are also closer in the first phase than in the second phase. Although the second set of simulation series impose a broader acceptable range, for both sets of simulation series, it is again shown that the probability that a person gets hit in the outside P_{HitOTW} is for the vast majority of simulation series much less than the assumed P_{CumCat} , if the two extreme results of Cologne and Frankfurt are left out.

In case the comparison between the assumed P_{CumCat} and P_{HitOTW} would be the singular metric for the authorization of the example UAS operations, it can be said, that based on the simulation results, an operation authorization could be possible for both types of example operations for all except Cologne and Frankfurt. The results clearly indicate, that even if a UAS only fulfills such an assumed worse P_{CumCat} , which even is not close to those P_{CumCat} as they are required by several airworthiness code, the expected probability that a person gets hit due to a crash during the example operations would be lower. This finding underlines the widely expectation that although a UAS, in particular light UAS, might be much less safe than a manned aircraft in terms of technical failure probability per flight hour, the risk that people get hurt due to a crash is very low.

However, the partly immense negative difference between the total P_{Hit} and P_{CumCat} and especially between P_{HitATB} and P_{CumCat} raises the question why this occurred during the simulation runs. Therefore, a review of the distribution of the different impact types and the related number of people who got hit was done. Table 8-16 and Table 8-17 summarize the number of occurred events and related impact scenarios described in chapter 7.2.5: Emergency Landing (ELF), Impact at a random point on the map (IRP), Flight termination and immediate impact (FTI), Impact after glide with best glide-ratio on the flight path (IGR), Impact close to the flight path in forward flight direction (IFD), Tangential to the flight path impact (TFP) and Debris impact (DIP). Additionally, for the sake of completeness the No Ground Effect (NGE) case was added, which occurs if a countermeasure was successful and the UA continued the flight.

N_{Events}	NGE	ELF	IRP	FTI	IGR	IFD	TFP	DIP
Cologne	4	50	14	78	7	5	14	45
Saarbrücken	4	33	9	67	9	6	11	41
Gröbenzell	6	49	19	68	6	5	16	51
Arnstein	5	39	15	68	8	5	11	37
Ibbenbueren	7	36	12	67	5	5	8	35
Eberbach	4	34	17	67	9	1	18	41
Georgensgmünd	6	43	11	83	3	2	6	39
Frankfurt a.M.	4	31	15	68	4	2	25	39
Hagen	7	35	15	82	4	2	14	40
Aalen	7	33	12	63	8	4	18	41
Schwedt/Oder	6	37	9	76	8	2	20	35
Kemberg	3	51	15	80	8	1	14	43
Bad Köstritz	7	39	9	67	2	4	18	44
Kroppenstedt	10	33	21	80	6	5	21	44

Table 8-16 Phase 1 number of events.

N_{Events}	NGE	ELF	IRP	FTI	IGR	IFD	TFP	DIP
Cologne	3	44	19	77	5	5	21	49
Saarbrücken	4	43	15	65	4	4	13	37
Gröbenzell	4	35	17	69	9	5	14	42
Arnstein	3	46	13	76	6	3	23	33
Ibbenbueren	11	31	16	64	10	3	16	33
Eberbach	4	44	17	61	7	0	16	46
Georgensgmünd	4	41	18	61	5	6	13	50
Frankfurt a.M.	6	44	20	69	5	7	16	42
Hagen	4	37	18	69	10	1	15	46
Aalen	2	38	18	82	5	0	14	54
Schwedt/Oder	3	40	19	90	7	8	20	41
Kemberg	4	37	13	69	11	3	21	35
Bad Köstritz	1	32	16	82	8	4	13	36
Kroppenstedt	3	44	19	77	5	5	21	49

Table 8-17 Phase 2 number of events.




Figure 8-19. Left phase 1, right phase 2 right event and impact distributions.

Figure 8-19 picturizes Table 8-16 and Table 8-17. By this figure, it can be seen that the distribution of events and impacts is for both phases more or less similar regarding the occurrence. This was expected, as the distribution follows the underlying event tree and given occurrence probabilities within the UAS. If this was not the case, the algorithms for the generation of initiating failures inside the UAS would not work correctly (cf. chapters 7.2.3 and 7.2.5).

While the general event distribution does not provide an explanation for the big deviation to the assumed cumulative probability of a catastrophic event, a review of the number of people hit due to the different impact scenarios gives a better insight. Figure 8-20 to Figure 8-23 conclude the number of people hit due to the different impact scenarios with respect to the two phases and to ATB and OTW. In order to visualize all impacts adequately, it was necessary to apply a logarithmic scale on the y-axis for the ATB parts. Note that the cases Emergency Landing and No Ground Effect are not included because in these cases obviously no people got hit.




Figure 8-20. Phase 1 ATB number of hits due to impact.




Figure 8-21. Phase 1 OTW number of hits due to impact.




Figure 8-22. Phase 2 ATB number of hits due to impact.




Figure 8-23. Phase 2 OTW number of hits due to impact.

Figure 8-20 to Figure 8-23 show that in each simulation series for every overflow area the most people got hit due to debris impacts in both phases. The noticeable difference between ATB and OTW regarding the number of hit persons can be traced back to the fact that in accordance with the movement algorithms and the source data of them, a majority of people is not in the outside (cf. chapter 7.2.7). Taking out the hit data caused by debris impacts results in a much clearer picture of the number of people who got hit. Figure 8-24 to Figure 8-27 present this reduced data set.




Figure 8-24. Phase 1 ATB number of hits due to impact without DIP.




Figure 8-25. Phase 1 OTW number of hits due to impact without DIP.




Figure 8-26. Phase 2 ATB number of hits due to impact without DIP.




Figure 8-27. Phase 2 OTW number of hits due to impact without DIP.

The reduced data set illustrated in Figure 8-24 to Figure 8-27 show that the remaining hit numbers are very low, in particular for people in the outside. Actually, for the more rural areas, the simulations resulted in zero person hits in the outside. Based on this one can deduce that at first sight the debris impact scenario implies a disproportionate number of hits. There are two major causes for this disproportion: The design of the debris impact scenario incorporates a very conservative approach to calculate the resulting impact area, which might lead to large impact areas (cf. equations (7-28) to (7-31)) and consequently to more potential persons hit, as the impact area directly affects the possible number of persons hit (cf. equation (5-2)). In case of the executed simulations and the applied mission parameters, the resulting debris impact area has a size of $A_{Impact} = 12,469 \text{ m}^2$. Compared to the impact areas that occur due to the other impact scenarios, the size of the debris impact area inflicts an immense increase of the impact area. The size of a non-gliding impact is 113.10 m^2 and in case of a glide impact the size is 240 m^2 . Based on this difference, the large numbers of people who got hit due to failures in the UAS that led to debris impact scenarios are corollary.

Subsequently, this follows the predictions given by equation (5-2). By this, another aspect becomes evident. One variable like an assumed impact area can affect the whole probability

that persons get hurt due to a UA impact vastly. Although this is directly linked to the occurrence probability of such an impact scenario, one can deduce an indication of the general reliability of such assumptions and also the reliability of operational safety aspects. At this point, the core research question as well as the three detailed research questions from chapter 1.3 shall be recalled:

Is it possible to proof the airworthiness of a light UAS with operational safety considerations instead of traditional airworthiness requirements in order to obtain a type certificate?

1. What are relevant operational safety considerations in the context of light UAS operations in Germany?
2. How can these operational safety considerations for light UAS be modelled?
3. How reliable are such operational safety considerations for light UAS?

At first, the three detailed questions will be discussed. Regarding the first detailed question, in accordance with chapter 5 and 6 as well as based on the review of selected operational safety assessments for UAS, the relevant operational safety considerations in the context of light UAS operations above Germany are primary the area to be the operational environment and overflowed area itself, infrastructure, the inhabitation grade and population density and in particular the movement of the inhabitants in relation to the time of day. Another operational safety consideration that needs to be taken into account is given by the impact area of the UA. Although this is an implicit operational safety consideration as it is not directly related to the environment where the operation takes place and rather related to the UAS design, the performed O.R.C.U.S. simulation runs exposed the enormous potential effects of this aspect on the simulation results.

With respect to the second question, chapter 5.7 provided an oversight of different model method across the reviewed operational risk assessments which then was completed by the resulting shortcomings shown in chapter 6 and an exemplary method to overcome them by the prototype implementation with O.R.C.U.S. presented in chapter 7. O.R.C.U.S. provides an exemplary method to model the relevant operational safety considerations as described in the passage above. Furthermore, the simulation environment of O.R.C.U.S. is not limited to these aspects only, the technical aspects from the UAS itself are also included, providing a comprehensive simulation environment. In any case, any model including O.R.C.U.S., must rely on several assumptions. The more robust these assumptions are, the more trust can be given to the model. This includes also a mean to validate the results, which was also provided by O.R.C.U.S. It can be said, that the methods applied for the generation of the O.R.C.U.S. simulation environment are founded on well-defined assumptions and derivations. For example, O.R.C.U.S. does not include an explicit infrastructure model which predicts the ability to withstand an impacting UA or which predicts the grade of injury, as it was found that this deems a too high uncertainty. However, after development competition, the application of O.R.C.U.S. showed that for example the chosen impact area methodology should be reassessed. While the UA non-debris impact areas, which were derived out of common impact area approaches, resulted in hit numbers that can be deemed as expected, the debris-impact scenario did result in hit numbers much higher than expected because of the pure impact area size. This underlines that any model decision for operational safety considerations might influence the entire simulation more than anticipated and therefore, must be handled with care.

At last, the third question needs to be assessed with respect to the findings out of the O.R.C.U.S. simulations. The common assumption that the probability of people getting hit due to a crashing UA is dependent upon time and place where the operation takes place could be shown. Aspects like inhabitation grade, the area itself and the defined population density must be deemed basically as unchangeable for a given operation. For example, if an operation shall be executed above the down town centre of Munich in order to assess traffic movement, it would not make sense to execute this operation above a rural area outside of Munich. Obviously, the risk to the inhabitants in Munich would be reduced significantly, but the whole operation would not fulfill the operational aim at all. With respect to the operational environment, it can be said, if the source material to outline the environment is taken from an acceptable source, this part of the model should be deemed as trustworthy.

The aspect of population movement provides a variable that can be used to reduce the risk to the overflowed population in a given area to be overflowed people, if the operational requirements allow it. For example, if the aim of the UAS operation shall be to investigate the structural integrity of buildings by using radar technology in a densely populated area, this could also be done at night when the vast majority of inhabitants is inside protective buildings. An example is shown in Figure 8-28 and Figure 8-29. These figures present the cumulated people distributions for people at buildings and in the outside for the example cities Saarbrücken and Ibbenbueren during the phase 1 simulation series. For Saarbrücken a Tuesday progression is shown and for Ibbenbueren a Monday progression. The time scale is in accordance to occurred UA failure events during the particular simulation. Figure 8-30 and Figure 8-31 present the cumulated numbers of people that got hit or not hit due to the crashing UA during the simulation series above Saarbrücken and Ibbenbeuren in phase 1.




Figure 8-28. Phase 1 SBN: Cumulated Tuesday people distribution during simulation.




Figure 8-29. Phase 1 IBN: Cumulated Monday people distribution during simulation.




Figure 8-30. Phase 1 SBN: Cumulated Tuesday numbers of people hit.




Figure 8-31. Phase 1 IBN: Cumulated Monday numbers of people hit.

As can be seen in Figure 8-30, there are peaks for people who got hit in the outside in the timeframes of around 11:00, 14:30 as well as around 18:00. Compared to the people progression shown in Figure 8-28, this relates to an increased movement of people in the outside. Similar observations can be made for Figure 8-31 and Figure 8-29. There are peaks regarding people who got hit in the outside around 13:00, 17:00 and 20:00. The timeframes around noon are typical lunch times when a noticeable percentage of people are in the outside in order to get food. The timeframe of roughly two hours before and after 18:00 is a common time to go home from work or to go to dinner and an increased number of people is in the outside. Nevertheless, it can also be seen, that although several crashes occurred, for the majority of crashes no person got hit. Neither in buildings, nor, and this is of particular interest, in the outside.

This leads to two conclusions: First, phases of increased people movement in the overflow area should be avoided in general for conducting a mission. It is felt better to have an almost constant number of people movement in the overflow area instead to have a constant varying number. It is recognized, that this would basically contradict the example mission, as the example mission required a constant surveillance of the area and this obviously implies a constant variation of people in move. In any case, it was shown by the prototype implementation with O.R.C.U.S. that it is possible to model the movement of people in Germany by applying clear methods and sources.

However, it must be said, that people movement cannot be controlled to that amount as for example the failure probability of the UAS itself. Therefore, the reliability is limited. The O.R.C.U.S. people movement algorithm can only represent a good basis and increase the risk awareness during the mission planning process. As suggested in [190], such an awareness can be augmented by a life data feed from the airborne UA.

Second, the risk to get hit by an impacting UA is present, but compared to the number of crashes in this simulation, the risk is relatively low. It should not be forgotten, that the assumed number of a failure that leads to a crash was set to 0.01 per flight hour. This brings back the point, that a UAS founded on good design techniques and based on clear development processes ensures a high level of reliability and will always surpass a UAS that was developed without respect to any standard. In contrast to people movement, this variable can be controlled almost entirely.

Although time and place can have a noticeable effect, it can be said, that a UAS which was shown to be airworthy, will decrease the risk to the overflowed people in a more sustainable way than to focus operations above sparsely populated areas or to focus on operations which take only place during a specific time frame. Those aspects might mitigate deficiencies for certain design factors, like a higher than allowed cumulative safety requirement, but a UA which is composed out of poor materials and a consequently weak structure vulnerable to gusts or wrong commands by an FCS can hardly be mitigated by operational considerations. Mitigating such deficiencies can only be covered by more than strict limitations which probably deny a practical operation execution.

In particular, UAS flight critical software developed without taking into account accepted standards implies a completely uncontrollable inherent risk for the UAS and the overflown people and area. Having this derivation at hand, the hypothesis which was derived out of the fundamental research question shall be recalled:

Operational safety considerations cannot be used as the only proof of airworthiness of a light UAS in an aircraft type inspection process to achieve a type certificate.

The application of O.R.C.U.S. showed that an operation with an assumed non-airworthy UAS that has a high cumulative crash probability can be conducted for specific operation areas without creating an unacceptable high risk for the operational environment. It can be said, that the combination of operational safety consideration factors might surpass the unknown failures within the UAS. Nonetheless, this also shows that operational safety considerations can only be a supportive mean to reduce risk but not to be used as a singular evidence for the airworthiness of a UAS.

Although airworthiness of aircraft is always linked to certain operational aspects, such as the operation of the aircraft in specific climate zones or altitudes only, these aspects cannot be treated the same way as operational safety considerations. For example, the limitation to certain flight altitudes does not limit the aircraft to be flown above specific areas. Such a limitation is part of the definitions made by the technical specification of the aircraft in which the aircraft shall work as expected. Airworthiness of aircraft should always be independent of the operational safety considerations discussed in the present thesis as they indulge a significant level of uncertainty and non-deterministic effects. One core principle of aircraft type inspection and the airworthiness is determinism. This determinism ensures the unlimited operation of the aircraft within the boundaries of the technical specifications. Operational safety considerations as for example shelter structures or population movement cannot be predicted entirely for every mission. Therefore, a mixture or complete reliance on operational safety considerations to obtain a type certificate for a light UAS would be a contradiction. Consequently, the core research question must be answered with no, it is not possible to proof the airworthiness of a light UAS by operational safety considerations alone and the hypothesis of the present thesis is proven.

9 Conclusion and Outlook

In the eight chapters which preceded the present chapter, the idea and also the question was discussed if it is thinkable to proof airworthiness of a light UAS by operational safety considerations in order to obtain a type certificate. To get an entry point into this complex topic, the history of unmanned aviation was described. Additionally, four aviation key organizations, ICAO, FAA, EASA and also NATO as representative for military aviation, were introduced for the broader context.

History showed that UAS were born in the military aviation world and were always a shadow of manned aviation. While flown in other airspaces than manned aircraft, regulations for unmanned aircraft lacked behind. This was emphasized by the deduction of aviation safety by outlining the two driving concepts *airworthy by design* and *airworthy by operation*. Whereas the first concept is an inevitable part of manned aviation to ensure highest levels of safety to passengers, the second concept is basically one key to enable operations with UAS that do not comply with all airworthiness requirements they are expected to comply with. This was presented and discussed within the chapters that gave an in-depth insight into current UAS regulation activities of the four key organizations mentioned before and supported by the process description about type certification.

It was shown that the need of harmonization and interoperability within military forces led to the first international airworthiness standards for UAS, published by NATO. While large UAS, able to fulfill airworthiness standards, became a permanent asset within air forces worldwide, the civil world focused at first on small UAS. Light UAS are deemed to become part of specific regulations, incorporating the fact that regular operations comparable to manned aviation are not possible at the moment, as it was shown in chapter 4. For those kinds of operations, airworthiness or aviation safety will be achieved only by restrictive and stiff operational limitations. However, it can be said, that this is not airworthiness in the sense of the technical origin. It is more a kind of risk balancing. Such limitations should not be confused with operational safety considerations as the latter are, as implied by the name, options to be considered and not hard limitations. Would it be possible to obtain a type certificate for a light UAS by applying only operational safety considerations? Or is it necessary to apply always strict, non-flexible operational limitations? These ideas and questions led to the hypothesis which stated that operational safety considerations cannot be used as the only proof of airworthiness of a light UAS in an aircraft type inspection process to achieve a type certificate. Driven by the hypothesis, the fundamental research question and three detailed research questions were developed. The introduction outlined them and all are repeated below:

Is it possible to proof the airworthiness of a light UAS with operational safety considerations instead of traditional airworthiness requirements in order to obtain a type certificate?

1. What are relevant operational safety considerations in the context of light UAS operations in Germany?
2. How can these operational safety considerations for light UAS be modelled?
3. How reliable are such operational safety considerations for light UAS?

On the course to achieve answers to the core question and the three detailed questions, an intense review of existing UAS operational risk assessments was performed. This review

concluded within several operational safety considerations that are relevant for UAS operations in general and in consequence also for operations above Germany. Furthermore, numerous shortfalls were identified and recommendations to overcome them were developed. Chapter 5 and 6 described this sound analysis of the selected operational risk assessments which is completed by the appendix chapter 11.1 as this chapter contains a standardized scheme for each UAS operational risk assessment approach.

The further course of the research which led to the present thesis and to obtain an answer for detailed research question number two concluded in the development of the O.R.C.U.S. software tool. Based on the recognitions regarding other UAS operation risk assessment, O.R.C.U.S. took into account these findings which led to an encompassing software that enables operators to evaluate the potential ground risk of a UAS operation above any area Germany. Two of the important advantages of O.R.C.U.S. are the ability to apply it without the need to have in-depth knowledge about the UAS, the place and time dependent simulation of population distributions within the operational area and the direct relation to airworthiness quantification means with respect to the cumulative safety number. Other advantages are the open architecture, transparency and the suggested validation method. Furthermore, based on the architecture of O.R.C.U.S. it can be expanded or modified as required. Yet encompassing in its features, the development of O.R.C.U.S. is not seen as finalized. Possible upgrades might include a more detailed differentiation for green areas in order to differentiate better between uninhabited areas and areas of recreational activities. A further improvement to be included would be the ability to apply map images of any zoom level. Another possible improvement could be the inclusion of operational volumes in accordance to SORA or in general more impact area variations. Once available, it is also thinkable to add a database that contains air traffic data of the specific area where the UA is operated and consequently include the risk estimation of mid-air collisions.

With respect to the last detailed research question, a prototype implementation of O.R.C.U.S. was done. The implementation was performed by simulating UAS operations above 14 selected areas in Germany with two different settings each, which led to more than half a million simulated flight hours. To analyze the results, a comparison between the cumulated number of persons hit by UA crashes and the assumed cumulative probability of a catastrophic event was executed in order to show the relative deviation between both. By doing so, it was shown that the results are highly dependent upon the operational area and by modeling of the impact scenarios. For the prototype implementation they were modeled with a trend to be more conservative, e.g. the debris area model needs to be re-considered. Nevertheless, the application of O.R.C.U.S. also showed that an operation with an assumed non-airworthy UAS might not result in an unacceptable high risk for the operational environment if combined with specific operational safety considerations, such as the overflown area and the operational time. Such consideration factors before an operation might surpass the unknown failures within the UAS. However, the results of the simulation series also showed that operational safety considerations can only be a supportive mean to reduce risk and to increase risk awareness but they cannot be used as a single source to prove that a UAS is airworthy.

As any other UAS operational risk assessment tool, O.R.C.U.S. also depends on the validity of assumptions. Although O.R.C.U.S. relies on official data bases for the population and their movement, it is all theory and it is all a prediction only. Looking for example at SORA and the

upcoming annexes of it, the results of this process are similar to airworthiness evidences, yet they are not leading to a type certificate. Furthermore, the application will always be limited to specific operations only, not allowing regular operations although many variables are needed. The more variables needed, the more the application is limited and the more vulnerable the model will be to changes in one of the many variables. In contrast to such approaches, O.R.C.U.S. does not need that much variables and does not aim to produce airworthiness alike results.

In conclusion, operational safety considerations might be helpful for the pre-estimation of a UAS operation but they are highly dependent on the tools for their generation, the UAS and the operation itself to be conducted. To achieve airworthiness of a UAS, much more is needed and nothing surpasses a well-designed UAS that is compliant to an applicable airworthiness standard. An airworthy UAS will always reduce the risk to the operational environment more than any risk-based authorization. Furthermore, only with airworthy UAS, regular UAS operations will be possible, enhancing the acceptance of UAS in the aviation community as only by this, the unmanned aircraft will be treated as equivalent partner to manned aircraft. Therefore, to the authors best knowledge, the hypothesis of the present thesis has been proven to be correct.

10 Bibliography

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11 Appendices

11.1 Assessment of UAS Operations Risk Models

Please note that the equations within the different UAS operation risk models were aligned as far as possible to the formula notation of the present thesis. Formula symbols which are not explained in the registers chapter because they are too specific, are explained directly. As the equations are taken directly from the source and are only shown for the sake of completeness, the enumeration for equations is not applied.

In case a part is described as “not considered” or “not assessed”, this means that the model did not provide a qualitative or quantitative description of equation for the specific part.

Model	Weibel and Hansman [36]
P_{FUA}	Assumed as fraction of UA MTBF: $P_{FUA} = \frac{1}{MTBF_{UA}}$; No detailed consideration of root cause or sub-system failures in the UAS.
Operational Area	No specific operational area and details besides population densities applied. Example given for U.S.
S	Shelter based on object penetration probability; $S = P_{Pen}$
$\rho_{PopGround}$	Census based regions. Uniform distribution. Static in time.
A_{Impact}	Geographic method. UA planform area for six defined UAS classes. No equation provided. $A_{Impact} = A_{UARef}$
P_{Fat}	Includes mitigation possibilities (e.g. design based) $P_{Fat} = (1 - P_{Mit})$
$P_{CGround}$	$P_{CGround} = P_{FUA} \cdot A_{Impact} \cdot \rho_{PopGround} \cdot S \cdot P_{Fat}$
P_{MAC}	Assumed random location of UA in the airspace by gas model of aircraft. $P_{MAC} = \frac{A_{Front} \cdot d_{travel}}{V \cdot t_{travel}}$; V_{Air} = Airspace volume; d_{travel} = travelled distance; t_{travel} = time travelled
ρ_{PopAir}	Example taken for one day in US NAS, based on FAA data.
P_{CAir}	$P_{CAir} = P_{MAC}(P_{FatCol} - P_{MitCol})$ P_{FatCol} = Fatality probability in case of an aircraft collides with a UA P_{MitCol} = Mitigation measures against collision
P_C	Not assessed as combination of air and ground casualty probability.
Notes	Comprehensive model which involves air and ground risk. Mitigation variables suggested but not applied. Determination of penetration probabilities and impact areas is not given. Model uses given target of safety levels for a backwards calculation to determine acceptable population densities that could be overflown.

Model	Clothier and Walker [37]
P_{FUA}	Assumed as system failure rate: $P_{FUA} = SFR$ No detailed consideration of root cause or sub-system failures in the UAS.
Operational Area	No specific operational area and details besides population densities applied. Applied to Queensland, Australia.
S	Broad assumption that exposed people are not sheltered: $S = 1$
$\rho_{PopGround}$	Census based regions. Uniform distribution. Static in time.
A_{Impact}	Geographic method. Defined as lethal area: $A_{Impact} = A_{Lethal} = \pi(\max(\text{diameter})_{UA} + w_P)^2$
P_{Fat}	Assumed that any strike is a fatality: $P_{Fat} = 1$
$P_{CGround}$	$P_{CGround} = (P_{FUA} + P_{MAC} + Z) \times A_{Impact} \cdot \rho_{PopGround}$ $Z =$ other reasons for the UA to crash, e.g. bird strike or weather
P_{MAC}	P_{MAC} not modelled as equation but taken into account by applying debris as a result of a collision: $P_{MAC} = MC_{Debris}$
ρ_{PopAir}	Not modelled.
P_{CAir}	Not modelled.
P_C	$P_C = P_{CGround}$
Notes	Basic UAS operations risk model. Model uses casualty expectation for a backwards calculation to determine acceptable population densities that could be overflowed.

Model	Clothier et. al. [38]
P_{FUA}	Assumed as $P_{FUA} = \lambda = 1 \cdot 10^{-5} [1/Fh]$ No detailed consideration of root cause or sub-system failures in the UAS.
Operational Area	Generic model. No specific operational area and details besides population densities applied. Example given for a UA approach to an Australian Airforce base. The example includes flight path and ground elevation.
S	Not considered.
$\rho_{PopGround}$	Noted that spatial census information could be used. Uniform distribution. Static in time.
A_{Impact}	Geographic method. Two forms of impact: Glide and vertical fall. $A_{Impact UA} = \begin{cases} (w_{UA} + 2 \cdot r_P) \times (l_{UA} + d_{GlideGround} + 2 \cdot r_P) \\ \pi \times (0.5 \cdot w_{UA} + r_P)^2 \end{cases}$ $d_{GlideGround} = h_p / \sin(\gamma)$
P_{Fat}	Assumed that any strike is a fatality: $P_{Fat} = 1$
$P_{CGround}$	$P_{CGround} = P_{FUA} \cdot P_{Fat} \cdot \rho_{PopGround} \cdot A_{Impact}$
P_{MAC}	Not considered.
ρ_{PopAir}	Not considered.
P_{CAir}	Not considered.
P_C	$P_C = P_{CGround}$
Notes	Model calculates the individual casualty risk as bi-variate normal distribution along and across the flight path. Model can be seen as further development of [37]

Model	Dalamagkidis et. al. [39, 46]
P_{FUA}	The model applies a target level of safety approach based to determine an acceptable P_{FUA} which is linked to an acceptable frequency of ground impacts. Initial assumptions: $P_{FUA} = 10^{-6}[1/Fh]$. No detailed consideration of root cause or sub-system failures in the UAS.
Operational Area	Generic model. No specific operational area and details besides population densities applied. Several examples provided.
S	$S = p_s \in (0,1]; \bar{p}_s = 0.5$ Takes into account crash trajectory and by obstacles absorbed kinetic energy.
$\rho_{PopGround}$	Three assumed population densities. Uniform distribution. Static in time.
A_{Impact}	Geographic method: $A_{Impact} = w_{UA} \times [l_{UA} + h_p/\sin(\gamma)]$
P_{Fat}	$P_{Fat} = \frac{1}{1 + \sqrt{\alpha/\beta} \cdot [\beta/E_{Imp}]^{1/4 p_s}}$ <p> α= Impact energy required for a fatality probability of 50% with $p_s = 0.5$ β= Impact energy threshold required to cause a fatality if $p_s \rightarrow 0$ </p> $E_{Imp} = \frac{m^2 g}{\rho_{Air} \cdot A_{UAFront} \cdot C_d}$
$P_{CGround}$	$P_{CGround} = A_{Impact} \cdot \rho_{PopGround} \cdot P_{Fat}$
P_{MAC}	$P_{MAC} = \frac{A_{UAFront} \cdot d_{travel}}{V_{Air} \cdot t_{travel}} \cdot P_{Col CT}$ <p> $P_{Col CT}$ = Probability that one of the conflicting aircraft successfully attempts a collision avoidance maneuver. </p> <p> Elaborates that $\frac{A_{UAFront} \cdot d_{travel}}{V_{Air} \cdot t_{travel}}$ is hard to determine because of the high dynamic of air traffic. Instead a worst-case approach regarding conflicting trajectories is applied, see ρ_{PopAir}. </p>
ρ_{PopAir}	$\rho_{PopAir} = E(CT) = \frac{A_{UAFront} \cdot d_{travel}}{V_{Air} \cdot t_{travel}} = 10^{-4}[1/Fh]$ <p> $E(CT)$ = Expected conflicting trajectories, based on historical data. </p>
P_{CAir}	$P_{CAir} = P_{Col CT} = \frac{P_{MAC}}{\rho_{PopAir}}$
P_C	Not assessed as combination of air and ground casualty probability. P_C is presented as acceptable frequency of ground impacts. $P_C = 1/T_{GI,min}$; T_{GI} = Minimum acceptable time between two ground impacts. $T_{GI,min} = \frac{A_{Impact} \cdot \rho_{PopGround} \cdot P_{FUA}}{P_{Fat}}$
Notes	Unusual with respect to P_C presentation. Expands the P_{MAC} of [36]. Function failure conditions with TLS as overall target.
Model	Burke [40]

P_{FUA}	Acceptable P_{FUA} shall be determined via TLS. Initial TLS is set to 10^{-7} [1/Fh]. No detailed consideration of root cause or sub-system failures in the UAS.
Operational Area	Generic model for sUAS with ca. $0.9 \text{ kg} < m_{UA} < 150 \text{ kg}$. No specific operational area and details besides population densities applied.
S	Defined as hard and soft shelters. No specific value given. Seen as factor of E_{Kin} and therefore m_{UA} is included within the final $P_{C UA}$ equation.
$\rho_{PopGround}$	Four categories, uniform distribution and static in time: unpopulated, sparsely populated, densely populated, and open-air assembly. Average values for each category based on U.S. census data. The average values are summed up with respect to the mission time above a specific category.
A_{Impact}	Geographic method. Defined as lethal area: $A_{Impact} = A_{Lethal} = \pi \times w_{UA}^2$
P_{Fat}	Based on 66 J blunt trauma criterion, m_{UA} range was set. For any UA within the scope of the model $P_{Fat} = 1$ is valid.
$P_{CGround}$	$P_{CGround} = P_{FUA} \cdot \rho_{PopGround} \cdot A_{Impact} \cdot S \cdot P_{Fat}$
P_{MAC}	Not assessed.
ρ_{PopAir}	Not assessed.
P_{CAir}	Not assessed.
P_C	$P_C = P_{CGround}$; transferred into point-based TLS: $TLS = k \cdot m_{UA} \cdot (\log_{10}(\rho_{PopGround} \cdot A_{Impact}))^2; k = \text{Correction factor}$ <p>The TLS equation is sensitive regarding units. Original units are not SI units. If applied to another units, correction factor k must be amended accordingly.</p>
Notes	Instead of applying target values in terms of events per flight hour, the approach applies a point-based TLS. Foundation of the TLS is the casualty equation of [192]

Model	Waggoner [42]
P_{FUA}	No detailed consideration of root cause or sub-system failures in the UAS. Defined as UAS specific “mid-air” failure $\lambda = P_{FUA}$.
Operational Area	Surface and airspace model. Includes structure density, average height and size.
S	Considered implicitly by P_{Fat} for persons inside buildings.
$\rho_{PopGround}$	Based on U.S. census. Outside pedestrian density based on assumptions. Uniform distribution. Static in time.
A_{Impact}	Geographic method. A_{Impact} defined as lethal area for pedestrian (p) and building (b) strikes with respect to horizontal glide and vertical fall impacts: $A_{LVp}, A_{LHp}, A_{LVb}, A_{LHb}$
	$A_{Impact} = \begin{cases} A_{LVp} = \pi(w_{UA}/2 + r_p)^2 \\ A_{LHp} = (w_{UA} + 2r_p)(l_{UA} + h_p/\tan(\gamma)) \\ A_{LVb} = \pi(w_{UA}/2 + w_b/2)^2 \\ A_{LHb} = (w_{UA} + w_b)(l_{UA} + h_b/\tan(\gamma)) \end{cases}$
P_{Fat}	Differentiates between fatality probability inside (b) and outside buildings (p):
	$P_{Fat} = \begin{cases} 0 \leq P_{Fat_b} \leq 1 \\ 0 \leq P_{Fat_p} \leq 1 \end{cases}$
$P_{CGround}$	Differentiates between pedestrian and building strikes. Note that the mid-air collision rate is already included here.
	$P_{CGround} = \rho_p \cdot P_{FUA} \cdot A_{LVp} + P_{MAC} \cdot \rho_{ped} \cdot A_{LVp}$ $P_{CGround} = \rho_b \cdot P_{FUA} \cdot A_{LVb} + P_{MAC} \cdot \rho_b \cdot A_{LVb}$ <p>ρ_p = Pedestrian density, defined as percentage of $\rho_{PopGround}$.</p> <p>ρ_b = Building density.</p>
P_{MAC}	Defined as transient aircraft strikes ($P_{MACtrans}$) and UA fleet strikes ($P_{MACUAfleet}$), based on a molecular collision model and densities of UA ($\rho_{PopAirUA}$) and A/C in the air ($\rho_{PopAirA/C}$).
	$P_{MAC} = P_{MACtrans} + P_{MACUAfleet}$ $P_{MACtrans} = \rho_{PopAirA/C} \cdot A_{col} \cdot v_{rel} \cdot (1 - \epsilon_{UA/A/C})(1 - \epsilon_{A/C})$ $P_{MACUAfleet} = 2 \cdot \rho_{PopAirUA} \cdot A_{UAFront} \sqrt{2} \cdot v_{UA}(1 - \epsilon_{UA/UA}); \text{ with}$ $A_{col} = A_{UAFront} + A_{A/CFront} + 2\sqrt{A_{UAFront}A_{A/CFront}}$ $v_{rel} = \sqrt{v_{UA}^2 + v_{A/C}^2}; \epsilon = \text{Collision avoidance of UA or A/C}$
ρ_{PopAir}	Defined as number of transient A/C and UA in the airspace. Applies a database of air traffic density.
P_{CAir}	$P_{CAir} = P_{MACtrans}$; taken into account that UA-UA collisions do not harm other airspace users.
P_C	$P_C = P_{CGroundp} + P_{CGroundb} + P_{MACtrans} + P_{MACUAfleet}$; taken into account that A/C-UA and UA-UA collisions might pose a danger to people on the ground by falling debris.
Notes	Comprehensive model that includes careful considerations. Validation of results via historical aviation data. Rationale for building strike probability might be arbitrary.

Model	Lum and Waggoner [44]
P_{FUA}	No detailed consideration of root cause or sub-system failures in the UAS. Assumed as UAS specific system failure rate $\lambda = P_{FUA}$.
Operational Area	Surface and airspace model. Includes structure density, average height and size.
S	Considered implicitly by P_{Fat} for persons inside buildings.
$\rho_{PopGround}$	Based on U.S. census. Outside pedestrian density based on assumptions. Uniform distribution. Static in time.
A_{Impact}	A_{Impact} defined as lethal area for pedestrian (p) and building (b) strikes with respect to horizontal glide and vertical fall impacts: A_{LVp} , A_{LHp} , A_{LVb} , A_{LHb}
	$A_{Impact} = \begin{cases} A_{LVp} = \pi(\max(w_{UA}, l_{UA})/2 + r_p)^2 \\ A_{LHp} = (w_{UA} + 2r_p)(l_{UA} + h_p/\tan(\gamma) + 2r_p) \\ A_{LVb} = \pi(\max(w_{UA}, l_{UA})/2 + w_b/2)^2 \\ A_{LHb} = (w_{UA} + w_b)(l_{UA} + h_b/\tan(\gamma) + w_b) \end{cases}$
P_{Fat}	Differentiates between fatality probability inside (b) and outside buildings (p). In case of a building strike, assumptions on the fatality rate are made, e.g. 25 % of the inhabitants will suffer lethal injuries. This would lead to $P_{Fat_b} = 0.25$.
	$P_{Fat} = \begin{cases} 0 \leq P_{Fat_b} \leq 1 \\ 0 \leq P_{Fat_p} \leq 1 \end{cases}$
$P_{CGround}$	$P_{CGround} = \rho_p \cdot P_{FUA} \cdot A_{LVp} + P_{MAC} \cdot \rho_{ped} \cdot A_{LVp}$ $P_{CGround} = \rho_b \cdot P_{FUA} \cdot A_{LVb} + P_{MAC} \cdot \rho_b \cdot A_{LVb}$
P_{MAC}	Defined as transient aircraft strikes and UA fleet strikes, based on a molecular collision model.
	$P_{MAC} = t_{Miss} \cdot (P_{MAC_{trans}} + P_{MAC_{UA_{fleet}}}); \text{ with}$ $P_{MAC_{trans}} = n_{UA} \cdot \rho_{Pop_{Air_{A/C}}} \cdot A_{col} \cdot v_{rel} \cdot (1 - \epsilon_{UA/A/C})(1 - \epsilon_{A/C})$ $P_{MAC_{UA_{fleet}}} = n_{UA} \cdot \rho_{Pop_{Air_{UA}}} \cdot v_{rel} \cdot (4 \cdot A_{UA_{Front}}) \cdot (1 - \epsilon_{UA/UA})^2$ $A_{col} = A_{UA_{Front}} + A_{A/C_{Front}} + 2\sqrt{A_{UA_{Front}} A_{A/C_{Front}}}$ $v_{rel} = \sqrt{v_{UA}^2 + v_{A/C}^2}; \epsilon = \text{Collision avoidance of UA or A/C}; n_{UA} = \text{Number of UA in the airspace}$
$\rho_{Pop_{Air}}$	Defined as density of transient A/C and UA in the airspace, based on historical data: $\rho_{Pop_{Air_{A/C}}}$; $\rho_{Pop_{Air_{UA}}}$
P_{CAir}	$P_{CAir} = P_{MAC_{trans}}$
P_C	$P_C = P_{CGround_p} + P_{CGround_b} + P_{MAC_{trans}} + P_{MAC_{UA_{fleet}}}$
Notes	Can be seen as further development of Waggoner's former model [42]. Cf. assessment for further explanation.

Model	Skobir and Magister [187]
P_{FUA}	No detailed consideration of root cause or sub-system failures in the UAS. It is assumed that a failure occurred, $P_{FUA} = 1$. Two scenarios are taken into account UFIT and CFIT.
Operational Area	Generic consideration as populated or unpopulated area.
S	Not assessed.
$\rho_{PopGround}$	Considered as populated or unpopulated area but not assessed in detail.
A_{Impact}	Not assessed.
P_{Fat}	Assessed as function of E_{Kin} for both impact scenarios. E_{Kin} is deduced out of available UAS data via regression analysis.
$P_{CGround}$	Not assessed.
P_{MAC}	Not assessed.
ρ_{PopAir}	Not assessed.
P_{CAir}	Not assessed.
P_C	Not assessed.
Notes	The model presents a generic method to determine E_{Kin} of a crashing UA with $m_{UA} \leq 150$ kg in order to show a sufficient level of safety and that UAS classification should go further than just m_{UA} and v_{UA} .

Model	Melnyk [47]
P_{FUA}	No detailed consideration of root cause or sub-system failures in the UAS. Assumed as UAS specific system failure rate $\lambda_{system} = P_{FUA}$.
Operational Area	Detailed consideration regarding infrastructure resistance to UA impact. Population considered by six average groups.
S	Applied results of two studies to determine P_{Pen} . Implicitly $S = 1 - P_{Pen}$. Based on these results, fatality probability of building inhabitants is determined.
$\rho_{PopGround}$	Based on U.S. census, six $\rho_{PopGround_{local}}$ are defined. UAS operation duration and local dependent distribution considered: $\rho_{PopGround_{local}} = \rho_{PopGround} \times \frac{t_{Miss}}{A_{Impact}}$
A_{Impact}	Empirical method, weight-based approach: $A_{Impact} [ft^2] = -2475.466 + 1.001 \times m_{UA} [lbs];$
P_{Fat}	Energy and shelter based, for $E_{Kin} > 78$ J and $S = 1$: $P_{Fat} = 1$.
$P_{CGround}$	$P_{CGround} = P_{FUA} \times \rho_{PopGround} \times A_{Impact} \times S \times P_{Fat}$
P_{MAC}	Not assessed.
ρ_{PopAir}	Not assessed.
P_{CAir}	Not assessed.
P_C	$P_C = P_{CGround}$
Notes	Comprehensive model that takes into account all relevant aspects regarding UA ground impacts. Provides a validation by comparing model results with General Aviation accidents and applying a t -test. Based on the results of the paper, a UAS classification scheme is presented.

Model	Ancel et al. [188]
P_{FUA}	Assessed in general terms as undesired events, ranging from improbable up to frequent failures. Ultimate outcome is flight termination.
Operational Area	Divided into N grid cells. Given example is a local limited area. Wind model included.
S	Four defined roof classes are presented, including a vulnerability model.
$\rho_{POP_{Ground}}$	Uniform distribution. Static in time. Based on building occupancy of assessed operational area.
A_{Impact}	Geographic method. Differentiates between potential impact area and casualty area A_C . $A_{Impact} = A_C = (w_{UA} + 2 \cdot r_p) \cdot (l_{UA} + h_p / \tan(\gamma) + 2 \cdot r_p)$
P_{Fat}	Divided into four outcomes which range from non-serious injuries up to fatalities. These outcomes are combined with E_{Kin} , leading to a severity index. A direct correlation in terms of fatalities per flight hour is not given.
$P_{C_{Ground}}$	$P_{C_{Ground_j}} = \sum_{k=1}^N P_{I_k} \cdot \rho_{POP_{Ground_j}} \cdot A_{Impact_j}$, with: $k = k^{th}$ grid cell; $j = j^{th}$ sheltering category; P_{I_k} = Probability of impact in the k^{th} grid cell based on P_{FUA} .
P_{MAC}	Not assessed.
$\rho_{POP_{Air}}$	Not assessed.
$P_{C_{Air}}$	Not assessed.
P_C	$P_C = P_{C_{Ground}}$
Notes	The model applies a Bayesian Belief Network as well as Monte-Carlo Simulation to predict UAS failures, impacts and outcomes. Applicable to sUAS.

Model	Barr et al. [191]
P_{FUA}	<p>Consideration of root cause and sub-system failures in the UAS. Seven failure sets are assessed with respect to possible effects. Four root causes are considered. Acceptable failure rates are based on manned aviation:</p> $P_{FUA} = \begin{cases} P_{MIN} < 10^{-3} \\ P_{MAJ} < 10^{-4} \vee 10^{-5} \\ P_{HAZ} < 10^{-5} \vee 10^{-7} [1/Fh] \\ P_{CAT} < 10^{-6} \vee 10^{-9} \end{cases}$
Operational Area	Besides $\rho_{PopGround}$, ρ_{PopAir} and S , the model elaborates that obstacles, terrain should be considered. Airspace below 400 ft.
S	Considered as aspect that needs to be taken into account, but not assessed in terms of an equation.
$\rho_{PopGround}$	Five classes regarding $\rho_{PopGround}$ are defined. Uniform distribution. Static in time.
A_{Impact}	<p>Geographical method. In contrast to other models, the cross section of a person's body or head is defined as lethal area instead of the impact area of a crashing UA. This area is divided into vertical ($A_{PVertical}$) and glide impact (A_{PGlide}).</p> $A_{Impact} = \begin{cases} A_{PVertical} = 1.5 [ft^2] \\ A_{PGlide} = 11 [ft^2] \end{cases}$
P_{Fat}	P_{Fat} considered as possible effect of P_{HAZ} and P_{CAT} . For these failure cases $P_{Fat} = 1$.
$P_{CGround}$	$P_{CGround} = \rho_{PopGround} \cdot A_{Impact}$
P_{MAC}	Considered as aspect and possible effect of P_{FUA} that needs to be taken into account, but not assessed in terms of an equation.
ρ_{PopAir}	Considered as aspect that needs to be taken into account, but not assessed in terms of an equation.
P_{CAir}	Considered as aspect that needs to be taken into account, but not assessed in terms of an equation.
P_C	$P_{C UA} = P_{CGround} + P_{CAir}$
Notes	Model can be seen as traditional preliminary system safety assessment, which is expanded to a three-dimensional UAS risk assessment and Bayesian Belief Network. Applicable to sUAS. Hazard classification for CAT ("multiple fatalities") seems to be not proportionate with respect to sUAS.

Model	Clothier et al. [49]
P_{FUA}	Qualitative discussion of P_{FUA} as part of UAS reliability in the Barrier Bow Tie Model (BBTM). Four resulting failure scenarios are defined: UDS, LOC, DOJC, CFIT. Not discussed in terms of probabilities.
Operational Area	Considered in terms of risk control regarding terrain awareness, impact location, exposure and entities barriers within the BBTM.
S	Considered in terms of risk control regarding terrain awareness, impact location, exposure and entity response barriers within the BBTM. No equation or number provided.
$\rho_{Pop_{Ground}}$	Considered in qualitative manner as part of risk control within exposure barrier in BBTM.
A_{Impact}	Considered in qualitative manner as part of risk control within impact location and UAS (impact) energy management barrier in BBTM.
P_{Fat}	Considered in qualitative manner in terms of consequence states which result in MIN, MAJ, HAZ or CAT effects.
$P_{C_{Ground}}$	Considered as top event hazard. No probability equation or number provided.
P_{MAC}	Not assessed.
$\rho_{Pop_{Air}}$	Not assessed.
$P_{C_{Air}}$	Not assessed.
P_C	$P_C = P_{C_{Ground}}$
Notes	Pure qualitative BBTM approach. All aspects of the UAS operation including technical details of the UAS must be known very well upfront in order to provide realistic predictions.

Model	Breunig et al. [48]
P_{FUA}	No detailed consideration of root cause or sub-system failures in the UAS. Assumed as UAS class specific system failure rate $P_{FUA} = P_{FUA_{Class_i}}$. Four classes with associated P_{FUA} are defined based on m_{UA} : $P_{FUA_{Class}} = \begin{cases} P_{FUA_{Micro}}(m_{UA} \leq 0.55 \text{ [lbs]}) = 10^{-2} [1/Fh] \\ P_{FUA_{Mini}}(0.56 \text{ [lbs]} < m_{UA} \leq 4.4 \text{ [lbs]}) = 10^{-3} [1/Fh] \\ P_{FUA_{Limited}}(4.5 \text{ [lbs]} < m_{UA} \leq 20.9 \text{ [lbs]}) = 10^{-4} [1/Fh] \\ P_{FUA_{Mini}}(21 \text{ [lbs]} < m_{UA} \leq 55 \text{ [lbs]}) = 10^{-5} [1/Fh] \end{cases}$
Operational Area	Defined by latitude and longitude coordinates. Eight standard mission profiles defined.
S	General assumption that 7.5 % of people in overflow area are outdoor and unsheltered. Therefore, S is related to mission profile.
$\rho_{Pop_{Ground}}$	Three classes differentiated into three categories each. Basis is a 24 h time-based weighted average from a model of the U.S. Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
A_{Impact}	Geographic method. Defined as circle shaped lethal area dependent on travelled horizontal distance d_{horz} after UA internal failure. $A_{Impact} = A_{Lethal} = \pi d_{horz}^2$ $d_{horz} = h_{Alt} \left \frac{F_L}{F_D} \right ; F_l = \cos(2\theta); F_d = \sin(2\theta)$ $v_{Impact} = \sqrt{(2 \cdot m_{UA} \cdot g) / (\rho_{Air} \cdot A_{UA_{Front}} \cdot \sqrt{C_d^2 + C_l^2})};$ <p>Equations only for given example of a multi copter. Might be applied to other UAS via differential equations.</p>
P_{Fat}	$P_{Fat UA} = 1 / (1 + \exp(-k(E_{Kin} - E_{Kin0})))$ $E_{Kin} = 0.5 \cdot m_{UA} \cdot v_{impact}^2; E_{Kin0} = \text{Kinetic energy required to cause a fatality with a probability of 50 \%, for the given example } E_{Kin0} = 110 \text{ [J]};$ $k = \text{Constant shape parameter}$
$P_{C_{Ground}}$	$P_{C_{Ground}} = P_{FUA} \cdot \rho_{Pop_{Ground}} \cdot A_{Impact} \cdot S \cdot P_{Col} \cdot P_{Fat}$
P_{MAC}	Not assessed.
$\rho_{Pop_{Air}}$	Not assessed.
$P_{C_{Air}}$	Not assessed.
P_C	$P_C = P_{C_{Ground}}$
Notes	Comprehensive model, high input regarding operational area necessary.

Model	Phiesel [189]
P_{FUA}	No detailed consideration of root cause or sub-system failures in the UAS. Assumed as UAS intrinsic failure rate resulting in an out of control scenario f_{ooc} .
Operational Area	Generic, quantitative considerations. No detailed assessment. Seven scenarios are defined in a generic way.
S	$S = 1$, based on the assumption that if a sUAS hits a building, people inside are not endangered.
$\rho_{PopGround}$	Based on the operational area, seven $\rho_{PopGround}$ are defined. No place dependency. Uniform distribution. Static in time.
A_{Impact}	$A_{Impact} = A_{hit} = \pi \cdot (r_p + r_{UA})^2, \quad r_{UA} = \sqrt{A_{UA}/\pi}; \quad A_{UA} = 0.25 \cdot (m_{UA})^{\frac{2}{3}}$ $A_{Impact} = \pi \cdot \left(r_p + \sqrt{\frac{A_{UA}}{\pi}} \right)^2 = \left(r_p + \sqrt{\frac{0.25 \cdot (m_{UA})^{\frac{2}{3}}}{\pi}} \right)^2$ <p>Based on "Square-Root-Cubic Law", mass-volume-length and area-length proportionality. 0.25 is a correction factor based on an empirical comparison.</p>
P_{Fat}	$P_{Fat} = \tilde{p}_{let hit} = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-2.6(\log_{10} E_{Kin} - \log_{10} 4928)}}; \quad E_{Kin,max} = 155.42 \cdot m_{UA}^{\frac{4}{3}}$
$P_{CGround}$	<p>Defined as mortality risk n_{mort} based on f_{ooc}, fatality probability in case of hit $p_{fat hit}$ and mitigation probability p_{mit}.</p> $P_{CGround} = n_{mort} = f_{ooc} \cdot n_{hit ooc} \cdot p_{fat hit} \cdot p_{mit};$ additionally the intrinsic UA risk is defined as $n_{int} = n_{hit ooc} \cdot p_{fat hit}$ <p>Transferred into safety numbers via application of negative decadic logarithm.</p> $P_{CGround} = N_{mort} = F_{ooc} + N_{int} + P_{mit}$
P_{MAC}	<p>Determined on the basis of reported near MAC between UA and A/C Seven categories assessed, reduced to two resulting in lethality in case of collision:</p> $P_{MAC} = n_{let hit(MAC)} = \begin{cases} 10 & cat_{a/s} = I, II \\ 0.1 & \text{all other cat} \end{cases}$
ρ_{PopAir}	Not assessed.
P_{CAir}	<p>States that air risk for VLOS ops below 150 m AGL can be neglected entirely if the operation does not take place in close proximity to certain risk areas, e.g. airports.</p> <p>BVLOS ops research states that a BVLOS operation is 20 times riskier than a VLOS operation.</p>
P_C	Provided as combined safety numbers of ground and air risk.
Notes	Applicable to sUAS only. Determination coefficients are lacking for several fundamental equations, e.g. $E_{Kin,max}$.

Model	La Cour-Harbo [50]
P_{FUA}	No overall P_{FUA} assumed. Four failure modes taken into account with $P_{FUA_i} = \{8.0^{-3}, 6.67^{-3}, 1.0^{-2}, 5^{-3}\}[1/Fh]$ No detailed consideration of root cause that leads to the failures.
Operational Area	Denmark as operational area applied. Includes a wind drift model. Area is clustered into cells that identify built up areas or non-built up areas.
S	Shelter factor dependent upon impact scenario. For the given example: $S = \{0.3, 0.6\}$
$\rho_{POP_{Ground}}$	Based on geographical coordinates (latitude and longitude) and census data. Assumed that 30% are not in buildings. Uniform distribution. Static in time. Defined as matrix D .
A_{Impact}	Dependent upon impact scenario and the corresponding time to impact the ground. Formulated as individual probability density functions (PDF).
P_{Fat}	Two methods are discussed: Blunt Trauma Criterion (BC) and Area Weight Kinetic Energy. For the first one, an equation is provided: $P_{Fat} = BC = \ln\left(\frac{E_{Kin}}{m_{UA}^{\frac{1}{3}}TD}\right);$ T =Thickness of body wall, D = Diameter of impacting object.
$P_{C_{Ground}}$	Defined as probability of impact persons $P_{ImpactPerson}$. $P_{C_{Ground}} = P_{ImpactPerson} = S \cdot A_p \cdot \sum_{long}^{lat} (PDF \circ D)$ $A_p = 1[m^2]$
P_{MAC}	Not assessed.
$\rho_{POP_{Air}}$	Not assessed.
$P_{C_{Air}}$	Not assessed.
P_C	$P_C = P_{FUA_i} \cdot P_{Fat} \cdot P_{C_{Ground}}$
Notes	Different approach than the mutual casualty expectation with respect to the inclusion of PDF. Inclusion of wind is notably.

Model	Kaya [190]
P_{FUA}	No overall P_{FUA} assumed. Four failure modes with constant occurrence rates are defined $P_{FUA_i} = \{10^{-5}, 10^{-4}, 10^{-3}, 10^{-4}\}[1/Fh]$ No detailed consideration of root cause that leads to the failures.
Operational Area	Based on construction survey data. Augmented by UA sensor data.
S	Not considered.
$\rho_{PopGround}$	Based on census data, static in time. Augmented by UA sensor data.
A_{Impact}	Elliptical impact areas related to the four failure modes: $A_{Impact_i} = \{1650, 777, 521, 777\}[m^2]$. Boundaries based on truncated Gaussian distributions assumed to be within a 3σ deviation. Altitude dependent circle-shaped impact areas are also considered.
P_{Fat}	Assumed $P_{Fat} = 1$ in A_{Impact_i} . No equation provided.
$P_{CGround}$	$P_{CGround} = p(R(x)) = \sum_i w^i p(R^i(x))$ $i = a, b, \dots =$ Risk sources; $w =$ Risk weighting $w^i \geq 0$; $\sum_i w^i = 1$
P_{MAC}	Assessed in a general, descriptive way. Taken into account within the failure modes.
ρ_{PopAir}	Not assessed.
P_{CAir}	Not assessed.
P_C	$P_C = P_{CGround}$
Notes	The model applies probabilistic risk functions together with rapidly-exploring random trees in order to find a UA flight path posing the least risk to the overflown area. Real UAS sensor data is necessary to apply the model entirely.

Model	JARUS SORA (as part of [24, 166, 167, 169, 170] and with [173])
P_{FUA}	Must be taken into account for determining the probability of a loss of control scenario. Defined as λ_{FUA} . Within [173] explicitly part of the generic FTA for P_{LOC} .
Operational Area	Generic operational area to be considered by the user. Defined as operational volume (cf. Figure 4-5).
S	Considered in qualitative terms within the <i>Controlled ground area</i> (cf. Figure 4-5). Furthermore, within [173] applied within the fraction of people exposed to risk by the operation ($F_{Exp} = 1 - S$) and within the obstacle considerations.
$\rho_{Pop Ground}$	<p>Considered in qualitative terms within the <i>Controlled ground area</i> (cf. Figure 4-5).</p> <p>Within [173] several methods provided how $\rho_{Pop Ground}$ might be modelled by an applicant and recommendations for authorities are provided. General assumptions: Uniform distribution with an area weighting but no method for time dependency. Suggestions include satellite data or movement of people based on mobile phone network data. In general, the TLOS shall be met for every $\rho_{Pop Ground}$.</p>
A_{Impact}	<p>Combination of glide and slide on the ground model, including restitution and friction.</p> $A_{Impact} = 2 \cdot r_D \cdot (d_{Glide} + d_{slide, reduced}) + \pi \cdot r_D^2 \text{ with}$ $d_{slide, reduced} = e \cdot v_{horizontal} \cdot t_{safe} - \frac{1}{2} C_g \cdot g \cdot t_{safe}^2$ $t_{safe} = \frac{v_{non-lethal} - e \cdot v_{horizontal}}{-C_g \cdot g}; v_{non-lethal} = \sqrt{\frac{2 \cdot K_{non-lethal}}{m}}$ <p>$K_{non-lethal}$ Non-lethal energy; C_g friction coefficient; e restitution coefficient; t_{safe} time that it takes that the speed of the UA becomes non-lethal.</p>
P_{Fat}	Defined as $P(fatality collision, LOC)$, which is the probability that a person who got hit after a crash of UA that entered afore a loss of control condition. Generally, it is assumed $P(fatality collision, LOC) = 1$
$P_{C Ground}$	Final GRC gives back the risk for people on the ground. GRC ranges from 1 to 8 (cf. Table 4-24 and Table 4-25).
P_{MAC}	Considered in qualitative terms as air risk class ARC. Four classes of ARC are defined a to d (cf. Figure 4-6).
$\rho_{Pop Air}$	Considered in qualitative terms as air risk class ARC. Four classes of ARC are defined a to d (cf. Figure 4-6).
$P_{C Air}$	Considered in qualitative terms as air risk class ARC. Four classes of ARC are defined a to d (cf. Figure 4-6).

P_C	Based on final GRC and ARC, SAIL is defined which is the qualitative description of the cumulative risk for other aircraft and third parties on the ground, imposed by the UAS operation.
Notes	<p>JARUS SORA as part of [24, 166, 167, 169, 170] is set as AMC by EASA, while [173] is still under discussion at JARUS. SORA itself requires for operations with higher risk levels activities which are similar to an aircraft type certification process although the mission is limited to one specific operation.</p> <p>[173] is a very exhaustive and encompassing model to determine GRC, with many variables to be considered.</p>

11.2 O.R.C.U.S. Manual

11.2.1 General Description

O.R.C.U.S. is a set of interacting MATLAB™ functions, which together form a software, that simulates a Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operation above populated areas in Germany. After setting up the UAS parameters and mission parameters, the simulation is started. Basically, the software is specified for light fixed wing UAS with a MTOW \leq 150 kg. Nevertheless, it can also be adapted to other light UAS.

During the simulation, technical failures are introduced randomly into the UAS which might lead to a crash of the Unmanned Aircraft (UA). In case a crash occurs, the current population distribution is calculated in accordance to time and place where the UA operates. Afterwards it is checked if people were present within the impact zone. People who were present in the impact zone are counted as hit person with no regard of the severity of hit. The persons hit are differentiated between unprotected people in the outside (OTW) and protected people in buildings (ATB). The results are presented in the unit per flight hour as it is done for failure conditions in airworthiness codes. Finally, the results are summarized in a .xlsx spread sheet.

Chapter 11.2.7 provides a quick example for the application of O.R.C.U.S.

The present manual summarizes the core steps to apply O.R.C.U.S. and is focused on the default settings of the tool. For advanced settings and information please refer to chapters 11.2.8 and 11.2.9.

11.2.2 Recommended Minimum System Requirements

O.R.C.U.S. was developed and tested in the environment shown in Table 11-1. It might also work on systems that are less powerful, however, this is not ensured.

MATLAB™	R2016B or later including Image Processing Toolbox and Aerospace Toolbox
Operating System	Any that is able to run MATLAB™ in the recommended version
CPU	2.3 GHz Intel Core i5 Dual-Core with 3 MB L3-Cache
RAM	16 GB
HDD	60 MB for O.R.C.U.S. files Ca. 270 kB per simulated flight hour
OTHER	Third party software that is able to read .xlsx files.

Table 11-1 O.R.C.U.S recommended minimum system requirements.

11.2.3 Installation

Unlike other application software, O.R.C.U.S. does not need to be installed on the computer. It is only necessary to copy the files into the directory where the simulation results shall be stored and evaluated. The data package is stored within the directory *O.R.C.U.S._02.01_FinalBuild*. It consists of five file directories, shown in Table 11-2.

Directory	Content
O.R.C.U.S._02.00_MapDetection	27 MATLAB™ function files
O.R.C.U.S._02.01_UAFlightPath	One MATLAB™ function file
O.R.C.U.S._02.01_UAFlightSim	54 MATLAB™ function files 3 Microsoft Excel files
O.R.C.U.S._02.01_UAFlightSimEval	Total 14 files including one subfolder. Two MATLAB™ function files within the main directory. Two MATLAB™ function files within the subfolder plus Apache POI library folder.
TrainingExample	One OSM image One Map struct file One O.R.C.U.S. INI file

Table 11-2 O.R.C.U.S._02.01_FinalBuild content.

- 1) Copy all five file directories at the MATLAB™ working directory.
- 2) Check each directory if the file numbers are correct.
- 3) Run MATLAB™.
- 4) Go to *O.R.C.U.S._02.01_UAFlightSim*.
- 5) Open the function *UAFlightSimFastEval0204.m* with the editor.
- 6) In case you are using a macOS or Linux system, go to code line 249 and follow the instruction regarding the POI library.
- 7) Modify the path directions within code lines 252 to 256 by exchanging
`'/Applications/MATLAB_R2020b.app/`
 the MATLAB™ version that is present on your machine.
- 8) If a Windows PC is present, it is assumed that MS Excel is installed. In this case no POI addition should be necessary. If this is not the case, or if an error is reported due to missing POI library, please add the POI library to the appropriate path on your Windows PC.
- 9) Move to code line 271 and update the path in accordance to your directory structure:
`YOURPATH/O.R.C.U.S._02.01_FinalBuild/O.R.C.U.S._02.01_UAFlightSim`
- 10) Save and close the file.
- 11) Switch to directory *O.R.C.U.S._02.01_UAFlightSimEval* and repeat steps 7) to 10).

GENERAL WARNING

Do not change anything of the uncommented source code as long as not explicitly stated within the present manual or in comment sections of the source code itself.

Notes

It is ok to change the source code, for example to add new modules to your personal O.R.C.U.S., but the user should have sound knowledge about the software.

It is recommended to keep an unamended copy of all source code files in order to undo any changes if the software does not work anymore.

Although the version numbers are higher than the 02.00, the current version of O.R.C.U.S. is designated as version 02.00 which is reflected within the simulation summary xlsx file.

11.2.4 Creating a Map Struct

The structural array *Map Struct* is the centerpiece of every O.R.C.U.S. simulation. It encompasses the operational environment to be simulated, the UAS parameters, the mission parameters and many more. All parameters are stored within specific fields, which are part of the structural array. Every Map Struct begins with the creation of the operational environment, which is a two-dimensional map of the intended area to be simulated. Therefore, to create a *Map Struct*, it is necessary to have an Open Street Map image present.

The OSM must have a zoom level of 15 and the scale level must be known.

The following steps describe the standard map detection sequence. In case a quick example shall be performed, it is recommended to use the training example given in chapter 11.2.7.

- 1) To download an OSM, visit <https://www.openstreetmap.org> and search for the area or city of interest. Figure 11-1 provides an example picture of the web site.




Figure 11-1. Openstreetmap website [199].

- 2) Zoom to the area of interest and ensure that the zoom level is 15. This can be verified by looking at the address field, which contains the coordinates and the zoom level, for example:

<https://www.openstreetmap.org/#map=15/48.1282/11.5765>

- 3) To download the OSM image, click on the share icon. Then download either the entire image or draw a rectangle with the area of interest.

Note

Not all browsers support the OSM web page entirely. In seldom cases the share function might not work. Recommended browsers are Mozilla Firefox or Google Chrome.




Figure 11-2. Share function of Openstreetmaps [199].

- 4) Note the scale of the map. The scale is usually a five-digit number.
- 5) Move the downloaded OSM to the *O.R.C.U.S._02.00_MapDetection* directory.
- 6) Run MATLAB™ (if not already active).
- 7) Within MATLAB™, switch within the working directory to the *O.R.C.U.S._02.00_MapDetection* folder.
- 8) Type the following command line and hit enter:

```
[Map] = MapDetection0200()
```
- 9) A command prompt line will occur, confirming that *MapDetection* is running.
- 10) After the start of the function, a pop-up window will occur and request the user to select the OSM map image.
- 11) When the OSM was selected, the function will ask for the DPI number within the command prompt. Enter the value and hit enter.

Note

The standard DPI number is 72.

- 12) Afterwards, the program will ask for the scale within the command prompt. Enter the value and hit enter.
- 13) After step 12), *MapDetection* will run automatically until the *MapOverlay* subfunction is called. *MapOverlay* might be applied in case the city over which the operation shall take place does not cover the whole OSM. In such a case, the map is divided into the submap polygon (SMP) and the surrounding map (SurM). While in the SMP the census data of the city will be applied by O.R.C.U.S., in the SurM the census data of the county and federal state will be applied during the simulation.
- If a sub map polygon shall be included, the user is required to draw the polygon. This is done by marking the first point by a left click within the map image. After the second point is marked a line will be drawn automatically. This shall be continued until the polygon is closed. The polygon should be drawn in a way that it marks the boundary of the small city.




Figure 11-3. Map with SMP (blue) and SurM after MapOverlay.

WARNING

There is no undo function within *MapOverlay*. Once a point is drawn, this point is fixed. To undo, the whole map detection process must be done again.

14) Once all remaining subfunctions are completed all types of sub structs and several other MapDetection results are displayed as figures. Furthermore, a protocol with all details of the MapDetection run is saved.

If not needed, the presented figures can be closed separately or by using the command prompt “close all”. If needed, they can be saved via the save dialog within the Matlab figure editor.

15) To save the Map Struct on the HDD, write the following line and hit enter:

```
save Map -v7.3
```

The default internal pixel to meter conversion value within O.R.C.U.S. is defined as one to one. This means, within the resulting Map Struct of MapDetection, one pixel is equal one meter.

Note:

It is not recommended to change this as the current O.R.C.U.S. version is optimized for this conversion value.

However, if needed to change, open the function MapDetection0200 go to line 141. There you find the call for the subfunction NormMap, which is started by the line:

```
[Map] = NormMap0200(Map,1);
```

The one within the brackets is the target scale for the pixel metre conversion. For example, if one pixel shall be equal four, exchange the one by four.

11.2.5 Flight Path Generation

11.2.5.1 Pre-Requisites

The Map struct in which the flight path shall be included, must be loaded into the MATLAB™ workspace. If the Map struct file is already present in the workspace, this step can be skipped.




Figure 11-4. Loaded Map struct within MATLAB™ workspace.

Switch within MATLAB™ the current folder to the *O.R.C.U.S._02.01_UAFlightPath* directory.

11.2.5.2 Function Execution

- 1) Enter the following command into the command prompt and hit enter:

```
[Map] = UAFlightPath0201(Map);
```
- 2) A command prompt will occur, confirming that UAFlightPath is running and providing some informations about the Map struct.
- 3) The function provides two flight path possibilities:
 - a. Circle → 1
 - b. Ellipse → 2

You have to choose between one of them by either entering one or two. Confirm the selection by hitting enter.




Figure 11-7. ORCUS ellipse flight path projections.

13) O.R.C.U.S. gives a command prompt output that summarizes the specific flight path information.

```
>> [Map] = UAFlightPath0201(Map);
-----
-----O.R.C.U.S.-----
-----
Version 02.00 - Final Build
Oliver Hirling
-----
UAFlightPath
Version 02.00
-----
Map-Length (y-Direction) 5786.97 [m]
Map-Width (x-Direction) 11552.8 [m]
Map-Area 6.68555e+07 [m^2]
Possible flightpaths:
1 - Circle
2 - Ellipse
Choose flightpath:
1
Center Coordinates: (5725 / 2610)
Resulting Radius: 1297 [m]
Circle Area: 5.28482e+06 [m^2]
Flight Path Length 8149.29 [m]
Flight Area / Area: 0.0790484 [/]

>> [Map] = UAFlightPath0201(Map);
-----
-----O.R.C.U.S.-----
-----
Version 02.00 - Final Build
Oliver Hirling
-----
UAFlightPath
Version 02.00
-----
Map-Length (y-Direction) 5786.97 [m]
Map-Width (x-Direction) 11552.8 [m]
Map-Area 6.68555e+07 [m^2]
Possible flightpaths:
1 - Circle
2 - Ellipse
Choose flightpath:
2
Vertex 1
X 3677.36
Y 1994.16
Vertex 2
X 7804.65
Y 3521.89
Enter the ratio for semi minor to semi major axis:
(The ratio must be element of -1 to 1)
0.2
Resulting Semi Major Axis: 2200.48 [m]
Resulting Semi Minor Axis: 440.096 [m]
Ellipse Area: 3.04239e+06 [m^2]
Flight Path Length 9055.74 [m]
Flight Area / Area: 0.045507 [/]
phi 0.354516 [rad]
```

Figure 11-8. O.R.C.U.S. flight path summary output.

14) By default, both flight paths have 3,600 waypoints. The x and y coordinates of these waypoints are stored automatically within the struct as variable of the type double and have the name:

```
UA_FP_X_imp_norm
UA_FP_Y_imp_norm
```

Note that the number of waypoints applied within the flight simulation must not be equal the default number.

15) By the automatic storing, the UAFlightPath function ends.

11.2.6 Automatic UAS flight simulation and evaluation

The automatic mode is the default mode for O.R.C.U.S. Hence, it is possible to execute the main functions also manually step by step. Nevertheless, this takes a lot of more interaction of the user during the simulation. Therefore, it is not recommended to execute the O.R.C.U.S. flight simulation manually.

11.2.6.1 Pre-requisites

The Map struct in which the flight path is included, must be loaded into the MATLAB™ workspace.

In order to check if the flight path is entirely included within the Map struct, you can either double click on the *Map* variable within the workspace to open the variable or you enter “Map” into the command prompt. The latter will display all variables which are contained in the Map struct in the command prompt. The flight path is complete if the following variables exist:

a. Circle shaped flight path

```
UA_FP_C_x
UA_FP_C_y
UAFlightPath_ccf_imp_norm
UA_FP_X_imp_norm
UA_FP_Y_imp_norm
```

b. Ellipse shaped flight path

```
UAFlightPath_imp_norm
UA_FP_v1x
UA_FP_v1y
UA_FP_v2x
UA_FP_v2y
UA_FP_C_x
UA_FP_C_y
Ellipse_SemiMajorAxis
Ellipse_SemiMinorAxis
ecc
UAFlightPath_ccf_imp_norm
Ellipse_phi
UA_FP_X_imp_norm
UA_FP_Y_imp_norm
```

Switch within MATLAB™ from the current folder to the *O.R.C.U.S._02.01_UAFlightSim* directory.

11.2.6.2 Initialization Function Preparation and Execution

To initiate an O.R.C.U.S. flight simulation, it is necessary to prepare the O.R.C.U.S. initialization function.

The initialization file can be found within the *O.R.C.U.S._02.01_UAFlightSim* directory. It has the name "ORCUS_INI0202.m".

- 1) Double click on the ORCUS_INI0202.m file. The MATLAB™ function editor opens.
- 2) Go to **Step 01 - UA Physical Parameters**
- 3) Modify the UA physical parameters as required, but do not modify variable names.

<i>Parameter</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Description</i>
Map.wUA	[m]	Wingspan of the UA
Map.lUA	[m]	Length of the UA
Map.mUA	[kg]	MTOW of the UA
Map.LtDUA	[/]	Lift to drag ratio

Table 11-3 O.R.C.U.S. Initialization function: UA physical parameters

- 4) Go to **Step 02.01 - Cumulative Probability of a Catastrophic Event**
- 5) Enter the cumulative probability of a catastrophic event of the UA to be simulated. If this number is unknown, enter an assumed one. The format can be a decimal (for example 0.001) or exponential (for example 1E-3).
- 6) Go to **Step 02.02 - Percentage of equipment failure**
- 7) Enter the percentage number per main sub systems, but do not modify the variable names.

<i>Parameter</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Range</i>	<i>Description</i>
Map.FPer_EngineUA_sets	[/]	0 to 1	Percentage failure of the engine.
Map.FPer_ESysUA_sets	[/]	0 to 1	Percentage failure of the electrical system.
Map.FPer_FCSUA_sets	[/]	0 to 1	Percentage failure of the flight control system.
Map.FPer_NavSysUA_sets	[/]	0 to 1	Percentage failure of the navigation system.
Map.FPer_StructureUA_sets	[/]	0 to 1	Percentage failure of the structure.

Table 11-4 O.R.C.U.S. Initialization function: Percentage of main sub systems failure.

The default values are for each main sub system 0.2.

- 8) Go to **Step 03.01 - UA Mission Parameters**

- 9) Modify the UA mission parameters as required before the semicolon, but do not modify variable names.

<i>Parameter</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Description</i>
Map.vUA	[m/s]	Velocity of the UA
Map.AltUA	[m]	Altitude at which the UA operates

Table 11-5 O.R.C.U.S. Initialization function: UA mission parameters.

- 10) Go to **Step 03.02 – Area Mission Parameters**

In this section, all relevant data for the simulated mission are entered.

- 11) Modify the area mission parameters as required before the semicolon, but do not modify variable names.

<i>Parameter</i>	<i>Description</i>
Step 03.02.01 – Overflown area	
Map.city_name	Name of the city which is stored within the Map struct. Note: The name must be precise and in accordance to the city database. If you are not sure what the exact name is, open the file <i>pplCitiesCountiesFS.xlsx</i> . Switch to sheet <i>2_MATLAB_PPL_EXPORT</i> and search for the precise name of the city which is intended to serve as simulation area. Afterwards, close the file. WARNING Do not modify the <i>pplCitiesCountiesFS.xlsx</i>! In case Excel asks you if you want to save changes, decline it.
Step 03.02.02 – Number of probes	
Map.nProbes0	Defines the initial number of probes that is used to calculate the final number of probes dependent on the mission scheme. Recommended number of probes is 100.

Table 11-6 O.R.C.U.S. Initialization function: Overflown area and number of probes.

- 12) There are two possibilities to define the mission itself and the resulting total number of probes to be conducted. Go to **Step 03.02.03 Days of UA flight and mission definition**.

There are two options for the mission definition. One must be chosen.

Option 1 - UAS operation on a random day during the week

In case the exact day of the UAS operation is not further specified, this option should be activated by uncommenting the following lines. To uncomment, delete the percent sign:

```
% UA_days0 = [1 2 3 4 5 6 7];  
% Map.UA_days0 = UA_days0;  
% Map.UA_days = repmat(UA_days0,1,nProbes0);  
% Map.nProbes_eval = length(Map.UA_days);
```

Each number within `UA_days0` identifies one day as follows:

- 1 – Monday
- 2 – Tuesday
- 3 – Wednesday
- 4 – Thursday
- 5 – Friday
- 6 – Saturday
- 7 – Sunday

The resulting number of probes will be equal the initial number of probes multiplied with seven and therefore equal the length of `UA_days`. `UA_days` is the variable within the Map struct that identifies and stores all simulated days within the simulation run.

Option 2 - UAS operation on a specific day or days

In case the UAS operation shall take on a specific day or days, option 2 should be activated by uncommenting the following lines and by deleting the days that shall not be simulated. To uncomment, delete the percent sign:

```
% UA_days0 = [1 2 3 4 5 6 7];  
% Map.UA_days0 = UA_days0;  
% Map.UA_days = repmat(UA_days0,1,nProbes0);  
% Map.nProbes_eval = nProbes0;
```

The resulting number of relevant probes will be equal the initial number of probes and not equal the length of `UA_days`. Because one mission is equal one or more days, one probe is equal those days. In case a mission which shall take place every day in one week, one probe would be equal seven days (Monday to Sunday).

`nProbes_eval` is the resulting number of probes for calculating the t value, necessary to check if the simulation run is valid or not.

Note

Only one option for the mission definition shall be activated by uncommenting the specific lines. The other option must be deactivated by commenting the specific lines with the percentage sign.

- 13) Go to **Step 03.02.04 - Start and Landing time** to enter the time when the UAS operation is planned to start and to land each day. Modify the numbers within the brackets, but do not modify the name of the variable.

The `UA_start_land` variable must look as follows:

```
UA_start_land = [s 1];
```

With `s` = start time and `1` = landing time.

`s` must be lower than `1`.

`s` and `1` must be integers which have a range from zero to 24.

Note

These times cannot vary between the days to be simulated. In the beginning, it was thought that it might be useful to include several start and landing times. However, this was omitted due to validation reasons. Therefore, wherever start and landing time sets occur, this number is equal one.

- 14) Go to **Step 04.01 - Basic population density determination**

In case the population density shall be entered *manually*, the struct variable `Map.dv0` must be set to one: `Map.dv0 = 1;`

Additionally, the struct variables `Map.ppldens_km2` and `Map.city_pp1` must be uncommented and filled. The first is the population density per square kilometre and the second one the number of inhabitants of the city to be overflowed within the simulation. Examples:

```
Map.ppldens_km2 = 1500;
```

```
Map.city_pp1 = 10000;
```

In case of manual input be aware that this may result in too much people for the map. If this happens the O.R.C.U.S. will be re-initiated during the simulation.

In case the population density shall be entered *automatically* by a search within the O.R.C.U.S. database, the struct variable `Map.dv0` must be set to two: `Map.dv0 = 2;`

If this is activated, nothing more must be done in this part of the INI function.

- 15) Go to **Step 04.02 - Tourist allocation**

In case tourists shall be added to the basic population number, set the struct variable `Map.dv2` to one: `Map.dv2 = 1`. If no tourists shall be added, set `Map.dv2 = 0`.

The default setting is `Map.dv2 = 0`

Note

Not for every city stored within the O.R.C.U.S. city database tourist numbers are available. If a city is selected without related tourist numbers, the tourist numbers of the county is applied. If also no tourist data about the county is available, the tourist data from the federal state is applied. This is done automatically by O.R.C.U.S.

16) Go to **Step 04.03 – OTW/ATB modification**

In case the user wishes to modify the people distribution of people in the outside (OTW) and at building sites (ATB), set `Map.ac = 1`. In general, using the activating this will result in following modification:

$$PPL_{TD_{OTW}} = PPL_{TD_{OTW_{original}}} + PPL_{TD_{ATB}} \cdot modppl$$

$$PPL_{TD_{ATB}} = PPL_{TD_{ATB_{original}}} - PPL_{TD_{ATB}} \cdot modppl$$

If `Map.ac = 1` the variable `Map.modppl` must be set to a value within the range between 0 and 1 as decimal, for example: `Map.modppl = 0.5`;

By default, `Map.ac` is set to zero: `Map.ac=0`; In this case, `Map.modppl` becomes “NA”.

Note

The OTW/ATB modification should only be applied in specific cases only as it neglects the time and place dependent population distribution algorithm. A specific case could be for example a segregated ground area where a huge assembly of people shall be overflowed.

17) Go to **Step 05.01 – Cycle number**

During an O.R.C.U.S. simulation series, after launch, the UA will continuously follow the flight path until landing time is reached. One completed flight path is called *cycle*.

The control variable for the cycle number is `Map.d_cyc`.

The default setting of O.R.C.U.S. is to maintain the automated cycle number. In this case the `Map.d_cyc` is set to one: `Map.d_cyc = 1`;

If you wish to apply the default setting, you can skip this step and go to step 0.

In case the cycle number is very high, the user could desire to lower this number. High cycle numbers might occur in case of a short flight path and an increased velocity. If the cycle number shall be lowered, the variable `Map.d_cyc` must be set to zero:

`Map.d_cyc = 0`;

In this case, the cycle number variable `Map.cyc` must be uncommented by deleting the percent sign and an integer number must be assigned, for example:

`Map.cyc = 20`;

18) Go to **Step 05.02 – Waypoint number**

O.R.C.U.S. calculates automatically the number of waypoints within a flight path. Due to the current possibilities for a flight path, circle or ellipse, the default value is 3600 two waypoints are separated by 0.1° seen from the theoretical centre point of the flight path.

The control variable for the cycle number is `Map.wp_num0`.

The default setting of O.R.C.U.S. is to maintain the automated waypoint number. In this case the `Map.wp_num0` is set to one: `Map.wp_num0 = 1;`

If you wish to apply the default setting, you can skip this step and go to step 19).

In case you wish to lower the waypoint number, the variable `Map.wp_num0` must be set to zero: `Map.wp_num0 = 0;`

In this case, the waypoint number variable `Map.wp_num` must be uncommented by deleting the percent sign and an integer number must be assigned, for example:

`Map.wp_num = 100;`


19) Save the file by and close the INI file.

20) Execute the INI file by writing the following line into the command prompt:

`[Map] = ORCUS_INI0202 (Map) ;`

Press **enter**.

After the execution was successful, you get the following command prompt output:



```

Command Window
>> [Map] = ORCUS_INI0202(Map);
Initialisation complete.
All parameters of INI file included into Map struct.
fx >> |

```

Figure 11-9. O.R.C.U.S. INI summary output.

11.2.6.3 Execution of the Automatic UAS Flight Simulation and Evaluation

After preparation in accordance to 11.2.6.1 and 11.2.6.2 is complete, O.R.C.U.S. is ready to run the simulation with the loaded Map struct.

1) Go to directory *O.R.C.U.S._02.01_UAFlightSim*.

2) Execute the O.R.C.U.S. by writing the following line into the command prompt:

`[Map] = ORCUS_RUN0205 (Map) ;`

Press **enter**.

After the execution was successful, you will see progression outputs within the command prompt. The progression parameter is `k_day`.

```

Command Window
>> [Map] = ORCUS_RUN0205(Map);
-----
O.R.C.U.S.
-----
Version 02.00 - Final Build
Oliver Hirling
-----
Automated and complete simulation mode.
Version 02.05
-----
Number of different PCumCat to simulate
k_pcc 1/1
Number of different main system failure probabilities to simulate
k_fps 1/1
Number of days to simulate
k_day 1/1400
Start and Landing Time per day
k_slt 1/1
-----
Initiating UAFlightSim function
-----
O.R.C.U.S.
-----
Version 02.00 - Final Build
Oliver Hirling
-----
UAFlightSim
Version 02.03
-----
RdPeopleBasicInput function
Daytime weighted random people distribution function
Version 02.02
-----
BASIC INFORMATION
City / Area Kroppenstedt, Stadt
Day 1
Start [h] 6
    
```

Figure 11-10. Running O.R.C.U.S. simulation output.

Based on the inputs transferred into the Map struct, O.R.C.U.S. will search the database for area information. In case it is successful, the following output will be shown.

```

Command Window
Database is searched for "Kroppenstedt, Stadt".
-----
Data entry found in city database for "Kroppenstedt, Stadt".
-----
Basic database entries
-----
Allocated data entry:      Kroppenstedt, Stadt
City size:                 38.65 [km^2]
City population:          1440 [ppl]
City population density:  37 [ppl/km^2]
-----
Allocated county:         Boerde
County size:              2366.84 [km^2]
County population:        172619 [ppl]
County population density: 73 [ppl/km^2]
-----
Allocated federal state:  Sachsen-Anhalt
Federal state size:       20453.8 [km^2]
Federal state population: 2.22308e+06 [ppl]
Federal state population density: 109 [ppl/km^2]
-----
Resulting basic people numbers to distribute
-----
Total map size            66.8555 [km^2]
People to distribute in the map 2474 [ppl]
-----
Tourist people addition
-----
No tourists are added.
-----
People numbers to distribute remain.
    
```

Figure 11-11. Successful database search during a simulation.

Figure 11-13. O.R.C.U.S. completed evaluation function.

- 6) In case no events occurred during the whole simulation run, the evaluation function will give a back an error message within the command prompt as the array to fill the Excel sheet is empty. The Excel file will be generated anyway and *ORCUS_Run* is terminated afterwards.

11.2.6.4 Evaluation File

The xlsx evaluation file consists of two sheets. The *Summary* sheet contains all information of the simulation results and the *tTest* sheet contains the results of the t-Test. For the latter, only the resulting t-Values are of importance. They can be found in the left part of the spread sheet for ATB, OTW and for the total simulation run. For a significance level $\alpha = 0.01$ the t-Values shown in Table 11-7 shall be passed in order that the simulation run can be counted as valid.

Number of probes	$t_{Crit} = t_{df;99.5}$
$df = n = 30$	2.750
$df = n = 120$	2.617
$df = n \rightarrow \infty$	2.576

Table 11-7 t-Values to be passed.

While in the left part of the summary sheet the information about the results of the particular simulation is presented, the details about every event during the simulation are presented in the columns *G* to *AI*. Table 11-8 provides a description about every column entry within the summary sheet.

O.R.C.U.S. 02.00 - Simulation Summary				
UA Parameters				
MTOW [kg]	Wingspan [m]	Length [m]	L/D	
90	5	4	8	
v [km/h]	Alt [m]	CCF [m]		
100	100	9927.607		
P_CumCat	Engine [%]	ESys [%]	FCS [%]	NavSys [%] Struct [%]
0.01	20	20	20	20 20
General map parameters				
	Name	Area [km2]	PPL	PPL/km2
City	Koeln	405.01	1080394	2668
County	Koeln, Stadt	405.01	1080394	2668
FS	NW	34112.45	17912134	525
Mission specific map parameters				
	Area [km2]	PPL	Tourists	Total PPL
City	66.855476	178371	0	178371
Map total	66.855476	178371	0	178371
PPL MOD NA				
Sim FH [Fh]	19600	Ev/Fh [1/Fh]	0.0113776	
Events total	223			
Hits due to UA impacts Hits/Fh [1/Fh]				
City ATB	1791	0.0913776		
City OTW	356	0.0181633		
Total	2147	0.1095408		

Figure 11-14. Evaluation file: Example simulation information and results summary.

<i>Designation</i>	<i>Description</i>
Prot	Number of simulation protocol file
cyc	Cycle within simulation when
k-UA	Current position of UA on flight path
Day	Simulated day
Start [hh]	Starting time of mission
Land [hh]	Landing time of mission
Time of impact	Time in simulation when impact happened
UA X Pos	UA impact coordinate x-axis
UA Y Pos	UA impact coordinate y-axis
Travelled Distance [km]	Total travelled distance of UA on flight path
pcc [1/Fh]	Probablility of the initiating failure
FP Eng [%]	Failure percentage of the different main sub systems engine, electrical system, flight control system, navigation system and structure.
FP ESys [%]	
FP FCS [%]	
FP NAV [%]	
FP STR [%]	
PPL_TD_CITY_ATB	Number of people to distribute at buildings within the simulated city.
PPL_CITY_ATB_COUNT	Number of distributed people at buildings within the simulated city.
HIT_CITY_ATB_COUNT	Number of people at buildings that got hit by the impact.
MAX_HIT_CITY_ATB	Maximum hit value that occurred at buildings.
PPL_TD_CITY_OTW	Number of people to distribute outside within the simulated city.
PPL_CITY_OTW_COUNT	Number of distributed people outside within the simulated city.
HIT_CITY_OTW_COUNT	Number of people outside that got hit by the impact.
MAX_HIT_CITY_OTW	Maximum hit value that occurred outside.
PPL_TD_SURM_ATB	Number of people to distribute at buildings in the surrounding map. <i>Only active in case SMP/SurM is present.</i>
PPL_SURM_ATB_COUNT	Number of distributed people at buildings in the surrounding map. <i>Only active in case SMP/SurM is present.</i>
HIT_SURM_ATB_COUNT	Number of people at buildings in the surrounding map that got hit by the impact. <i>Only active in case SMP/SurM is present.</i>
MAX_HIT_SURM_ATB	Maximum hit value that occurred at buildings in the surrounding map. <i>Only active in case SMP/SurM is present.</i>
PPL_TD_SURM_OTW	Number of people to distribute at buildings in the outside. <i>Only active in case SMP/SurM is present.</i>
PPL_SURM_OTW_COUNT	Number of distributed people at buildings in the outside. <i>Only active in case SMP/SurM is present.</i>

HIT_SURM_OTW_COUNT	Number of people at buildings in the outside that got hit by the impact. <i>Only active in case SMP/SurM is present.</i>
MAX_HIT_SURM_OTW	Maximum hit value that occurred at buildings in the outside. <i>Only active in case SMP/SurM is present.</i>
PPL_ALL_ATB_COUNT	Cumulated number distributed people at buildings.
PPL_ALL_OTW_COUNT	Cumulated number distributed people outside.
E	Event chain vector number.
Case	Description of failure case.
Outcome	Outcome of failure case.

Table 11-8 Evaluation file columns description.

11.2.6.5 Remarks on the Simulation Duration

The simulation duration is dependent upon many factors such as size of the map, flight duration per day, number of days to be simulated, the probability of an initiating failure F_0 or the initial number of probes n_0 and the combination of all these factors. Furthermore, the computer hardware has a significant influence. Therefore, a precise prediction is hardly feasible.

For example, Figure 11-15 shows the duration of 28 simulation runs on a map with 5787×11553 pixels and with $F_0 = 0.01$ 1/Fh. The mission duration was 14 h and n_0 was set to 200. Both options for the mission definitions were applied and the total number of mission days to be simulated was 1,400. The used hardware was an Apple MacBook Pro with a 2.6 GHz 6-Core Intel Core i7 and 32 GB RAM. As can be seen by Figure 11-15, the duration between the simulation runs varies greatly. The linear trend function is shown in equation (11-1). As the determination coefficient is very low, it can be said that there is no clear trend.

$$y = 0,0058x + 1,362 \quad (11-1)$$

$$R^2 = 0.0304$$




Figure 11-15. Example of O.R.C.U.S. simulation runs duration.

During a simulation, whenever a decision is required, e.g., failure detected or not, countermeasure successful or not, the decision is deduced on random basis with values stored in the event tree.

A complete event chain results in a so-called event vector. This vector represents the different layers with defined values in order to trace the complete chain of events. The event vector does not contain all layers, as some of them are only descriptive elements within the event tree. Table 11-9 outlines the layers, their definitions, the values and the specific designation. The last row shows if the layer is part of the event vector or not.

<i>Layer</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Values</i>	<i>Designation</i>	<i>Event vector element</i>
L0	Primary event	0	There is no initiating failure.	Yes
		1	There is an initiating failure.	
L1	Primary failure	1	Engine	Yes
		2	Electrical system	
		3	Flight control system	
		4	Navigation system	
		5	Structure	
L2	Primary failure detail	11-13	Detailed failure cases of engine.	Yes
		21-23	Detailed failure cases of ELS.	
		31-34	Detailed failure cases of FCS.	
		41-42	Detailed failure cases of NavSys.	
		51	Detailed failure of structure.	
L3	Failure Detection by GCS	0	Failure Not Detected	Yes
		1	Failure Detected	
L4	Failure Detection by UA	0	Failure Not Detected or L3 == 1	Yes
		1	Failure Detected	
L5	Primary consequence	/	Qualitative description of primary failure	No
L6	Countermeasures possible?	/	Qualitative description if CMs are possible. CMs are only possible if L3 or L4 == 1.	No
L7	CM, by default the 1 st CM	/	Qualitative description of CM.	No

L8	Success parameter of L7	0	Fail	Yes
		1	Success	
		-1	If this CM is not available or if another CM before was successful	
L9	Consequence parameter of L8	0	If L8 == 0	Yes
		1	If L8 == 1	
		-1	If L8 == -1	
L10	CM, by default the 2 nd CM	/	Qualitative description of CM.	No
L11	Success parameter of L10	0	Fail	Yes
		1	Success	
		-1	If this CM is not available or if another CM before was successful	
L12	Consequence parameter of L11	0	If L11 == 0	Yes
		1	If L11 == 1	
		-1	If L11 == -1	
L13	CM, by default the 3 rd CM	/	Qualitative description of CM.	No
L14	Success parameter of L13	0	Fail	Yes
		1	Success	
		-1	If this CM is not available or if another CM before was successful	
L15	Consequence parameter of L14	0	If L14 == 0	Yes
		1	If L14 == 1	
		-1	If L14 == -1	
L16	Final Consequence	0	If no CM is available or no CM was successful	Yes
		1	If one CM was available	

Table 11-9 Layer logic.

The probability for L0 is assigned within the INI file by setting up the probability of an initiating failure. For the remaining elements that are part of the event vector, an individual probability can be set up within the event tree file. This file consists of various spread sheets, including the complete event tree and the necessary export data for MATLAB™, as well as an editor which can be used to easily modify the probability values in terms of percent for the different elements.

L1	L2	L3 GCS Detection	L4 UA Detection	L5	L6	L7 - Success probability 1. Countermeasure	L8 - Success probability 2. Countermeasure	L9 - Success probability 3. Countermeasure
Engine	Engine Out	50	50	L7 - 1. Countermeasure	GCS_Restart	50	-1	-1
Engine	Engine Out				UA_Restart	50	-1	-1
Engine	Engine Out			L10 - 2. Countermeasure	GCS_CFT / Emergency Landing	-1	50	-1
Engine	Engine Out				UA_CFT / Emergency Landing	-1	50	-1
Engine	Engine Out			L13 - 3. Countermeasure	GCS_ITF	-1	-1	50
Engine	Engine Out				UA_ITF	-1	-1	50
Engine	Engine Anomaly	50	50	L7 - 1. Countermeasure	GCS_CFT / Emergency Landing	50	-1	-1
Engine	Engine Anomaly				UA_CFT / Emergency Landing	50	-1	-1
Engine	Engine Anomaly			L10 - 2. Countermeasure	GCS_ITF	-1	50	-1
Engine	Engine Anomaly				UA_ITF	-1	50	-1
Engine	Engine Anomaly			L13 - 3. Countermeasure	N/A	-1	-1	-1
Engine	Engine Anomaly				N/A	-1	-1	-1
Engine	Engine Fire	50	50	L7 - 1. Countermeasure	GCS_ITF	50	-1	-1
Engine	Engine Fire				UA_ITF	50	-1	-1
Engine	Engine Fire			L10 - 2. Countermeasure	N/A	-1	-1	-1
Engine	Engine Fire				N/A	-1	-1	-1
Engine	Engine Fire			L13 - 3. Countermeasure	N/A	-1	-1	-1
Engine	Engine Fire				N/A	-1	-1	-1
Engine	Engine Fire			L13 - 3. Countermeasure	N/A	-1	-1	-1
Engine	Engine Fire				N/A	-1	-1	-1
Electrical System	Generator Failure	50	50	L7 - 1. Countermeasure	GCS_CFT / Emergency Landing	50	-1	-1
Electrical System	Generator Failure				UA_CFT / Emergency Landing	50	-1	-1
Electrical System	Generator Failure			L10 - 2. Countermeasure	GCS_ITF	-1	50	-1
Electrical System	Generator Failure				UA_ITF	-1	50	-1
Electrical System	Generator Failure			L13 - 3. Countermeasure	N/A	-1	-1	-1
Electrical System	Generator Failure				N/A	-1	-1	-1
Electrical System	Connection Failure	50	50	L7 - 1. Countermeasure	GCS_CFT / Emergency Landing	50	-1	-1
Electrical System	Connection Failure				UA_CFT / Emergency Landing	50	-1	-1
Electrical System	Connection Failure			L10 - 2. Countermeasure	GCS_ITF	-1	50	-1
Electrical System	Connection Failure				UA_ITF	-1	50	-1
Electrical System	Connection Failure			L13 - 3. Countermeasure	N/A	-1	-1	-1
Electrical System	Connection Failure				N/A	-1	-1	-1

Figure 11-17. Part of the editor to modify the event tree values.

WARNING

Within the event tree file, only the green fields in the EDITOR spread sheet shall be modified. Otherwise, it cannot be guaranteed that O.R.C.U.S. will work as intended.

In the current version, O.R.C.U.S. is limited to the defined default LUAS, the associated main sub systems, failure modes and countermeasures. The addition of sub systems is possible but requires at first to expand the event tree in order to define the associated failure modes. Furthermore, the necessary MATLAB™ functions must be programmed and included into O.R.C.U.S. in accordance to the architecture of the software. This encompasses new failure mode functions, the assignation of an appropriate impact function and the expansion of the command prompt output functions. Figure 11-18 shows the complete map of the interacting functions necessary for a complete O.R.C.U.S. simulation and for the sake of completeness Figure 11-19 shows O.R.C.U.S._02.00_MapDetection.




Figure 11-18. Function interaction of O.R.C.U.S. flight simulation.




Figure 11-19. Function interaction of O.R.C.U.S. map detection.

11.2.9 Function Glossary

11.2.9.1 CoordinatePix

Description	The function calculates the surrounding pixels to the input pixel in relation to the position of the input pixel on the input map. Up to 24 neighbour pixels might be calculated. After calculation, the surrounding pixels are given back to the parent function as vectors.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	CorrectFPix1Street CorrectFPix2TrunkRoad CorrectFPix3RuralRoad CorrectFPix4MotorWay CorrectFPix5Walk CorrectFPix6Tram CorrectFPix7RailRoad CorrectFPix8House CorrectFPix9ResidentialArea CorrectFPix10OpenArea CorrectFPix11NonBuiltArea CorrectFPix12GreenArea CorrectFPix13WaterArea CorrectFPix14Airfield MappingUndefined
Child function(s)	None
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	$[Y, X] = \text{CoordinatePix0200}(y, x, m_{Max}, n_{Max})$
Input variables	y and x coordinate of input pixel, maximum pixel numbers in y and x direction. $y = m_{Max}; x = n_{Max}$
Output variables	Surrounding pixels to the input pixel

11.2.9.2 CoordinatePixNormMap

Description	The function calculates the surrounding pixels to the input pixel in relation to the position of the input pixel on the input map. Input map is the improved and scaled map. Up to 9 neighbour pixels might be calculated. After calculation, the surrounding pixels are given back to the parent function as vectors.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	NormMap
Child function(s)	None
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	<code>[Y,X] = CoordinatePixNormMap0200(y,x,Map)</code>
Input variables	Scaled improved Map struct including sub-structs; y and x coordinate of input pixel
Output variables	Surrounding pixels to the input pixel

11.2.9.3 CorrectFPix

Description	The CorrectFPix function takes the map struct including the sub-structs from MapScan and deletes "wrong" allocated pixels. In this case "wrong" means for example a house pixel within a street or similar. These errors occur due to the RGB vagueness and the map labelling. The correction is done by the 14 child functions and the defined correction factors. The correction factors may be changed.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	MapDetection
Child function(s)	CorrectFPix1Street CorrectFPix2TrunkRoad CorrectFPix3RuralRoad CorrectFPix4MotorWay CorrectFPix5Walk CorrectFPix6Tram CorrectFPix7RailRoad CorrectFPix8House CorrectFPix9ResidentialArea

	CorrectFPix10OpenArea CorrectFPix11NonBuiltArea CorrectFPix12GreenArea CorrectFPix13WaterArea CorrectFPix14Airfield
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = CorrectFPix0200 (Map) ;
Input variables	Map struct including sub-structs
Output variables	Corrected Map struct including sub-structs

11.2.9.4 CorrectFPix01Street

Description	<p>The function checks the street sub-struct of the map struct for wrong allocated street pixels. A wrong street pixel is identified if the surrounding pixels are less than the number defined by the handed over correction factor. The surrounding pixels are calculated by the CoordinatePix sub function.</p> <p>If a wrong allocated street pixel is detected, it is replaced with the correct sub-struct pixel by majority weighting. The correction is done by an outer and an inner loop. The outer loop is defined by the number of all original street pixels. The inner loop is defined by the number of surrounding pixels of every original street pixel. By this process every street pixel is checked.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	CorrectFPix
Child function(s)	CoordinatePix
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = CorrectFPix01Street0200 (Map, SCor)
Input variables	Map struct including sub-structs, street sub-struct correction factor
Output variables	Map struct including corrected street sub-struct

11.2.9.5 CorrectFPix02TrunkRoad

Description	<p>The function checks the trunk road sub-struct of the map struct for wrong allocated street pixels. A wrong trunk road pixel is identified if the surrounding pixels are less than the number defined by the handed over correction factor. The surrounding pixels are calculated by the CoordinatePix sub function.</p> <p>If a wrong allocated trunk road pixel is detected, it is replaced with the correct sub-struct pixel by majority weighting. The correction is done by an outer and an inner loop. The outer loop is defined by the number of all original trunk road pixels. The inner loop is defined by the number of surrounding pixels of every original trunk road pixel. By this process every trunk road pixel is checked.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	CorrectFPix
Child function(s)	CoordinatePix
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	<code>[Map] = CorrectFPix02TrunkRoad0200 (Map, TRCor)</code>
Input variables	Map struct including sub-structs; trunk road correction factor
Output variables	Map struct including corrected trunk road sub-struct

11.2.9.6 CorrectFPix03RuralRoad

Description	<p>The function checks the rural road sub-struct of the map struct for wrong allocated street pixels. A wrong rural road pixel is identified if the surrounding pixels are less than the number defined by the handed over correction factor. The surrounding pixels are calculated by the CoordinatePix sub function.</p> <p>If a wrong allocated trunk road pixel is detected, it is replaced with the correct sub-struct pixel by majority weighting. The correction is done by an outer and an inner loop. The outer loop is defined by the number of all original rural road pixels. The inner loop is defined by the number of surrounding pixels of every original rural road pixel. By this process every rural road pixel is checked.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00

Parent function(s)	CorrectFPix
Child function(s)	CoordinatePix
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = CorrectFPix03RuralRoad0200 (Map, RRCor)
Input variables	Map struct including sub-structs; rural road correction factor
Output variables	Map struct including corrected rural road sub-struct

11.2.9.7 CorrectFPix04MotorWay

Description	<p>The function checks the motorway sub-struct of the map struct for wrong allocated street pixels. A wrong motorway pixel is identified if the surrounding pixels are less than the number defined by the handed over correction factor. The surrounding pixels are calculated by the CoordinatePix sub function.</p> <p>If a wrong allocated motor way pixel is detected, it is replaced with the correct sub-struct pixel by majority weighting. The correction is done by an outer and an inner loop. The outer loop is defined by the number of all original motor way pixels. The inner loop is defined by the number of surrounding pixels of every original rural road pixel. By this process every motor way pixel is checked.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	CorrectFPix
Child function(s)	CoordinatePix
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = CorrectFPix04MotorWay0200 (Map, MWCOR)
Input variables	Map struct including sub-structs; motor way correction factor
Output variables	Map struct including corrected motor way sub-struct

11.2.9.8 CorrectFPix05Walk

Description	The function checks the walk sub-struct of the map struct for wrong allocated walk pixels. A wrong walk pixel is identified if the surrounding pixels are less than the number defined by the handed
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	<p>over correction factor. The surrounding pixels are calculated by the CoordinatePix sub function.</p> <p>If a wrong allocated walk pixel is detected, it is replaced with the correct sub-struct pixel by majority weighting. The correction is done by an outer and an inner loop. The outer loop is defined by the number of all original walk pixels. The inner loop is defined by the number of surrounding pixels of every original walk pixel. By this process every walk pixel is checked.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	CorrectFPix
Child function(s)	CoordinatePix
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	<code>[Map] = CorrectFPix05Walk0200 (Map, WCor)</code>
Input variables	Map struct including sub-structs; walk correction factor
Output variables	Map struct including corrected walk sub-struct

11.2.9.9 CorrectFPix06Tram

Description	<p>The function checks the tram sub-struct of the map struct for wrong allocated walk pixels. A wrong tram pixel is identified if the surrounding pixels are less than the number defined by the handed over correction factor. The surrounding pixels are calculated by the CoordinatePix sub function.</p> <p>If a wrong allocated tram pixel is detected, it is replaced with the correct sub-struct pixel by majority weighting. The correction is done by an outer and an inner loop. The outer loop is defined by the number of all original walk pixels. The inner loop is defined by the number of surrounding pixels of every original tram pixel. By this process every tram pixel is checked.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	CorrectFPix
Child function(s)	CoordinatePix

Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = CorrectFPix06Tram0200 (Map, TCor)
Input variables	Map struct including sub-structs; tram correction factor
Output variables	Map struct including corrected tram sub-struct

11.2.9.10 **CorrectFPix07RailRoad**

Description	<p>The function checks the railroad sub-struct of the map struct for wrong allocated railroad pixels. A wrong railroad pixel is identified if the surrounding pixels are less than the number defined by the handed over correction factor. The surrounding pixels are calculated by the CoordinatePix sub function.</p> <p>If a wrong allocated railroad pixel is detected, it is replaced with the correct sub-struct pixel by majority weighting. The correction is done by an outer and an inner loop. The outer loop is defined by the number of all original railroad pixels. The inner loop is defined by the number of surrounding pixels of every original railroad pixel. By this process every railroad pixel is checked.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	CorrectFPix
Child function(s)	CoordinatePix
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = CorrectFPix07RailRoad0200 (Map, RCor)
Input variables	Map struct including sub-structs; railroad correction factor
Output variables	Map struct including corrected railroad sub-struct

11.2.9.11 **CorrectFPix08House**

Description	<p>The function checks the house sub-struct of the map struct for wrong allocated house pixels. A wrong house pixel is identified if the surrounding pixels are less than the number defined by the handed over correction factor. The surrounding pixels are calculated by the CoordinatePix sub function.</p>
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	<p>If a wrong allocated house pixel is detected, it is replaced with the correct sub-struct pixel by majority weighting. The correction is done by an outer and an inner loop. The outer loop is defined by the number of all original house pixels. The inner loop is defined by the number of surrounding pixels of every original house pixel. By this process every house pixel is checked.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	CorrectFPix
Child function(s)	CoordinatePix
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	<code>[Map] = CorrectFPix08House0200 (Map, HCor)</code>
Input variables	Map struct including sub-structs; house correction factor
Output variables	Map struct including corrected house sub-struct

11.2.9.12 *CorrectFPix09ResidentialArea*

Description	<p>The function checks the residential area sub-struct of the map struct for wrong allocated residential area pixels. A wrong residential area pixel is identified if the surrounding pixels are less than the number defined by the handed over correction factor. The surrounding pixels are calculated by the CoordinatePix sub function.</p> <p>If a wrong allocated residential area pixel is detected, it is replaced with the correct sub-struct pixel by majority weighting. The correction is done by an outer and an inner loop. The outer loop is defined by the number of all original residential area pixels. The inner loop is defined by the number of surrounding pixels of every original residential area pixel. By this process every residential area pixel is checked.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	CorrectFPix
Child function(s)	CoordinatePix
Group	Operational Environment Generation

Command	[Map] = CorrectFPix09ResidentialArea0200 (Map, RACor)
Input variables	Map struct including sub-structs; residential area correction factor
Output variables	Map struct including corrected residential area sub-struct

11.2.9.13 **CorrectFPix10OpenArea**

Description	<p>The function checks the open area sub-struct of the map struct for wrong allocated open area pixels. A wrong open area pixel is identified if the surrounding pixels are less than the number defined by the handed over correction factor. The surrounding pixels are calculated by the CoordinatePix sub function.</p> <p>If a wrong allocated open area pixel is detected, it is replaced with the correct sub-struct pixel by majority weighting. The correction is done by an outer and an inner loop. The outer loop is defined by the number of all original residential area pixels. The inner loop is defined by the number of surrounding pixels of every original open area pixel. By this process every open area pixel is checked.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	CorrectFPix
Child function(s)	CoordinatePix
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = CorrectFPix10OpenArea0200 (Map, OACor)
Input variables	Map struct including sub-structs; open area correction factor
Output variables	Map struct including corrected open area sub-struct

11.2.9.14 **CorrectFPix11NonBuiltArea**

Description	<p>The function checks the non-built area sub-struct of the map struct for wrong allocated non-built area pixels. A wrong non-built area pixel is identified if the surrounding pixels are less than the number defined by the handed over correction factor. The surrounding pixels are calculated by the CoordinatePix sub function.</p> <p>If a wrong allocated open area pixel is detected, it is replaced with the correct sub-struct pixel by majority weighting. The correction is done by an outer and an inner loop. The outer loop is defined by the</p>
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	number of all original non-built area pixels. The inner loop is defined by the number of surrounding pixels of every original non-built area pixel. By this process every non-built area pixel is checked.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	CorrectFPix
Child function(s)	CoordinatePix
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = CorrectFPix11NonBuiltArea0200 (Map, Ncor)
Input variables	Map struct including sub-structs; non-built area correction factor
Output variables	Map struct including corrected non-built area sub-struct

11.2.9.15 **CorrectFPix12GreenArea**

Description	<p>The function checks the green area sub-struct of the map struct for wrong allocated green area pixels. A wrong green area pixel is identified if the surrounding pixels are less than the number defined by the handed over correction factor. The surrounding pixels are calculated by the CoordinatePix sub function.</p> <p>If a wrong allocated open area pixel is detected, it is replaced with the correct sub-struct pixel by majority weighting. The correction is done by an outer and an inner loop. The outer loop is defined by the number of all original green area pixels. The inner loop is defined by the number of surrounding pixels of every original green area pixel. By this process every green area pixel is checked.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	CorrectFPix
Child function(s)	CoordinatePix
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = CorrectFPix12GreenArea0200 (Map, GACor)
Input variables	Map struct including sub-structs; green area correction factor
Output variables	Map struct including corrected green area sub-struct

11.2.9.16 *CorrectFPix13WaterArea*

Description	<p>The function checks the water area sub-struct of the map struct for wrong allocated water area pixels. A wrong water area pixel is identified if the surrounding pixels are less than the number defined by the handed over correction factor. The surrounding pixels are calculated by the CoordinatePix sub function.</p> <p>If a wrong allocated water area pixel is detected, it is replaced with the correct sub-struct pixel by majority weighting. The correction is done by an outer and an inner loop. The outer loop is defined by the number of all original water area pixels. The inner loop is defined by the number of surrounding pixels of every original water area pixel. By this process every water area pixel is checked.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	CorrectFPix
Child function(s)	CoordinatePix
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = CorrectFPix13WaterArea0200 (Map, WACor)
Input variables	Map struct including sub-structs; water area correction factor
Output variables	Map struct including corrected water area sub-struct

11.2.9.17 *CorrectFPix14Airfield*

Description	<p>The function checks the airfield sub-struct of the map struct for wrong allocated airfield pixels. A wrong airfield pixel is identified if the surrounding pixels are less than the number defined by the handed over correction factor. The surrounding pixels are calculated by the CoordinatePix sub function.</p> <p>If a wrong allocated airfield pixel is detected, it is replaced with the correct sub-struct pixel by majority weighting. The correction is done by an outer and an inner loop. The outer loop is defined by the number of all original water area pixels. The inner loop is defined by the number of surrounding pixels of every original airfield pixel. By this process every airfield pixel is checked.</p>
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Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	CorrectFPix
Child function(s)	CoordinatePix
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	<code>[Map] = CorrectFPix14Airfield0200 (Map, AFCor)</code>
Input variables	Map struct including sub-structs; airfield correction factor
Output variables	Map struct including corrected airfield sub-struct

11.2.9.18 *CorrectNormMap*

Description	<p>Within the scaling process of the NormMap sub function, it may happen that several pixels are allocated with two or three sub-structs.</p> <p>CorrectNormMap determines these pixels and allocates them to a sole sub-struct. It is only activated if it's needed. The function works similar to the MappingUndefined sub function. However, in contrast to MappingUndefined only five loops are used.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	MapDetection
Child function(s)	CoordinatePixNormMap
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	<code>[Map] = CorrectNormMap0200 (Map)</code>
Input variables	Scaled improved Map struct including sub-structs
Output variables	Corrected scaled improved Map struct including sub-structs

11.2.9.19 *CorrectNormSMPSurM*

Description	<p>Within the scaling process of the NormMap sub function, it may happen that several pixels are allocated with two or three sub-structs.</p>
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	CorrectNormSMPSurM determines these pixels and allocates them to a sole sub-struct. It is only activated if it's needed and only in case an overlay has been drawn. The function works similar to the MappingUndefined sub function. However, in contrast to MappingUndefined only five loops are used.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	MapDetection
Child function(s)	CoordinatePixNormMap
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = CorrectNormMap0200 (Map)
Input variables	Scaled improved Map struct including sub-structs
Output variables	Corrected scaled improved Map struct including SurM, SMP and sub-structs

11.2.9.20 *EISysFail*

Description	The function summarizes the different failure mode functions for the UA Electrical System, calls them and hands the results back to the <i>EvCGlobal</i> function.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	EvCGlobal
Child function(s)	EISysFail221 EISysFail222 EISysFail223
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = EISysFail10200 (Map, L1, L2, L3, L4)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Layer parameters L1, L2, L3, and L4. See Table 11-9 for description.

Output variables	Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16. See Table 11-9 for description.
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11.2.9.21 *EISysFail221*

Description	Function for determining the event chain in case of the electrical system failure condition "Generator Failure". Event Chain is based on <i>Eventtree_6.xlsx</i> .
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	EISysFail
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = EISysFail221_0200 (Map, L2, L3, L4)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Layer parameters L2, L3, and L4. See Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16. See Table 11-9 for description.

11.2.9.22 *EISysFail222*

Description	Function for determining the event chain in case of the electrical system failure condition "Connection Failure". Event Chain is based on <i>Eventtree_6.xlsx</i> .
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	EISysFail
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation

Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = EISysFail222_0200 (Map, L2, L3, L4)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Layer parameters L2, L3, and L4. See Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16. See Table 11-9 for description.

11.2.9.23 *EISysFail223*

Description	Function for determining the event chain in case of the electrical system failure condition "Short Circuit / Overload". Event Chain is based on <i>Eventtree_6.xlsx</i> .
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	EISysFail
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = EISysFail223_0200 (Map, L2, L3, L4)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Layer parameters L2, L3, and L4. See Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16. See Table 11-9 for description.

11.2.9.24 *EngFail*

Description	The function summarizes the different failure mode functions for the UA engine, calls them and hands the results back to the <i>EvCGlobal</i> function.
Type	Sub function

Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	EvCGlobal
Child function(s)	EngFail111 EngFail112 EngFail113
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = EngFail10200 (Map, L1, L2, L3, L4)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Layer parameters L1, L2, L3, and L4. See Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16. See Table 11-9 for description.

11.2.9.25 EngFail111

Description	Function for determining the event chain in case of the electrical system failure condition "Engine Out". Event Chain is based on <i>Eventtree_6.xlsx</i> .
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	EngFail
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = EngFail1111_0200 (Map, L2, L3, L4)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Layer parameters L2, L3, and L4. See Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16.

	See Table 11-9 for description.
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11.2.9.26 *EngFail112*

Description	Function for determining the event chain in case of the electrical system failure condition "Engine Anomaly". Event Chain is based on <i>Eventtree_6.xlsx</i> .
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	EngFail
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = EngFail112_0200 (Map, L2, L3, L4)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Layer parameters L2, L3, and L4. See Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16. See Table 11-9 for description.

11.2.9.27 *EngFail113*

Description	Function for determining the event chain in case of the electrical system failure condition "Engine Fire". Event Chain is based on <i>Eventtree_6.xlsx</i> .
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	EngFail
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = EngFail113_0200 (Map, L2, L3, L4)

Input variables	<p>O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.</p> <p>Layer parameters L2, L3, and L4.</p> <p>See Table 11-9 for description.</p>
Output variables	<p>Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16.</p> <p>See Table 11-9 for description.</p>

11.2.9.28 *EvCGlobal*

Description	Function that calculates the failure process in the airborne UA, based on <i>Eventree_6.xlsx</i> . The function flow is based on the layers and values stored within the event tree file.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	TransferFcn
Child function(s)	PrimEvFail RdFailureL1L2 EvCOutput RdDecisionL3L4 EvCCGCFailureOutput EvCGCSUdUADFailureOutput EvCUdFailureOutput EngFail EISysFail FCSFail NavSysFail StructFail
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L1, L2, L3, L4, L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = EvCGlobal0200 (Map)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.
Output variables	<p>Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16.</p> <p>See Table 11-9 for description.</p>

11.2.9.29 *EvCGCSDFailureOutput*

Description	Function which provides a command prompt output that the GCS detected a failure within the airborne UA.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	EvCGlobal
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[] = EvCGCSDFailureOutput0200 (L2)
Input variables	Layer parameter L2; see Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	None except command line output.

11.2.9.30 *EvCGCSUdUADFailureOutput*

Description	Function which returns a command prompt output that the UA detected a failure within the airborne UA, which was not detected in the GCS.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	EvCGlobal
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[] = EvCGCSUdUADFailureOutput0200 (L2)
Input variables	Layer parameter L2; see Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	None except command line output.

11.2.9.31 *EvCOutput*

Description	Function that returns the results of the <i>RdFailureL1L2</i> function within the command prompt.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00

Parent function(s)	EvCGlobal
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[] = EvCOutput0200 (L1, L2)
Input variables	Layer parameter L1 and L2; see Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	None except command line output.

11.2.9.32 *EvCPrimConOutput*

Description	Function that returns a command prompt output of the primary consequence in case a failure occurred within the airborne UA.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	EvCGlobal
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[] = EvCPrimConOutput0200 (L2)
Input variables	Layer parameter L2; see Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	None except command line output.

11.2.9.33 *EvCUdFailureOutput*

Description	Function which returns a command prompt output that a failure within the airborne UA was not detected neither in the GCS nor in the UA.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	EvCGlobal
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[] = EvCUdFailureOutput0200 (L2)
Input variables	Layer parameter L2; see Table 11-9 for description.

Output variables	None except command line output.
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11.2.9.34 *Eventtree_6.xlsx*

Description	The event tree file contains all probability values defined by the UAS and by the O.R.C.U.S. user regarding possible events which might occur by random during an O.R.C.U.S. simulation. See also chapter 11.2.8.
Type	xlsx table
Current Version	6
Parent function(s)	None
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	None
Input variables	Probability values for failure modes, failure detection and countermeasures in accordance to UAS and user definition.
Output variables	Probability values for failure modes, failure detection and countermeasures in accordance to UAS and user definition.

11.2.9.35 *FCSFail*

Description	The function summarizes the different failure mode functions for the UA FCS, calls them and hands the results back to the <i>EvCGlobal</i> function.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	EvCGlobal
Child function(s)	FCSFail331 FCSFail332 FCSFail333 FCSFail334
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = FCSFail10200 (Map, L1, L2, L3, L4)

Input variables	<p>O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.</p> <p>Layer parameters L1, L2, L3, and L4.</p> <p>See Table 11-9 for description.</p>
Output variables	<p>Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16.</p> <p>See Table 11-9 for description.</p>

11.2.9.36 *FCSFail331*

Description	Function for determining the event chain in case of the electrical system failure condition "Partial Lock of flight control surfaces". Event Chain is based on <i>Eventtree_6.xlsx</i> .
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	FCSFail
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = FCSFail331_0200 (Map, L2, L3, L4)
Input variables	<p>O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.</p> <p>Layer parameters L2, L3, and L4.</p> <p>See Table 11-9 for description.</p>
Output variables	<p>Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16.</p> <p>See Table 11-9 for description.</p>

11.2.9.37 *FCSFail332*

Description	Function for determining the event chain in case of the electrical system failure condition "Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces, resulting in oscillations". Event Chain is based on <i>Eventtree_6.xlsx</i> .
Type	Sub function

Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	FCSFail
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = FCSFail1332_0200 (Map, L2, L3, L4)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Layer parameters L2, L3, and L4. See Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16. See Table 11-9 for description.

11.2.9.38 FCSFail333

Description	Function for determining the event chain in case of the electrical system failure condition "Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces / override of GCS commands". Event Chain is based on <i>Eventtree_6.xlsx</i> .
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	FCSFail
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = FCSFail333_0200 (Map, L2, L3, L4)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Layer parameters L2, L3, and L4. See Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16. See Table 11-9 for description.

11.2.9.39 FCSFail334

Description	Function for determining the event chain in case of the electrical system failure condition "Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine resulting in movements beyond the limitations of the UA (V_{NE} is exceeded)". Event Chain is based on <i>Eventtree_6.xlsx</i> .
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	FCSFail
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = FCSFail334_0200 (Map, L2, L3, L4)

Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Layer parameters L2, L3, and L4. See Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16. See Table 11-9 for description.

11.2.9.40 *ImpactArea_anyP*

Description	The function determines the circle-shaped impact area after a UA ground impact that happened at a random point on the overflown map. This impact scenario occurs after event chains E56, E58, E59, E67, E70 and E71. The impact area is calculated as follows: $r_{CoreImpact} = [0.5 \cdot \max(w_{UA}, l_{UA})] \quad (11-2)$ $r_{Impact} = 2 \cdot r_{CoreImpact} \quad (11-3)$ $A_{Impact} = \pi \cdot r_{Impact}^2 \quad (11-4)$
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	TransferFcn
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[Map] = ImpactArea_anyP0200 (Map, k_cyc, k_UA)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Current position of UA on flight path k_UA and current cycle number k_cyc. Handed over automatically by parent function.
Output variables	Impact area on the map which is stored directly in map struct. If activated, plot of impact zone.

11.2.9.41 ImpactArea_bFP

Description	<p>The function determines the circle-shaped impact area after a UA ground impact directly below the flight path on the overflown map. This impact scenario occurs after event chains E3, E7, E11, E14, E17, E19, E23, E26, E30, E33, E36, E37, E38, E39, E40, E42, E45, E49, E50, E52, E53, E54, E55, E57, E60, E62, E66, E69, E73, E74, E76, E77, E78, E79 and E81.</p> <p>The calculation of the impact areas is identical to the function <i>ImpactArea_anyP</i>.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	TransferFcn
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[Map] = ImpactArea_bFP0200 (Map, k_cyc, k_UA)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Current position of UA on flight path k_UA and current cycle number k_cyc. Handed over automatically by parent function.
Output variables	Impact area on the map which is stored directly in map struct. If activated, plot of impact zone.

11.2.9.42 ImpactArea_bFPbGR

Description	<p>The function determines the rectangular-shaped impact area after the UA has followed the flight path at best-glide ratio until it touched the ground. This impact scenario occurs after event chains E4, E12, E15 and E16. The impact area is calculated as follows:</p> $d_{Glide} = L/D \cdot h_{Alt} \text{ [m]} \quad (11-5)$ $d_{Glide h_P} = L/D \cdot h_P \text{ [m]} \quad (11-6)$ $d_{Swath} = 2 \cdot \max(w_{UA}, l_{UA}) + d_{Glide h_P} \text{ [m]} \quad (11-7)$ $A_{GlideImpact} = 2 \cdot \max(w_{UA}, l_{UA}) \cdot d_{Swath} \text{ [m]} \quad (11-8)$
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.01

Parent function(s)	TransferFcn
Child function(s)	PIZ_nbFP
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[Map] = ImpactArea_bFPbGR0201 (Map, k_cyc, k_UA)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Current position of UA on flight path k_UA and current cycle number k_cyc. Handed over automatically by parent function.
Output variables	Impact area on the map which is stored directly in map struct. If activated, plot of impact zone.

11.2.9.43 *ImpactArea_Debris*

Description	<p>The function determines the impact area in case the UA disintegrates in the air and debris occurs. This impact scenario occurs after event chains E18, E20, E21, E61, E63, E64, E80, E82 and E83. The impact area is calculated as follows:</p> $t_{Impact} = \sqrt{\frac{2 \cdot h_{Alt}}{g}} \text{ [sec]} \quad (11-9)$ $d_{Debris} = v_{UA} \cdot t_{Impact} \text{ [m]} \quad (11-10)$ $r_{Impact} = \max(w_{UA}, l_{UA}, 0.5 \cdot d_{Debris}) \quad (11-11)$ $A_{Debris} = \pi \cdot r_{Impact}^2 \text{ [m}^2\text{]} \quad (11-12)$
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	TransferFcn
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[Map] = ImpactArea_Debris0200 (Map, k_cyc, k_UA)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Current position of UA on flight path k_UA and current cycle number k_cyc. Handed over automatically by parent function.

Output variables	Impact area on the map which is stored directly in map struct. If activated, plot of impact zone.
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11.2.9.44 *ImpactArea_EmergL*

Description	The function determines the emergency landing field in case an emergency landing is possible due to a countermeasure. This applies to all event chains not linked to another impact scenario. The quadratic-shaped emergency landing area is calculated as follows: $A_{ELF} = r_{Impact}^2 = [\max(w_{UA}, l_{UA})]^2 \quad (11-13)$
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	TransferFcn
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[Map] = ImpactArea_EmergL0200 (Map, k_cyc, k_UA)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Current position of UA on flight path k_UA and current cycle number k_cyc. Handed over automatically by parent function.
Output variables	Impact area on the map which is stored directly in map struct. If activated, plot of impact zone.

11.2.9.45 *ImpactArea_nbFPFD*

Description	The function calculates an impact zone close to the flight path in flight direction. The UA deviates from the flight path by a normal distributed random pitch angle and a yaw angle. In any case, it is assumed, that the last phase before the impact is comparable to a deep dive. The impact scenario occurs after event chains E43, E46 and E47. The calculation of the impact areas is identical to the function <i>ImpactArea_anyP</i> .
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	TransferFcn

Child function(s)	PIZ_nbFP YawPos
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[Map] = ImpactArea_nbFPFD0200 (Map, k_cyc, k_UA)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Current position of UA on flight path k_UA and current cycle number k_cyc. Handed over automatically by parent function.
Output variables	Impact area on the map which is stored directly in map struct. If activated, plot of impact zone.

11.2.9.46 *ImpactArea_tanFP*

Description	The function calculates an impact zone after the UA has deviated tangentially from the flight path and loses altitude at best glide ratio until it touches the ground. The impact scenario occurs after event chains E8, E9, E24, E27, E28, E31, E34 and E35. The calculation of the impact areas is identical to the function <i>ImpactArea_bFPbGR</i> .
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.01
Parent function(s)	TransferFcn
Child function(s)	PIZ_nbFP
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[Map] = ImpactArea_tanFP0201 (Map, k_cyc, k_UA)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Current position of UA on flight path k_UA and current cycle number k_cyc. Handed over automatically by parent function.
Output variables	Impact area on the map which is stored directly in map struct. If activated, plot of impact zone.

11.2.9.47 GetMap

Description	The function loads an OSM image into the MATLAB workspace.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	MapDetection
Child function(s)	None
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = GetMap0200()
Input variables	OSM png map image, scale, resolution
Output variables	Map struct

11.2.9.48 MapDetection

Description	The function calls all sub functions necessary to import and render an OSM image, categorize it and transfer it into a MATLAB struct.
Type	Main function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	None
Child function(s)	CorrectFPix CorrectNormMap CorrectNormSMP GenerateSurM GetMap MapOverlay MappingUndefined MapScan NormMap SubStruct_Coord
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = MapDetection0200()
Input variables	OSM png map image
Output variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct

11.2.9.49 *MapOverlay*

Description	<p>This function allows the user to draw a polygon shaped overlay, if required. With this polygon the "small city/big map" is solved.</p> <p>"Small city/big map" issue:</p> <p>In general, O.R.C.U.S. uses the population data stored in pplCities and pplDayTime databases to distribute people in a city on the map image.</p> <p>In case the city covers the whole map image, this is applicable without any limitations. However, if the city doesn't cover the whole map image, this would also be applied to areas on the map even if there's no city.</p> <p>By using the overlay function a sub map is generated for the city area. In this sub map the original data and algorithms are used.</p> <p>For the remaining area the data from the advanced database "pplCitiesCountiesFS" is used. This database encompasses an update of population data for all cities plus population data from each county and federal state. In addition, a "PeopleDayTimeFS" algorithm was generated for this area.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	MapDetection
Child function(s)	None
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = MapOverlay0200 (Map)
Input variables	Improved corrected Map struct including sub-structs
Output variables	Improved corrected Map struct including SurM, SMP and sub-structs

11.2.9.50 MapScan

Description	The function compares an imported OSM image from GetMap() with the included RGB database and allocates House, Street, etc. The resulting elements are stored in sub-structs within the main struct.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	MapDetection
Child function(s)	None
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = MapScan0200 (Map)
Input variables	Map struct
Output variables	Map struct including sub-structs

11.2.9.51 MappingUndefined

Description	<p>The sub function determines undefined pixels after the MapScan sub function was completed. Pixels which were not identified have a value of zero. Those pixels are determined by the present function and stored into a y and x vector.</p> <p>The vectors are handed over to the CoordinatePix function which calculates the surrogating pixels of each undefined pixel (maximum of 24 pixels). In the next step, the function counts the pixel number of each sub-struct in the surrounding area. Afterwards, the undefined pixel is replaced by the sub-struct pixel with the most pixels in the surrounding area. This process is repeated 20 times.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	MapDetection
Child function(s)	CoordinatePix
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = MappingUndefined0200 (Map)
Input variables	Corrected Map struct including sub-structs

Output variables	Improved corrected Map struct including sub-structs
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11.2.9.52 *NavSysFail*

Description	The function summarizes the different failure mode functions for the UA navigation system, calls them and hands the results back to the <i>EvCGlobal</i> function.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	EvCGlobal
Child function(s)	NavSysFail441 NavSysFail442
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = NavSysFail0200 (Map, L1, L2, L3, L4)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Layer parameters L1, L2, L3, and L4. See Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16. See Table 11-9 for description.

11.2.9.53 *NavSysFail441*

Description	Function for determining the event chain in case of the electrical system failure condition "Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy". Event Chain is based on <i>Eventtree_6.xlsx</i> .
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	NavSysFail
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation

Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = NavSysFail441_0200 (Map, L2, L3, L4)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Layer parameters L2, L3, and L4. See Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16. See Table 11-9 for description.

11.2.9.54 NavSysFail442

Description	Function for determining the event chain in case of the electrical system failure condition "Degradation of altitude data". Event Chain is based on <i>Eventtree_6.xlsx</i> .
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	NavSysFail
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = NavSysFail442_0200 (Map, L2, L3, L4)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Layer parameters L2, L3, and L4. See Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16. See Table 11-9 for description.

11.2.9.55 *NormMap*

Description	The function scales the loaded map struct to a given to a variable pixel to metre ratio target scale by using <code>imresize</code> . The target scale can be either handed over by the function directly or it may be entered during the function flow. Default setting is the direct hand over. The target scale is defined in the INI function.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	MapDetection
Child function(s)	None
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	<code>[Map] = NormMap0200 (Map, target_scale)</code>
Input variables	Improved corrected <i>Map struct</i> including sub-structs; target scale <i>Protocol file</i> . The filename of a protocol is composed as follows: <pre> yyyyymmdd_Protocol_UAFlightSim Current date </pre>
Output variables	Scaled improved Map struct including sub-structs

11.2.9.56 *ORCUS_INI*

Description	The function stores all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables in the map struct. UAS parameters and mission variables have to be entered into the function file itself first.
Type	INI function
Current Version	02.02
Parent function(s)	None
Child function(s)	None
Group	Initialisation
Command	<code>[Map] = ORCUS_INI0202 (Map)</code>
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct
Output variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables

	EvalELF	$m \times n$	Matrix with emergency landing area. Each cell of the emergency landing area has a value of 5.
	EvalZPL_Quad	$m \times n$	Matrix with the impact area defined by the specific impact scenario. Each impact cell has a value defined by the fatality probability equation stored within the specific impact scenario function.
	EvalPos	1×2	Contains the x and y coordinates of the UA on the map where the failure occurred.
	EvalPPL	$m \times n$	Contains the people distribution in the moment of the UA failure. Each cell which contains a person has the value one.

11.2.9.58 *PeopleDayTime*

Description	This function determines how many people have to be distributed in the outside and inside buildings within a city on a Map in accordance to the entered day and time. The percentage is based upon "Mobilitaet in Deutschland 2008" and the follow up study "Mobilitaet in Deutschland 2017" and the related RegioStaR 7 classification of the German Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.02
Parent function(s)	RdPeopleBasicInput
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[ppl_td_otw, ppl_td_atb] = PeopleDayTime0202 (R7, ppl_td, day, hour)
Input variables	All input variables are handed over automatically. R7 RegioStaR 7 classification of overflown city ppl_td Basic number of people to be distributed on the map day Current simulated day hour current simulated daytime

Output variables	<p>ppl_td_atb Number of people to be distributed at buildings.</p> <p>ppl_td_otw Number of people to be distributed in the outside.</p>
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11.2.9.59 *PeopleDayTimeFS*

Description	This function determines how many people have to be distributed in the outside and at buildings around a city on a Map in accordance to entered day, time and the Federal State surrounding the overflown city. The function relies on the <i>pplDayTime.xlsx</i> database.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.02
Parent function(s)	RdPeopleBasicInput
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[ppl_td_otw,ppl_td_atb] = PeopleDayTimeFS0202 (FS,ppl_td,day,hour)
Input variables	All input variables are handed over automatically. FS Federal State code ppl_td Basic number of people to be distributed on the surrounding map day Current simulated day hour current simulated daytime
Output variables	<p>ppl_td_atb Number of people to be distributed at buildings.</p> <p>ppl_td_otw Number of people to be distributed in the outside.</p>

11.2.9.60 *PIZ_nbFP*

Description	The function calculates all possible central impact coordinates after a failure occurred within the airborne UA leading to the impact scenarios <i>ImpactArea_nbFPFD</i> or <i>ImpactArea_tanFP</i> . Note: The final central impact point is determined within the parent function.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00

Parent function(s)	ImpactArea_nbFPFD or ImpactArea_tanFP
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[Map, UA_mov_y, UA_mov_x, y1, x1, psi] = PIZ_nbFP0200 (Map, k_UA, x_FOC, y_FOC)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Current position of UA on flight path k_UA and current cycle number k_cyc. Failure occurrence point coordinates: x_FOC, y_FOC. All input variables are handed over automatically.
Output variables	Potential central impact coordinates on the map which is are directly in map struct. If activated, plot of impact zone. Approximated UA move vector: UA_mov_x, UA_mov_y. Supporting variables, necessary for further calculations in parent functions: x1, y1: Coordinates to avoid that the limitations of the map are exceeded. Psi: Angle between x-axis and UA move vector.

11.2.9.61 *pplCitiesCountiesFS.xlsx*

Description	The pplCitiesCountiesFS is a xlsx file which represents the population database applied in O.R.C.U.S. It contains population data of more than 3,300 cities in Germany, as well as the population data of all counties and all Federal States in Germany. Furthermore, for each city, the RegioStaR 7 classification is included. Additionally, data of tourists for selected cities, counties and all Federal States are included. The database is founded on official census data obtained from Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis).
Type	xlsx table
Current Version	2019-06
Parent function(s)	None
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	None

Input variables	Census data obtained from Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis)
Output variables	Population data in terms of inhabitant numbers and population densities.

11.2.9.62 *pplDayTime.xlsx*

Description	The pplDayTime is a xlsx file which represents a database that contains the percentage numbers of people who are in movement in accordance to RegioStaR 7 classification as well as in accordance to several time frames during a weekday. The percentage values are based upon "Mobilitaet in Deutschland 2017" of the German Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure.
Type	xlsx table
Current Version	2019-01
Parent function(s)	None
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	None
Input variables	Data obtained from "Mobilitaet in Deutschland 2017" of the German Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure.
Output variables	Percentage values of people in movement in accordance to day, time and city type.

11.2.9.63 *RdDecisionL3L4*

Description	The function determines if a failure is detected within the UA or GCS in relation to event tree file. The underlying detection probabilities are stored within the <i>Eventtree_6.xlsx</i> file.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	TransferFcn
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L3,L4] = RdDecisionL3L4_0200 (Map, L1, L2)

Input variables	<p>O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.</p> <p>Layer parameters L1 and L2.</p> <p>See Table 11-9 for description.</p>
Output variables	<p>Layer parameters L3 and L4.</p> <p>See Table 11-9 for description.</p>

11.2.9.64 *RdFailureL1L2*

Description	The function determines the random failed main sub system (L1) and the random detailed failure mode (L2) based on the probabilities stored within the <i>Eventtree_6.xlsx</i> file.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	TransferFcn
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[rd_failure, rd_failure1] = RdFailureL1L2_0200 (Map)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.
Output variables	<p>Layer parameters L1 = rd_failure and L2 = rd_failure1.</p> <p>See Table 11-9 for description.</p> <p>Note: The renaming is done within the parent function.</p>

11.2.9.65 *RdPeopleBasicInput*

Description	<p>The function returns all basic information regarding population density to the parent function which are necessary for the current run of the O.R.C.U.S. simulation. Therefore, it searches the <i>pplCitiesCountiesFS.xlsx</i> database for an entry in accordance to the city name and extracts all information provided there for further calculation. In case no entry is found, the user has to provide all information manually.</p> <p>The function is called every time the parent function progresses one simulation day (<i>k_day</i>).</p>
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Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.02
Parent function(s)	UAFlightSim
Child function(s)	PeopleDayTime PeopleDayTimeFS
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[Map, day, start, land, city_ppl, R7, FS, terminate] = RdPeopleBasicInput0202 (Map)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.
Output variables	All input variables are handed over automatically. Map By present function modified O.R.C.U.S. Map struct day Current simulated day start Starting time of UA mission land Landing time of UA mission city_ppl Number of inhabitants of overflown city R7 RegioStaR 7 classification of overflown city FS Federal State code terminate Termination signal. If equal one, current simulation is terminated. Only activated in case inputs are out of range for Map struct.

11.2.9.66 *RdPeopleCleanUp*

Description	The function cleans up the Map struct with respect to people distribution related fields and variables to ensure a clean initiation of the <i>RdPeople</i> functions and to avoid errors due to overwrite of such variables.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	UAFlightSim
Child function(s)	None

Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[Map] = RdPeopleCleanUp0200 (Map)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.
Output variables	By present function modified O.R.C.U.S. Map struct.

11.2.9.67 *RdPeopleCorrectATB*

Description	It might happen that not enough or too much people are distributed at building sites (ATB) within the Map because of approximation errors during map generation. The function counts the number of people distributed amongst the sub structs and increases or decrease them.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	RdPeopleLoop
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[Map] = RdPeopleCorrectATB0200 (Map, A_atb, csum_atb)
Input variables	All input variables are handed over automatically. Map O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. A_atb Number of all distributed people at building sites. Csum_atb Sum of all people distributed at building sites within the sub structs.
Output variables	By present function modified O.R.C.U.S. Map struct.

11.2.9.68 *RdPeopleCorrectOTW*

Description	It might happen that not enough or too much people are distributed in the outside (OTW) within the Map because of approximation errors during map generation. The function counts the number of people distributed amongst the sub structs and increases or decrease them.
Type	Sub function

Current Version	02.00	
Parent function(s)	RdPeopleLoop	
Child function(s)	None	
Group	UA Flight Simulation	
Command	[Map] = RdPeopleCorrectOTW0200 (Map, A_otw, csum_otw)	
Input variables	All input variables are handed over automatically.	
	Map	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.
	A_otw	Number of all distributed people in the outside.
	Csum_otw	Sum of all people distributed in the outside within the sub structs.
Output variables	By present function modified O.R.C.U.S. Map struct.	

11.2.9.69 *RdPeopleCorrectSMPatb*

Description	It might happen that not enough or too much people are distributed at building sites (ATB) within the submap polygon map (SMP) because of approximation errors during map generation. The function counts the number of people distributed amongst the sub structs and increases or decrease them.	
Type	Sub function	
Current Version	02.00	
Parent function(s)	RdPeopleLoop	
Child function(s)	None	
Group	UA Flight Simulation	
Command	[Map] = RdPeopleCorrectSMPatb0200 (Map, A_SMP_atb, csum_atb)	
Input variables	All input variables are handed over automatically.	
	Map	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.
	A_SMP_atb	Number of all distributed people at building sites in the SMP.

	Csum_atb Sum of all people distributed at building sites within the sub structs of the SMP.
Output variables	By present function modified O.R.C.U.S. Map struct.

11.2.9.70 *RdPeopleCorrectSMPotw*

Description	It might happen that not enough or too much people are distributed in the outside (OTW) within the submap polygon (SMP) because of approximation errors during map generation. The function counts the number of people distributed amongst the sub structs and increases or decrease them.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	RdPeopleLoop
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[Map] = RdPeopleCorrectSMPotw0200 (Map, A_SMP_otw, csum_otw)
Input variables	All input variables are handed over automatically. Map O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. A_SMP_otw Number of all distributed people in the outside within the SMP. Csum_otw Sum of all people distributed in the outside within the sub structs of the SMP.
Output variables	By present function modified O.R.C.U.S. Map struct.

11.2.9.71 *RdPeopleCorrectSurMatb*

Description	It might happen that not enough or too much people are distributed at building sites (ATB) within the SMP surrounding Map (SurM) because of approximation errors during map generation. The function counts the number of people distributed amongst the sub structs and increases or decrease them.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00

Parent function(s)	RdPeopleLoop
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[Map] = RdPeopleCorrectSurMatb0200 (Map, A_SurM_atb, csum_atb)
Input variables	All input variables are handed over automatically. Map O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. A_SurM_atb Number of all distributed people at building sites in the SurM. Csum_atb Sum of all people distributed at building sites within the sub structs of the SMP.
Output variables	By present function modified O.R.C.U.S. Map struct.

11.2.9.72 *RdPeopleCorrectSurMotw*

Description	It might happen that not enough or too much people are distributed in the outside (OTW) within the SMP surrounding Map (SurM) because of approximation errors during map generation. The function counts the number of people distributed amongst the sub structs and increases or decrease them.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	RdPeopleLoop
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[Map] = RdPeopleCorrectSurMotw0200 (Map, A_SurM_otw, csum_otw)
Input variables	All input variables are handed over automatically. Map O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. A_SurM_otw Number of all distributed people in the outside within the SurM.

	Csum_otw Sum of all people distributed in the outside within the sub structs of the SurM.
Output variables	By present function modified O.R.C.U.S. Map struct.

11.2.9.73 **RdPeopleLoop**

Description	<p>The function distributes people randomly on the different applicable pixels in the map within the simulation. The numbers of people to be distributed within the map are in accordance to the current time within the simulation. These numbers are defined by the <i>PeopleDayTime</i> function.</p> <p>The function is only activated in case no SMP and SurM fields are present within the Map struct.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	UAFlightSim
Child function(s)	RdPeopleCorrectATB RdPeopleCorrectOTW
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[Map] = RdPeopleLoop0200 (Map, ppl_td_city, ppl_td_city_otw, ppl_td_city_atb, ppl_otw_y0, ppl_otw_x0, ppl_atb_y0, ppl_atb_x0)
Input variables	<p>All input variables are handed over automatically.</p> <p>Map O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.</p> <p>ppl_td_city Total number of people to be distributed in the city.</p> <p>ppl_td_city_otw Number of people to be distributed in the outside (OTW) within the city area.</p> <p>ppl_td_city_atb Number of people to be distributed at buildings (ATB) within the city area.</p> <p>ppl_otw_y0 Y-coordinates of the map where people could be in the outside.</p> <p>ppl_otw_x0 X-coordinates of the map where people could be in the outside.</p>

	ppl_atb_y0	Y-coordinates of the map where people could be at buildings.
	ppl_atb_x0	X-coordinates of the map where people could be at buildings.
Output variables	By present function modified O.R.C.U.S. Map struct.	

11.2.9.74 *RdPeopleLoopSMP*

Description	<p>The function distributes people randomly on the different applicable pixels in the SMP within the simulation. The numbers of people to be distributed within the SMP are in accordance to the current time within the simulation. These numbers are defined by the <i>PeopleDayTime</i> function.</p> <p>The function is only activated in case SMP and SurM fields are present within the Map struct.</p>	
Type	Sub function	
Current Version	02.00	
Parent function(s)	UAFlightSim	
Child function(s)	CorrectRdPeopleSMPatb CorrectRdPeopleSMPotw	
Group	UA Flight Sim	
Command	<pre>[Map] = RdPeopleLoopSMP0200 (Map, ppl_td_city, ppl_td_city_otw, ppl_td_city_atb, pplSMP_otw_y0, pplSMP_otw_x0, pplSMP_atb_y0, pplSMP_atb_x0)</pre>	
Input variables	<p>All input variables are handed over automatically.</p> <p>Map O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.</p> <p>ppl_td_city Total number of people to be distributed in the city.</p> <p>ppl_td_city_otw Number of people to be distributed in the outside (OTW) within the SMP.</p> <p>ppl_td_city_atb Number of people to be distributed at buildings (ATB) within the SMP.</p> <p>pplSMP_otw_y0 Y-coordinates of the SMP where people could be in the outside.</p>	

	<p>pplSMP_otw_x0 X-coordinates of the SMP where people could be in the outside.</p> <p>pplSMP_atb_y0 Y-coordinates of the map where people could be at buildings.</p> <p>pplSMP_atb_x0 X-coordinates of the map where people could be at buildings.</p>
Output variables	By present function modified O.R.C.U.S. Map struct.

11.2.9.75 *RdPeopleLoopSurM*

Description	<p>The function distributes people randomly on the different applicable pixels in the SurM within the simulation. The numbers of people to be distributed within the SurM are in accordance to the current time within the simulation. These numbers are defined by the <i>PeopleDayTimeFS</i> function.</p> <p>The function is only activated in case SMP and SurM fields are present within the Map struct.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	UAFlightSim
Child function(s)	CorrectRdPeopleSurMatb CorrectRdPeopleSurMotw
Group	UA Flight Sim
Command	<code>[Map] = RdPeopleLoopSurM0200 (Map, ppl_td_SurM, ppl_td_SurM_otw, ppl_td_SurM_atb, pplSurM_otw_y0, pplSurM_otw_x0, pplSurM_atb_y0, pplSurM_atb_x0)</code>
Input variables	<p>All input variables are handed over automatically.</p> <p>Map O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.</p> <p>ppl_td_SurM Total number of people to be distributed in the SurM.</p> <p>ppl_td_SurM_otw Number of people to be distributed in the outside (OTW) within the SurM.</p> <p>ppl_td_city_atb Number of people to be distributed at buildings (ATB) within the SurM.</p>

	pplSurM_otw_y0	Y-coordinates of the SurM where people could be in the outside.
	pplSurM_otw_x0	X-coordinates of the SurM where people could be in the outside.
	pplSurM_atb_y0	Y-coordinates of the SurM where people could be at buildings.
	pplSurM_atb_x0	X-coordinates of the SurM where people could be at buildings.
Output variables	By present function modified O.R.C.U.S. Map struct.	

11.2.9.76 **StructFail**

Description	The function summarizes the different failure mode functions for the UA structure, calls them and hands the results back to the <i>EvCGlobal</i> function.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	EvCGlobal
Child function(s)	StructFail551
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = StructFail0200 (Map, L1, L2, L3, L4)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Layer parameters L1, L2, L3, and L4. See Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16. See Table 11-9 for description.

11.2.9.77 **StructFail551**

Description	Function for determining the event chain in case of the electrical system failure condition "Separation of essential UA parts". Event Chain is based on <i>Eventtree_6.xlsx</i> .
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Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	StructFail
Child function(s)	None
Group	UA Flight Simulation
Command	[L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15, L16] = StructFail1551_0200 (Map, L2, L3, L4)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables. Layer parameters L2, L3, and L4. See Table 11-9 for description.
Output variables	Layer parameters L8, L9, L11, L12, L14, L15 and L16. See Table 11-9 for description.

11.2.9.78 *SubStruct_Coord*

Description	The sub function stores all sub-struct pixels from the three basic phases of MapDetection (MapScan, MappingUndefined and NormMap) in order to have a complete and traceable data package of the operational environment. In addition to this, figures are provided to show the efficiency of the MapDetection.
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	MapDetection
Child function(s)	None
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = SubStruct_Coord0200 (Map)
Input variables	Corrected scaled improved Map struct including sub-structs
Output variables	Corrected scaled improved Map struct including sub-structs, efficiency figures

11.2.9.79 *SubStruct_CoordSMP*

Description	<p>The sub function stores all sub-struct pixels from the three basic phases of MapDetection (MapScan, MappingUndefined and NormMap) in order to have a complete and traceable data package of the operational environment. This is done for SMP as well as SurM.</p> <p>In addition to this, figures are provided to show the efficiency of the MapDetection.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.00
Parent function(s)	MapDetection
Child function(s)	None
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = SubStruct_CoordSMP0200 (Map)
Input variables	Corrected scaled improved Map struct including sub-structs
Output variables	Corrected scaled improved Map struct including sub-structs, efficiency figures

11.2.9.80 *TransferFcn*

Description	<p>In case a random failure occurs within the airborne UA during a simulation, <i>TransferFcn</i> is activated. Purpose of <i>TransferFcn</i> is to call the <i>EvCGlobal</i> function with the subsequent sub functions.</p> <p>Afterwards, <i>TransferFcn</i> transfers the results into command line outputs, activates the assigned impact functions and hands the Event Vector back to <i>UAFlightSim</i> function.</p>
Type	Sub function
Current Version	02.01
Parent function(s)	UAFlightSim
Child function(s)	EvCGlobal EmergencyLanding ImpactArea_bFP ImpactArea_anyP ImpactArea_bFPbGR ImpactArea_nbFPFD ImpactArea_tanFP

	ImpactArea_Debris	
Group	UA Flight Sim	
Command	[Map, E] = TransferFcn0201(Map, L0, y_FP, x_FP, k_pcc, k_fps, k_day, k_slt, k_cyc, k_UA)	
Input variables	All input variables are handed over automatically.	
	Map	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.
	L0	Layer parameter L0, defines if a failure has occurred in the airborne UA or not. See Table 11-9 for further description.
	y_FP	Y-Coordinates of the projected UA flight path.
	x_FP	X-Coordinates of the projected UA flight path.
	k_pcc	Number of applied P_{CumCat} set
	k_fps	Number of applied probability failure set
	k_day	Number of current simulated day
	k_slt	Number of current simulated start and landing time (always equal one)
	k_cyc	Number of current cycle.
	k_UA	Position index of UA on flight path.
Output variables	By present function modified O.R.C.U.S. Map struct and event vector E.	

11.2.9.81 *UAFlightPath*

Description	<p>With this function, the user can define the flight path for the mission that shall be simulated by O.R.C.U.S. Two flight paths are possible:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Circle 2) Ellipse <p>In case 1), the user must set the centre point and one boundary point which will mark the radius. For case 2), the user must set the centre point and the two vertices. Additionally, the ratio for semi minor to semi major axis must be entered after the three points have been set. For setting up the points, an image of the simulation map is provided and the input is done via the mouse cursor.</p> <p>O.R.C.U.S. composes the flight path automatically by distributing 3,600 points on the circle or the ellipse. All flight path coordinates are stored within the map struct as x and y coordinates.</p>
Type	Main function
Current Version	02.01
Parent function(s)	None
Child function(s)	None
Group	Operational Environment Generation
Command	[Map] = UAFlightPath0201 (Map)
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct
Output variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including flight path coordinates

11.2.9.82 *UAFlightSim*

Description	<p>This function simulates the flight of a UA as a projected two-dimensional trajectory above a city. Via the function <i>TransferFcn</i> a random failure generator is activated, which may initiate a failure within the UA. In case a failure occurs, the simulation program uses the event tree and assigned probabilities of detection and success for countermeasures. Either the failure is covered or an emergency procedure is sufficient or the UA crashes. In case of a crash, people in accordance to city and time are distributed. After this, data is provided for evaluation.</p>
Type	Main function

Current Version	02.03	
Parent function(s)	ORCUS_RUN	
Child function(s)	PeopleDayTime PeopleDayTimeFS RdPeopleCleanUp RdPeopleBasicInput RdPeopleLoop RdPeopleLoopSMP RdPeopleLoopSurM TransferFcn	
Group	UA Flight Simulation	
Command	<code>[Map, terminate] = UAFlightSim0203 (Map, k_pcc, k_fps, k_day, k_slt)</code>	
Input variables	O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.	
	k_pcc	Number of applied P_{CumCat} set
	k_fps	Number of applied probability failure set
	k_day	Number of current simulated day
	k_slt	Number of current simulated start and landing time (always equal one)
Output variables	<p><i>Struct array files for evaluation</i></p> <p>See ORCUS_RUN for description.</p> <p>In automated mode, these files are directly handed over to ORCUS_RUN for the execution of <i>UAFlightSimFastEval</i>.</p>	

11.2.9.83 UAFlightSimFastEval

Description	<p>The function generates a xlsx file, which contains all necessary information for evaluation of the O.R.C.U.S. simulation run.</p> <p>Mission information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Overflown City/Area incl. size, people density etc. - UAS Data (failure probabilities, size etc.) - Start/land time <p>Simulation results</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cumulated simulated flight hours - Resulting event probabilities - Resulting hit probabilities of people (outside/inside buildings) - Failure event analysis - Event cases and outcomes - Number of people to distribute - Number of people distributed - Number of people hit - Protocol identity - UA position on map - t-Test values
Type	Main function
Current Version	02.04
Parent function(s)	ORCUS_RUN
Child function(s)	PeopleDayTime PeopleDayTimeFS xlwrite (Copyright 2012-2021, by Alec de Zegher)
Group	Evaluation
Command	UAFlightSimFastEval0204 (Map)
Input variables	<p>O.R.C.U.S. Map struct including all relevant UAS parameters and mission variables.</p> <p>Struct array files for evaluation – must be stored in the directory where <i>UAFlightSimFastEval</i> is executed.</p>
Output variables	xlsx evaluation table

11.2.9.84 xlwrite

Description	Alec de Zegher (2021). xlwrite: Generate XLS(X) files without Excel on Mac/Linux/Win (https://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/38591-xlwrite-generate-xls-x-files-without-excel-on-mac-linux-win), MATLAB Central File Exchange.	
Type	External function	
Current Version	20130227 (Version applied in O.R.C.U.S.)	
Parent function(s)	UAFlightSimFastEval	
Child function(s)	None	
Group	External	
Command	<code>xlwrite(filename, A, sheet, range)</code>	
Input variables	filename	Name of xls(x) to be generated.
	A	MATLAB data to be written into the xls(x) file.
	sheet	Spread sheet within the xls(x) to be written onto.
	range	Range of the spread sheet where the MATLAB™ data shall written.
Output variables	xls(x) file	

11.2.9.85 yawPos

Description	The function is a sub function of the <i>ImpactArea_nbFPFD</i> function. It calculates the central impact point of the impact area by determining a deviating yaw angle eta and aligning it to the afore calculated potential impact points.	
Type	Sub function	
Current Version	02.00	
Parent function(s)	ImpactArea_nbFPFD	
Child function(s)	None	
Group	UA Flight Simulation	
Command	<code>[x_CIP, y_CIP, eta] = YawPos0200(UA_mov_x, UA_mov_y, y_pCIP1, x_pCIP1)</code>	

Input variables	Approximated UA move vector: UA_mov_x, UA_mov_y. Possible central impact coordinates: x_pCIP1, y_pCIP1. Handed over automatically by parent function.
Output variables	X- and Y-coordinate of the central impact point, to the flight path deviating yaw angle eta.

11.3 Example Mission Areas

11.3.1 Cologne – R71

$N_{PPL_{City}}$	1,080,394	[/]
A_{City}	405.01	[km ²]
ρ_{PPL}	2,668	[PPL/km ²]
$A_{Mission}$	66.8555	[km ²]
$N_{PPL_{Map}}$	178,371	[/]




Figure 11-20. Example city R71 with flight path.

11.3.2 Saarbrücken – R72

$N_{PPL_{City}}$	180,966	[/]
A_{City}	167.52	[km ²]
ρ_{PPL}	1,080	[PPL/km ²]
$A_{Mission}$	65.2964	[km ²]
$N_{PPL_{Map}}$	70,521	[/]




Figure 11-21. Example city R72 with flight path.

11.3.3 Gröbenzell – R73

$N_{PPL City/Area}$	19,835	[/]
$A_{City/Area}$	112.1	[km ²]
$\rho_{PPL/City}$	3119	[PPL/km ²]
$\rho_{PPL/SurM}$	501	[PPL/km ²]
$A_{SMP/Area}$	20,7327	[km ²]
$A_{SurM/Area}$	46,1228	[km ²]
$A_{Mission}$	66,8555	[km ²]
$N_{PPL Mission}$	42,943	[/]




Figure 11-22. Example city R73 with flight path.

11.3.4 Arnstein – R74

$N_{PPL City/Area}$	8,168	[/]
$A_{City/Area}$	112.1	[km ²]
$\rho_{PPL/City}$	73	[PPL/km ²]
$\rho_{PPL/SurM}$	96	[PPL/km ²]
$A_{SMP/Area}$	10,7276	[km ²]
$A_{SurM/Area}$	56.1279	[km ²]
$A_{Mission}$	66.8555	[km ²]
$N_{PPL Mission}$	13,557	[/]




Figure 11-23. Example city R74 with flight path.

11.3.5 Ibbenbüren – R75

$N_{PPL City/Area}$	52,037	[/]
$A_{City/Area}$	108.87	[km ²]
ρ_{PPL}	478	[PPL/km ²]
$A_{Mission}$	66.8555	[km ²]
$N_{PPL Mission}$	31,957	[/]




Figure 11-24. Example city R75 with flight path.

11.3.6 Eberbach – R76

$N_{PPL City/Area}$	14,578	[/]
$A_{City/Area}$	81.15	[km ²]
$\rho_{PPL/City}$	180	[PPL/km ²]
$\rho_{PPL/SurM}$	515	[PPL/km ²]
$A_{SMP/Area}$	16.8002	[km ²]
$A_{SurM/Area}$	50.0553	[km ²]
$A_{Mission}$	66.8555	[km ²]
$N_{PPL Mission}$	40,357	[/]




Figure 11-25. Example city R76 with flight path.

11.3.7 Georgensgmünd – R77

$N_{PPL City/Area}$	6,680	[/]
$A_{City/Area}$	46.89	[km ²]
$\rho_{PPL/City}$	142	[PPL/km ²]
$\rho_{PPL/SurM}$	141	[PPL/km ²]
$A_{SMP/Area}$	12.9739	[km ²]
$A_{SurM/Area}$	53.8816	[km ²]
$A_{Mission}$	66.8555	[km ²]
$N_{PPL Mission}$	14,278	[/]




Figure 11-26. Example city R77 with flight path.

11.3.8 Frankfurt am Main – C1

$N_{PPL City/Area}$	746,878	[/]
$A_{City/Area}$	248.31	[km ²]
ρ_{PPL}	3,008	[PPL/km ²]
$A_{Mission}$	66.8555	[km ²]
$N_{PPL Mission}$	201,102	[/]




Figure 11-27. Example city C1 with flight path.

11.3.9 Hagen – C2

$N_{PPL City/Area}$	187,730	[/]
$A_{City/Area}$	160.45	[km ²]
ρ_{PPL}	1,170	[PPL/km ²]
$A_{Mission}$	66.8555	[km ²]
$N_{PPL Mission}$	78,221	[/]




Figure 11-28. Example city C2 with flight path.

11.3.10 Aalen – C3

$N_{PPL City/Area}$	67,849	[/]
$A_{City/Area}$	146,58	[km ²]
ρ_{PPL}	463	[PPL/km ²]
$A_{Mission}$	66.8555	[km ²]
$N_{PPL Mission}$	30,955	[/]




Figure 11-29. Example city C3 with flight path.

11.3.11 Schwedt/Oder – C4

$N_{PPL City/Area}$	30,075	[/]
$A_{City/Area}$	205.56	[km ²]
ρ_{PPL}	146	[PPL/km ²]
$A_{Mission}$	66.8555	[km ²]
$N_{PPL Mission}$	9,761	[/]




Figure 11-30. Example city C4 with flight path.

11.3.12 Kemberg – C5

$N_{PPL City/Area}$	9,799	[/]
$A_{City/Area}$	235.22	[km ²]
$\rho_{PPL/City}$	42	[PPL/km ²]
$\rho_{PPL/SurM}$	66	[PPL/km ²]
$A_{SMP/Area}$	15.2596	[km ²]
$A_{SurM/Area}$	51.5959	[km ²]
$A_{Mission}$	66.8555	[km ²]
$N_{PPL Mission}$	13,205	[/]



Figure 11-31. Example city C5 with flight path.

11.3.13 Bad Köstritz – C6

$N_{PPL City/Area}$	3,571	[/]
$A_{City/Area}$	16.93	[km ²]
$\rho_{PPL/City}$	211	[PPL/km ²]
$\rho_{PPL/SurM}$	117	[PPL/km ²]
$A_{SMP/Area}$	13.5387	[km ²]
$A_{SurM/Area}$	53.3168	[km ²]
$A_{Mission}$	66.8555	[km ²]
$N_{PPL Mission}$	9,810	[/]




Figure 11-32. Example city C6 with flight path.

11.3.14 Kroppenstedt – C7

$N_{PPL City/Area}$	1,440	[/]
$A_{City/Area}$	38.65	[km ²]
$\rho_{PPL/City}$	37	[PPL/km ²]
$\rho_{PPL/SurM}$	73	[PPL/km ²]
$A_{SMP/Area}$	11.7983	[km ²]
$A_{SurM/Area}$	55.0572	[km ²]
$A_{Mission}$	66.8555	[km ²]
$N_{PPL Mission}$	5,460	[/]




Figure 11-33. Example city C7 with flight path.

11.4 Example Mission Protocols

The following protocols are extracted raw data from the O.R.C.U.S. evaluation tables. For a better handling, not all columns are shown. Nevertheless, as the files contain much more columns and the number of rows is big, it was necessary to reduce the font size to a minimum in order to include the pages in the appendix. Within the digital version, by zooming in, the values can be read.

As this is the original data, the pages do not have a page number but they are preceded by a plain sheet with page number and title. The entire evaluation tables are deposited at the Institute of Flight System Dynamics and can be retrieved there.

11.4.1 Cologne – R71

11.4.1.1 Cologne – R71 – Phase 1

563	65	824	Wednesday	12:22:35	4019	2038	637.64	149831	149831	0	28540	28540	0	149831	28540	11	Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
564	37	2788	Thursday	09:30:22	3924	1808	365.08	147156	147156	46	31215	31215	6	147156	31215	6	Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact		
570	71	407	Wednesday	12:57:37	5303	1174	696.05	140913	140913	0	37458	37458	0	140913	37458	5	Generator Out	No Ground Effect		
571	133	222	Thursday	19:06:38	5635	923	1311.06	150996	150996	0	21405	21405	0	150996	21405	25	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
574	101	2827	Thursday	16:02:20	4064	1721	1000.56	131964	131964	1	46377	46377	0	131964	46377	78	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
574	13	2971	Sunday	07:15:43	3138	2308	126.22	175695	175695	0	2676	2676	0	175695	2676	74	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
580	105	3478	Saturday	09:10:30	59129	2918	1039.30	139129	139129	0	39242	39242	10	139129	39242	65	GCS Overide Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate		
580	121	249	Saturday	17:55:11	5599	653	1192.00	139129	139129	0	39242	39242	10	139129	39242	10	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact		
580	33	598	Saturday	08:11:35	4785	310	333.30	158750	158750	0	19621	19621	0	158750	19621	75	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
587	27	2386	Saturday	08:30:28	3191	2274	267.25	158750	158750	60	19621	19621	0	158750	19621	18	Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact		
59	112	2551	Wednesday	17:05:23	3068	2354	1284.27	128427	128427	2	49944	49944	0	128427	49944	26	Generator Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
597	81	1526	Thursday	17:46:42	3949	1848	1391.42	139129	139129	0	39242	39242	0	139129	39242	53	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact		
608	87	2781	Saturday	14:35:51	3988	1824	881.44	135561	135561	0	42810	42810	0	135561	42810	72	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
61	81	3111	Friday	13:45:03	3364	1030	755.50	135463	135463	0	41918	41918	0	135463	41918	17	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
610	108	1056	Monday	16:39:08	3143	2589	1065.19	130210	130210	0	48161	48161	0	130210	48161	65	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
614	76	2422	Friday	13:30:44	2636	2640	99.25	136453	136453	0	41918	41918	0	136453	41918	17	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
624	102	294	Monday	05:29:49	3029	1507	1002.60	130210	130210	0	48161	48161	0	130210	48161	65	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
628	11	111	Saturday	06:59:44	5738	81	79.28	173911	173911	0	4460	4460	0	173911	4460	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory		
63	134	2071	Tuesday	17:26:51	3780	3246	1226.81	127355	127355	0	50836	50836	0	127355	50836	18	Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact		
653	54	82	Tuesday	11:15:50	5752	615	526.39	148047	148047	0	30324	30324	0	148047	30324	53	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
654	15	257	Wednesday	07:23:49	5587	962	139.70	159642	159642	0	18729	18729	8	159642	18729	29	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact		
658	105	877	Sunday	16:21:08	3163	2391	1319.64	131964	131964	0	46377	46377	0	131964	46377	78	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
661	117	2904	Wednesday	17:35:45	4336	1554	1159.81	128427	128427	0	49944	49944	0	128427	49944	72	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
661	70	2205	Wednesday	12:54:45	3183	2950	691.25	149831	149831	0	28540	28540	0	149831	28540	11	Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
673	121	632	Monday	17:55:50	4678	1606	1302.10	130210	130210	0	48161	48161	0	130210	48161	65	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA ground impact in flight direction with deviating trajectory.		
679	29	1581	Sunday	08:49:23	1759	3360	262.33	159642	159642	0	18729	18729	0	159642	18729	25	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
684	10	3298	Friday	08:05:03	5445	915	86.44	160533	160533	1	17838	17838	0	160533	17838	28	Generator Failure	Central UA ground impact tangential to trajectory		
687	8	647	Monday	08:42:45	4630	1638	71.28	158750	158750	0	19621	19621	0	158750	19621	53	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
708	55	3483	Saturday	11:27:25	5708	753	545.70	127355	127355	28	50836	50836	16	127355	50836	18	Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact		
715	27	975	Monday	08:36:29	3469	2386	260.81	146264	146264	0	32107	32107	0	146264	32107	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
716	69	1392	Tuesday	12:47:20	2136	3162	676.52	148047	148047	0	30324	30324	0	148047	30324	47	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA ground impact in flight direction with deviating trajectory.		
725	63	2394	Thursday	14:12:23	2549	2699	820.67	138237	138237	0	40134	40134	0	138237	40134	54	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
729	47	1026	Monday	10:35:41	3285	2501	459.50	146264	146264	0	32107	32107	0	146264	32107	42	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
738	65	2516	Monday	14:25:11	2320	2955	840.31	138237	138237	0	40134	40134	0	138237	40134	60	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
737	97	2268	Tuesday	15:35:34	2191	2945	959.30	139129	139129	0	39242	39242	0	139129	39242	42	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
738	111	3411	Wednesday	17:05:51	5628	825	1101.44	128427	128427	25	49944	49944	14	128427	49944	64	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact		
742	32	1861	Friday	09:07:40	1587	3419	1471.56	147156	147156	0	31215	31215	6	147156	31215	15	Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
752	14	1550	Wednesday	07:19:59	3357	133.33	159642	159642	0	18729	18729	0	159642	18729	0	159642	18729	25	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
760	103	2004	Saturday	16:11:52	3198	3055	1516.08	139129	139129	0	39242	39242	0	139129	39242	42	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate		
778	63	1891	Monday	14:11:34	1598	3405	819.28	138237	138237	0	40134	40134	8	138237	40134	53	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact		
788	27	854	Tuesday	08:36:17	3910	2108	260.47	146264	146264	0	32107	32107	0	146264	32107	18	Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact		
800	85	856	Tuesday	15:21:20	3803	2112	946.70	139129	139129	0	39242	39242	0	139129	39242	42	GCS Overide Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact tangential to trajectory		
803	3	2248	Friday	06:15:57	2140	2961	20.05	160533	160533	0	17838	17838	0	160533	17838	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory		
803	84	3298	Friday	15:19:24	2525	925	1364.53	136453	136453	0	41918	41918	0	136453	41918	51	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
813	4	2043	Monday	06:21:15	1739	3278	35.42	158750	158750	14	19621	19621	11	158750	19621	26	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact		
813	68	1256	Monday	14:40:17	3423	2967	887.17	138237	138237	0	40134	40134	0	138237	40134	51	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
813	98	2990	Monday	15:42:44	4623	1380	971.22	138237	138237	1	40134	40134	0	138237	40134	51	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
814	84	1857	Tuesday	14:17:28	1926	3421	829.11	139129	139129	0	39242	39242	7	139129	39242	42	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact		
82	17	3160	Friday	07:40:32	5128	1087	167.56	160533	160533	0	17838	17838	0	160533	17838	28	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
820	97	2923	Monday	15:36:39	4402	1514	961.11	138237	138237	48	40134	40134	8	138237	40134	51	Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact		
828	125	2641	Tuesday	18:22:59	3389	2147	528.31	127355	127355	2	50836	50836	0	127355	50836	18	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
830	75	2497	Thursday	13:24:55	2882	2476	741.53	138237	138237	0	40134	40134	0	138237	40134	51	Engine Out	No Ground Effect		
831	132	1193	Friday	19:02:17	2711	2850	1300.81	160533	160533	0	17838	17838	0	160533	17838	10	Engine Anomaly	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
837	79	2229	Thursday	13:46:18	2094	3013	790.90	138237	138237	0	40134	40134	0	138237	40134	54	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
841	52	1059	Monday	15:03:47	3168	2973	906.33	138237	138237	0	40134	40134	0	138237	40134	54	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
843	62	2387	Wednesday	12:07:16	2467	2754	612.11	149831	149831	0	28540	28540	0	149831	28540	11	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
858	85	3565	Friday	14:26:15	5755	783	843.75	136453	136453	0	41918	41918	0	136453	41918	51	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
878	58	3027	Wednesday	11:45:41	4744	1310	574.22	149831	149831	0	28540	28540	0	149831	28540	11	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
879	79	3462	Thursday	13:45:23	5686	800	773.97	138237	138237	29	40134	40134	11	138237	40134	54	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact		
880	118	3001	Friday	17:41:53	4681	1359	1169.81	135561	135561	0	42810	42810	0	135561	42810	36	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
884	116	2153	Tuesday	12:28:34	1926	3135	1147.61	127355	127355	0	50836	50836	0	127355	50836	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path		
887	107	63	Friday	16:31:30	5759	806	1052.50	135561	135561	0	42810	42810	0	135561	42810	9	Engine Out	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory		
889	17	2968	Sunday	07:16:03	4120	1631	166.75	175695	175695	0	2676	2676	0	175695	2676	65	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
9	89	3330	Tuesday	12:44:35	5504	884	674.33	148047	148047	0	30324	30324	0	148047	30324	47	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
905	34	504	Tuesday	09:17:28	2933	2442	880.56	139129	139129	0	39242	39242	0	139129	39242	42	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
919	120	2308	Tuesday	17:52:38	2298	2971	1187.75	127355	127355	0	50836	50836	0	127355	50836	18	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA approaches Emergency landing site		
919	63	2638	Tuesday	14:12:47	3370	2168	821.33	139129	139129	0	39242	39242	0	139129	39242	42	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA		

	UADayProt	HIT_TOT	HTT	HTT_OTW	UADayProt cor	HIT_TOT_mean	HTT_TOT_mean	HTT_TOT_mean_OTW	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW	x_k_x_cross_ATB	x_k_x_cross_OTW	(x_k_x_cross_ATB)^2	(x_k_x_cross_OTW)^2
rPobots	1400	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
rEvents	217	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
rEvents_cor	199	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
Mississ	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
x_cross_ATB	1.1278571	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
x_cross_OTW	1.2064286	26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
s2ATB	1.3697307	42	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
sATB	1.1792925	51	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
s2OTW	0.070984	61	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
sOTW	0.2755953	69	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
tOTW	34.781053	85	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
s2TOT	2.0569706	82	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
tTOT	1.4347849	83	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
sTOT	36.099647	85	65	7	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		104	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		110	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		122	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		123	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		139	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		137	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		139	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		144	76	1	144	39	4	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		146	0	0	155	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		155	0	0	158	0	17	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		164	0	0	171	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		171	0	0	171	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		173	0	0	185	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		185	0	0	185	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		187	0	0	201	1	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		203	1	0	203	1	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		203	0	0	224	14	14	1	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		203	17	1	227	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		224	0	0	247	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		224	14	25	257	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		227	0	0	259	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		247	0	0	261	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		251	0	0	262	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		249	0	0	261	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		251	0	0	262	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		281	0	0	275	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		262	0	0	282	59	2	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		276	0	0	291	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		282	0	0	294	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		282	0	0	294	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		282	0	0	300	42	10	3	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		291	0	0	301	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		294	0	0	307	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		296	0	0	315	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		300	2	1	313	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		300	40	0	319	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		301	0	0	323	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		307	0	0	327	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		312	0	0	340	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		323	0	0	354	3	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		359	0	0	359	359	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		323	0	0	368	3	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		327	0	0	377	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		340	0	0	404	1	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		354	3	0	414	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		369	5	0	414	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		370	99	0	436	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		370	0	0	440	41	8	2	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		404	0	0	451	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		411	55	0	468	1	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		425	0	0	485	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		425	0	0	487	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		440	0	0	494	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		440	41	8	496	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		451	0	0	514	14	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		468	1	0	523	1	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		485	0	0	528	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		487	0	0	548	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		494	0	0	561	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		496	0	0	563	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		521	66	3	564	46	9	3	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		523	25	11	571	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		548	0	0	580	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		561	0	0	587	5	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		563	0	0	597	0	16	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		594	46	0	608	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		571	0	0	610	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		574	0	0	624	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		574	0	0	629	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		580	0	0	631	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		580	0	0	633	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		580	0	0	634	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		580	10	0	654	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		587	60	5	661	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		597	16	0	673	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		608	0	0	679	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		610	0	0	684	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		614	0	0	687	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		706	624	0	706	28	16	2	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.272061735	0.070984184
		629	0	0	716	0	0	0	0	-1.12785743	-0.266428571	1.	

11.4.1.2 Cologne – R71 – Phase 2

55	116	1367	Saturday	17:27:16	2200	3147	1145.44	139129	139129	0	39242	39242	0	139129	39242	40	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
56	166	1797	Tuesday	12:30:08	1583	3438	1480.47	148047	148047	0	30324	30324	0	148047	30324	41	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA approaches Emergency landing site
561	63	227	Monday	12:09:40	5629	929	616.14	146264	146264	0	32107	32107	0	146264	32107	34	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
565	45	1437	Tuesday	10:24:27	2030	241	148047	148047	148047	0	30324	30324	0	148047	30324	36	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
579	103	2051	Friday	17:25:13	3425	2123	1188.70	135661	142810	0	42810	42810	0	135661	42810	71	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
582	67	2871	Saturday	12:37:53	4221	1625	863.14	146264	146264	0	32107	32107	0	146264	32107	70	GC3 Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
590	107	2447	Tuesday	15:17:32	5692	806	1862.56	159129	159129	0	39242	39242	0	159129	39242	30	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
611	112	2783	Saturday	17:05:47	3906	1819	1109.64	139129	139129	3	39242	39242	0	139129	39242	40	Engine Out	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
601	12	4401	Saturday	07:05:15	1220	620	1460.62	146062	146062	0	44601	44601	0	146062	44601	12	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
609	88	2153	Sunday	14:41:47	1926	3135	889.64	126643	126643	0	51728	51728	0	126643	51728	30	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
614	5	1797	Saturday	16:25:47	1963	3438	1480.47	148047	148047	0	19631	19631	0	148047	19631	25	Engine Fire	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
616	87	1683	Sunday	14:35:02	1640	3431	858.42	126643	126643	0	51728	51728	18	126643	51728	28	Degradation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
618	73	2897	Tuesday	13:13:39	4312	1569	722.78	139129	139129	0	39242	39242	0	139129	39242	40	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
622	149	1304	Sunday	16:45:27	2174	3049	1480.47	148047	148047	0	46377	46377	0	148047	46377	24	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
623	49	1472	Sunday	10:48:21	1934	2382	480.58	135661	135661	0	42810	42810	0	135661	42810	68	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
625	61	2050	Wednesday	14:55:29	1493	2258	1409.17	140913	140913	0	32107	32107	0	140913	32107	41	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA approaches Emergency landing site
628	122	648	Friday	18:01:48	1626	1640	1203.03	135661	135661	0	42810	42810	0	135661	42810	43	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
658	43	1989	Sunday	10:13:26	1462	3381	422.89	135661	135661	0	42810	42810	0	135661	42810	10	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
661	113	2134	Wednesday	11:10:39	1659	2162	1117.78	126642	126642	0	49644	49644	0	126642	49644	44	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
665	76	1908	Sunday	13:29:53	1606	3395	749.83	126643	126643	0	51728	51728	0	126643	51728	20	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
668	96	721	Wednesday	15:27:03	1832	1802	845.11	140913	140913	0	32107	32107	0	140913	32107	37	Engine Fire	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
670	12	460	Friday	07:06:16	5175	1285	110.47	160533	160533	66	17838	17838	2	160533	17838	2	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
679	86	2151	Sunday	14:20:52	1922	3138	849.78	126643	126643	0	51728	51728	0	126643	51728	22	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
690	135	707	Thursday	08:19:20	4430	1770	1332.25	156966	156966	33	21405	21405	4	156966	21405	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
695	54	1241	Thursday	11:17:55	2268	3108	529.86	147156	147156	0	31215	31215	0	147156	31215	15	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
695	55	1622	Sunday	16:22:40	1650	3424	1266.42	126643	126643	0	51728	51728	0	126643	51728	22	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
695	22	3080	Tuesday	08:10:11	4905	1215	216.97	146264	146264	0	32107	32107	0	146264	32107	65	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
708	11	3350	Monday	07:05:08	5662	856	1587.50	158750	158750	0	19621	19621	4	158750	19621	20	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
709	104	941	Tuesday	16:15:04	3993	2399	1025.14	127535	127535	0	50836	50836	0	127535	50836	72	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
712	58	330	Tuesday	15:38:19	5454	1056	963.89	139129	139129	24	39242	39242	15	139129	39242	15	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
725	25	449	Thursday	08:23:42	5203	1245	239.50	147156	147156	67	31215	31215	3	147156	31215	82	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
73	98	1696	Wednesday	12:25:55	1686	3421	649.86	148831	148831	0	29540	29540	1	148831	29540	41	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
744	51	173	Tuesday	06:56:58	5690	877	298.31	146264	146264	0	32107	32107	0	146264	32107	81	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA approaches Emergency landing site
745	19	2860	Wednesday	07:51:57	4182	1648	185.58	159642	159642	1	18729	18729	0	159642	18729	29	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
747	128	211	Friday	18:38:49	6649	912	1281.39	135661	135661	0	42810	42810	0	135661	42810	41	Connection Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
749	71	2502	Sunday	13:01:05	2899	2485	701.83	126643	126643	0	51728	51728	0	126643	51728	65	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
756	2	4078	Sunday	00:56:43	1644	3429	14.55	175695	175695	0	2676	2676	0	175695	2676	16	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
765	138	2015	Tuesday	19:39:22	1702	3308	1365.64	187929	187929	0	18729	18729	0	187929	18729	29	Connection Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
78	3	1886	Monday	08:10:30	1588	3417	25.00	158750	158750	0	19621	19621	0	158750	19621	20	GC3 Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
79	60	2244	Tuesday	11:50:08	2106	3095	591.89	146047	146047	0	30324	30324	0	146047	30324	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
792	30	2244	Monday	08:35:36	3043	2370	294.92	146264	146264	0	32107	32107	0	146264	32107	67	Engine Anomaly	UA approaches Emergency landing site
796	1	1780	Friday	06:04:35	3895	1603	1605.33	160533	160533	0	17838	17838	7	160533	17838	3	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
804	53	348	Saturday	11:10:19	5430	1082	517.20	127535	127535	0	50836	50836	0	127535	50836	70	Generator Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
811	79	1322	Saturday	13:04:47	2321	3078	778.50	135661	135661	1	42810	42810	0	135661	42810	70	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
816	58	3320	Thursday	11:45:01	5486	894	575.03	147156	147156	0	31215	31215	0	147156	31215	75	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
818	129	2756	Saturday	18:47:30	3807	1981	1276.33	139129	139129	0	39242	39242	0	139129	39242	40	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
822	79	3045	Wednesday	13:49:39	4789	1277	782.75	140913	140913	25	37458	37458	0	140913	37458	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
823	102	73	Thursday	16:01:44	5755	810	1002.89	130210	130210	0	48161	48161	0	130210	48161	41	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	Central UA ground impact in flight direction with deviating trajectory.
83	66	488	Sunday	12:27:59	5103	1316	646.64	127535	127535	0	50836	50836	0	127535	50836	69	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
84	15	2412	Sunday	07:27:22	2605	2961	145.84	175695	175695	0	2676	2676	0	175695	2676	16	Engine Anomaly	UA ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.
846	152	2643	Saturday	19:04:40	3396	2142	1307.81	160533	160533	0	17838	17838	0	160533	17838	30	GC3 Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
852	6	333	Friday	06:30:20	5459	1060	50.56	160533	160533	0	17838	17838	0	160533	17838	31	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
853	131	2023	Saturday	18:57:42	1712	3300	1296.17	160533	160533	0	17838	17838	0	160533	17838	30	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
853	14	664	Saturday	07:18:32	4574	1675	130.89	173911	173911	43	4460	4460	3	173911	4460	40	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
855	37	2446	Monday	09:38:29	2713	2988	364.14	146264	146264	21	32107	32107	0	146264	32107	64	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
867	112	1161	Wednesday	17:03:05	2916	2797	1105.17	129427	129427	1	129427	129427	0	129427	129427	31	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
863	22	944	Tuesday	08:05:38	3582	2316	211.08	146264	146264	0	32107	32107	0	146264	32107	75	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
868	45	2334	Sunday	10:25:57	2370	2820	443.25	135661	135661	20	42810	42810	5	135661	42810	18	Engine Fire	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
877	59	22	Tuesday	11:45:31	5765	791	575.86	148047	148047	0	30324	30324	0	148047	30324	44	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA approaches Emergency landing site
881	140	3185	Saturday	19:05:11	5141	1080	1388.67	160533	160533	0	17838	17838	0	160533	17838	30	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
882	102	2742	Sunday	16:00:08	3756	1913	1016.25	131964	131964	0	46377	46377	0	131964	46377	24	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
886	2	1023	Thursday	06:07:38	3296	2494	12.75	159750	159750	0	19621	19621	0	159750	19621	20	Engine Anomaly	UA approaches Emergency landing site
888	112	416	Saturday	17:01:52	5285	1189	1103.11	139129	139129	0	39242	39242	0	139129	39242	40	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
899	140	1745	Wednesday	19:50:50	1599	3441	1384.75	160533	160533	0	17838	17838	0	160533	17838	30	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
900	160	2226	Thursday	15:55:22	2087	3019	888.97	138237	138237	0	40134	40134	0	138237	40134	13	Engine Anomaly	UA approaches Emergency landing site
907	72	3183	Thursday	13:08:10	5187	1054	713.84	138237	138237	6	40134	40134	0	138237	40134	12	Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.
908	80	502	Friday	13:51:23	5065	1342	785.67	138453	138453	0	41918	41918	0	138453	41918	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
912	28	3033	Tuesday	08:35:35	4782	1299	296.50	146264	14626									

UADyPrio	HTT_ATB	HTT_OTW	UADyPrioCor	HTT_mcan_ATB	HTT_mcan_OTW	HTT_mcan_ATB/F	HTT_mcan_OTW/F	x_k_xross_ATB	x_k_xross_OTW	x_k_xcross_ATB/F	x_k_xcross_OTW/F			
rPobus	200	19	20	7	19	20	7	1.428571429	0.5	-7.026428571	-1.28	56.64712704	1.0384	
rEvans	223	20	27	13	102	27	13	0.214285714	0	0.740714286	-1.78	78.4008622	3.1684	
rEvans_cor	205	35	65	9	47	6	9	1.428571429	0.5	-7.026428571	-1.28	56.64712704	1.0384	
rMission	14	47	0	0	73	0	0	0.428571429	-0.59787143	-1.301428571	0	31.3300449	1.82035194	
x_k_xross_ATB	8.956	51	73	2	55	0	0	0.214285714	-1.740714286	-1.037428571	-0.285714286	13.9349437	2.60230735	
x_k_xcross_OTW	1.78	66	0	0	66	0	0	0.428571429	-0.206428571	-1.351428571	-0.785714286	64.42781384	1.13574939	
x_k_xcross_OTW	10.735	66	13	6	72	24	15	1.714285714	-7.240714286	-0.708571429	-0.708571429	52.42794337	0.50207349	
s2ATB	71.495976	73	0	1	78	0	0	0.074285714	0	-0.855	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
s2ATB	8.455293	79	0	0	83	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
s2ATB	14.960791	79	0	0	78	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
s2ATW	2.8227925	84	0	0	89	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
s2ATW	1.683592	84	0	0	85	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
s2OTW	14.872394	95	0	0	99	38	8	2.714285714	0.571428571	-6.240714286	-1.285714286	38.985148	1.40064498	
s2OTW	103.3531	106	38	8	102	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
s2OTW	10.116459	102	0	0	106	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
s2OTW	14.888872	106	0	0	108	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		125	0	0	132	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		134	0	0	134	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		134	0	14	146	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		146	0	0	156	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		156	0	0	156	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		170	0	0	170	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		170	0	0	170	74	4	5.825714286	0.285714286	-3.669285714	-1.484285714	13.46555765	2.22838976	
		170	0	0	207	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		177	0	0	217	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		207	74	0	220	20	10	1.428571429	1.142857143	-7.026428571	-0.637142857	56.64712704	0.40599102	
		207	0	0	222	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		207	0	0	233	2	15	0.142857143	1.074285714	-8.812142857	-0.708571429	77.65386173	0.50207349	
		217	0	0	245	1	1	0.074285714	0.074285714	-8.883571429	-1.708571429	78.91784133	2.919216327	
		220	20	16	262	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		222	0	0	272	74	0	0	0	0.214285714	-3.669285714	-1.565714286	13.46555765	2.415461224
		232	2	15	273	34	14	2.428571429	1	-6.026428571	-0.78	42.5942699	0.6094	
		243	1	0	281	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		253	0	0	283	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		270	34	3	316	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		273	34	14	325	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		277	0	0	326	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		281	0	0	347	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		283	34	14	352	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		325	0	0	359	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		326	0	0	360	1	0	0.074285714	0.074285714	-8.883571429	-1.78	78.91784133	3.1684	
		347	0	0	367	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		350	32	10	366	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		359	0	0	370	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		363	0	0	372	1	0	0.074285714	0.074285714	-8.883571429	-1.78	78.91784133	3.1684	
		361	0	0	374	71	0	5.074285714	5.074285714	-8.883571429	-1.637142857	15.06812704	2.60230735	
		364	0	0	376	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		372	1	0	380	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		374	71	2	399	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		374	0	0	400	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		378	0	0	406	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		378	58	2	408	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		378	0	0	413	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		389	20	0	419	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		389	0	0	422	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		399	0	0	435	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		400	0	0	442	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		406	12	1	452	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		412	0	0	454	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		413	0	0	452	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		425	0	0	462	17	8	1.214285714	0.571428571	-7.407142857	-1.203871429	59.91855765	1.40064498	
		436	66	0	466	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		441	10	1	501	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		442	0	0	502	4	0	0.285714286	0.074285714	-8.669285714	-1.708571429	78.4008622	2.919216327	
		450	0	0	508	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		457	1	0	512	33	17	2.307142857	2.142857143	-6.987142857	-0.965714286	43.5317888	0.30020353	
		463	66	5	539	3	0	0.214285714	0.074285714	-8.740714286	-1.78	78.4008622	3.1684	
		467	4	1	542	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		502	0	0	555	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		506	0	0	561	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		512	33	17	562	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		527	0	0	578	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		539	0	0	582	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		540	0	0	590	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		542	0	0	601	1	0	0.074285714	0.074285714	-8.883571429	-1.78	78.91784133	3.1684	
		565	0	0	610	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		561	0	0	610	1	0	0.074285714	0.074285714	-8.883571429	-1.78	78.91784133	3.1684	
		562	0	0	616	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		579	0	0	618	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		582	0	0	623	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		590	0	0	626	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		601	0	0	628	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		609	0	0	658	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		610	66	0	660	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		610	0	18	668	25	5	1.785714286	0.357142857	-7.169285714	-1.422857143	51.3985765	2.02452449	
		618	0	0	670	66	2	4.714285714	0.142857143	-4.240714286	-1.301428571	17.6865765	2.60230735	
		623	0	0	679	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		625	0	0	690	33	4	2.307142857	0.285714286	-6.987142857	-1.484285714	43.5317888	0.30020353	
		626	0	0	693	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		628	0	0	695	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		636	0	0	708	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		665	0	0	709	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		666	26	0	716	67	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		670	66	2	744	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		670	0	0	745	1	0	0.074285714	0.074285714	-8.883571429	-1.78	78.91784133	3.1684	
		690	33	4	747	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		690	0	0	748	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		693	0	0	756	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		699	0	0	759	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		708	53	4	792	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		709	0	0	796	0	0	0	0	-0.955	-1.78	80.192025	3.1684	
		725	6											

11.4.2 Saarbrücken – R72

11.4.2.1 Saarbrücken – R72 – Phase 1

750	59	2733	Monday	11:59:56	6131	2438	599.92	57827	57827	10	12694	12694	0	57827	12694	9	Engine Out	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
760	18	2641	Thursday	07:48:38	6987	2741	181.06	62058	62058	0	18423	18423	0	62058	18423	47	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA ground impact in flight direction with deviating trajectory
772	72	2908	Tuesday	13:19:52	6841	1893	733.14	55006	55006	0	15515	15515	0	55006	15515	16	Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path with BIG Ratio.
778	51	220	Tuesday	11:06:39	7861	1135	511.11	58179	58179	2	12342	12342	5	58179	12342	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
795	58	3033	Thursday	11:04:20	6960	1551	990.56	58179	58179	0	12342	12342	1	58179	12342	78	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
799	41	636	Monday	10:06:00	7312	2172	410.19	57827	57827	24	12694	12694	3	57827	12694	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
801	11	2922	Wednesday	07:05:20	6462	3199	109.19	61705	61705	0	8816	8816	0	61705	8816	62	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA approaches Emergency landing site
804	137	745	Saturday	19:54:22	7030	2523	1390.64	62763	62763	0	7768	7768	0	62763	7768	29	Connection Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
826	33	2138	Sunday	09:21:22	7260	1309	335.61	63116	63116	0	7405	7405	0	63116	7405	59	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Disturbances)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
832	42	3178	Saturday	10:16:34	7354	1230	427.61	49717	49717	0	20804	20804	0	49717	20804	36	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
833	123	1074	Thursday	16:29:29	7220	2293	1247.50	51832	51832	0	18689	18689	0	51832	18689	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
840	94	1948	Sunday	15:31:29	6181	3503	952.47	47601	47601	0	22520	22520	0	47601	22520	71	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
844	33	2119	Thursday	09:19:37	4768	4262	332.72	59590	59590	0	10931	10931	0	59590	10931	37	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
846	90	891	Saturday	15:06:42	6633	3006	911.19	52343	52343	0	17278	17278	0	52343	17278	73	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
851	20	3159	Thursday	08:01:45	7310	1267	202.94	59590	59590	0	10931	10931	0	59590	10931	37	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
860	119	1489	Saturday	15:05:23	5052	4532	1298.97	53948	53948	0	16573	16573	0	53948	16573	32	Connection Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
866	118	201	Friday	17:37:03	7972	1105	1195.11	52343	52343	0	17278	17278	0	52343	17278	31	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
876	26	2176	Tuesday	08:49:06	4836	4135	281.83	59590	59590	0	10931	10931	0	59590	10931	72	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
881	122	1218	Saturday	18:23:17	5692	3993	1238.83	53948	53948	0	16573	16573	1	53948	16573	38	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
891	77	1937	Friday	06:40:00	4643	4598	66.67	62763	62763	1	7768	7768	0	62763	7768	38	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
907	67	1652	Thursday	12:47:07	4795	4676	676.53	58179	58179	0	12342	12342	0	58179	12342	37	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
909	50	1606	Saturday	11:02:53	4656	4651	504.83	49717	49717	7	20804	20804	3	49717	20804	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
914	77	3048	Thursday	13:50:45	7030	1514	784.58	54653	54653	0	15868	15868	2	54653	15868	89	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
92	36	3508	Monday	09:40:02	7625	1026	366.72	58532	58532	1	11989	11989	0	58532	11989	36	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
920	21	1655	Wednesday	08:05:21	4779	4681	298.92	59227	59227	0	11284	11284	0	59227	11284	2	Engine Out	UA approaches Emergency landing site
928	49	1504	Monday	10:56:35	5024	4551	494.33	57827	57827	0	12694	12694	0	57827	12694	3	Engine Out	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
929	94	1820	Thursday	15:32:48	4658	4667	954.67	54653	54653	0	15868	15868	0	54653	15868	44	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA approaches Emergency landing site
93	27	3161	Tuesday	08:44:39	7315	1263	274.42	59590	59590	18	10931	10931	1	59590	10931	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
936	69	745	Sunday	13:59:05	7030	2523	786.47	47601	47601	2	22520	22520	0	47601	22520	29	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
950	49	25	Friday	10:54:04	7986	918	490.14	56769	56769	0	13752	13752	0	56769	13752	22	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
952	44	3356	Sunday	10:29:52	7974	905	449.22	51832	51832	0	18689	18689	0	51832	18689	66	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
980	4	1051	Sunday	06:20:09	6168	3519	33.61	68405	68405	0	2116	2116	0	68405	2116	21	Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
986	7	1846	Monday	06:40:03	4849	4584	86.76	62763	62763	37	7768	7768	0	62763	7768	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
988	81	1400	Sunday	14:12:26	6289	4393	820.75	47601	47601	1	22520	22520	0	47601	22520	47	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA ground impact in flight direction with deviating trajectory.

O.R.C.U.S. D.00 - t-test of the Simulation

	UADayProt	HIT_TOT_ATB	HIT_TOT_OTW	UADayProt_cor	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB/Fh	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW/Fh	x_k_x_cross_ATB	x_k_x_cross_OTW	(x_k-x_cross_ATB)^2	(x_k-x_cross_OTW)^2	
nProbes	1400	31	0	0	31	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
nEvents	180	36	22	0	36	22	0	1.571428571	1.200714286	-0.092142857	1.441714798	0.008490306	
nEvents_cor	174	39	0	0	39	0	0	0	0.142857143	-0.370714286	0.008490306	0.008490306	
mSimulation	14	50	0	0	50	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
x_cross_ATB	0.3707143	60	0	0	60	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
x_cross_OTW	0.0921429	62	0	0	62	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
x_cross_TOT	0.4628571	68	0	1	68	0	1	0.071428571	-0.370714286	-0.020714286	0.137429082	0.008490306	
s2ATB	0.1610346	73	0	0	73	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
sATB	0.4012911	74	0	0	74	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
iATB	33.633171	89	1	0	89	1	0	0.071428571	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.089571939	0.008490306	
s3OTW	0.0094452	79	0	0	79	0	0	0.071428571	-0.299285714	-0.092142857	0.089571939	0.008490306	
sOTW	0.0971866	93	18	1	102	0	1	0	0.126571429	0.915	0.020714286	0.837225	0.008490306
iOTW	31.624782	102	0	0	102	0	7	1.357142857	0.5	0.988428571	0.407857143	0.973041327	0.166347449
sTOT	0.2397948	106	19	7	108	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
iTOT	0.4886663	108	0	0	115	20	6	1.428571429	0.428571429	1.057857143	0.336428571	1.119061735	0.113184184
	34.67471	115	20	6	120	0	6	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		120	0	0	122	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		132	0	0	139	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		139	0	0	153	13	5	0.928571429	0.357142857	0.579287143	0.265	0.310204569	0.008490306
		153	13	5	156	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		156	0	0	173	0	1	0.071428571	-0.370714286	-0.020714286	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		173	0	1	196	28	0	0	1.629285714	-0.092142857	2.654671939	0.008490306	
		196	28	0	193	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		193	0	0	194	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		194	0	0	195	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		195	0	0	208	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		208	0	0	215	1	0	0.071428571	-0.299285714	-0.092142857	0.089571939	0.008490306	
		215	1	0	216	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		216	0	0	226	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		226	0	0	235	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		235	0	0	246	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		246	0	0	252	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		252	0	0	254	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		254	0	1	271	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		271	0	0	275	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		275	0	0	285	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		285	0	0	287	7	6	0.5	0.428571429	1.29285714	0.336428571	0.016714796	0.008490306
		287	7	6	289	15	4	1.071428571	0.285714286	0.700714286	0.193571429	0.4910051	0.037498988
		289	15	4	313	0	0	0	0.142857143	-0.370714286	0.008490306	0.008490306	
		313	0	2	319	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		319	0	0	335	0	3	0	0.214285714	-0.370714286	0.122142857	0.137429082	0.014918878
		335	0	0	345	0	0	0	-0.158428571	-0.092142857	0.024469898	0.008490306	
		345	3	0	356	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		356	0	0	361	0	1	0	0.071428571	-0.370714286	-0.020714286	0.137429082	0.008490306
		361	0	0	387	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		387	0	0	404	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		404	0	0	417	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		417	0	0	422	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		422	0	0	430	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		430	0	0	433	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		433	0	0	434	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		434	0	0	437	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		437	0	0	457	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		457	0	0	458	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		458	0	3	464	0	0	0.214285714	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		464	0	0	473	1	0	0.071428571	-0.299285714	-0.092142857	0.089571939	0.008490306	
		473	1	0	474	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		474	0	0	486	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		486	0	0	497	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		497	0	0	500	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		500	0	2	513	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		513	0	0	515	13	4	0.928571429	0.285714286	0.557857143	0.193571429	0.371204952	0.037498988
		515	13	4	524	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		524	0	1	525	0	0.5	0	0.129285714	-0.092142857	0.016714796	0.008490306	
		525	0	0	528	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		528	0	0	531	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		531	0	0	534	3	2	0.214285714	0.142857143	0.050714286	0.024469898	0.002571939	0.008490306
		534	3	2	537	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		537	0	0	570	19	4	1.357142857	0.285714286	0.988428571	0.193571429	0.973041327	0.037498988
		570	19	4	580	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		580	0	0	586	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		586	0	0	589	2	0	0.071428571	-0.299285714	-0.092142857	0.089571939	0.008490306	
		589	2	0	593	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		593	0	0	599	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		599	0	0	605	23	2	1.642857143	0.142857143	1.272142857	0.050714286	1.618347449	0.002571939
		605	23	2	635	0	1	0.071428571	-0.370714286	-0.020714286	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		635	0	1	643	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		643	0	0	648	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		648	0	0	678	0	1	0.071428571	-0.370714286	-0.020714286	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		678	0	0	686	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		686	0	0	697	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		697	0	1	694	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		694	0	1	723	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		723	0	0	725	39	2	2.785714286	0.142857143	12.415	0.050714286	5.83225	0.002571939
		725	39	2	732	42	0	0.071428571	-0.370714286	-0.020714286	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		732	42	0	734	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		734	0	0	750	10	0	0.714285714	0.343571429	0.092142857	0.118041327	0.008490306	
		750	10	0	757	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		757	0	0	772	0	5	0.142857143	0.357142857	-0.227857143	0.265	0.009198878	0.070225
		772	0	5	799	24	3	1.714285714	0.214285714	1.343571429	0.122142857	1.805184184	0.014918878
		799	24	3	832	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		832	0	0	840	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		840	0	0	844	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		844	0	0	846	0	0	0	-0.370714286	-0.092142857	0.137429082	0.008490306	
		846	0	0	851	0	0	0	-0.3707142				

11.4.2.2 Saarbrücken – R72 – Phase 2

625	10	3086	Tuesday	07:00:23	7130	1423	100.64	62411	62411	0	8110	8110	0	62411	8110	10	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
625	10	3144	Tuesday	10:38:44	4601	4670	464.08	62411	62411	0	8110	8110	0	62411	8110	10	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
638	61	2154	Monday	12:11:12	4807	4186	618.69	57827	57827	0	12694	12694	0	57827	12694	60	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
638	85	256	Monday	14:53:23	7308	1197	888.97	57827	57827	0	15163	15163	0	57827	15163	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
64	42	1023	Monday	10:12:54	6248	3432	421.50	57827	57827	0	12694	12694	0	57827	12694	9	Engine Out	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
646	104	2197	Tuesday	16:34:42	4866	4080	1007.83	52328	52328	0	17983	17983	0	52328	17983	54	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
646	115	1273	Thursday	17:45:02	5296	4343	636.80	51832	51832	0	18689	18689	0	51832	18689	81	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
653	20	2062	Tuesday	07:59:53	4711	4374	196.83	59590	59590	5	10031	10031	1	59590	10031	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
668	111	2216	Tuesday	17:17:17	5070	3710	1270.64	51127	51127	0	19394	19394	0	51127	19394	20	Generator Failure	Central UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
686	116	2679	Sunday	18:01:16	5975	2615	1202.14	52185	52185	1	18336	18336	0	52185	18336	39	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
686	116	2679	Tuesday	12:21:20	5975	2615	4376.08	58179	58179	0	12342	12342	0	58179	12342	26	CCS Overload/ Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
688	63	1536	Tuesday	12:22:24	4967	4589	632.40	58179	58179	0	12342	12342	0	58179	12342	29	Connection Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
695	75	4243	Monday	15:36:36	4776	4243	677.50	59590	59590	0	10031	10031	0	59590	10031	15	Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path with BIG Ratio
702	29	1615	Tuesday	08:53:15	6271	3407	288.75	59590	59590	0	10031	10031	0	59590	10031	71	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
703	7	3210	Wednesday	06:42:13	7427	1172	70.36	61705	61705	0	8816	8816	0	61705	8816	19	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
703	85	1491	Wednesday	14:43:14	5049	4534	636.49	57827	57827	0	12694	12694	0	57827	12694	72	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
71	50	2165	Monday	11:03:51	4822	4161	506.42	57827	57827	0	12694	12694	0	57827	12694	30	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
725	105	3019	Thursday	17:43:29	6952	1567	1122.47	51832	51832	7	16573	16573	2	51832	16573	82	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
725	136	1427	Friday	19:49:25	5178	4439	1382.36	63468	63468	0	7053	7053	0	63468	7053	50	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA approaches Emergency landing site
74	63	2379	Thursday	12:23:31	5200	3585	639.75	58179	58179	0	12342	12342	0	58179	12342	40	Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
744	108	2146	Tuesday	16:59:07	4797	4204	1098.53	52538	52538	0	17983	17983	0	52538	17983	51	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA approaches Emergency landing site
749	131	966	Sunday	19:17:50	8704	2504	1329.72	62763	62763	0	7758	7758	0	62763	7758	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
752	65	110	Monday	12:38:22	7859	587	953.95	57827	57827	0	12694	12694	0	57827	12694	70	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
753	126	206	Thursday	18:46:10	7329	1215	1276.97	51832	51832	7	18689	18689	5	51832	18689	21	Engine Fire	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
756	126	683	Sunday	18:40:42	7272	2228	1227.86	52185	52185	0	18336	18336	0	52185	18336	70	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
76	23	1468	Saturday	08:17:15	5093	4503	228.78	62058	62058	6	8463	8463	1	62058	8463	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
763	62	2874	Sunday	12:18:34	7695	541	936.93	54653	54653	0	19689	19689	0	54653	19689	65	CCS Overload/ Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
763	62	2874	Sunday	12:18:34	7695	541	630.94	51832	51832	0	18689	18689	0	51832	18689	60	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
764	21	391	Monday	08:39:47	7695	1263	295.31	58532	58532	0	11989	11989	0	58532	11989	65	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	UA approaches Emergency landing site
772	122	3688	Tuesday	18:27:19	7869	901	1245.55	52538	52538	0	17983	17983	0	52538	17983	86	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
786	34	586	Tuesday	09:23:38	7470	1968	338.53	59590	59590	1	10031	10031	0	59590	10031	12	Engine Anomaly	Central ground impact point below flight path with BIG Ratio
786	52	1723	Tuesday	11:15:20	4720	4652	791.79	58179	58179	0	12342	12342	0	58179	12342	10	Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path with BIG Ratio
788	40	2904	Thursday	10:03:50	6830	1954	406.42	58179	58179	2	12342	12342	2	58179	12342	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
788	4	2908	Thursday	06:21:55	4727	4341	624.11	62411	62411	0	8110	8110	0	62411	8110	20	CCS Overload/ Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
808	103	1614	Wednesday	16:27:34	4845	4656	1045.97	51127	51127	0	19394	19394	0	51127	19394	31	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
808	70	852	Wednesday	13:04:07	6748	2977	796.89	53948	53948	0	16573	16573	0	53948	16573	48	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
815	104	1991	Wednesday	16:34:20	4865	4492	1057.25	51127	51127	0	19394	19394	0	51127	19394	72	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
815	85	325	Wednesday	14:41:14	7869	1333	868.75	53948	53948	0	16573	16573	0	53948	16573	80	CCS Overload/ Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
82	86	2343	Friday	14:44:41	5124	3692	874.47	52343	52343	15	17278	17278	8	52343	17278	82	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
828	31	328	Wednesday	09:04:20	7868	1339	307.22	59237	59237	0	11284	11284	0	59237	11284	68	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	UA approaches Emergency landing site
841	100	3276	Monday	16:12:01	7564	1068	1200.06	52343	52343	14	17278	17278	0	52343	17278	82	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
841	119	3448	Monday	18:08:43	7842	907	1214.53	52343	52343	0	17278	17278	0	52343	17278	70	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
847	57	1059	Sunday	11:44:55	6027	3663	874.86	51832	51832	2	18689	18689	5	51832	18689	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
850	17	1853	Wednesday	07:41:09	4640	4646	168.61	61705	61705	0	8816	8816	0	61705	8816	6	Engine Out	UA approaches Emergency landing site
856	110	3137	Tuesday	17:31:25	7507	1311	1152.39	52038	52038	5	17983	17983	3	52038	17983	20	Engine Fire	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
869	6	766	Monday	06:31:55	62763	2592	53.22	62763	62763	0	7758	7758	0	62763	7758	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
875	102	2913	Sunday	16:23:40	6656	1878	1039.45	52185	52185	0	18336	18336	0	52185	18336	11	Engine Out	No ground Effect
883	34	419	Monday	09:22:51	7743	1551	338.11	58532	58532	0	11989	11989	0	58532	11989	31	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
891	120	2277	Tuesday	18:12:51	4997	3879	1223.42	52538	52538	0	17983	17983	0	52538	17983	85	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	UA approaches Emergency landing site
892	15	1844	Wednesday	07:28:53	4650	4652	148.17	61705	61705	0	8816	8816	0	61705	8816	9	Engine Out	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
897	120	2708	Monday	18:13:55	6059	2520	1222.64	52343	52343	0	17278	17278	0	52343	17278	41	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA approaches Emergency landing site
898	93	2281	Tuesday	15:21:19	5004	3968	836.56	59590	59590	0	10031	10031	0	59590	10031	50	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
900	84	2696	Thursday	14:33:01	6024	2509	856.05	54653	54653	0	19689	19689	0	54653	19689	78	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
907	29	359	Thursday	09:39:52	7628	1407	266.47	59590	59590	1	10031	10031	0	59590	10031	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
908	64	101	Friday	12:26:06	7999	978	643.50	56769	56769	0	13752	13752	0	56769	13752	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
909	80	857	Saturday	14:05:34	6730	2894	809.00	52343	52343	0	17278	17278	0	52343	17278	23	Generator Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
909	82	2433	Saturday	14:20:20	5323	3419	833.89	52343	52343	0	17278	17278	0	52343	17278	37	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
912	25	448	Tuesday	08:27:48	7696	1628	246.30	59590	59590	0	10031	10031	0	59590	10031	67	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
925	136	1740	Saturday	19:49:56	4706	4692	1385.25	62763	62763	0	7758	7758	0	62763	7758	51	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA approaches Emergency landing site
938	52	1627	Sunday	11:10:00	4982	4579	525.03	51832	51832	0	18689	18689	0	51832	18689	51	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA approaches Emergency landing site
942	22	2012	Thursday	08:12:03	4676	4460	220.11	59590	59590	13	10031	10031	3	59590	10031	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
943	118	1749	Friday	17:59:41	4699	4691	1199.50	52343	52343	0	17278	17278	0	52343	17278	70	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
951	65	2152	Saturday	12:35:42	4805	4180	696.03	49717	49717	0	20804	20804	0	49717	20804	17	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
962	16	3337	Wednesday	07:37:33	7677	962	617.05	61705	61705	0	8816	8816	0	61705	8816	78	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
964	75	1016	Friday	13:41:10	6268	3410	768.61	52343	52343	0	17278	17278	0	52343	17278	10	Engine Anomaly	UA approaches Emergency landing site
974	65	3298	Sunday	12:37:39	7607	1038	662.78	51832	51832	0	18689	18689	0	51832	18689	36	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
989	126	540	Tuesday	18:46:38	7204	1861	1277.75	52538	52538	0	17983	17983	0	52538	17983	78	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
995	77	1	Saturday	15:45:33	7975	506	775.64	52343	52343	1	17278	17278	0	52343	17278	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
995	113	3206	Monday	17:31:33	7418	1179	1152.58	52343	52343									

11.4.3 Gröbenzell – R73

11.4.3.1 Gröbenzell – R73 – Phase 1

891	191	2880	Thursday	17/30/12	4898	1423	1183.89	14777	14777	0	5058	3099	0	17219	17215	0	5893	5893	0	31992	10991	24	Generator Failure	
897	4	833	Wednesday	08/18/12	4818	2087	23.72	17296	17296	1	2979	2979	0	18888	18888	0	3120	3120	0	37244	8999	8	Engine Out	
																								UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
																								UA ground impact tangential to trajectory

O.R.C.U.S. 02.00 - tTest of the Simulation

	UADayProx	HIT_TOT_ATB	HIT_TOT_OTW	UADayProx	HIT_tot_mean_ATB	HIT_tot_mean_OTW	HIT_tot_mean_ATB	HIT_tot_mean_OTW	HIT_tot_mean_ATB	HIT_tot_mean_OTW	x_k_cross ATB	x_k_cross OTW	(x_k_cross ATB)^2	(x_k_cross OTW)^2	
rProbes	1400	21	0	0	21	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
nEvents	185	26	0	0	26	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
rEvents_cor	174	33	0	0	33	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
lMission	14	33	0	0	44	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
x_cross_ATB	0.2528571	44	0	0	53	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
x_cross_OTW	0.0607143	54	0	0	64	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
x_cross_TOT	0.3135714	54	0	0	67	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
s2ATB	0.0742291	67	0	0	72	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
sATB	0.2724502	90	0	0	105	16	3	1.142857143	0.214285714	0.89	0.153571429	0.7921	0.023584184	0.003686224	
sATB	33.352451	113	11	0	124	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
sOTW	0.0043544	113	0	0	124	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
sOTW	0.069888	124	0	0	145	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
OTW	28.759039	145	146	1	155	1	1	0.214285714	0.285714286	0.225	0.011417959	0.025825	0.000625	0.003686224	
sTOT	0.1117545	146	3	4	155	1	1	0.071428571	0.071428571	-0.181428571	0.010714286	0.032916327	0.000747449	0.003686224	
sTOT	0.334297	155	1	1	158	14	7	1	1	0.5	0.174142857	0.43269714	0.58222449	0.192971939	0.003686224
ITOT	33.977853	158	10	2	162	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		158	4	5	178	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		162	0	0	167	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		178	190	0	190	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		187	0	0	204	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		190	0	0	212	11	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		204	0	0	248	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		248	11	1	252	11	3	0.785714286	0.785714286	0.532857143	0.153571429	0.289396735	0.023584184	0.003686224	
		252	11	3	265	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		265	0	0	272	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		265	0	0	279	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		272	0	0	281	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		279	0	0	284	15	7	1.071428571	1.071428571	0.5	0.818571429	0.43269714	0.870059184	0.192971939	0.003686224
		281	0	0	283	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		283	15	7	296	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		293	0	0	306	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		296	0	0	306	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		301	0	1	323	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		306	0	0	324	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		323	0	0	330	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		324	0	0	334	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		330	0	0	339	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		334	0	0	393	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		339	7	1	399	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		393	0	408	410	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		399	0	0	410	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		408	0	0	448	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		410	0	0	451	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		448	0	0	454	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		451	0	0	479	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		454	0	0	479	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		476	0	0	484	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		479	0	0	486	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		484	0	0	509	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		496	1	0	510	8	0	0.571428571	0.571428571	0.318571429	0.060714286	0.11447755	0.003686224	0.003686224	
		509	0	0	510	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		510	0	0	516	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		511	0	0	521	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		516	0	0	529	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		525	0	0	555	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		529	0	0	563	12	1	0.857142857	0.857142857	0.071428571	0.071428571	0.365181224	0.000747449	0.003686224	
		552	0	0	598	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		555	0	0	608	1	2	0.071428571	0.071428571	-0.181428571	0.082142857	0.032916327	0.006747449	0.003686224	
		563	12	1	642	0	0	0.071428571	0.071428571	-0.181428571	0.082142857	0.032916327	0.006747449	0.003686224	
		563	0	0	642	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		573	0	0	645	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		598	0	0	650	1	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		608	1	2	666	1	0	0.071428571	0.071428571	-0.181428571	0.082142857	0.032916327	0.006747449	0.003686224	
		636	0	0	671	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		638	0	0	683	16	2	1.142857143	1.142857143	0.89	0.821428571	0.7921	0.006747449	0.003686224	
		642	0	0	699	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		645	0	0	699	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		650	0	0	704	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		666	0	0	704	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		671	0	0	720	13	1	0.928571429	0.928571429	0.675714286	0.010714286	0.456589796	0.000747449	0.003686224	
		683	16	2	721	29	0	2.071428571	2.071428571	1.818571429	0.060714286	3.37022041	0.003686224	0.003686224	
		694	0	0	723	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		699	0	0	725	2	0	0.142857143	0.142857143	-0.11	-0.060714286	0.0121	0.003686224	0.003686224	
		704	0	0	729	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		716	0	0	735	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		720	13	1	744	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		721	29	0	747	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		723	0	0	753	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		725	2	0	755	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		729	0	0	768	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		744	0	0	773	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		747	0	0	773	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		753	0	0	777	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		755	0	0	783	19	3	1.357142857	1.357142857	1.104285714	0.153571429	1.21946939	0.023584184	0.003686224	
		757	0	0	794	0	0	0	0	0	-0.252857143	-0.060714286	0.063936735	0.003686224	
		768	0	0											

11.4.3.2 Gröbenzell – R73 – Phase 2

O.R.C.U.S. 02.00 - Simulation Summary

Table with columns: U/A Parameters, Gen. Param Parameters, Mission Specific Parameters, Sim FH/FD, and a large grid of simulation results for various parameters like Day, Time of Impact, and various impact paths.

Table with columns: Case, Outcome, and a list of 79 numbered entries describing simulation results and impact paths.

670	130	1788	Friday	15:31:50	2516	2400	893.08	15372	15372	0	4463	4463	0	17562	17562	0	5546	5546	0	32934	10009	75	Degradation of all UA approaches Emergency landing site
691	97	1777	Friday	13:08:06	2514	2396	710.19	15372	15372	0	4463	4463	0	17562	17562	0	5546	5546	0	32934	10009	28	Generator Failure UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
692	27	3193	Saturday	07:58:43	5518	1351	197.89	19140	19140	0	695	695	0	22058	22058	0	1940	1940	0	41208	1735	65	Degradation of all UA approaches Emergency landing site
700	186	2640	Sunday	19:40:11	3991	1607	1307.03	17851	17851	1	1984	1984	0	20335	20335	0	2773	2773	0	38186	4757	9	Engine Out - UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
708	88	373	Monday	12:24:39	5679	1661	641.08	16661	16661	0	3174	3174	0	19179	19179	0	3929	3929	0	35840	7103	28	Generator Failure UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
712	120	893	Friday	14:40:38	4347	2148	877.87	15372	15372	0	4463	4463	0	17562	17562	0	5546	5546	0	32934	10009	9	Engine Out - UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
714	51	204	Sunday	09:41:03	5906	1523	368.42	17560	17560	0	1888	1888	0	20103	20103	0	3005	3005	0	38053	4890	59	GCS Overide Wn Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
718	148	3387	Thursday	16:51:36	5816	1339	1098.81	14777	14777	0	5058	5058	0	17215	17215	0	5893	5893	0	31991	10951	35	Connection Failure UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
720	15	2956	Saturday	09:00:15	4811	1447	300.44	17256	17256	0	2579	2579	0	19179	19179	0	3929	3929	0	36435	6508	58	GCS Overide Wn Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
721	35	2627	Sunday	08:33:21	3962	1999	255.61	17050	17050	16	1888	1888	2	20103	20103	0	3005	3005	0	38053	4890	61	Wrong commands UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
723	179	1479	Tuesday	13:14:34	2814	2449	724.30	15471	15471	10	4364	4364	7	18255	18255	0	4823	4823	0	33726	9217	20	Engine Fire - UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
729	175	2324	Monday	19:08:53	1988	1314.83	18149	18149	0	1686	1686	0	21028	21028	0	2080	2080	0	39177	3766	17	Engine Fire - Central UA ground impact point below flight path	
734	129	3425	Saturday	15:29:27	3885	1346	989.08	15272	15272	0	4563	4563	0	17793	17793	0	5315	5315	0	32065	9878	81	Separation of ess Central UA ground impact point below flight path
744	71	2076	Tuesday	11:11:40	2872	2210	519.44	16254	16254	0	3571	3571	0	19179	19179	0	3929	3929	0	36443	7500	79	Separation of ess Central UA ground impact point below flight path
750	141	1923	Monday	16:20:35	2533	2320	1034.33	14478	14478	0	5036	5036	0	17446	17446	0	5662	5662	0	31925	11018	70	Degradation of all Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
758	168	1605	Tuesday	18:18:34	4311	2158	1230.97	14975	14975	9	4860	4860	3	17446	17446	0	5662	5662	0	32421	10522	64	Wrong commands UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
761	131	111	Friday	15:34:13	5733	1461	632.3	15372	15372	0	4463	4463	0	17562	17562	0	5546	5546	0	32934	10009	6	Engine Out - UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
763	160	3550	Sunday	17:48:29	5975	1381	1177.90	14578	14578	0	5237	5237	0	18688	18688	0	6240	6240	0	31446	11497	13	Engine Anomaly - UA approaches Emergency landing site
77	4	341	Sunday	06:33:39	5733	1632	22.78	19438	19438	0	397	397	0	22299	22299	0	809	809	0	41737	1206	23	Generator Failure Central UA ground impact point below flight path
77	75	787	Sunday	11:27:44	4665	2053	546.25	14479	14479	0	5336	5336	0	17215	17215	0	5893	5893	0	31694	11249	81	Separation of ess Central UA ground impact point below flight path
770	13	373	Sunday	06:33:39	5679	1660	89.08	19438	19438	0	397	397	0	22299	22299	0	809	809	0	41737	1206	23	Generator Failure Central UA ground impact point below flight path
774	47	1813	Thursday	09:25:28	2528	2326	342.47	17157	17157	0	2678	2678	0	19757	19757	0	3351	3351	0	36914	6029	79	Separation of ess Central UA ground impact point below flight path
780	186	3184	Wednesday	19:40:52	5469	1393	1388.11	16049	16049	0	1786	1786	0	21028	21028	0	2080	2080	0	39177	3966	1	Engine Out - No Ground Effect
795	63	2547	Thursday	10:36:55	3716	1773	861.03	16363	16363	0	3472	3472	0	18948	18948	0	4160	4160	0	35310	7532	11	Engine Anomaly - Central UA ground impact point below flight path
80	92	1598	Wednesday	12:43:49	2943	2446	673.03	16363	16363	0	3472	3472	0	19054	19054	0	4044	4044	0	36427	7516	2	Engine Out - UA approaches Emergency landing site
802	17	389	Thursday	07:11:07	5651	1874	116.56	17256	17256	1	2379	2379	0	20103	20103	0	3005	3005	0	37859	5584	31	Connection Failure UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
804	37	2112	Saturday	08:41:34	2721	2180	289.28	17256	17256	0	2579	2579	0	19179	19179	0	3929	3929	0	36435	6508	17	Engine Fire - Central UA ground impact point below flight path
815	30	2098	Sunday	08:19:25	2552	2216	332.39	17560	17560	1	1885	1885	0	20103	20103	0	3005	3005	0	38053	4890	42	Partial Lock of Fig Central UA ground impact point below flight path
815	30	1837	Wednesday	08:09:55	2724	2451	216.58	16958	16958	0	2877	2877	0	19526	19526	0	3582	3582	0	36484	6459	72	Degradation of all UA approaches Emergency landing site
823	28	2894	Thursday	07:53:57	4754	1485	189.92	17256	17256	0	2579	2579	0	20103	20103	0	3005	3005	0	37859	5584	40	Shut Circuit/ Over Central UA ground impact point below flight path
85	113	210	Monday	14:14:51	5591	1528	824.75	15471	15471	0	4364	4364	0	18255	18255	0	4823	4823	0	33726	9217	74	Degradation of all Central UA ground impact point below flight path
854	159	1519	Thursday	17:59:44	4570	2002	1164.56	14777	14777	7	5058	5058	3	17215	17215	0	5893	5893	0	31992	10951	63	Separation of ess UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
861	104	1863	Sunday	13:37:08	2512	2355	781.89	14380	14380	0	5455	5455	0	16637	16637	0	6471	6471	0	31017	11926	25	Generator Failure UA approaches Emergency landing site
865	48	1514	Monday	09:28:16	5384	1795	346.97	16958	16958	0	2877	2877	0	19526	19526	0	3582	3582	0	36484	6459	32	Separation of ess UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
865	133	1389	Wednesday	15:44:38	2989	2438	974.38	15471	15471	29	4364	4364	2	18139	18139	0	4989	4989	0	33610	9333	18	Engine Fire - UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
868	35	1757	Thursday	08:32:17	2520	2404	253.83	17157	17157	32	2678	2678	0	19757	19757	0	3351	3351	0	36914	6029	80	Separation of ess UA approaches Emergency landing site
886	37	284	Thursday	08:39:16	5841	1569	265.90	17157	17157	0	2678	2678	0	19757	19757	0	3351	3351	0	36914	6029	28	Generator Failure UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
888	31	1936	Tuesday	08:16:54	2576	2276	224.86	16760	16760	0	3075	3075	0	19526	19526	0	3582	3582	0	36286	6637	65	Degradation of all UA approaches Emergency landing site
901	190	2235	Friday	19:57:22	2304	2072	1395.61	16049	16049	0	1786	1786	0	21143	21143	0	1965	1965	0	39192	3751	18	Engine Fire - UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
901	170	2632	Sunday	16:20:32	3967	1904	1249.22	14978	14978	0	5237	5237	0	18688	18688	0	6240	6240	0	31446	11497	66	Degradation of all Central UA ground impact point below flight path
908	142	2885	Wednesday	16:25:57	1927	1647	1043.25	14975	14975	11	4860	4860	0	17215	17215	0	5893	5893	0	32190	10753	17	Engine Fire - UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
907	107	1742	Saturday	13:50:14	2526	2410	783.72	15272	15272	0	4563	4563	0	17793	17793	0	5315	5315	0	32065	9878	49	Wrong commands Central UA ground impact point below flight path
960	135	31	Friday	15:51:46	5990	1416	986.30	15372	15372	0	4463	4463	0	17562	17562	0	5546	5546	0	32934	10009	22	Generator Failure UA approaches Emergency landing site
959	117	1897	Sunday	14:34:35	2521	2336	857.64	14380	14380	21	5455	5455	0	16637	16637	0	6471	6471	0	31017	11926	18	Engine Fire - UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
966	110	2124	Sunday	14:03:57	2789	2170	806.58	14380	14380	0	5455	5455	0	16637	16637	0	6471	6471	0	31017	11926	56	GCS Overide Wn Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
973	111	188	Sunday	14:06:50	4262	2144	811.42	14380	14380	0	5455	5455	0	16637	16637	0	6471	6471	0	31017	11926	23	Generator Failure Central UA ground impact point below flight path
976	1	1766	Wednesday	06:02:09	2517	2401	3.61	17256	17256	0	2579	2579	0	19988	19988	0	3120	3120	0	37244	5699	49	Wrong commands Central UA ground impact point below flight path
990	119	1110	Wednesday	14:42:27	3697	2113	870.75	15471	15471	0	4364	4364	0	18139	18139	0	4989	4989	0	33610	9333	79	Separation of ess Central UA ground impact point below flight path
991	6	1049	Thursday	06:23:22	3876	2272	38.94	17256	17256	0	2579	2579	0	20103	20103	0	3005	3005	0	37359	5584	48	Wrong commands UA approaches Emergency landing site
997	24	963	Wednesday	07:42:44	4134	2267	171.25	17256	17256	0	2579	2579	0	19988	19988	0	3120	3120	0	37244	5699	77	Degradation of all Central UA ground impact point below flight path

11.4.4 Arnstein – R74

11.4.4.1 Arnstein – R74 – Phase 1

938	72	534	Sunday	14.56:51	5767	5077	894.75	6044	6044	0	2124	2124	0	3880	3880	0	1509	1509	0	9024	3832	1	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
938	88	1026	Monday	16:56:44	3250	3870	1057.89	6166	6166	26	2002	2002	0	4068	4068	0	1321	1321	0	10224	3223	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural deceleration - Deline Impact
961	82	2236	Tuesday	16:16:04	2987	2526	1026.81	5982	5982	0	2206	2206	0	4098	4098	0	1321	1321	0	10030	3527	40	Short Circuit / Overload	Control UA ground impact point below flight path
967	71	1521	Monday	14:51:27	1582	1581	883.03	6330	6330	0	1838	1838	2	4227	4227	0	1132	1132	0	10587	2276	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural deceleration - Deline Impact
97	24	484	Saturday	08:31:52	8042	5766	251.14	6881	6881	0	1307	1307	0	4472	4472	0	817	817	0	11333	2226	65	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
973	27	1365	Tuesday	09:04:26	1700	2346	227.09	6901	6901	0	1287	1287	0	4655	4655	0	836	836	0	11404	2162	69	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Control UA ground impact point below flight path
973	71	1618	Thursday	14:48:39	1709	2638	81.71	7106	7106	0	1062	1062	0	4688	4688	0	701	701	0	11704	1765	72	Degradation of altitude.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
980	111	1070	Sunday	19:52:14	3315	3909	1387.08	7381	7381	1	817	817	0	4742	4742	0	647	647	0	12053	1464	45	Short Circuit / Overload	Control UA ground impact point below flight path
981	63	944	Sunday	13:49:48	3889	4234	783.90	6044	6044	0	2124	2124	1	3880	3880	0	1609	1609	0	9024	3832	83	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural deceleration - Deline Impact
989	8	2178	Tuesday	09:57:23	2400	2353	99.84	6779	6779	0	1389	1389	0	4681	4681	0	728	728	0	11440	2117	82	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Control UA ground impact point below flight path
989	63	1262	Monday	13:50:28	2448	2408	794.11	6320	6320	0	1838	1838	4	4257	4257	0	1132	1132	0	10587	2070	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural deceleration - Deline Impact
996	2	2626	Tuesday	06:13:02	4299	3078	21.73	6779	6779	0	1389	1389	0	4681	4681	0	728	728	0	11440	2117	16	Engine Anomaly	Control ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.

11.4.4.2 Arnstein – R74 – Phase 2

916	97	1700	Friday	18:07:55	1654	2507	1213.22	6411	6411	0	1757	1757	2	4230	4230	0	1159	1159	0	10641	2916	83	Stoppage of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural disintegration - Debris impact
924	82	400	Sunday	16:12:13	5608	5124	1020.99	6207	6207	0	1861	1861	0	3933	3933	0	1556	1556	0	10140	1417	37	Short Circuit / Overheat	Central UA ground impact point below Right path
926	14	2300	Thursday	07:44:03	5383	3862	173.47	6779	6779	2	1389	1389	0	4661	4661	0	728	728	0	11440	2117	20	Engine Fire	UA structural disintegration - Debris impact
928	01	410	Thursday	16:22:23	4539	6250	1013.84	6128	6128	0	2542	2542	0	4014	4014	0	1375	1375	0	10140	1417	26	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below Right path
930	38	700	Saturday	19:45:03	6202	5232	486.09	6933	6933	0	2105	2105	0	3628	3628	0	1053	1053	0	8620	3728	61	Wrong commands to the Right control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural disintegration - Debris impact
936	48	3285	Friday	11:35:53	6626	4712	568.81	6916	6916	0	1852	1852	0	4338	4338	0	1051	1051	0	10024	2922	11	Engine Assembly	Central UA ground impact point below Right path
937	36	230	Saturday	19:45:33	6637	4304	311.22	6881	6881	0	1267	1267	0	4472	4472	0	917	917	0	11133	2224	27	Short Circuit / Overheat	Central UA ground impact point below Right path
94	37	1480	Wednesday	10:34:43	1950	2917	457.86	6738	6738	0	1430	1430	0	4445	4445	0	844	844	0	11183	2374	2	Engine Out	UA approach Emergency landing site
96	33	142	Friday	09:55:37	4446	4768	392.44	6616	6616	0	1626	1626	0	4238	4238	0	1051	1051	0	10864	2624	79	Stoppage of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below Right path
968	59	2985	Thursday	15:23:50	5391	3615	730.72	6248	6248	17	1920	1920	1	4237	4237	0	1132	1132	0	10909	3052	21	Engine Fire	UA structural disintegration - Debris impact
971	73	1847	Friday	15:04:36	5281	4954	957.72	6350	6350	0	1836	1836	0	4695	4695	0	1294	1294	0	10429	3128	50	Wrong commands to the Right control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below Right path
973	32	1943	Sunday	09:57:59	1814	2300	390.84	5840	5840	0	2328	2328	0	4014	4014	0	1375	1375	0	9954	3193	59	SCS Overide Wrong commands to the Right control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
975	72	3000	Thursday	09:14:01	6332	4276	23.30	6779	6779	0	1396	1396	0	4661	4661	0	728	728	0	11440	2117	37	Short Circuit / Overheat	Central UA ground impact point below Right path
976	78	364	Thursday	15:43:04	3703	4133	971.79	6248	6248	0	1920	1920	0	4237	4237	0	10005	1132	0	10909	3052	9	Engine Out	UA ground impact point on a trajectory
978	42	2973	Wednesday	11:38:14	5863	3962	563.72	6738	6738	0	1430	1430	0	4445	4445	0	844	844	0	11183	2374	80	Wrong commands to the Right control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below Right path
984	42	110	Thursday	11:11:52	2904	3586	519.78	6575	6575	0	1920	1920	0	4416	4416	0	971	971	0	10909	2954	67	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
990	82	2115	Wednesday	14:29:56	2206	2314	849.97	6248	6248	0	1920	1920	0	4230	4230	0	1159	1159	0	10476	3076	62	Wrong commands to the Right control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below Right path
992	80	2117	Wednesday	14:37:31	2211	2315	862.55	6248	6248	0	1920	1920	0	4230	4230	0	1159	1159	0	10476	3076	29	Connection Failure	UA approach Emergency landing site
996	56	80	Thursday	12:29:55	7009	5276	616.53	6738	6738	0	1430	1430	0	4472	4472	0	917	917	0	11210	2447	22	Generator Failure	UA approach Emergency landing site

	UADayProt	HIT_TOT_ATB	HIT_TOT_OTW	UADayProt	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB/Ph	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW/Ph	x_h_x_cross_ATB	x_h_x_cross_OTW	(x_h_x_cross_ATB)^2	(x_h_x_cross_OTW)^2		
rProbes	200	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
nEvents	196	13	0	0	13	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
nEvents_cor	181	26	0	0	26	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
Mission	14	53	0	1	53	0	1	0	0.071428571	-0.91	-0.163571429	0.8281	0.028755612	
x_cross_ATB	0.91	72	0	0	72	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
x_cross_OTW	0.235	94	0	0	94	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
x_cross_TOT	1.145	86	0	0	86	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
sATB	0.8479171	105	0	0	105	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
sATB	0.8208262	111	0	0	111	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
sATB	13.822315	127	0	0	127	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
sOTW	0.0517014	131	29	0	131	29	0	2.071428571	0	1.161428571	-0.235	1.348916327	0.055225	
sOTW	0.2273793	149	0	0	149	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
sOTW	13.99415	152	0	0	152	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
sTOT	1.2721116	153	0	0	153	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
sTOT	1.1276792	168	4	0	168	4	0	0.285714286	0	0.050714286	-0.91	0.002571429	0.055225	
sTOT	14.231421	191	0	0	191	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		197	0	0	197	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		202	0	0	202	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		206	0	0	206	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		212	0	0	212	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		214	0	0	214	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		225	0	0	225	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		233	0	0	233	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		248	0	0	248	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		255	5	0	255	5	0	0.357142857	-0.91	-0.552857143	-0.235	0.30565102	0.055225	
		261	0	0	261	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		267	0	0	267	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		273	0	0	273	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		279	0	0	279	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		299	0	1	299	0	1	0.071428571	-0.91	-0.163571429	0.8281	0.028755612	0.055225	
		311	0	0	311	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		313	0	0	313	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		321	0	0	321	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		323	0	2	323	0	2	0.142857143	-0.91	-0.092142857	0.8281	0.008490306	0.055225	
		323	0	0	345	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		345	0	0	345	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		355	0	0	355	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		355	0	0	361	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		356	0	0	361	0	1	0.071428571	-0.91	-0.163571429	0.8281	0.028755612	0.055225	
		381	0	0	381	0	2	0.142857143	-0.91	-0.092142857	0.8281	0.008490306	0.055225	
		385	0	0	385	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		384	0	2	396	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		406	0	0	406	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		396	409	0	409	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		408	0	0	418	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		408	0	0	429	0	1	0.142857143	0.071428571	-0.767142857	-0.163571429	0.588608163	0.028755612	0.055225
		418	0	0	433	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		429	2	1	441	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		433	0	0	443	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		441	0	0	445	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		443	0	0	459	11	0	0.785714286	-0.124285714	-0.235	0.015446939	0.055225		
		445	0	0	461	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		459	11	0	471	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		461	0	0	473	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		471	0	0	474	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		473	0	0	481	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		474	0	0	482	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		481	0	0	485	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		482	0	0	505	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		485	0	0	516	0	0	0.071428571	-0.91	-0.163571429	0.8281	0.028755612	0.055225	
		505	0	0	517	4	4	0.285714286	0.285714286	-0.624285714	0.050714286	0.389732653	0.028755612	0.055225
		516	1	0	533	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		517	0	0	533	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		517	4	4	566	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		517	0	0	574	0	0	0	0.5	0.265	0.8281	0.07032541	0.055225	
		524	0	0	577	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		533	0	0	579	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		566	0	0	592	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		574	0	0	601	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		574	0	0	609	0	0	0	0.071428571	-0.163571429	0.8281	0.028755612	0.055225	
		574	0	0	612	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		577	0	0	612	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		579	0	0	616	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		592	0	0	631	60	0	4.285714286	0.378714286	-0.235	11.39544694	0.055225		
		601	0	0	637	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		602	1	0	642	1	0	0.142857143	-0.767142857	-0.235	0.588608163	0.055225		
		609	0	0	648	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		612	0	0	660	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		618	0	0	665	0	0	0.357142857	-0.91	-0.121428571	0.8281	0.014188178	0.055225	
		631	0	0	666	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		637	0	0	681	0	1	0.071428571	-0.91	-0.163571429	0.8281	0.028755612	0.055225	
		642	2	0	686	2	0	0.142857143	-0.767142857	-0.235	0.588608163	0.055225		
		646	0	0	703	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		660	0	0	706	0	0	0.071428571	-0.91	-0.163571429	0.8281	0.028755612	0.055225	
		665	0	0	713	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		666	0	0	721	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		681	0	0	725	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		686	2	0	726	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		686	0	0	728	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		703	0	0	737	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		706	0	0	747	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		713	0	0	749	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		721	0	0	754	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		725	0	0	755	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		725	0	0	764	4	0	0.285714286	-0.624285714	-0.235	0.389732653	0.055225		
		726	0	0	771	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		728	0	0	786	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		737	0	0	799	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		747	0	0	800	0	0	0.071428571	-0.91	-0.163571429	0.8281	0.028755612	0.055225	
		749	0	0	827	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		754	0	0	842	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		755	0	0	857	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		764	4	0	858	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		771	0	0	859	10	0	0.714285714	-0.195714286	-0.235	0.038304082	0.055225		
		786	0	0	863	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		799	0	0	865	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		807	0	0	867	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		827	0	0	881	1	0	0.071428571	-0.91	-0.163571429	0.8281	0.028755612	0.055225	
		842	0	0	890	0	0	0	-0.91	-0.235	0.8281	0.055225		
		857	0	0	896	4	0	0.285714286	-0.624285714	-0.235	0.389732653	0.055225		
		858	0	0	904	0	1	0.071428571	-0.163571429	0.8281	0.028755612	0.055225		
		85												

11.4.5 Ibbenbüren – R75

11.4.5.1 Ibbenbüren – R75 – Phase 1

705	28	2432	Friday	08:29:21	5984	3892	248.94	28122	28122	0	3835	3835	0	28122	3835	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
714	61	1441	Sunday	11:25:58	6207	4766	543.30	23009	23009	0	8948	8948	0	23009	8948	5	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
729	84	2543	Monday	13:31:46	6046	3498	762.95	24606	24606	0	7351	7351	0	24606	7351	70	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
730	154	2192	Tuesday	19:49:02	5918	4610	1361.72	29560	29560	1	2397	2397	0	29560	2397	76	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
731	64	513	Wednesday	11:40:46	7031	1660	587.67	25405	25405	0	6552	6552	0	25405	6552	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
735	26	1150	Sunday	08:16:39	6562	3951	227.75	27962	27962	0	3995	3995	0	27962	3995	2	Engine Out	UA approaches Emergency landing site
741	94	606	Saturday	15:22:50	6907	1976	638.06	24606	24606	0	7351	7351	0	24606	7351	72	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
760	35	1790	Thursday	09:06:10	6023	5138	310.31	27163	27163	0	4794	4794	0	27163	4794	59	GCS Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
776	30	1213	Saturday	08:39:19	6520	4157	263.89	26524	26524	0	5433	5433	0	26524	5433	45	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
787	69	2981	Wednesday	12:11:19	6331	2209	618.89	25405	25405	0	6552	6552	0	25405	6552	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
791	69	1368	Sunday	12:29:02	6367	4598	615.08	23009	23009	6	8948	8948	1	23009	8948	61	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural desintegration - Dribble Impact
791	91	1100	Sunday	14:07:22	6630	3779	612.31	23648	23648	0	8309	8309	0	23648	8309	2	Engine Out	UA approaches Emergency landing site
803	3	1594	Friday	06:13:11	6162	5023	21.97	26281	26281	0	3676	3676	0	26281	3676	50	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
807	121	1713	Tuesday	18:16:33	6072	5152	1227.61	23967	23967	0	7960	7960	0	23967	7960	54	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
818	36	80	Saturday	09:09:00	6993	849	315.03	26524	26524	0	5433	5433	0	26524	5433	68	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
821	101	3243	Tuesday	15:04:33	6675	1186	907.61	25086	25086	0	6871	6871	0	25086	6871	39	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
828	108	1030	Tuesday	15:28:14	6696	3029	947.08	25086	25086	0	6871	6871	0	25086	6871	11	Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
828	119	3024	Tuesday	16:41:23	6471	1734	1069.00	23967	23967	0	7960	7960	0	23967	7960	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
830	79	2955	Thursday	13:05:14	6207	2037	708.75	25405	25405	0	6552	6552	0	25405	6552	29	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
836	126	35	Wednesday	17:14:40	6971	627	1124.47	23648	23648	0	8309	8309	0	23648	8309	31	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
836	8	603	Wednesday	06:36:40	6998	1965	64.47	28122	28122	0	3835	3835	0	28122	3835	11	Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
846	148	3025	Saturday	19:17:54	6462	1762	1329.83	28921	28921	0	3036	3036	0	28921	3036	72	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
854	63	1145	Sunday	11:06:19	6587	3054	560.95	23009	23009	0	8948	8948	0	23009	8948	69	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
87	32	3052	Wednesday	08:51:53	6489	1679	286.47	26684	26684	0	5273	5273	0	26684	5273	39	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
878	75	2658	Wednesday	12:43:21	6127	3070	672.28	25405	25405	0	6552	6552	0	25405	6552	29	Connection Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
885	132	414	Thursday	17:47:38	7050	1462	1179.39	24287	24287	0	7670	7670	0	24287	7670	41	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA approaches Emergency landing site
897	94	2040	Monday	14:25:52	6113	3138	843.14	24606	24606	0	7351	7351	0	24606	7351	48	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA approaches Emergency landing site
916	85	3018	Monday	15:54:04	6465	1784	750.11	24606	24606	0	7351	7351	0	24606	7351	9	Engine Out	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
939	86	2113	Monday	13:41:54	5917	4789	769.86	24606	24606	0	7351	7351	0	24606	7351	5	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
948	21	228	Wednesday	07:48:16	7042	1013	180.47	28122	28122	0	3835	3835	0	28122	3835	77	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
957	10	963	Friday	06:50:01	6756	3281	83.36	26281	26281	0	3676	3676	0	26281	3676	47	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA ground impact in flight direction with deviating trajectory.
96	119	2100	Monday	16:39:59	5918	4610	1066.67	22689	22689	9	9268	9268	1	22689	9268	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Dribble Impact
96	121	1938	Monday	16:50:33	5954	5099	1084.25	22689	22689	0	9268	9268	0	22689	9268	1	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
997	78	52	Wednesday	12:55:39	6990	833	692.75	24766	24766	0	7191	7191	0	24766	7191	53	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path

O.R.C.U.S. 02.00 - t-test of the Simulation

	UADayProt	HIT_TOT_ATB	HIT_TOT_OTW	UADayProt	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB/Ph	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW/Ph	x_j, x_k_cross ATB	x_j, x_k_cross OTW	(x_j, x_k_cross ATB)^2	(x_j, x_k_cross OTW)^2
nProbes	1400	28	0	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
nEvents	175	34	2	34	2	1	0.142857143	0.071428571	-0.085	0.052857143	0.007225	0.002793878
nEvents_cor	163	30	4	36	1	2	0.285714286	0.142857143	0.052857143	0.025437449	0.003448988	0.000344898
tMission	14	46	4	46	4	0	0.285714286	0	0.057857143	-0.018571429	0.003347449	0.000344898
x_cross_ATB	0.2278571	48	0	48	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
x_cross_OTW	0.0185714	49	0	49	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
x_cross_TOT	0.2464286	86	0	86	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
sATB	0.0622264	67	0	67	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
sATB	0.2454107	68	0	68	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
iATB	33.21562	69	0	69	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
sOTW	0.000417	99	1	99	1	0	0.642857143	0.071428571	0.415	0.052857143	0.172225	0.002793878
sOTW	0.020117	99	0	101	1	2	0.642857143	0.071428571	0.415	0.052857143	0.172225	0.002793878
tOTW	15.259707	101	7	102	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
sTOT	0.0694009	102	0	109	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
sTOT	0.2934045	106	0	114	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
tTOT	33.580061	174	0	183	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		183	0	187	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		187	0	188	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		188	0	194	9	1	0.642857143	0.071428571	0.415	0.052857143	0.172225	0.002793878
		194	9	196	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		196	0	200	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		200	0	205	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		205	0	212	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		212	0	213	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		213	0	290	4	0	0.285714286	0	0.057857143	-0.018571429	0.003347449	0.000344898
		290	4	309	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		309	0	313	0	0	0	0.5	0.272428571	-0.018571429	0.017406135	0.000344898
		313	7	320	9	0	0.642857143	0	0.415	0.052857143	0.172225	0.002793878
		320	9	321	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		321	0	344	1	0	0.071428571	0	-0.156428571	-0.018571429	0.002446988	0.000344898
		344	1	345	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		344	0	360	1	1	0.071428571	0.071428571	-0.156428571	0.052857143	0.024469888	0.002793878
		345	0	377	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		345	0	382	1	0	0.071428571	0	-0.156428571	-0.018571429	0.002446988	0.000344898
		360	1	395	7	2	0.5	0.142857143	0.272428571	0.124285714	0.074061735	0.015446939
		377	0	386	20	2	1.428571429	0.142857143	1.200714286	0.124285714	1.441714786	0.015446939
		382	1	399	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		395	7	403	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		398	20	415	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		399	0	421	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		403	0	422	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		415	0	423	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		421	0	442	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		422	0	443	5	0	0.357142857	0	0.129285714	-0.018571429	0.016714796	0.000344898
		421	0	445	3	0	0.214285714	0	-0.013571429	-0.018571429	0.000194184	0.000344898
		423	0	456	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		442	0	465	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		443	5	471	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		445	0	474	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		456	0	479	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		465	0	484	7	0	0.5	0.5	0.272428571	-0.018571429	0.074061735	0.000344898
		471	0	511	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		474	0	522	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		479	0	530	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		484	0	531	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		511	7	535	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		522	0	546	1	0	0.071428571	0	-0.156428571	-0.018571429	0.002446988	0.000344898
		530	0	555	11	0	0.071428571	0.071428571	-0.156428571	0.052857143	0.024469888	0.002793878
		531	0	559	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		535	0	562	5	0	0.357142857	0	0.129285714	-0.018571429	0.016714796	0.000344898
		545	0	574	0	2	0	0.142857143	0.272428571	0.124285714	0.074061735	0.015446939
		546	1	580	1	1	0.071428571	0.071428571	-0.156428571	0.052857143	0.024469888	0.002793878
		555	17	582	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		559	0	589	19	0	1.357142857	0	1.120285714	-0.018571429	1.275286224	0.000344898
		562	5	605	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		578	0	612	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		580	1	616	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		582	0	617	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		589	19	632	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		605	0	634	19	0	1.357142857	0	1.120285714	-0.018571429	1.275286224	0.000344898
		612	0	640	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		616	0	641	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		617	0	645	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		632	0	660	7	0	0.5	0.5	0.272428571	-0.018571429	0.074061735	0.000344898
		634	19	663	8	1	0.571428571	0.071428571	0.343571429	0.052857143	0.118041327	0.002793878
		640	0	667	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		641	0	668	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		645	0	678	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		660	0	686	1	0	0.071428571	0	-0.156428571	-0.018571429	0.002446988	0.000344898
		661	0	689	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		663	7	704	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		667	0	705	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		668	0	714	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		678	0	729	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		686	1	730	1	0	0.071428571	0	-0.156428571	-0.018571429	0.002446988	0.000344898
		689	0	731	0	0	0.071428571	0	-0.156428571	-0.018571429	0.002446988	0.000344898
		704	0	735	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		705	0	741	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		714	0	760	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		729	0	776	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		730	1	787	0	0	0.428571429	0.071428571	0.272428571	0.124285714	0.074061735	0.015446939
		731	0	791	0	0	0.071428571	0.071428571	-0.156428571	0.052857143	0.024469888	0.002793878
		735	0	803	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		741	0	807	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143	-0.018571429	0.005198878	0.000344898
		750	0	818	0	0	0	0	-0.227857143</			

11.4.5.2 Ibbenbüren – R75 – Phase 2

643	113	2100	Saturday	16:07:37	5918	4815	1012.70	25086	25086	0	6871	6871	0	25086	6871	44	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA approaches Emergency landing site
650	26	2973	Saturday	08:19:22	6411	1029	2523.1	26024	26024	7	6433	6433	3	26024	6433	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
650	69	1124	Saturday	12:08:41	6607	3862	614.47	25229	25229	0	8428	8428	0	25229	8428	71	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
655	74	1534	Thursday	12:36:17	6213	4939	660.47	25065	25065	10	6362	6362	0	25065	6362	64	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
656	24	428	Sunday	08:16:19	6787	3150	272.20	27962	27962	0	3965	3965	0	27962	3965	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
662	97	3302	Thursday	14:43:03	6729	1071	871.75	25405	25405	0	6552	6552	0	25405	6552	38	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
673	43	1428	Sunday	09:48:48	6969	4738	381.36	25089	25089	0	6905	6905	0	25089	6905	65	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
675	105	983	Wednesday	15:22:45	6739	3355	247.66	24766	24766	10	7191	7191	3	24766	7191	82	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
679	105	983	Wednesday	15:22:45	6739	3355	247.66	24766	24766	10	7191	7191	3	24766	7191	82	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central ground impact point below flight path with BVG Ratio.
68	91	1434	Friday	14:07:53	6303	4751	813.14	24766	24766	0	7191	7191	0	24766	7191	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
682	132	2871	Wednesday	17:51:19	6312	2280	1185.53	23648	23648	0	8309	8309	0	23648	8309	31	Connection Failure	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
70	7	1713	Sunday	06:34:57	6072	6123	58.25	30518	30518	0	1439	1439	0	30518	1439	64	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
703	34	3523	Wednesday	09:03:23	6905	4201	305.64	26684	26684	1	5273	5273	1	26684	5273	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
732	48	1227	Thursday	10:15:30	6505	4001	424.83	25055	25055	0	6362	6362	0	25055	6362	32	Connection Failure	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
738	115	3360	Wednesday	16:20:18	6780	978	1033.83	23648	23648	1	8309	8309	0	23648	8309	62	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
738	115	3360	Wednesday	16:20:18	6780	978	1033.83	23648	23648	1	8309	8309	0	23648	8309	62	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA approaches Emergency landing site
745	12	460	Wednesday	07:00:16	7000	1956	100.44	28122	28122	0	3835	3835	0	28122	3835	46	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA ground impact in flight direction with deviating trajectory.
747	8	1459	Friday	06:39:57	6280	4803	66.61	26201	26201	0	3076	3076	0	26201	3076	70	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
749	98	1492	Sunday	14:45:45	6250	4867	876.25	23648	23648	0	8309	8309	0	23648	8309	29	Connection Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
755	130	1109	Tuesday	18:04:51	6622	3810	1208.11	23967	23967	0	7990	7990	0	23967	7990	4	Engine Out	Central ground impact point below flight path with BVG Ratio.
775	63	2902	Thursday	13:38:08	6342	2170	564.95	25055	25055	0	6362	6362	0	25055	6362	55	GCS Overide Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
779	22	2385	Sunday	07:56:53	5956	4115	184.81	30518	30518	0	1439	1439	0	30518	1439	8	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
779	29	2399	Tuesday	08:31:53	7051	1119	252.50	27163	27163	0	4794	4794	1	27163	4794	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
782	10	2308	Friday	06:52:02	5938	4291	86.72	28281	28281	13	3676	3676	1	28281	3676	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
786	147	3167	Tuesday	19:12:42	6602	1381	1321.19	25960	25960	0	2397	2397	0	25960	2397	41	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA approaches Emergency landing site
786	153	738	Thursday	17:53:30	6927	2459	1189.19	24287	24287	0	7670	7670	0	24287	7670	23	Generator Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
81	150	1384	Thursday	19:26:14	6342	4681	1343.75	29080	29080	0	2877	2877	0	29080	2877	68	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
815	34	1855	Wednesday	10:00:35	6114	5085	300.87	26684	26684	0	5273	5273	0	26684	5273	31	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
822	134	3588	Wednesday	18:03:10	6944	817	1205.30	23648	23648	0	8309	8309	0	23648	8309	57	GCS Overide Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
827	67	2487	Monday	11:59:56	6013	3701	599.89	26344	26344	0	5913	5913	0	26344	5913	75	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
836	100	3030	Wednesday	14:58:50	6467	1746	898.08	24766	24766	0	7191	7191	0	24766	7191	73	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
840	23	121	Sunday	07:58:54	7010	889	188.19	27962	27962	0	3995	3995	0	27962	3995	18	Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
842	141	2833	Tuesday	18:39:49	6276	2417	1286.39	23967	23967	6	7990	7990	2	23967	7990	64	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
858	66	2663	Thursday	11:54:48	6131	3081	591.33	25665	25665	0	6392	6392	0	25665	6392	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
861	26	550	Sunday	08:16:21	6768	3232	227.25	27962	27962	0	3965	3965	0	27962	3965	32	Connection Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
871	91	1956	Wednesday	14:07:19	6672	3623	812.20	24766	24766	0	7191	7191	0	24766	7191	72	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
885	50	3410	Wednesday	16:29:34	6821	914	449.28	25405	25405	0	6552	6552	0	25405	6552	19	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
886	152	220	Thursday	19:35:17	7040	1001	2098.0	29080	29080	0	2877	2877	0	29080	2877	17	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
892	94	181	Wednesday	14:22:09	7024	1022	839.94	24766	24766	0	7191	7191	0	24766	7191	66	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
894	116	3173	Friday	16:25:25	6608	1346	1042.56	23967	23967	0	7960	7960	2	23967	7960	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
895	33	1588	Saturday	08:55:04	6168	5013	291.81	26024	26024	0	5433	5433	0	26024	5433	38	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
896	98	3249	Tuesday	14:48:23	6681	1173	880.64	25086	25086	0	6871	6871	0	25086	6871	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
901	72	2464	Friday	12:26:53	6000	3782	644.81	26204	26204	0	5753	5753	0	26204	5753	40	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
906	7	2358	Wednesday	06:35:55	5954	4137	59.86	28122	28122	0	3835	3835	0	28122	3835	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
916	130	732	Saturday	17:37:18	6931	2417	1162.19	25086	25086	7	6871	6871	2	25086	6871	18	Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
918	108	3030	Monday	15:42:46	6913	825	971.31	24606	24606	0	7351	7351	0	24606	7351	31	Generator Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
92	112	608	Monday	15:59:59	6996	1962	999.67	22989	22989	0	8268	8268	0	22989	8268	60	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
93	76	1315	Tuesday	12:46:44	6419	4459	677.92	26044	26044	0	5913	5913	0	26044	5913	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
937	6	1911	Saturday	08:29:51	5964	5084	49.75	30538	30538	0	1119	1119	0	30538	1119	9	Engine Out	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
947	6	866	Tuesday	06:28:26	6754	3292	47.39	27962	27962	0	3995	3995	0	27962	3995	70	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
952	111	2885	Sunday	15:57:59	6255	2230	896.67	23648	23648	0	8309	8309	0	23648	8309	54	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillators)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
952	131	2469	Sunday	17:45:19	6003	3764	1175.53	23648	23648	0	8309	8309	0	23648	8309	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
953	106	2419	Monday	10:30:18	5978	3937	960.50	24606	24606	0	7351	7351	0	24606	7351	31	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
96	52	1101	Friday	10:36:53	6629	3783	481.50	26204	26204	6	5753	5753	0	26204	5753	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
966	103	1102	Sunday	15:12:09	6628	3786	920.25	23648	23648	0	8309	8309	0	23648	8309	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
972	122	2173	Saturday	15:56:17	5916	4666	1093.83	25086	25086	21	6871	6871	0	25086	6871	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
980	15	372	Sunday	07:16:06	7054	1298	108.86	30518	30518	2	1439	1439	0	30518	1439	9	Engine Out	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
982	12	2445	Tuesday	07:03:01	5991	3848	105.05	27962	27962	8	3995	3995	1	27962	3995	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
987	150	3440	Tuesday	19:29:18	6845	884	1348.86	28441	28441	2	3516	3516	0	28441	3516	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
989	147	785	Tuesday	19:09:00	6916	2502	1315.17	29660	29660	0	2397	2397	0	29660	2397	24	Generator Failure	Central UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
99	66	2963	Monday	11:50:14	6401	1962	592.08	26044	26044	0	5913	5913	0	26044	5913	31	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
996	11	1198	Tuesday	06:55:45	6335	4109	92.94	27962	27962	0	3995	3995	0	27962	3995	29	Connection Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site

	LADayProt	HIT_ATT	HIT_OTW	LADayProt cor	HIT_ATT_mean	HIT_OTW_mean	HIT_ATT_OTW	HIT_ATT_OTW/FH	HIT_ATT_OTW/FH	x_k_cross	ATB	x_k_cross	OTW	(x_k_cross-ATB)/OTW	(x_k_cross-OTW)/OTW
rPhobas	200	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
nEvents	203	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
nEvents_cor	190	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
nMisses	14	18	0	0	18	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
x_cross_ATB	1.035	0	0	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
x_cross_OTW	0.19	38	8	1	38	8	1	0.571428571	0.071428571	-0.463571429	-0.118571429	0.214898499	0.014099184		
x_cross_OTW	1.225	39	0	0	42	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
sATB	0.995992	41	0	0	41	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
sATB	0.995734	43	0	0	43	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
sATB	14.564529	46	0	0	46	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
sOTW	0.0333495	49	0	0	49	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
sOTW	0.181788	68	0	0	68	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
sOTW	14.00341	70	0	0	70	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
sTOT	1.3799102	81	0	0	81	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
sTOT	1.178992	92	0	0	92	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
sTOT	14.446604	93	0	0	93	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		96	6	3	96	6	3	0.428571429	0.214285714	-0.606428571	0.024285714	0.387755612	0.000589796		
		99	0	0	99	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		109	0	0	109	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		118	0	0	118	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		137	0	0	137	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		144	0	0	144	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		145	0	0	145	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		147	3	0	147	3	0	0.214285714	0	-0.820714286	-0.19	0.673571939	0.0361		
		148	0	0	148	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		156	0	0	156	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		158	2	0	158	2	0	0.142857143	0	-0.892142857	-0.19	0.795918878	0.0361		
		170	8	2	170	8	2	0.142857143	-0.192142857	-0.047142857	-0.19	0.795918878	0.00222449		
		172	0	0	172	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		174	0	0	174	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		175	0	0	175	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		182	0	0	182	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		191	0	0	191	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		211	0	0	211	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		231	11	0	231	11	0	0.785714286	-0.249285714	-0.19	-0.19	0.621433037	0.0361		
		258	0	0	258	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		263	0	0	263	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		264	0	0	264	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		278	0	0	278	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		283	0	0	283	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		284	2	1	284	2	1	0.142857143	0.071428571	-0.892142857	-0.118571429	0.795918878	0.014099184		
		292	0	0	292	0	0	0.142857143	-0.892142857	-0.19	-0.19	0.795918878	0.0361		
		295	0	0	295	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		309	0	0	309	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		322	0	0	322	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		321	0	0	321	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		327	0	0	327	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		331	0	0	331	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		333	0	0	333	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		334	0	0	334	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		337	26	0	337	26	0	1.857142857	0.822142857	-0.19	-0.19	0.795918878	0.0361		
		346	0	0	346	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		375	0	0	375	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		387	0	0	387	0	0	0.071428571	0.071428571	-0.963571429	-0.118571429	0.629469898	0.014099184		
		389	0	0	389	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		391	0	0	391	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		392	0	0	392	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		396	0	0	396	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		417	0	0	417	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		417	0	0	438	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		438	0	0	438	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		439	0	0	440	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		440	0	0	440	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		447	0	0	447	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		450	0	0	450	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		456	0	0	456	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		461	0	0	461	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		466	0	0	466	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		464	0	0	464	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		466	0	0	466	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		469	0	0	480	3	1	0.214285714	0.071428571	-0.820714286	-0.118571429	0.673571939	0.014099184		
		469	0	0	485	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		472	0	0	511	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		480	3	1	514	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		485	0	0	517	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		485	0	0	526	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		511	0	0	529	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		514	0	0	541	0	0	0.071428571	0	-0.963571429	-0.19	0.629469898	0.0361		
		543	0	0	543	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		545	0	0	545	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		529	0	0	572	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		529	0	0	585	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		541	1	0	594	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		543	0	0	607	1	1	0.071428571	0.071428571	-0.963571429	-0.118571429	0.629469898	0.014099184		
		545	0	1	610	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		607	0	0	656	10	2	0.714285714	0.142857143	-0.320714286	-0.047142857	0.10267653	0.00222449		
		617	0	0	662	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		643	0	0	673	0	0	0.714285714	0.214285714	-0.320714286	-0.047142857	0.10267653	0.000589796		
		675	7	3	675	10	3	0.714285714	0.214285714	-0.320714286	-0.047142857	0.10267653	0.014099184		
		650	11	0	679	0	0	0.714285714	0.214285714	-0.320714286	-0.047142857	0.10267653	0.014099184		
		655	10	2	682	0	0	0.714285714	0.214285714	-0.320714286	-0.047142857	0.10267653	0.014099184		
		658	0	0	703	1	1	0.071428571	0.071428571	-0.963571429	-0.118571429	0.629469898	0.014099184		
		662	0	0	732	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		673	0	0	738	1	0	0.071428571	0.071428571	-0.963571429	-0.118571429	0.629469898	0.0361		
		675	14	0	745	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		679	0	1	747	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		682	0	0	749	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		703	1	0	765	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		732	0	0	767	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		738	1	0	770	0	0	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.19	1.071225	0.0361	
		738	0	0	779										

11.4.6 Eberbach – R76

11.4.6.1 Eberbach – R76 – Phase 1

937	10	135	Saturday	07:38:52	4301	507	164.25	13649	13649	0	729	729	0	24747	24090	0	1032	1032	0	37920	1701	80	Separation of essential LA parts (tail or main wing)	LA structural disintegration - Debris impact
932	21	310	Sunday	08:40:25	3372	812	281.00	13047	13047	0	831	1331	0	20844	22293	0	2900	2900	0	32040	4466	40	Short Circuit / Overheat	Central LA ground impact point below Right path
970	02	2472	Thursday	14:20:46	2644	3170	634.04	11370	11370	0	3208	3208	0	39975	19930	0	5801	5801	0	31051	8000	40	Short Circuit / Overheat	Central LA ground impact point below Right path
975	06	2063	Thursday	13:04:36	2594	2714	530.72	11943	11943	0	2120	2120	0	39792	24338	0	5227	5227	0	32281	7922	24	Generator Failure	LA ground impact triggered by lightning
981	14	2017	Friday	16:21:38	2712	1446	5168.00	11443	11443	0	3126	3126	0	39720	18400	0	6100	6100	0	31000	8100	20	Corrosion Failure	LA ground impact triggered by lightning
988	104	1324	Monday	10:24:35	3710	3887	840.07	11297	11297	0	3281	3281	0	39840	19287	0	5920	5920	0	30084	8211	29	Corrosion Failure	LA approach Emergency landing site
990	10	1007	Thursday	10:10:26	4120	3046	630.70	11950	11950	0	3020	3020	0	39762	24463	0	5627	5627	0	32368	7922	24	Generator Failure	LA ground impact triggered by lightning
997	13	1883	Wednesday	07:08:23	2901	4402	114.00	12464	12464	0	2114	2114	0	25427	21942	0	3302	3302	0	34408	8460	70	Separation of essential LA parts (tail or main wing)	Central LA ground impact point below Right path

UADYProt	HIT_TOT_ATB	HIT_TOT_OTW	UADYProtCor	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB/H	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW/H	x_k_cross ATB	x_k_cross OTW	(x_k_cross ATB)^2	(x_k_cross OTW)^2
rProbes	1400	4	0	0	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
nEvents	191	0	0	8	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
nEvents_cor	178	0	0	22	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
nMission	14	0	9	37	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
x_cross_ATB	0.042857	27	4	66	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
x_cross_OTW	0.0262857	66	0	79	8	1	0.571428571	0.071428571	0.012142857	0.134793878	0.000147449
sATB	0.0242061	83	0	89	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sATB	0.232622	81	0	82	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sATB	31.224544	91	0	110	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sOTW	0.0041271	108	0	108	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sOTW	0.0042429	110	0	111	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sOTW	28.705171	111	7	134	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT	0.0832063	146	0	146	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT	0.2884002	148	0	155	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT	32.891102	155	0	156	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		150	0	173	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		180	0	189	0	1	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		173	0	189	0	1	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		189	0	192	14	1	0.071428571	0.071428571	0.012142857	0.833161224	0.000147449
sTOT		180	0	195	1	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		192	0	207	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		192	14	217	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		195	1	222	0	2	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		207	0	226	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		217	0	227	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		222	0	244	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		222	0	258	3	0	0.214285714	0.01	-0.09285714	1E-04	0.003514796
sTOT		226	0	277	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		227	0	282	0	0	0.124285714	0.156	-0.09285714	0.024025	0.003514796
sTOT		244	0	283	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		251	0	291	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		258	0	300	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		277	0	321	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		282	0	322	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		283	0	326	18	1	1.285714286	0.071428571	0.012142857	1.168487756	0.000147449
sTOT		291	0	330	9	2	0.842857143	0.142857143	0.438571429	0.03571429	0.006984184
sTOT		304	0	334	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		321	0	341	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		322	0	341	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		328	18	358	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		330	9	364	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		334	0	367	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		341	0	373	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		342	0	376	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		358	0	378	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		364	0	385	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		367	0	386	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		373	0	387	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		376	0	389	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		378	0	390	0	0	0.071428571	0.012142857	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.000147449
sTOT		385	0	396	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		386	0	398	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		387	0	402	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		389	0	408	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		393	0	412	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		393	0	414	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		396	0	415	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		402	0	417	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		402	0	417	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		408	0	432	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		412	0	435	0	0	0.142857143	0.156	-0.09285714	0.024025	0.003514796
sTOT		414	0	448	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		415	0	456	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		417	0	463	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		423	7	466	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		432	0	489	1	0	0.071428571	0.012142857	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		436	0	493	0	0	0.357142857	0.152857143	0.152857143	0.223536184	0.003514796
sTOT		448	0	505	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		452	0	517	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		463	0	519	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		468	0	526	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		489	0	541	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		503	5	543	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		505	0	556	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		517	0	558	0	0	0.071428571	0.012142857	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.000147449
sTOT		519	0	570	0	1	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		529	0	580	6	1	0.428571429	0.224285714	0.012142857	0.050340462	0.000147449
sTOT		535	0	581	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		541	0	587	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		553	0	600	12	5	0.857142857	0.357142857	0.652857143	0.271787143	0.088718878
sTOT		558	0	609	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		566	0	617	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		568	0	625	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		570	0	628	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		580	6	635	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		581	0	637	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		587	0	647	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		600	0	662	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		609	0	654	0	3	0.214285714	0.156	-0.09285714	0.024025	0.003514796
sTOT		617	0	656	0	4	0.285714286	0.224285714	0.012142857	0.051269888	0.003514796
sTOT		625	0	666	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		628	0	670	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		635	0	673	17	0	1.214285714	0.01	-0.09285714	0.1201	0.003514796
sTOT		637	0	677	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		647	0	691	0	0	0.214285714	0.156	-0.09285714	0.024025	0.003514796
sTOT		652	0	701	13	0	0.928571429	0.724285714	0.012142857	0.052489786	0.003514796
sTOT		652	0	730	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		656	0	746	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		656	0	746	16	1	1.142857143	0.071428571	0.012142857	0.880949327	0.000147449
sTOT		666	0	767	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714	0.041732653	0.003514796
sTOT		670	0	782	0	0	0	-0.204285714	-0.09285714		

11.4.6.2 Eberbach – R76 – Phase 2

O.R.C.U.S. D.00 - tTest of the Simulation

	UADayProt	HIT_TOT_ATB	HIT_TOT_OTW	UADayProt cor	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB/Fh	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW/Fh	x_i,x_cross_ATB	x_i,x_cross_OTW	(x_i,x_cross_ATB)^2	(x_i,x_cross_OTW)^2	
nProbes	200	23	0	0	23	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
nEvents	184	23	0	0	23	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
nEvents_cor	172	25	0	33	10	0	0.7142857143	-1.2607142857	-1.2607142857	-0.3735714286	1.5884051	0.13955612	
nMission	14	33	10	1	44	2	0.142857143	-1.832142857	-1.832142857	-0.445	3.356747449	0.198025	
x_cross_ATB	1.975	44	2	0	45	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
x_cross_OTW	0.445	47	0	0	47	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
x_cross_TOT	2.42	47	0	0	48	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
s2ATB	3.706184	48	0	0	57	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
sATB	1.9251452	57	0	0	68	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
iATB	14.434909	68	0	0	76	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
s2OTW	0.1817929	66	0	0	82	21	1.5	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
sOTW	0.4263715	86	21	0	88	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
iOTW	14.428331	88	0	0	100	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
s2TOT	5.4319824	109	0	0	109	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
sTOT	2.3306614	109	0	0	114	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
iTOT	14.623552	114	0	0	117	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		129	0	0	139	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		138	0	0	140	16	6	1.142857143	0.428571429	-0.832142857	-0.016428571	0.692461735	0.000269898
		140	16	6	143	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		143	0	0	145	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		145	0	0	156	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		158	0	0	170	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		170	0	0	178	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		170	0	0	204	9	4	0.642857143	0.285714286	-1.332142857	-0.159285714	1.774604592	0.025371939
		178	0	0	207	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		204	9	4	214	2	0	0.142857143	-1.832142857	-1.832142857	-0.445	3.356747449	0.198025
		207	0	0	219	3	0	0.214285714	-1.760714286	-1.760714286	-0.445	3.100174796	0.198025
		214	2	0	225	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		219	3	0	236	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		225	0	0	242	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		236	0	0	305	64	1	4.571428571	0.071428571	2.596428571	-0.373571429	6.74441327	0.13955612
		242	0	0	307	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		305	64	0	308	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		307	0	0	317	0	2	0.142857143	-1.975	-3.02142857	-3.02142857	0.091290306	0.198025
		308	0	0	325	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		317	0	0	333	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		317	0	2	339	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		325	0	0	348	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		333	0	0	353	0	0	0.642857143	-1.975	-0.197857143	-0.197857143	0.03947449	0.198025
		339	0	0	359	0	1	0.071428571	-1.975	-3.373571429	-3.373571429	0.13955612	0.198025
		348	0	0	366	52	0	3.714285714	1.739285714	-1.739285714	-0.445	3.025174796	0.198025
		353	0	0	368	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		353	0	0	382	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		359	0	1	389	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		368	0	0	397	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		368	0	0	412	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		382	0	0	417	12	1	0.857142857	0.071428571	-1.17857143	-0.373571429	1.249604592	0.13955612
		389	0	0	430	5	0	0.357142857	-1.617857143	-1.617857143	-0.445	2.617481735	0.198025
		397	0	0	433	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		412	0	0	458	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		412	0	0	463	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		417	0	0	471	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		430	5	0	480	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		433	0	0	503	0	0	0.214285714	-1.975	-2.230714286	-2.230714286	0.053229082	0.198025
		458	0	0	516	0	3	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		463	0	0	517	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		471	0	0	522	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		480	0	0	525	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		503	0	0	526	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		516	0	0	538	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		517	0	0	544	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		522	0	0	547	24	3	1.714285714	0.214285714	-0.260714286	-0.230714286	0.069791939	0.053229082
		525	0	0	558	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		526	0	0	561	1	0	0.071428571	-1.975	-3.373571429	-3.373571429	0.13955612	0.198025
		538	0	0	564	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		544	0	0	572	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		547	0	0	579	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		558	0	0	582	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		561	0	1	588	5	0	0.357142857	-1.617857143	-1.617857143	-0.445	2.617481735	0.198025
		564	0	0	591	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		572	0	0	603	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		576	0	0	623	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		579	0	0	633	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		582	0	0	639	12	1	0.857142857	0.071428571	-1.17857143	-0.373571429	1.249604592	0.13955612
		588	5	0	648	5	1	0.357142857	0.071428571	-1.617857143	-0.373571429	2.617481735	0.13955612
		601	0	0	648	24	9	1.714285714	0.142857143	-0.260714286	-0.302142857	0.069791939	0.091290306
		603	0	0	670	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		623	0	0	673	6	2	0.428571429	0.142857143	-1.546428571	-0.302142857	2.391441327	0.091290306
		633	0	0	678	0	0	0.357142857	-1.617857143	-1.617857143	-0.445	2.617481735	0.198025
		639	12	1	682	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		646	5	1	692	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		648	24	9	694	0	0	0.428571429	-1.975	-0.016428571	-0.016428571	0.000269898	0.198025
		670	0	0	696	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		673	6	2	701	0	5	0.357142857	-1.975	-0.087857143	-0.087857143	0.007718878	0.198025
		678	0	0	709	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		682	0	0	715	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		682	0	0	729	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		694	0	0	741	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		696	0	0	748	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		701	0	5	760	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		709	0	0	781	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		715	0	0	788	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		729	0	0	793	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		741	0	0	814	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		748	0	0	825	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		761	0	0	830	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		773	0	0	833	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		788	0	0	841	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		793	0	0	845	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		814	0	0	873	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		825	0	0	898	10	2	0.714285714	0.142857143	-1.260714286	-0.302142857	1.5884051	0.091290306
		830	0	0	900	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		833	0	0	905	0	2	0.142857143	-1.975	-3.02142857	-3.02142857	0.091290306	0.198025
		841	0	0	908	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		845	0	0	914	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		873	0	0	917	0	0	0	-1.975	-0.445	3.90625	0.198025	
		888	10	2	918	0	0	0.785714286					

11.4.7 Georgensgmünd – R77

11.4.7.1 Georgensgmünd – R77 – Phase 1

D.R.C.U.S. 02-00 - Simulation Summary

Table with columns: File, Run, Date, Time, Location, Status, and various numerical data points. Includes sub-sections for LA Parameters, V-Restrict, P_Coverage, General use parameters, City, County, MS, PMS, and Special Files.

Case ID: 1234567890
Case Name: Project Phoenix - Phase 1
Case Description: This case simulates the impact of proposed development on the local environment. It includes detailed data on air quality, noise, and traffic patterns. The simulation was conducted using advanced modeling software to predict future conditions under various scenarios.

941	45	550	Wednesday	10:23:00	7890	1725	438.50	5544	5544	0	1136	1136	0	6268	6268	0	1330	1330	0	11812	2460	23	Generator Failure	Central LA ground impact point below flight path
946	62	1420	Wednesday	12:05:00	7065	4860	693.75	5544	5544	0	1136	1136	0	6268	6268	0	1330	1330	0	11812	2460	27	Sheet Circuit / Overload	Central LA ground impact point below flight path
950	30	2240	Wednesday	03:26:30	6307	4400	264.19	5511	5511	0	890	890	0	6420	6420	0	1176	1176	0	12231	2047	20	Connection Failure	LA approaches Emergency landing site
971	72	2270	Friday	13:15:15	6485	2370	725.14	5170	5170	0	1297	1297	0	5774	5774	0	1624	1624	0	10864	2364	16	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central LA ground impact point below flight path
971	28	846	Friday	0:25:26	7495	2000	104.17	4918	4918	0	1804	1704	0	5900	5900	0	1638	1638	0	10836	2462	18	Timing error/issue to the flight control software (Clock/reset)	Central LA ground impact point below flight path
979	104	1918	Saturday	16:16:51	6488	5143	1026.19	5243	5243	0	1437	1437	0	5904	5904	0	1634	1634	0	11307	2071	05	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	LA approaches Emergency landing site
985	29	498	Saturday	09:47:31	6923	1387	279.29	5679	5679	0	1663	1663	0	6305	6305	0	1265	1265	0	11964	2364	14	Degradation of altitude	Central LA ground impact point below flight path
986	66	3151	Saturday	12:32:27	7135	1277	654.11	4876	4876	0	1804	1804	0	5304	5304	0	2204	2204	0	10270	4008	79	Degradation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central LA ground impact point below flight path
991	127	985	Thursday	16:32:24	7899	3367	1024.03	4976	4976	0	1954	1704	0	6600	6600	0	1638	1638	0	10636	2462	17	Sheet Circuit / Overload	Central LA ground impact point below flight path
997	109	2165	Wednesday	16:47:09	6362	4651	1078.58	4943	4943	0	1737	1737	0	5660	5660	0	1938	1938	0	10903	2675	37	Sheet Circuit / Overload	Central LA ground impact point below flight path

11.4.7.2 Georgensgmünd – R77 – Phase 2

918	113	492	Tuesday	17:08:30	8922	1511	1113.64	5910	5910	0	1670	1670	0	5736	5736	0	1862	1862	0	10746	3332	59	OCIS Override Wrong comments to the right control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
925	108	3268	Monday	16:43:28	7756	398	1027.47	4876	4876	0	1864	1864	0	5736	5736	0	1862	1862	0	10812	3366	58	OCIS Override Wrong comments to the right control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
926	125	2720	Monday	19:22:05	6885	2737	128.22	6112	6112	0	588	588	0	6914	6914	0	694	694	0	13206	1232	20	Connection Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
92	72	1828	Tuesday	13:10:13	8585	3267	251.11	5243	5243	0	1437	1437	0	6922	6922	0	1566	1566	0	11245	2032	72	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
965	18	178	Monday	18:41:15	5828	5228	131.35	8112	8112	0	588	588	0	6918	6918	0	694	694	0	13206	1232	20	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
968	85	198	Saturday	14:20:51	7828	784	824.75	5277	5277	0	1403	1403	0	5850	5850	0	1748	1748	0	11127	3151	83	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
972	35	2098	Saturday	09:44:29	4306	4954	273.21	5679	5679	0	1093	1092	1	6306	6306	0	1290	1290	0	11984	2384	81	Degradation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural disintegration - Debris Impact
972	49	1491	Saturday	15:46:19	7132	4776	977.11	5277	5277	0	1403	1403	1	5850	5850	0	1748	1748	0	11127	3151	83	Degradation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural disintegration - Debris Impact
976	109	1511	Wednesday	16:22:12	6847	3923	1023.05	4963	4963	0	1737	1737	0	6950	6950	0	1026	1026	0	10653	2979	18	Engine anomaly.	Central ground impact point below flight path with I/O Fluo.
980	8	2720	Wednesday	08:48:10	6885	2781	76.97	5977	5977	0	1103	1103	0	6972	6972	0	1026	1026	0	12749	3129	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact longitudinal to trajectory
985	24	3348	Wednesday	05:22:37	7487	736	237.69	5911	5911	0	899	899	0	6420	6420	0	1178	1178	0	12231	2047	78	Degradation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
994	104	118	Sunday	16:13:55	7872	678	1023.22	5043	5043	0	1637	1637	0	5646	5646	0	2052	2052	0	10989	3689	85	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site

UADayProt	HIT_TOT_ATB	HIT_TOT_OTW	UADayProt cor	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB/Ph	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW/Ph	x_i-x_cross ATB	x_i-x_cross OTW	(x_i-x_cross ATB)^2	(x_i-x_cross OTW)^2			
rProbes	200	0	0	5	0	0	0	0.357142857	0	-0.272857143	-0.27	0.07445102	0.0729	
nEvents	196	0	0	27	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
nEvents_cor	181	0	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
MissIon	14	0	0	32	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
x_cross_ATB	0.63	0	0	36	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
x_cross_OTW	0.27	0	0	50	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
x_cross_TOT	0.9	0	0	53	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
sATB	0.3713424	0	0	54	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
sATB	0.6038797	0	0	70	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
iATB	14.386626	0	0	90	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
sOTW	0.0664916	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
sOTW	0.2578597	0	0	93	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
iOTW	14.259517	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
sTOT	0.7392575	0	0	116	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
sTOT	0.8598003	0	0	123	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
iTOT	14.638856	0	0	149	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				150	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				151	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				154	3	3	3	0.214285714	-0.415714286	-0.055714286	0.172818367	0.003104082	0.0729	
				151	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				154	3	3	3	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				158	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				161	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				181	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				188	0	0	0	0.428571429	0.214285714	-0.201428571	-0.055714286	0.040573469	0.003104082	
				199	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				200	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				206	0	0	0	0.071428571	-0.83	-0.198571429	0.3969	0.039430612	0.0729	
				213	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				220	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				222	0	1	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				241	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				252	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				254	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				256	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				262	0	0	0	0.285714286	0.071428571	-0.344285714	-0.198571429	0.18532653	0.039430612	
				269	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				275	4	4	4	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				276	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				292	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				296	0	312	0	0.071428571	0.285714286	-0.558571429	0.015714286	0.000246939	0.0729	
				307	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				310	0	0	0	0.285714286	-0.344285714	-0.198571429	0.18532653	0.039430612	0.0729	
				312	1	4	367	1	0.071428571	-0.558571429	-0.198571429	0.312020241	0.0729	0.0729
				312	0	0	0	0.071428571	-0.558571429	-0.198571429	0.312020241	0.039430612	0.0729	
				338	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				338	4	1	380	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				367	1	1	406	15	1.071428571	0.214285714	0.441428571	-0.055714286	0.19469114	0.003104082
				374	1	1	406	0	0.5	-0.13	-0.110169	0.039430612	0.0729	
				379	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				380	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				400	15	3	434	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				405	7	1	438	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				406	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				410	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				410	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				423	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				434	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				438	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				439	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				540	0	0	0	0.071428571	-0.558571429	-0.27	0.312020241	0.0729	0.0729	
				545	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				478	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				482	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				488	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				501	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				503	1	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				508	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				513	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				524	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				529	0	0	0	0.142857143	-0.83	-0.127142857	0.3969	0.016185306	0.0729	
				533	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				538	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				548	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				551	0	0	0	0.071428571	-0.83	-0.198571429	0.3969	0.039430612	0.0729	
				551	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				553	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				556	2	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				560	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				568	0	0	0	0.071428571	-0.558571429	-0.27	0.312020241	0.0729	0.0729	
				570	0	1	639	10	0.071428571	0.084285714	-0.198571429	0.007104082	0.039430612	0.0729
				576	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				577	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				592	0	0	0	0.214285714	-0.83	-0.055714286	0.3969	0.003104082	0.0729	
				597	0	0	0	0.285714286	-0.344285714	-0.198571429	0.3969	0.000246939	0.0729	
				606	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				611	0	0	0	0.214285714	-0.415714286	-0.055714286	0.172818367	0.003104082	0.0729	
				639	10	1	669	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				645	0	0	0	0.071428571	-0.83	-0.198571429	0.3969	0.039430612	0.0729	
				651	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				653	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				654	0	0	0	0.428571429	-0.201428571	-0.055714286	0.040573469	0.003104082	0.0729	
				660	0	3	727	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				661	0	0	0	0.142857143	-0.83	-0.127142857	0.3969	0.016185306	0.0729	
				665	4	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				669	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				669	0	0	0	0.214285714	-0.415714286	-0.055714286	0.172818367	0.003104082	0.0729	
				684	1	795	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				692	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				704	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				715	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				726	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				727	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				728	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				731	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				745	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				750	0	0	0	0.214285714	-0.415714286	-0.055714286	0.172818367	0.003104082	0.0729	
				756	1	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				764	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				779	0	0	0	0.071428571	-0.83	-0.198571429	0.3969	0.039430612	0.0729	
				784	0	0	0	0	0	-0.83	-0.27	0.3969	0.0729	
				798	0	0	0	0.285714286	-					

11.4.8 Frankfurt am Main – C1

11.4.8.1 Frankfurt am Main – C1 – Phase 1

676	271	3054	Thursday	18:46:17	7237	3458	1277.17	146804	146804	0	54298	54298	0	146804	54298	47	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA ground impact in flight direction with deviating trajectory.
682	281	1325	Wednesday	19:13:14	7204	2002	1322.93	180991	180991	40	20111	20111	4	180991	20111	61	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
684	188	2073	Friday	14:50:42	7176	1751	884.50	153843	153843	0	47259	47259	0	153843	47259	16	Engine Anomaly	Central ground impact point below flight path with BVG Ratio
696	109	1536	Tuesday	11:06:46	7045	1745	911.28	166914	166914	1	34188	34188	0	166914	34188	33	Connection Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
695	125	431	Tuesday	11:51:10	7220	3638	1669.14	166914	166914	0	34188	34188	0	166914	34188	66	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
697	264	3145	Thursday	18:26:33	7223	3600	1244.29	146804	146804	0	54298	54298	2	146804	54298	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
712	240	518	Friday	17:16:35	7055	3098	1127.67	152837	152837	0	48265	48265	2	152837	48265	24	Generator Failure	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
717	188	567	Wednesday	14:49:31	6997	3427	882.53	158870	158870	0	42232	42232	0	158870	42232	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
719	291	910	Friday	19:41:11	6969	2168	1368.67	180990	180990	0	20111	20111	0	180990	20111	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
721	34	2780	Sunday	07:35:33	7280	2845	169.25	198085	198085	3	3017	3017	0	198085	3017	16	Engine Anomaly	Central ground impact point below flight path with BVG Ratio
725	233	1659	Thursday	17:03:21	7074	1658	1105.58	146804	146804	2	54298	54298	0	146804	54298	9	Engine Out	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
731	108	2845	Wednesday	11:04:57	7257	3075	608.28	168925	168925	0	32177	32177	0	168925	32177	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
731	116	745	Wednesday	11:25:57	6977	3100	543.25	168925	168925	0	32177	32177	0	168925	32177	5	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
731	7	2470	Wednesday	06:18:55	7246	2329	31.23	179986	179986	0	21116	21116	0	179986	21116	78	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
737	64	2723	Tuesday	09:02:22	7261	2830	300.64	164903	164903	0	36199	36199	0	164903	36199	3	Engine Out	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
738	108	1764	Wednesday	11:04:07	7100	1625	506.86	168925	168925	1	32177	32177	0	168925	32177	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
739	151	735	Thursday	13:04:57	6977	3119	708.28	155854	155854	1	45248	45248	0	155854	45248	33	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
780	45	2354	Wednesday	08:09:09	7231	2123	213.28	163898	163898	58	37204	37204	7	163898	37204	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
781	295	316	Thursday	18:52:03	7044	3778	1386.78	176969	176969	2	24133	24133	1	176969	24133	62	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
784	191	1897	Sunday	14:59:02	7133	1638	898.42	142782	142782	0	58320	58320	2	142782	58320	9	Engine Out	Central UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
785	61	1541	Monday	09:52:57	7046	1740	284.84	164903	164903	74	36199	36199	3	164903	36199	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
803	222	3394	Friday	16:27:55	7172	3874	1048.56	152837	152837	0	48265	48265	0	152837	48265	10	Engine Anomaly	UA approaches Emergency landing site
810	74	400	Friday	09:26:51	7028	3079	344.75	165909	165909	0	35193	35193	0	165909	35193	78	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
819	38	2599	Sunday	07:41:03	7257	2979	168.44	198085	198085	0	3017	3017	0	198085	3017	66	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
827	155	3259	Monday	13:18:16	7202	3748	730.44	155854	155854	0	45248	45248	0	155854	45248	40	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
83	285	1621	Saturday	19:36:06	7064	1978	1360.17	180991	180991	2	20111	20111	0	180991	20111	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
831	290	2305	Friday	19:39:28	7223	2044	1363.78	180991	180991	30	20111	20111	7	180991	20111	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
833	155	469	Sunday	13:44:22	7013	3083	773.84	142782	142782	0	58320	58320	0	142782	58320	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
839	265	298	Saturday	18:27:07	7055	3628	1245.22	156859	156859	0	44243	44243	0	156859	44243	70	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
85	233	1649	Monday	16:57:41	7071	1663	1058.14	146804	146804	0	54298	54298	0	146804	54298	78	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
879	195	1027	Thursday	15:09:40	6972	2633	916.14	155854	155854	2	45248	45248	0	155854	45248	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
882	111	3327	Monday	11:13:49	7167	3619	923.06	164903	164903	48	36199	36199	0	164903	36199	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
902	1507	2007	Saturday	15:26:36	7161	1696	747.67	152837	152837	0	48265	48265	0	152837	48265	75	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
930	104	2379	Saturday	10:53:16	7235	2185	488.81	143787	143787	54	57315	57315	5	143787	57315	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
933	185	1420	Tuesday	14:53:00	7021	1871	888.36	156859	156859	0	44243	44243	0	156859	44243	50	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
935	262	1120	Thursday	18:19:18	6978	2353	1232.19	146804	146804	0	54298	54298	0	146804	54298	78	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
941	194	3397	Wednesday	15:08:42	7171	3876	914.53	158870	158870	33	42232	42232	11	158870	42232	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
943	142	1558	Friday	12:40:08	7050	1728	666.92	165909	165909	0	35193	35193	0	165909	35193	29	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
948	285	1494	Wednesday	10:24:40	7036	1786	1341.14	180991	180991	0	20111	20111	0	180991	20111	75	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
954	69	692	Tuesday	09:12:56	6981	2092	321.56	164903	164903	0	36199	36199	0	164903	36199	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
957	163	946	Friday	13:39:04	6970	2985	765.14	153843	153843	0	47259	47259	0	153843	47259	71	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
957	278	1012	Friday	19:04:28	6971	2063	1307.50	180991	180991	44	20111	20111	2	180991	20111	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
963	3	1474	Thursday	06:06:49	7031	1807	11.35	179880	179880	4	22122	22122	0	179880	22122	78	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
967	88	2157	Monday	19:35:07	7195	1839	460.22	164903	164903	0	36199	36199	0	164903	36199	70	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
97	138	1177	Saturday	12:28:31	6983	2248	647.56	143787	143787	0	57315	57315	16	143787	57315	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
982	39	961	Tuesday	07:48:16	6970	2665	180.45	177975	177975	37	23127	23127	6	177975	23127	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
988	18	3	Wednesday	06:48:05	7120	3090	80.17	179986	179986	0	21116	21116	0	179986	21116	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path

	UADayProt	HIT_TOT_ATB	HIT_TOT_OTW	UADayProt cor	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB/Fh	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW/Fh	x_j-x_cross ATB	x_j-x_cross OTW	(x_j-x_cross ATB)^2	(x_j-x_cross OTW)^2		
rProbes	1400	3	10	29	10	29	10	29	2.071428571	0.714285714	1.121428571	0.534285714	1.238861224	0.285481224
nEvents	188	12	0	12	0	12	0	12	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
nEvents_cor	176	40	0	40	0	40	0	40	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
lMision	14	83	2	0	83	2	0	0	0.142857143	0	-0.816428571	-0.18	0.66655612	0.0324
x_cross_ATB	0.959285714	85	0	85	0	85	0	85	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
x_cross_OTW	0.18	97	16	0	97	16	0	16	1.142857143	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
x_cross_TOT	1.139285714	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
s2ATB	1.02939032	110	2	110	0	110	0	110	0.142857143	0	-0.816428571	-0.18	0.66655612	0.0324
sATB	1.014563469	129	21	15	129	21	15	15	1.071428571	0.540714286	0.891428571	0.292371939	0.794844988	0.0324
sATB_cor	35.00916418	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	4.142857143	0	-0.816428571	-0.18	0.66655612	0.0324
sOTW	0.036828347	147	0	147	0	147	0	147	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
sOTW_cor	0.191807131	159	0	159	0	159	0	159	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
OTW	33.14429691	166	1	1	166	1	0	0	0.071428571	0	-0.959285714	-0.108571429	0.920229082	0.011787755
sTOT	1.414538081	172	0	172	0	172	0	172	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
sTOT_cor	1.89343551	172	0	172	0	172	0	172	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
tTOT	35.52716314	180	0	180	0	180	0	180	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		181	0	181	0	181	0	181	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		182	0	182	0	182	0	182	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		192	0	192	0	192	0	192	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		222	0	222	2	222	2	222	0.142857143	0.428571429	-0.816428571	-0.18	0.66655612	0.061787755
		226	0	226	0	226	0	226	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		228	2	5	237	0	0	0	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		227	0	237	0	237	0	237	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		237	0	243	36	1	1	1	2.571428571	1.511428571	-0.816428571	-0.108571429	2.28904592	0.011787755
		239	0	245	53	7	7	7	3.785714286	0.5	2.826428571	0.32	7.98898469	0.1024
		243	0	252	0	252	0	252	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		243	36	1	252	0	0	0	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		245	53	7	256	0	0	0	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		252	0	260	0	260	0	260	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		252	0	264	0	264	0	264	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		256	0	270	0	270	0	270	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		260	0	276	0	276	0	276	0.071428571	0	-0.887857143	-0.18	0.788290306	0.0324
		264	0	278	0	278	0	278	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		270	0	277	14	14	14	14	1	0.040714286	0.82	0.011657653	0.6724	
		275	1	4	280	0	0	0	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		276	0	286	0	286	0	286	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		277	14	14	300	0	2	0	0.142857143	-0.959285714	-0.037142857	0.920229082	0.001379592	0.0324
		280	0	302	0	302	0	302	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		300	0	304	0	304	0	304	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		300	2	323	0	323	0	323	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		302	0	329	0	329	0	329	0.071428571	-0.959285714	-0.108571429	0.920229082	0.011787755	0.0324
		304	0	330	0	330	0	330	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		323	0	336	0	336	0	336	0.071428571	-0.887857143	-0.18	0.788290306	0.0324	
		330	0	336	0	336	0	336	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		333	0	344	0	344	0	344	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		335	1	351	0	351	0	351	0.142857143	-0.816428571	-0.18	0.66655612	0.0324	
		336	0	359	0	359	0	359	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		344	0	400	0	400	0	400	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		351	2	403	0	403	0	403	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		359	0	410	0	410	0	410	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		400	0	415	0	415	0	415	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		400	0	416	-0.745	0	4	0	0.214285714	-0.959285714	0.105714286	0.920229082	0.01117551	0.0324
		403	0	427	0	427	0	427	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		410	0	428	0	428	0	428	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		415	4	433	48	48	11	11	3.428571429	0.071428571	-2.469285714	-0.108571429	6.973711939	0.011787755
		416	3	444	0	444	0	444	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		427	0	459	0	459	0	459	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		426	0	469	90	2	2	2	6.428571429	0.142857143	5.469285714	-0.037142857	29.91508822	0.001379592
		433	48	1	472	41	4	4	2.928571429	0.285714286	1.969285714	0.105714286	3.87896224	0.01117551
		444	0	484	50	50	0	0	3.571428571	0.285714286	2.114285714	0.005714286	8.82239036	0.386869796
		459	0	476	0	476	0	476	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		469	90	2	490	0	0	0	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		471	4	495	4	495	0	495	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		474	50	11	514	0	0	0	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		476	0	522	0	522	0	522	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		490	0	531	0	531	0	531	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		495	0	560	0	560	21	21	1.5	-0.959285714	1.32	0.920229082	1.7424	0.0324
		514	0	563	0	563	0	563	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		522	0	562	0	562	0	562	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		531	0	568	45	14	2	2	3.214285714	1	2.255	0.82	5.080525	0.0324
		560	21	584	0	584	0	584	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		563	0	593	0	593	0	593	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		564	0	594	0	594	0	594	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		568	45	14	604	0	0	0	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		584	0	604	0	604	0	604	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		584	0	606	62	3	3	3	4.428571429	0.214285714	3.469285714	0.034285714	12.05984337	0.00117551
		596	0	664	1	664	0	664	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		603	0	671	51	5	5	5	3.642857143	0.357142857	2.683571429	0.177142857	7.20155612	0.001379592
		604	0	672	0	672	0	672	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		606	62	676	0	676	0	676	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		664	0	682	40	4	0	0	2.857142857	0.285714286	1.897857143	0.105714286	3.80181735	0.01117551
		671	51	604	0	604	0	604	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		672	0	692	0	692	0	692	0.071428571	0	-0.887857143	-0.18	0.788290306	0.0324
		676	0	697	0	697	0	697	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		682	40	703	0	703	0	703	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		684	0	717	0	717	0	717	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		695	1	719	0	719	0	719	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		695	0	721	0	721	0	721	0.214285714	-0.745	0	0.55025	0.0324	
		697	2	725	2	725	2	725	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		712	0	731	0	731	0	731	0	0	-0.959285714	-0.18	0.920229082	0.0324
		725	2	730	0	730	0	730	0.0714					

11.4.8.2 Frankfurt am Main – C1 – Phase 2

630	8	800	Sunday	06:20:28	6973	2991	34.06	198085	0	3017	3017	0	198085	3017	24	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
632	261	649	Tuesday	18:16:07	6986	3282	1208.86	143787	0	67315	67315	0	143787	17	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path	
675	42	2333	Wednesday	07:57:49	7228	2088	186.39	179986	0	21116	21116	0	179986	21116	31	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
676	48	185	Wednesday	09:15:56	7075	3890	226.58	163898	0	37204	37204	0	163898	37204	16	Engine Anomaly	Central ground impact point below flight path with BG Ratio
682	177	727	Wednesday	12:25:21	6979	3135	642.26	168825	1	32177	32177	0	168825	32177	54	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
684	176	3362	Friday	14:14:55	7179	3850	824.89	153843	1	47259	47259	0	153843	47259	78	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
693	68	2426	Sunday	09:11:28	7241	2048	319.11	179986	0	21116	21116	0	179986	21116	72	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
7	88	1893	Sunday	10:07:37	7152	1637	412.72	152837	0	48265	48265	0	152837	48265	74	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
709	98	26	Tuesday	19:29:47	7115	3849	448.00	166914	0	34188	34188	0	166914	34188	72	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
71	191	3467	Monday	15:00:17	7155	3918	900.47	155854	1	45248	45248	0	155854	45248	73	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
71	214	1592	Monday	16:03:52	7058	1899	1026.47	148504	0	54288	54288	0	148504	54288	59	GCS Overide Wiring commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
710	61	2411	Wednesday	08:51:39	7239	2221	286.08	163898	0	37204	37204	0	163898	37204	33	Connection Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
721	66	719	Sunday	09:04:28	6979	3150	307.44	179986	0	21116	21116	0	179986	21116	58	GCS Overide Wiring commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
723	102	798	Tuesday	10:46:22	6973	2993	1699.14	169914	0	34188	34188	0	169914	34188	30	Connection Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
726	91	2927	Friday	10:16:56	7252	3233	428.22	165909	0	35193	35193	0	165909	35193	4	Engine Out	Central ground impact point below flight path with BG Ratio
734	98	3038	Saturday	19:31:10	7239	3431	451.95	143787	1	67315	67315	0	143787	67315	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
751	191	2788	Tuesday	14:59:45	7200	2961	899.58	156859	0	44243	44243	0	156859	44243	51	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA approaches Emergency landing site
754	52	3584	Friday	06:27:07	7123	3650	245.18	166909	9	36193	36193	12	166909	36193	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
757	97	2725	Monday	10:33:45	7261	2834	456.25	164603	0	36199	36199	0	164603	36199	34	Connection Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
76	61	311	Saturday	08:49:59	7045	3784	283.33	178980	0	22122	22122	0	178980	22122	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
766	225	2620	Thursday	16:35:49	7258	2931	1039.69	146604	0	54288	54288	0	146604	54288	88	Generator Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
761	292	2638	Friday	17:52:13	7259	2658	1187.03	152837	65	48265	48265	5	152837	48265	82	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
772	292	300	Tuesday	18:43:32	7048	3795	1372.93	179986	5	21116	21116	0	179986	21116	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
773	22	88	Wednesday	06:59:29	7099	3636	89.14	179986	0	21116	21116	0	179986	21116	6	Engine Out	UA approaches Emergency landing site
777	299	3598	Sunday	18:40:28	7122	3650	1307.47	177975	0	23127	23127	0	177975	23127	45	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
777	61	3226	Sunday	09:09:15	7208	3769	316.44	179986	0	21116	21116	0	179986	21116	58	GCS Overide Wiring commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
777	71	2060	Sunday	09:19:40	7173	1739	332.79	179986	5	21116	21116	0	179986	21116	82	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
780	270	547	Wednesday	18:41:30	7000	3461	1269.17	144793	0	56269	56269	0	144793	56269	1	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
809	77	2875	Thursday	09:37:16	7256	3133	362.14	165909	3	35193	35193	0	165909	35193	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
825	34	3885	Saturday	07:36:10	7125	3849	160.30	196074	0	5028	5028	0	196074	5028	60	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
83	21	422	Saturday	06:56:55	7022	3650	84.88	186074	0	5028	5028	0	186074	5028	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
831	112	2948	Friday	11:16:19	7253	3197	827.22	166909	0	35193	35193	0	166909	35193	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
842	162	1429	Tuesday	15:36:38	7052	1860	761.06	156859	0	44243	44243	0	156859	44243	65	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
847	158	3232	Sunday	13:29:44	7207	3716	744.56	142782	0	58320	58320	0	142782	58320	59	GCS Overide Wiring commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
863	81	2090	Tuesday	09:47:58	7160	1787	379.97	164903	25	36198	36198	0	164903	36198	20	Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
870	198	205	Tuesday	16:11:51	7070	3877	919.78	156859	0	44243	44243	0	156859	44243	57	GCS Overide Wiring commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
874	91	3457	Saturday	19:17:21	7157	3913	428.92	143787	0	67315	67315	0	143787	67315	70	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
887	206	660	Tuesday	15:40:30	6985	3262	967.53	156859	22	44243	44243	16	156859	44243	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
888	20	2262	Saturday	06:55:32	7216	1879	162.56	186074	7	5028	5028	0	186074	5028	74	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
891	114	2948	Friday	11:16:19	7253	3197	827.22	166909	0	35193	35193	0	166909	35193	68	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
901	293	2299	Friday	19:47:57	7222	2034	1379.92	180991	2	20111	20111	0	180991	20111	62	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
903	88	3441	Sunday	10:08:50	7161	3004	414.76	152837	3	48265	48265	0	152837	48265	9	Engine Out	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
903	91	721	Sunday	10:15:11	7229	3146	423.33	152837	46	48265	48265	10	152837	48265	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
91	240	2833	Sunday	17:18:10	7253	2449	1130.31	148815	1	52287	52287	0	148815	52287	14	Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
921	157	1127	Thursday	13:22:14	6978	2339	737.08	155854	2	45248	45248	0	155854	45248	71	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
947	27	1810	Tuesday	07:14:58	7111	1622	124.97	177975	0	23127	23127	0	177975	23127	10	Engine Anomaly	UA approaches Emergency landing site
950	121	2531	Friday	11:41:30	7252	2445	509.17	165909	69	35193	35193	6	165909	35193	16	Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
952	262	1184	Sunday	18:19:22	6984	2235	1232.28	148815	0	52287	52287	0	148815	52287	68	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
956	13	1950	Sunday	06:35:29	7147	1681	59.14	198085	0	3017	3017	0	198085	3017	74	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
964	265	3002	Friday	18:29:16	7244	3369	1248.81	152837	0	48265	48265	0	152837	48265	36	Short Circuit / Overheat	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
964	95	2863	Friday	18:29:12	7246	3110	447.90	165909	0	35193	35193	0	165909	35193	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
97	63	3439	Saturday	08:58:07	7161	3903	286.86	178980	0	22122	22122	0	178980	22122	43	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA ground impact in flight direction with deviating trajectory.
970	24	819	Thursday	07:05:42	6972	2953	108.53	178980	0	22122	22122	0	178980	22122	48	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA approaches Emergency landing site
973	5	1972	Sunday	06:12:52	7152	1874	21.44	198085	0	3017	3017	0	198085	3017	37	Short Circuit / Overheat	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
975	158	1196	Tuesday	13:25:08	6985	2214	741.89	156859	0	44243	44243	15	156859	44243	20	Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
98	140	572	Sunday	12:33:42	6996	3419	656.19	152837	0	48265	48265	0	152837	48265	75	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
998	86	2371	Thursday	10:02:21	7234	2152	403.22	165909	0	35193	35193	0	165909	35193	22	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site

UADyProt	HIT_OTW_ATB	HIT_OTW_OTW	UADyProt	HIT_OTW_ATB	HIT_OTW_OTW	HIT_OTW_ATB	HIT_OTW_OTW	HIT_OTW_ATB	HIT_OTW_OTW	x_h_cross_ATB	x_h_cross_OTW	(k_h_cross_ATB)^2	(k_h_cross_OTW)^2
rProbes	200	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
nEvents	198	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
nEvents_cor	179	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
nMission	14	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
x_cross_ATB	10.06	36	11	5	43	29	9	2.071428571	0.642857143	-0.274285714	-1.397857143	86.0127551	1.95404592
x_cross_OTW	11.815	43	29	9	44	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
s2ATB	90.051712	47	40	11	49	23	13	2.857142857	0.785714286	-7.202857143	-0.869285714	51.8815102	0.828414754
sATB	94.69558	23	49	11	49	23	13	1.842857143	0.928571429	-8.417428571	-0.826428571	70.84829388	0.68284184
IATB	14.97753	59	0	0	0	0	0	0.071428571	0	-9.988571429	-1.755	99.77155918	3.80025
s2OTW	2.7476634	71	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
sOTW	1.6527969	71	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
iOTW	14.804018	76	0	0	0	0	0	0.071428571	0	-9.988571429	-1.755	99.77155918	3.80025
s2TOT	122.85619	83	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
sTOT	11.12907	91	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
iTOT	15.001066	97	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		98	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		104	0	0	0	0	0	0.071428571	0	-9.988571429	-1.755	99.77155918	3.80025
		110	0	0	0	0	0	2.785714286	0.857142857	-7.274285714	-0.897857143	52.9122385	0.806147449
		114	1	0	0	0	0	0.642857143	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		120	39	12	133	9	5	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		122	70	9	140	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		133	0	0	147	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		140	0	0	151	1	0	0.071428571	0	-9.988571429	-1.755	99.77155918	3.80025
		147	0	0	156	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		151	1	0	157	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		156	0	0	158	65	2	4.842857143	0.142857143	-5.417428571	-1.812142857	29.3454373	2.59904592
		158	85	158	0	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		165	87	1	185	0	0	0.071428571	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		174	0	0	203	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		185	0	0	216	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		203	0	0	229	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		216	0	0	230	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		229	0	0	240	2	0	0.142857143	0	-9.917428571	-1.755	98.34972245	3.80025
		230	0	0	248	3	0	0.214285714	0	-9.845714286	-1.755	98.9308088	3.80025
		240	0	0	250	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		248	2	0	254	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		250	0	0	265	0	0	4.214285714	0.428571429	-5.845714286	-1.326428571	34.17237551	1.798412755
		254	0	0	277	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		262	58	294	0	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		265	0	0	291	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		277	0	0	296	0	0	0.071428571	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		284	0	0	298	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		284	0	0	328	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		291	0	0	333	2	2	7.857142857	0	-0.969285714	-1.755	94.9638	0.939514794
		339	0	0	339	0	4	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		343	0	0	343	0	0	0.142857143	0	-9.917428571	-1.755	98.34972245	3.80025
		350	0	0	350	1	0	0.071428571	0	-9.988571429	-1.755	99.77155918	3.80025
		365	0	0	377	55	7	3.928571429	0.5	-8.131428571	-1.255	37.59441633	1.575025
		383	2	0	391	86	0	2.142857143	0.214285714	-3.917428571	-1.540714286	15.34400816	1.575025
		383	28	11	393	26	7	1.857142857	0.5	-8.202857143	-1.255	67.2886631	1.575025
		333	0	0	399	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		343	2	0	411	19	0	1.357142857	0	-8.702857143	-1.255	75.7872245	1.575025
		350	1	0	417	49	9	3.5	0.642857143	-6.56	-1.121428571	43.0336	1.239861735
		377	85	206	430	26	0	1.857142857	0	-8.202857143	-1.255	67.2886631	1.575025
		391	86	3	430	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		393	26	7	432	0	0	0.071428571	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		399	0	0	433	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		407	0	0	437	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		411	19	0	470	85	0	4.842857143	0.285714286	-5.417428571	-1.469285714	29.3454373	2.1580051
		417	49	9	479	2	0	0.142857143	0	-9.917428571	-1.755	98.34972245	3.80025
		420	26	14	486	1	0	0.071428571	0	-9.988571429	-1.755	99.77155918	3.80025
		430	0	0	502	1	0	0.071428571	0	-9.988571429	-1.755	99.77155918	3.80025
		432	0	0	512	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		433	0	0	521	1	0	0.071428571	0	-9.988571429	-1.755	99.77155918	3.80025
		437	0	0	523	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		470	65	4	536	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		479	1	0	545	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		479	1	0	555	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		496	0	0	566	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		502	1	0	560	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		512	0	0	579	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		521	1	0	597	1	0	0.071428571	0	-9.988571429	-1.755	99.77155918	3.80025
		523	0	0	601	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		538	0	0	607	31	0	2.214285714	0	-7.845714286	-1.255	61.5523285	1.575025
		545	0	0	613	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		545	0	0	614	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		555	0	0	618	24	0	1.714285714	0.214285714	-8.345714286	-1.540714286	69.6564964	2.3790051
		556	0	0	620	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		560	0	0	625	0	0	0.071428571	0	-9.988571429	-1.755	99.77155918	3.80025
		579	0	0	630	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		597	0	0	632	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		597	1	0	635	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		601	0	0	682	1	0	0.071428571	0	-9.988571429	-1.755	99.77155918	3.80025
		607	31	0	684	1	0	0.071428571	0	-9.988571429	-1.755	99.77155918	3.80025
		613	0	0	693	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		614	0	0	709	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		618	24	0	710	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		620	0	0	721	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		625	0	0	728	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		632	0	0	734	1	0	0.071428571	0	-9.988571429	-1.755	99.77155918	3.80025
		675	0	0	751	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		675	0	0	754	9	12	0.642857143	0.857142857	-8.417428571	-0.897857143	88.6825959	0.806147449
		682	1	0	757	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		684	1	0	760	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		693	0	0	761	65	5	4.842857143	0.357142857	-5.417428571	-1.397857143	29.3454373	1.95404592
		709	0	0	772	5	0	0.357142857	0	-8.702857143	-1.255	75.7872245	1.575025
		710	0	0	771	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		721	0	0	777	32	0	2.285714286	0.357142857	-7.774285714	-1.397857143	60.43851807	1.95404592
		723	0	0	780	0	0	0	0	-10.06	-1.755	101.2036	3.80025
		726	0	0	809	3	0	0.214285714	0	-9.845714286	-1.755	98.9308088	3.80025

11.4.9 Hagen – C2

11.4.9.1 Hagen – C2 – Phase 1

696	86	1868	Wednesday	15:53:27	5343	3618	989.11	59839	59839	0	18382	18382	0	59839	18382	38	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
711	46	2041	Thursday	11:16:12	5542	3426	627.03	64532	64532	0	13689	13689	0	64532	13689	18	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
716	118	1899	Tuesday	19:35:46	5456	3486	1369.61	71572	71572	0	6649	6649	0	71572	6649	85	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
727	57	1166	Saturday	12:31:58	3363	3737	683.31	55145	55145	0	23076	23076	0	55145	23076	85	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
729	41	3285	Monday	10:43:54	10446	2672	473.19	64141	64141	0	14080	14080	1	64141	14080	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
732	52	353	Thursday	11:54:30	10420	3298	963.00	64532	64532	0	13689	13689	0	64532	13689	40	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
733	57	1166	Saturday	12:31:58	3363	3737	683.31	55145	55145	0	23076	23076	0	55145	23076	85	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
741	1	3147	Saturday	08:06:03	10015	2626	10.11	75092	75092	5	3129	3129	1	75092	3129	44	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
750	52	811	Monday	11:52:28	8628	3785	462.47	64141	64141	0	14080	14080	0	64141	14080	71	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
761	71	473	Tuesday	14:06:41	10064	3440	811.14	61012	61012	0	17209	17209	0	61012	17209	1	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
764	48	487	Sunday	11:27:05	10015	3406	105.15	57462	57462	0	20729	20729	0	57462	20729	68	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
761	99	2	Friday	17:25:05	10899	2907	1133.47	59056	59056	0	19165	19165	0	59056	19165	71	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
783	36	308	Saturday	10:33:38	10337	3540	485.06	55145	55145	0	23076	23076	0	55145	23076	43	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA ground impact in flight direction with deviating trajectory
789	58	896	Friday	12:37:17	8218	3849	662.14	62967	62967	1	15254	15254	0	62967	15254	67	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
791	53	1370	Sunday	12:53:29	6137	3961	665.83	57462	57462	0	20729	20729	0	57462	20729	78	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
797	15	1162	Saturday	07:39:25	6874	3971	165.72	75092	75092	0	3129	3129	0	75092	3129	2	Engine Out	UA approaches Emergency landing site
806	33	2438	Monday	09:46:46	6813	2970	377.94	64923	64923	6	13298	13298	0	64923	13298	4	Engine Out	Central UA ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.
822	15	945	Wednesday	07:38:59	7961	3883	684.43	68443	68443	19	9778	9778	3	68443	9778	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
826	12	2973	Sunday	07:22:03	9319	2623	136.78	75874	75874	0	2347	2347	0	75874	2347	4	Engine Out	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
844	106	2291	Thursday	18:13:50	6126	3166	1223.69	57462	57462	0	20729	20729	0	57462	20729	69	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
845	16	948	Friday	07:45:59	9788	3525	175.25	69616	69616	1	8605	8605	1	69616	8605	61	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
850	116	2038	Wednesday	19:23:43	9163	2630	1339.53	69616	69616	0	8605	8605	0	69616	8605	40	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
854	23	3559	Sunday	08:39:33	10891	2876	265.92	70007	70007	0	8214	8214	0	70007	8214	18	Engine Fire	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
862	114	1198	Monday	19:06:29	6805	3973	1310.81	71181	71181	0	7040	7040	0	71181	7040	22	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
863	75	711	Tuesday	14:24:54	8096	3955	856.17	61012	61012	0	17209	17209	6	61012	17209	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
866	121	3097	Friday	19:59:02	10397	2664	1398.42	70398	70398	0	7823	7823	0	70398	7823	85	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
870	21	91	Tuesday	08:18:58	10877	2989	231.61	66096	66096	0	12125	12125	0	66096	12125	88	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
872	37	782	Thursday	10:11:19	8766	3760	418.89	64532	64532	13	13689	13689	5	64532	13689	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
876	66	3396	Monday	13:37:33	10641	2718	752.61	61403	61403	0	16818	16818	0	61403	16818	37	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
877	36	1469	Tuesday	10:05:43	5830	3927	489.53	64532	64532	0	13689	13689	0	64532	13689	66	G/C/S Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
878	112	2247	Wednesday	19:53:33	6579	3182	1362.61	69616	69616	0	8605	8605	0	69616	8605	68	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
887	79	3049	Friday	15:07:09	9640	2616	911.94	59056	59056	0	19165	19165	0	59056	19165	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
892	76	1572	Wednesday	14:42:29	5962	3872	872.26	59839	59839	0	18382	18382	0	59839	18382	52	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
893	22	2443	Thursday	08:30:38	7283	2967	251.05	66096	66096	0	12125	12125	0	66096	12125	68	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
903	56	3435	Sunday	12:26:17	10761	2763	647.17	57462	57462	0	20729	20729	0	57462	20729	17	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
913	3	2769	Wednesday	06:19:13	8368	2997	894.43	68443	68443	0	9778	9778	0	68443	9778	66	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
927	72	928	Wednesday	14:14:30	8063	3870	824.17	59839	59839	0	18382	18382	0	59839	18382	60	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
937	113	3432	Saturday	18:53:51	10756	2761	1396.42	69616	69616	1	8605	8605	3	69616	8605	18	Engine Fire	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
940	25	910	Tuesday	08:47:32	9932	3482	279.22	66096	66096	0	12125	12125	0	66096	12125	59	G/C/S Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
941	40	2709	Wednesday	10:38:51	8077	2734	499.78	64532	64532	0	13689	13689	0	64532	13689	36	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
944	101	1189	Saturday	17:36:14	6848	3972	1160.42	59839	59839	0	18382	18382	9	59839	18382	87	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
949	17	2297	Thursday	07:26:23	6113	3171	152.21	68834	68834	2	9387	9387	0	68834	9387	87	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
953	112	1369	Monday	18:52:56	6140	3961	1268.22	59056	59056	4	19165	19165	11	59056	19165	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
955	107	2327	Wednesday	18:20:04	6364	3091	1233.47	56710	56710	0	21511	21511	0	56710	21511	72	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
963	14	995	Thursday	07:32:07	7738	3909	153.56	68834	68834	0	9387	9387	0	68834	9387	62	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
964	67	2803	Friday	13:43:24	8532	2879	772.26	59056	59056	0	19165	19165	0	59056	19165	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
973	24	3021	Sunday	08:46:26	9525	2817	275.72	70007	70007	2	8214	8214	0	70007	8214	31	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
979	44	906	Saturday	11:02:08	8170	3856	500.25	55145	55145	0	23076	23076	0	55145	23076	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
984	112	2423	Thursday	18:54:57	6749	2985	1291.61	57462	57462	0	20729	20729	0	57462	20729	1	Engine Out	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
984	22	1851	Thursday	08:29:17	5337	3636	248.83	66096	66096	0	12125	12125	0	66096	12125	29	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
991	19	3391	Thursday	08:11:26	10886	2733	210.08	66096	66096	0	12125	12125	0	66096	12125	76	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
995	85	1560	Monday	15:45:55	9607	3879	976.56	61403	61403	0	16818	16818	0	61403	16818	71	Connection Failure	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
996	87	1813	Tuesday	16:00:18	5332	3874	1000.50	58274	58274	0	19947	19947	0	58274	19947	62	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path

	UADayProt	HIT_TOT_ATB	HIT_TOT_OTW	UADayProt	HIT_TOT_ATB	HIT_TOT_OTW	HIT_TOT_ATB/FH	HIT_TOT_OTW/FH	x _h × cross ATB	x _h × cross OTW	(x _h × cross ATB) ²	(x _h × cross OTW) ²
rProbes	1400	13	0	13	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
nEvents	199	26	8	26	8	0	1.857142857	0.571428571	1.577142857	0.47787143	2.48737692	0.228347448
nEvents_cor	188	24	6	24	6	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
mIssion	14	24	0	29	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
x _h × cross ATB	0.28	34	0	34	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
x _h × cross OTW	0.095714	34	0	38	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
x _h × cross TOT	0.3735714	48	0	43	10	3	0.714285714	0.214285714	0.434285714	1.120714286	0.188604062	0.14571939
s2ATB	0.0962994	48	0	49	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
sATB	0.3102314	43	0	49	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
IATB	32.554872	66	0	66	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
s2OTW	0.0101761	66	0	107	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
sOTW	0.1008765	107	0	109	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
iOTW	30.97961	109	0	111	0	1	0.071428571	-0.28	-0.02142857	0.784	0.00490306	
sTOT	0.1555168	111	0	118	0	0	0.285714286	0	0.285714286	0.818285714	0.03691878	
iTOT	0.3881442	118	0	130	18	8	1.285714286	0.571428571	0.47787143	1.011461224	0.228347448	
	34.167517	130	18	139	15	3	1.071428571	0.214285714	0.791428571	1.207142857	0.626599184	0.14571939
		159	144	148	1	2	0.071428571	0.142857143	-0.208571429	0.494985714	0.043502041	0.002429682
		148	1	157	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		152	0	185	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		157	0	198	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		185	0	191	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		188	0	213	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		191	0	215	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		213	0	218	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		215	0	227	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		218	0	234	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		227	0	239	4	4	0.285714286	0	0.005714286	0.080857143	3.26511E-05	0.00755612
		234	0	272	5	6	0.357142857	0.428571429	0.077142857	0.335	0.00595102	0.112225
		239	4	278	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		272	5	292	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		278	0	287	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		282	0	307	24	0	1.714285714	0.07	1.434285714	-0.05571429	2.05717551	0.00755612
		287	0	308	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		307	24	314	9	7	0.642857143	0.5	0.362857143	0.404285714	0.131665306	0.185184184
		308	0	317	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		314	9	318	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		317	0	347	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		318	0	324	36	0	2.571428571	0	2.281428571	-0.99571429	5.25064888	0.00755612
		319	0	335	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		324	36	347	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		335	0	353	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		347	0	361	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		353	0	376	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		361	0	381	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		362	31	384	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		376	0	391	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		381	0	422	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		384	0	444	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		391	0	448	1	0	0.071428571	-0.208571429	-0.208571429	0.818285714	0.043502041	0.00755612
		422	0	449	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		444	0	480	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		448	1	467	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		449	0	488	0	0	0.142857143	0.428571429	-0.137142857	0.335	0.018808163	0.112225
		460	0	470	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		467	0	474	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		468	2	477	2	0	0.142857143	0	-0.137142857	-0.99571429	0.018808163	0.00755612
		470	0	483	0	0	0.642857143	0	0.362857143	-0.02142857	0.131665306	0.00490306
		474	0	484	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		477	2	485	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		483	9	487	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		484	0	495	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		485	0	498	9	0	0.642857143	0	0.362857143	-0.99571429	0.131665306	0.00755612
		487	0	507	5	5	0.357142857	0.357142857	0.077142857	0.263571429	0.00595102	0.06498988
		498	9	508	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		498	9	522	0	4	0.285714286	0	0.285714286	-0.28	0.192142857	0.03691878
		498	0	526	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		507	0	530	13	0	0.928571429	0.142857143	0.648571429	0.494985714	0.020644888	0.002429682
		508	0	535	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		522	0	543	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		526	0	548	1	1	0.071428571	0.071428571	-0.208571429	-0.02142857	0.043502041	0.00490306
		530	13	570	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		535	0	575	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		543	0	581	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		548	0	583	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		548	1	585	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		570	0	599	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		575	0	602	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		581	0	624	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		583	0	654	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		585	0	663	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		589	0	692	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		602	0	694	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		606	0	696	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		624	0	711	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		633	38	716	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		654	0	727	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		663	0	729	0	1	0.071428571	-0.28	-0.02142857	0.784	0.00490306	
		692	0	722	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		694	0	733	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		698	0	741	5	1	0.357142857	0.071428571	0.077142857	-0.02142857	0.00595102	0.00490306
		698	0	750	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		711	0	751	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		716	0	750	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		727	0	761	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		729	0	783	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		732	0	786	1	0	0.071428571	-0.208571429	-0.208571429	0.818285714	0.043502041	0.00755612
		733	0	791	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		741	5	797	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		750	0	806	6	6	0.428571429	0	0.148571429	-0.99571429	0.022073469	0.00755612
		751	0	822	19	3	1.357142857	0.214285714	1.077142857	1.120714286	1.16028735	0.14571939
		756	0	826	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		761	0	844	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	0.00755612
		763	0	845	1	1	0.071428571	0.071428571	-0.208571429	-0.02142857	0.043502041	0.00490306
		789	1	850	0	0	0	0	-0.28	-0.99571429	0.784	

11.4.9.2 Hagen – C2 – Phase 2

670	72	1628	Friday	14:15:50	5452	3834	82642	59056	59056	0	19165	19165	0	59056	19165	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
671	18	2203	Saturday	09:02:18	6099	3176	203366	68334	68334	1	9387	9387	0	68334	3176	38	Short Circuit / Overheat	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
676	28	1996	Thursday	09:11:13	5456	3478	60696	66096	66096	0	12125	12125	0	66096	12125	10	Engine Anomaly	UA approaches Emergency landing site
683	29	3099	Thursday	09:20:16	9833	2919	333360	66096	66096	0	12125	12125	0	66096	12125	74	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
696	54	2370	Wednesday	12:12:22	6531	3043	62061	64532	64532	0	13689	13689	0	64532	13689	14	Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
698	68	1509	Friday	13:45:56	9935	3481	776366	59056	59056	0	19165	19165	0	59056	19165	5	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
707	94	1652	Sunday	16:48:34	5446	3816	108034	57883	57883	0	20338	20338	0	57883	20338	65	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	UA approaches Emergency landing site
72	45	2857	Tuesday	11:10:50	8789	2655	518368	64532	64532	0	13689	13689	0	64532	13689	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
720	89	2498	Saturday	16:15:29	7077	2909	102583	59839	59839	27	18382	18382	3	59839	18382	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
723	91	892	Tuesday	11:48:41	6238	3846	38117	64532	64532	2	13689	13689	0	64532	13689	82	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
730	89	1556	Tuesday	16:13:41	5616	3852	102281	58274	58274	1	19647	19647	7	58274	19647	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
74	69	1543	Thursday	13:54:52	5644	3889	79144	60621	60621	0	17600	17600	1	60621	17600	16	Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
748	4	457	Saturday	09:21:41	10119	3421	3617	75092	75092	0	3129	3129	0	75092	3129	8	Engine Out	Central UA ground impact point below flight path with BVG Ratio
753	101	1768	Thursday	17:37:22	5342	3717	116228	57492	57492	0	20729	20729	0	57492	20729	39	Short Circuit / Overheat	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
757	91	3434	Monday	16:31:10	10799	2703	90566	19165	19165	0	19165	19165	0	19165	19165	58	GCIS Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
758	89	194	Tuesday	16:12:38	7743	3908	102100	58274	58274	0	19647	19647	0	58274	19647	51	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Disabilities)	UA approaches Emergency landing site
765	121	2403	Wednesday	19:57:23	13954	344	139544	69616	69616	2	8005	8005	0	69616	8005	62	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
766	79	2946	Wednesday	18:05:58	9199	2638	91161	59839	59839	21	18382	18382	3	59839	18382	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
775	72	314	Friday	14:13:18	10335	3232	82219	59056	59056	0	19165	19165	3	59056	19165	63	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
776	102	2473	Saturday	17:45:39	6966	2934	117611	59839	59839	0	18382	18382	0	59839	18382	79	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
781	41	2309	Thursday	10:43:54	10446	2672	47319	64532	64532	0	13689	13689	0	64532	13689	72	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
782	19	3573	Friday	08:11:48	10892	2879	65314	65314	65314	0	12907	12907	0	65314	12907	10	Engine Anomaly	UA approaches Emergency landing site
789	2	2941	Friday	06:12:24	8714	2952	2069	69616	69616	9	8005	8005	5	69616	8005	64	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
789	8	1937	Friday	06:54:55	10477	2578	9105	69616	69616	0	8005	8005	0	69616	8005	59	GCIS Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
8	45	1059	Monday	11:07:23	7433	3938	51231	64141	64141	0	14080	14080	0	64141	14080	58	GCIS Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
807	45	2096	Tuesday	11:09:22	8956	3381	91564	64532	64532	15	13689	13689	4	64532	13689	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
812	17	945	Sunday	07:52:05	8800	3522	18881	75874	75874	0	2347	75874	0	75874	2347	78	Short Circuit / Overheat	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
815	71	3283	Wednesday	14:12:06	10440	2871	82017	59839	59839	0	18382	18382	7	59839	18382	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
838	91	3071	Friday	16:30:29	9729	2917	105081	59056	59056	0	19165	19165	0	59056	19165	29	Connection Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
847	75	146	Sunday	14:35:09	8446	3915	85681	52799	52799	0	25422	52799	0	52799	25422	47	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA ground impact in flight direction with deviating trajectory
853	69	2909	Saturday	13:57:30	9031	2937	79583	59056	59056	1	19165	19165	0	59056	19165	78	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
859	91	3395	Friday	16:21:03	10263	2716	105175	59056	59056	0	19165	19165	0	59056	19165	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
860	91	1368	Saturday	16:27:12	6144	3962	104533	59839	59839	0	18382	18382	0	59839	18382	23	Generator Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
863	10	723	Thursday	07:03:51	9041	3767	10642	69235	69235	0	8996	69235	0	69235	8996	23	Generator Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
869	71	1652	Monday	14:09:01	8398	3784	81506	61403	61403	0	16818	16818	0	61403	16818	60	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
874	53	835	Saturday	12:02:04	8432	3619	86347	65143	65143	0	22076	65143	0	65143	22076	71	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
877	38	2897	Thursday	10:22:20	8976	2641	43725	64532	64532	23	13689	13689	0	64532	13689	61	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
883	97	2325	Monday	17:10:40	6396	3093	111789	59056	59056	0	19165	19165	0	59056	19165	54	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Disabilities)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
884	19	3296	Tuesday	08:11:15	10475	2578	21678	66096	66096	0	12125	12125	0	66096	12125	67	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
886	101	773	Thursday	17:35:26	8809	3752	115908	57492	57492	0	20729	20729	0	57492	20729	22	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
886	78	3381	Thursday	18:00:51	9014	2736	90144	60621	60621	0	17600	17600	0	60621	17600	17	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
893	11	1870	Thursday	07:13:00	5344	3616	12167	68834	68834	6	9387	68834	4	68834	9387	64	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
911	77	1992	Monday	14:51:14	5460	3452	88642	61403	61403	0	16818	16818	0	61403	16818	38	Short Circuit / Overheat	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
913	111	3473	Wednesday	18:50:03	10813	2702	128342	56710	56710	0	21511	56710	0	56710	21511	41	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA approaches Emergency landing site
929	103	2954	Friday	17:53:31	9293	2928	118922	59056	59056	0	19165	19165	0	59056	19165	68	GCIS Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
93	115	1056	Tuesday	19:13:08	7447	3937	132192	71572	71572	0	6649	71572	0	71572	6649	73	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
951	57	2208	Sunday	12:33:03	8293	3152	85611	57492	57492	0	20729	57492	0	57492	20729	2	Engine Out	UA approaches Emergency landing site
95	96	677	Thursday	17:50:33	9249	3682	110034	57492	57492	0	20729	20729	0	57492	20729	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
956	14	2249	Thursday	07:34:33	8098	3180	86834	68834	68834	0	9387	68834	0	68834	9387	25	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
961	70	1886	Tuesday	14:02:28	8332	3599	80411	61012	61012	0	17209	61012	0	61012	17209	82	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
970	104	1911	Thursday	17:57:53	8910	3646	119847	57492	57492	0	20729	57492	0	57492	20729	74	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
971	15	216	Friday	07:51:26	10794	3137	18579	69616	69616	216	8005	69616	0	69616	8005	34	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
974	56	3237	Monday	12:27:55	10310	2952	64653	64141	64141	0	14080	14080	2	64141	14080	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
98	55	2199	Sunday	12:18:53	8813	3297	83100	57492	57492	0	20729	57492	0	57492	20729	8	Engine Out	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
99	62	1151	Monday	13:05:32	7010	3965	70922	61403	61403	0	16818	16818	0	61403	16818	71	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
990	90	1336	Wednesday	16:20:11	8297	3968	103387	56710	56710	0	21511	56710	0	56710	21511	38	Short Circuit / Overheat	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
991	55	2911	Thursday	12:20:20	9041	2637	83392	64532	64532	1	13689	13689	0	64532	13689	58	GCIS Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
995	37	2291	Monday	10:14:11	6130	3166	42354	64141	64141	0	14080	14080	0	64141	14080	6	Engine Out	UA approaches Emergency landing site

O.R.C.05.02.00 - rtest of the Simulation

UADYPror	HIT_TOT	ATB	HIT_TOT	UADYPror	HIT	HIT_tot	mean_ATB	HIT_TOT	mean_OTW	HIT_TOT	mean_ATBPh	HIT_TOT	mean_OTWPh	x_h_x	ATB	x_h_x	OTW	(x_h_x	ATB)	(x_h_x	OTW)	
rProbes	200	8	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
nEvents	209	14	0	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
nEvents_cor	194	17	0	0	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
lMission	14	44	0	0	44	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
x_cross_ATB	1.945	51	0	0	51	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
x_cross_OTW	0.74	64	0	0	64	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
x_cross_TOT	2.686	74	0	0	74	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
sATB	3.467357	64	0	0	72	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.07142857	-1.945	-0.668571429	3.783025	0.446897755					
sATB	1.867203	74	0	1	93	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
sATB	14.555021	96	0	0	96	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
sOTW	0.499521	95	0	0	99	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0.142857143	-1.945	-0.597142857	3.783025	0.356579592					
sOTW	0.899563	96	0	2	99	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
sOTW	14.755409	99	0	103	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
sTOT	6.512383	103	0	0	115	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0.214285714	-1.945	-0.525714286	3.783025	0.27637551					
sTOT	2.541037	115	0	0	127	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
tTOT	14.824117	127	0	0	130	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		130	0	0	134	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.912142857	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.83204582				
		134	40	0	138	3	4	0	0.214285714	2.285714286	-1.730714286	-0.454285714	2.99571939	3.783025	0.20637551	0.5476						
		138	3	4	158	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		158	0	0	159	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		162	0	0	162	9	6	0.642857143	0.428571429	-1.302142857	-0.311428571	1.69507602	0.09687755	0.09687755	0.356579592							
		171	0	0	171	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.142857143	-1.945	-0.597142857	3.783025	0.356579592				
		171	0	2	174	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		174	0	0	175	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		186	0	0	188	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		188	0	0	191	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		191	0	0	196	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		196	0	0	201	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		201	0	0	218	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.142857143	-1.945	-0.597142857	3.783025	0.356579592				
		218	0	2	223	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		223	0	0	225	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		223	0	0	226	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		226	0	0	231	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		231	0	0	244	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		232	0	0	249	7	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		244	0	0	250	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.285714286	-1.445	-0.454285714	2.088025	0.20637551				
		249	7	0	256	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		250	0	0	279	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		256	0	0	288	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		288	0	0	292	7	2	0.5	0.142857143	-1.445	-0.597142857	2.088025	0.356579592									
		289	0	0	331	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		292	0	0	344	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		331	0	0	363	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		344	0	0	370	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		353	0	0	381	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		362	1	0	383	25	1	1.785714286	0.071428571	-0.195285714	-0.668571429	0.02571939	0.446897755									
		370	0	0	389	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		376	0	0	405	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		381	0	0	429	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		383	25	1	409	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		389	0	0	429	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		395	0	0	435	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		400	0	0	442	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		409	0	0	446	1	0	0.071428571	0	-1.873571429	-0.74	3.510269898	0.0576									
		409	0	0	449	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		429	0	0	468	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		435	0	0	471	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		435	0	0	479	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		442	0	0	480	0	1	0	0.071428571	-1.945	-0.668571429	3.783025	0.446897755									
		446	0	0	486	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.668571429	3.783025	0.446897755					
		449	0	0	488	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		468	0	0	491	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		471	0	0	497	1	0	0.071428571	0.071428571	-1.873571429	-0.668571429	3.510269898	0.446897755									
		479	0	0	506	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		479	0	0	508	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		480	0	1	526	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		486	0	1	531	0	0	0.714285714	0.5	-1.230714286	-0.24	1.51007602	0.0576									
		488	0	0	533	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		491	0	0	537	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		497	1	0	549	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		497	1	0	549	7	0.5	0.571428571	-1.945	-0.168571429	2.088025	0.02816327	0.0576									
		506	0	0	552	0	2	0	0.142857143	-1.945	-0.597142857	3.783025	0.356579592									
		506	0	0	562	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		526	0	0	563	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		528	10	7	580	19	5	1.357142857	0.357142857	-0.587857143	-0.382857143	0.34827602	0.146979592									
		531	0	0	582	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		533	0	0	585	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		537	0	0	595	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1.945	-0.74	3.783025	0.5476					
		549	0	0	597	1	0															

11.4.10 Aalen – C3

11.4.10.1 Aalen – C3 – Phase 1

697	89	2396	Thursday	16:45:41	4828	3498	1076.17	23525	23525	0	7430	7430	0	23525	7430	13	Engine Anomaly	UA approaches Emergency landing site
70	68	3153	Sunday	14:14:17	7903	1569	3223.83	22906	22906	0	8049	8049	0	22906	8049	67	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
704	55	1186	Thursday	12:35:38	5329	4097	659.42	24764	24764	6	6191	6191	0	24764	6191	12	Engine Anomaly	Central ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.
709	41	1142	Tuesday	10:53:37	5489	4010	489.36	25228	25228	0	5727	5727	0	25228	5727	22	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
714	85	1332	Sunday	16:14:25	4779	4378	1024.03	22006	22006	0	8049	8049	0	22006	8049	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
715	53	57	Monday	12:18:48	8812	1403	631.33	25228	25228	6	5727	5727	2	25228	5727	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris impact
719	73	972	Friday	14:46:17	6299	3563	877.17	23990	23990	2	6965	6965	1	23990	6965	20	Engine Fire	UA structural degradation - Debris impact
723	102	3012	Tuesday	18:21:36	7384	1827	1236.03	23216	23216	0	7739	7739	0	23216	7739	5	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
723	60	307	Tuesday	13:10:17	8577	1776	717.14	24299	24299	0	6656	6656	0	24299	6656	85	GCS Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
724	79	2623	Wednesday	15:33:20	5724	2841	965.56	23990	23990	19	6965	6965	3	23990	6965	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris impact
728	102	2238	Sunday	18:20:03	4332	3911	1233.42	22906	22906	0	8049	8049	0	22906	8049	54	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
732	94	3952	Thursday	17:24:06	8770	1332	1140.75	23525	23525	0	7430	7430	0	23525	7430	59	GCS Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
740	91	2447	Friday	17:00:22	5014	3352	1100.61	23216	23216	0	7739	7739	0	23216	7739	29	Connection Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
753	96	1073	Thursday	17:33:59	5861	3830	1156.67	23525	23525	0	7430	7430	0	23525	7430	54	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
759	72	1265	Wednesday	15:39:39	4947	4297	896.08	23990	23990	0	6965	6965	0	23990	6965	55	GCS Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
76	70	2162	Saturday	14:26:54	4190	4043	844.63	23835	23835	1	7120	7120	0	23835	7120	77	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
773	8	2926	Wednesday	06:56:54	7076	1986	94.86	27240	27240	13	3715	3715	3	27240	3715	61	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
779	69	2956	Tuesday	14:21:11	7158	1950	835.31	24299	24299	0	6656	6656	0	24299	6656	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris impact
782	74	2324	Friday	14:56:19	4585	3992	893.88	23990	23990	0	6965	6965	0	23990	6965	49	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
783	17	65	Saturday	07:56:39	8812	1410	194.42	25692	25692	0	5263	5263	0	25692	5263	5	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
783	69	2936	Saturday	14:21:08	7088	1989	835.25	23835	23835	0	7120	7120	0	23835	7120	29	Connection Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
784	53	1350	Sunday	16:21:04	4717	4407	635.69	22287	22287	0	8068	8068	0	22287	8068	37	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
789	20	3395	Friday	08:25:14	8555	1331	242.06	27240	27240	0	3715	3715	0	27240	3715	17	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
789	22	3585	Friday	08:40:10	8763	1549	286.87	27240	27240	0	3715	3715	0	27240	3715	24	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
793	41	447	Tuesday	10:52:12	8254	2091	487.00	25228	25228	0	5727	5727	0	25228	5727	22	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
808	61	2293	Wednesday	13:21:34	4489	3773	735.97	23990	23990	0	6965	6965	0	23990	6965	11	Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
809	45	1017	Thursday	11:22:29	6043	3685	637.47	24764	24764	0	6191	6191	0	24764	6191	6	Engine Out	UA approaches Emergency landing site
817	77	3182	Friday	15:19:54	7999	1526	933.17	23990	23990	0	6965	6965	0	23990	6965	16	Engine Anomaly	Central ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.
830	101	2888	Thursday	18:14:04	6873	2112	1223.47	23525	23525	0	7430	7430	0	23525	7430	54	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
832	101	2797	Saturday	18:13:53	6480	2349	1223.17	24299	24299	0	6656	6656	0	24299	6656	71	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
834	105	3359	Monday	18:44:09	8481	1348	1273.61	21978	21978	0	8977	8977	0	21978	8977	25	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
843	64	210	Wednesday	13:39:13	8723	1599	765.36	23990	23990	0	6965	6965	0	23990	6965	22	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
849	78	1081	Tuesday	15:22:55	5767	3850	938.22	24299	24299	20	6656	6656	1	24299	6656	62	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris impact
852	108	2331	Friday	19:03:56	4608	3973	1308.56	28014	28014	7	2941	2941	1	28014	2941	18	Engine Fire	UA structural degradation - Debris impact
860	38	2143	Saturday	10:33:47	4104	4129	456.31	21823	21823	0	9132	9132	0	21823	9132	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
870	25	2795	Tuesday	09:00:21	6296	2484	300.58	26311	26311	0	4644	4644	0	26311	4644	12	Engine Anomaly	Central ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.
898	28	2991	Tuesday	09:21:51	5599	2534	336.44	26311	26311	0	4644	4644	0	26311	4644	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
90	94	3091	Saturday	17:23:31	7685	1672	1139.20	24299	24299	1	6656	6656	2	24299	6656	18	Engine Fire	UA structural degradation - Debris impact
909	54	1252	Saturday	12:29:30	5070	6234	647.60	21823	21823	0	9132	9132	0	21823	9132	56	GCS Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
913	58	3173	Wednesday	13:01:30	7970	1539	702.53	23990	23990	0	6965	6965	0	23990	6965	49	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
917	72	3559	Sunday	14:44:15	8778	1336	873.75	22906	22906	0	8049	8049	0	22906	8049	51	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA approaches Emergency landing site
928	102	466	Thursday	18:16:27	8200	2138	1227.44	23525	23525	8	7430	7430	2	23525	7430	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural degradation - Debris impact
93	19	1986	Tuesday	08:15:06	3661	4418	225.17	26311	26311	0	4644	4644	0	26311	4644	62	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
931	51	2702	Sunday	12:09:36	6095	2993	616.00	22287	22287	0	8068	8068	0	22287	8068	65	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
934	32	3285	Wednesday	09:52:23	8302	1404	387.33	25847	25847	0	5108	5108	0	25847	5108	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
940	69	898	Tuesday	14:17:30	6572	3350	826.36	24299	24299	0	6656	6656	0	24299	6656	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
944	24	3092	Saturday	08:53:45	7689	1671	289.58	25692	25692	0	5263	5263	0	25692	5263	17	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
966	7	430	Sunday	06:44:34	8275	2071	74.30	29562	29562	5	1393	1393	0	29562	1393	64	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural degradation - Debris impact
979	110	3370	Saturday	19:20:36	8564	1342	1334.33	28014	28014	0	2941	2941	0	28014	2941	70	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate

	UADayProt	HIT_TOT_ATB	HIT_TOT_OTW	UADayProt cor	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB/Fh	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW/Fh	x_k_x_cross_ATB	x_k_x_cross_OTW	(x_k_x_cross_ATB)^2	(x_k_x_cross_OTW)^2
rProbes	1400	54	1	0	54	1	0	0.071428571	0	-0.140714286	-0.047428571	0.01980051
nEvents	186	56	0	0	56	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
nEvents_cor	176	58	0	3	54	0	0	0.214285714	0	0.167142857	0.045004592	0.071938735
IMission	14	59	5	1	59	5	1	0.357142857	0.071428571	0.145	0.024285714	0.021025
x_cross_ATB	0.2121428	63	0	0	63	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
x_cross_OTW	0.2471429	70	0	0	70	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
x_cross_TOT	0.2592857	76	1	0	76	1	0	0.071428571	0	-0.140714286	-0.04742857	0.01980051
s2ATB	0.0581103	93	0	2	93	0	0	0.142857143	0	-0.140714286	-0.04742857	0.01980051
sATB	0.2410908	102	0	6	102	0	6	0.428571429	0.085714286	0.381428571	0.045004592	0.145487755
sATB	31.375873	104	9	0	104	9	0	0.642857143	0.430714286	0.414285714	0.045004592	0.185517786
sOTW	0.0026503	110	2	0	110	2	0	0.142857143	0	-0.089285714	-0.04742857	0.00480051
sOTW	0.051481	120	1	0	120	1	0	0.071428571	0	-0.140714286	-0.04742857	0.01980051
sOTW	28.89598	138	0	0	138	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
sTOT	0.0801658	149	0	2	149	0	2	0.142857143	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
sTOT	0.2337111	155	0	0	155	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
tTOT	32.539162	181	0	0	181	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		183	0	0	183	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		198	0	0	198	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		212	12	0	212	12	0	0.857142857	0	0.845	0.714285714	0.00222449
		215	0	0	215	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		218	0	0	218	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		240	0	0	240	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		250	45	0	250	45	0	3.214285714	0	3.002142857	0.04742857	9.012861735
		259	0	0	259	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		268	0	0	269	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		279	0	284	279	2	1	0.142857143	0.071428571	-0.069285714	0.024285714	0.00480051
		284	0	0	284	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		285	0	0	285	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		291	0	303	291	0	0	0.071428571	0	-0.140714286	-0.04742857	0.01980051
		303	1	0	313	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		313	0	0	313	0	0	0.714285714	0	0.502142857	-0.04742857	0.252147449
		327	10	0	330	24	0	1.714285714	0	1.502142857	-0.04742857	2.253643163
		330	24	0	341	0	1	0	0.071428571	-0.21242857	0.024285714	0.045004592
		330	0	1	344	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		341	0	1	369	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		344	0	0	372	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		369	0	0	372	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		372	0	0	382	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		382	0	0	398	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		391	0	0	391	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		398	0	0	408	0	0	0.071428571	0	-0.140714286	-0.04742857	0.01980051
		408	0	0	408	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		409	0	0	413	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		409	0	0	435	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		415	0	0	435	0	0	0.071428571	0	-0.140714286	-0.04742857	0.01980051
		433	0	0	448	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		447	1	0	448	0	1	0	0.071428571	-0.21242857	0.024285714	0.045004592
		448	0	0	453	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		451	0	1	455	0	1	0.142857143	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		452	0	0	459	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		455	0	1	455	1	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		459	0	0	471	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		465	0	0	473	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		471	0	0	482	0	0	0.842857143	0.071428571	0.430714286	0.024285714	0.185517786
		473	0	0	483	9	1	0.142857143	0.071428571	0.430714286	0.024285714	0.185517786
		482	0	0	482	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		483	9	1	495	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		486	0	0	499	0	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592
		495	0	0	532	0	0	0.357142857	0.142857143	0.145	0.021025	0.00222449
		499	0	0	515	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		506	5	2	517	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		515	0	0	532	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		517	0	0	535	6	7	0.428571429	0.5	0.216428571	0.452857143	0.046841327
		532	0	0	540	0	1	0.071428571	-0.21242857	0.024285714	0.045004592	0.00222449
		535	0	0	543	5	6	0.357142857	0.071428571	0.285714286	0.145	0.021025
		540	1	1	541	2	1	0.142857143	0.071428571	-0.069285714	0.024285714	0.00480051
		543	5	4	553	2	2	0.142857143	-0.21242857	0.095714286	0.045004592	0.009161224
		551	2	0	560	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		553	0	2	581	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		569	0	0	596	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		581	0	0	596	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		584	0	0	609	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		596	0	0	625	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		609	0	0	626	1	0	0.071428571	-0.140714286	-0.04742857	0.01980051	0.00222449
		622	0	0	636	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		626	1	0	637	0	0	0.142857143	0.071428571	-0.140714286	-0.04742857	0.01980051
		638	0	0	641	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		637	1	3	648	1	0	0.071428571	-0.140714286	-0.04742857	0.01980051	0.00222449
		641	0	0	653	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		648	1	0	659	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		648	0	0	668	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		653	0	0	668	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		659	0	0	676	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		662	0	0	682	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		668	0	0	694	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		676	0	0	697	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		682	0	0	704	0	0	0.428571429	0	0.216428571	-0.04742857	0.046841327
		694	0	0	709	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		697	0	0	714	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		704	0	0	715	0	0	0.428571429	0.142857143	0.145	0.021025	0.00222449
		709	0	0	719	2	1	0.142857143	0.071428571	-0.069285714	0.024285714	0.00480051
		714	0	0	723	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		715	6	1	724	2	0	1.357142857	0.214285714	0.145	0.021025	0.00222449
		719	2	1	728	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		723	0	0	740	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		724	19	3	753	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		728	0	0	759	0	0	0	-0.21242857	-0.04742857	0.045004592	0.00222449
		732	0	0	773	13	3	0.928571429	0.214285714	0.716428571	0.167142857	0.513288888
		740	0	0	779	1	0	0.071428571	-0.140714286	-0.04742857	0.01980051	0.00222449
		753	0	0	78							

11.4.10.2 *Aalen – C3 – Phase 2*

O.R.C.U.S. 02.00 - Simulation Summary

UA Parameters	Wingspan [m]	Length [m]	LD
M/TW Reg	90	100	1217.353
V km/h	100	100	1217.353
P_CumCat [1/F] Engine [%] ESts [%] FCS [%]	20	20	20
NavSys [N]	20	20	20
Struc [N]	20	20	20
General map parameters	Name	Area [m2]	PPL
City	Aden, Sada	145.58	6799
City	Outback	151.39	31242
City	Outback	307.43	1102425
Map total	66.8555	30965	0
Map total	66.8555	30965	0
PPL MOD	NA		
Sim FH [F]	18000	EvFth [F]	0.01020408
City ATB	406	Hits/FH [1/F]	
City OTW	80	0.0045618	
Total	496	0.0250631	

Prof	Day	Time of impact	UA X Pos	UA Y Pos	Travelled Distance [m]	PPL_2D_ATT_COUNT	PPL_2D_ATT_COUNT	HIT_CITY_ATT_COUNT	PPL_2D_OTW_COUNT	PPL_2D_OTW_COUNT	HIT_CITY_OTW_COUNT	PPL_2D_ATT_COUNT	PPL_2D_OTW_COUNT	E_Case
1021	51	Tuesday	12:28:43	5107	4184	9152	9152	9152	0	0	0	0	0	6184 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA
1023	60	Tuesday	13:12:13	5029	4256	23835	23835	23835	0	0	0	0	0	7120 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)
1024	81	Wednesday	15:46:35	3849	4438	97036	24299	24299	0	0	0	0	0	8696 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1046	44	Wednesday	17:45:24	5114	2912	9152	9152	9152	0	0	0	0	0	9152 21 Engine Fire
1077	39	Wednesday	19:39:56	4079	4644	46656	25228	25228	0	0	0	0	0	5727 Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.
1079	61	Wednesday	20:04:17	5084	4644	27080	27080	27080	0	0	0	0	0	5727 21 Engine Fire
1083	7	Friday	06:47:49	3922	4334	37360	27360	27360	0	0	0	0	0	3560 2 Engine Out
1090	25	Friday	08:55:17	4071	1668	29214	27240	27240	0	0	0	0	0	3715 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1092	14	Friday	10:31:22	3616	4184	10460	27240	27240	0	0	0	0	0	3715 2 Engine Out
1106	41	Monday	10:54:30	4077	4644	22267	22689	22689	0	0	0	0	0	8668 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA
1107	61	Monday	10:54:30	4077	4644	22267	22689	22689	0	0	0	0	0	8668 80 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1110	115	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1114	116	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1116	78	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1117	115	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1119	92	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1120	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1121	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1122	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1123	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1124	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1125	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1126	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1127	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1128	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1129	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1130	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1131	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1132	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1133	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1134	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1135	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1136	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1137	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1138	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1139	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1140	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1141	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1142	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1143	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1144	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1145	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1146	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1147	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1148	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1149	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1150	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1151	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1152	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1153	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1154	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1155	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1156	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1157	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1158	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1159	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1160	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1161	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1162	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1163	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1164	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1165	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1166	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1167	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1168	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1169	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1170	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1171	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1172	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1173	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1174	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1175	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1176	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1177	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1178	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1179	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1180	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1181	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1182	108	Monday	19:54:32	4108	4125	1390.89	28189	28189	0	0	0	0	0	2786 79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).
1183	108</													

637	10	3036	Sunday	07:11:40	7478	1777	119.47	29562	29562	0	1393	1393	0	29562	1393	10 Engine Anomaly	UA approaches Emergency landing site
65	113	3141	Tuesday	1941:59	7892	1587	1389.97	28633	28633	0	2322	2322	0	28633	2322	74 Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
650	7	2672	Saturday	06:49:05	5934	2089	81.83	29871	29871	0	1084	1084	0	29871	1084	81 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
651	86	320	Sunday	16:19:27	8712	1616	1032.42	22906	22906	0	8049	8049	3	22906	8049	80 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
652	93	3329	Monday	17:16:42	8413	1368	1127.86	21978	21978	0	8977	8977	0	21978	8977	69 Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
664	109	890	Saturday	19:08:18	6598	3333	1313.83	28014	28014	0	2941	2941	0	28014	2941	58 GCS Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
676	86	1176	Thursday	09:50:45	6835	1038.64	1038.64	23935	23935	0	7430	7430	34	23935	7430	43 Structural desintegration - Debris Impact	UA approaches Emergency landing site
685	74	585	Saturday	14:52:47	7821	2454	888.00	23835	23835	1	7120	7120	0	23835	7120	62 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
686	53	3402	Tuesday	12:25:34	8968	1328	842.81	22287	22287	0	8668	8668	0	22287	8668	70 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
688	45	1684	Tuesday	11:20:49	3911	6664	539.72	25228	25228	13	5727	5727	2	25228	5727	80 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
695	60	1896	Tuesday	13:13:42	3871	4403	722.83	24299	24299	0	6656	6656	0	24299	6656	77 Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
70	92	2958	Thursday	17:08:40	7107	1945	1114.47	22906	22906	0	8049	8049	0	22906	8049	1 Engine Out	No Ground Effect
718	101	1545	Thursday	18:11:21	4160	4623	1218.94	23525	23525	1	7430	7430	0	23525	7430	42 Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
720	88	3154	Saturday	10:06:57	7907	1967	1066.58	24299	24299	0	6656	6656	0	24299	6656	35 Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
721	107	131	Sunday	18:52:12	6791	1484	1287.00	22906	22906	0	8049	8049	0	22906	8049	15 Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.
729	7	629	Monday	06:44:58	7063	2577	74.94	27085	27085	0	3870	3870	0	27085	3870	71 Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
730	13	1505	Tuesday	07:50:26	4256	4084	703.85	27085	27085	0	3870	3870	0	27085	3870	24 Generator Failure	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
730	8	2566	Tuesday	06:56:10	5484	3007	93.61	27085	27085	10	3870	3870	1	27085	3870	74 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
733	3	2983	Friday	05:20:35	7389	1889	34.33	27395	27395	0	3660	3660	0	27395	3660	75 Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
733	89	3245	Friday	16:47:24	6192	1445	1079.03	23216	23216	0	7739	7739	3	23216	7739	82 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
737	39	675	Tuesday	13:08:58	7480	2709	414.95	25228	25228	0	5727	5727	0	25228	5727	19 Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
74	64	243	Thursday	13:39:17	8981	1655	765.47	24609	24609	0	6346	6346	0	24609	6346	28 Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
742	24	1609	Sunday	08:50:45	4029	4854	284.58	27085	27085	1	3870	3870	0	27085	3870	52 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
742	85	3598	Sunday	16:19:00	8799	1356	1031.67	22906	22906	0	8049	8049	0	22906	8049	68 Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
757	33	1217	Monday	09:35:29	5208	4164	392.50	25228	25228	1	5727	5727	0	25228	5727	40 Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
765	61	2713	Tuesday	13:22:25	6113	2582	737.39	24299	24299	0	6656	6656	0	24299	6656	54 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
772	107	1111	Tuesday	18:54:10	5638	3924	1290.31	23216	23216	23	7739	7739	0	23216	7739	61 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
778	62	2096	Monday	13:28:28	4013	4226	747.45	23835	23835	1	7120	7120	0	23835	7120	28 Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
786	24	2408	Friday	08:52:21	4070	3482	287.28	27240	27240	1	3715	3715	0	27240	3715	19 Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
796	67	1661	Friday	14:03:59	3943	4664	806.67	23990	23990	0	6965	6965	0	23990	6965	53 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
796	76	2242	Friday	15:10:42	4343	3901	977.86	23990	23990	0	6965	6965	0	23990	6965	81 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
809	39	1031	Thursday	10:38:49	5962	3722	464.70	24764	24764	0	6191	6191	0	24764	6191	59 GCS Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
818	29	1762	Saturday	08:56:22	3819	4633	297.30	26962	26962	0	5263	5263	0	26962	5263	41 Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA approaches Emergency landing site
821	69	3459	Thursday	16:40:34	6864	1316	1607.61	23216	23216	0	7739	7739	0	23216	7739	48 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA approaches Emergency landing site
84	3	3297	Sunday	06:21:14	8333	1393	35.39	29562	29562	1	1393	1393	1	29562	1393	21 Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
851	52	1916	Thursday	12:15:16	3612	4512	625.47	24764	24764	0	6191	6191	0	24764	6191	66 Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
860	49	2530	Saturday	11:55:29	7031	2010	1162.47	21623	21623	0	8152	8152	0	21623	8152	22 Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
869	106	2520	Monday	16:49:45	5207	3141	1282.92	21978	21978	0	8977	8977	0	21978	8977	4 Engine Out	Central UA ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.
876	76	718	Monday	15:07:38	7251	2833	912.72	23835	23835	1	7120	7120	0	23835	7120	16 Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
878	102	2757	Wednesday	18:21:06	6305	2458	1235.17	22906	22906	0	8049	8049	0	22906	8049	83 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
883	94	1822	Monday	17:20:57	3802	4607	1134.92	21978	21978	0	8977	8977	4	21978	8977	69 Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
898	49	2700	Sunday	11:55:01	6056	2619	591.70	22267	22267	0	8668	8668	0	22267	8668	70 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA approaches Emergency landing site
899	79	2012	Sunday	15:24:48	3889	4377	941.36	22906	22906	0	8049	8049	0	22906	8049	48 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA approaches Emergency landing site
9	16	376	Tuesday	07:50:00	8429	1628	163.33	27085	27085	8	3870	3870	0	27085	3870	63 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
90	95	1163	Saturday	17:26:53	5423	4046	1144.83	24299	24299	37	6656	6656	0	24299	6656	80 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
903	27	2203	Monday	09:13:47	4241	3995	323.00	27085	27085	0	3870	3870	0	27085	3870	76 Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
904	39	3156	Monday	10:43:06	7913	1564	471.88	25228	25228	0	5727	5727	0	25228	5727	40 Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
905	56	3049	Tuesday	12:46:42	7528	1751	677.83	25228	25228	6	5727	5727	1	25228	5727	61 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
908	39	1228	Friday	10:39:12	5163	4186	465.36	25383	25383	7	5572	5572	3	25383	5572	80 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
927	26	1190	Wednesday	09:04:28	5313	4106	307.45	25847	25847	27	5108	5108	0	25847	5108	108 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
928	16	979	Thursday	07:51:12	6209	3582	185.38	26930	26930	0	4025	4025	0	26930	4025	71 Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
931	81	3538	Sunday	15:49:44	8758	1327	982.92	22906	22906	0	8049	8049	0	22906	8049	65 Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
933	39	2485	Monday	10:12:38	5198	3214	421.08	25228	25228	0	5727	5727	0	25228	5727	49 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
940	67	2189	Tuesday	14:05:04	4207	4027	808.45	24299	24299	0	6656	6656	0	24299	6656	44 Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA approaches Emergency landing site
943	54	2240	Friday	12:30:29	6503	2933	650.83	25383	25383	0	5572	5572	0	25383	5572	56 GCS Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
946	25	1915	Thursday	08:06:26	3804	4612	291.42	26311	26311	0	4644	4644	0	26311	4644	79 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
949	58	1906	Thursday	12:57:07	6091	3655	695.22	24609	24609	0	6346	6346	0	24609	6346	27 Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
967	109	3540	Monday	15:12:39	7494	1769	1321.08	28169	28169	0	2786	2786	0	28169	2786	68 Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
978	115	3191	Friday	19:56:39	8038	1513	1584.42	28014	28014	0	2941	2941	0	28014	2941	71 Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
978	63	3200	Friday	13:37:58	8056	1501	763.30	23990	23990	0	6965	6965	0	23990	6965	72 Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
98	84	2186	Sunday	16:08:51	4205	4029	1014.76	22906	22906	0	8049	8049	0	22906	8049	78 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
983	65	1553	Wednesday	13:49:12	4142	4628	782.03	23990	23990	23	6965	6965	0	23990	6965	63 Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
998	29	3275	Thursday	09:30:31	8275	1414	350.89	26311	26311	0	4644	4644	0	26311	4644	54 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path

O.R.C.S. 02.00 - (Test of the Simulation)

UADayProt	HIT_TOT_ATB	HIT_TOT_OTW	UADayProt cor	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB/Fh	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW/Fh	x_k_cross ATB	x_k_cross OTW	(x_k_cross ATB)^2	(x_k_cross OTW)^2	
rProbes	200	4	1	20	4	1	0.285714286	-1.744285714	-0.378571429	3.042528633	0.143316327	
nEvents	200	4	1	20	4	1	0.285714286	-1.744285714	-0.378571429	3.042528633	0.143316327	
nEvents_cor	21	0	0	21	0	0	0.714285714	-1.315714286	-0.45	1.731104882	0.02025	
nMission	14	0	0	14	0	0	0.714285714	-1.315714286	-0.45	1.731104882	0.02025	
x_cross_ATB	2.03	0	0	2.03	0	0	0.714285714	-1.315714286	-0.45	1.731104882	0.02025	
x_cross_OTW	0.45	0	0	0.45	0	0	0.714285714	-1.315714286	-0.45	1.731104882	0.02025	
x_cross_TOT	2.48	0	0	2.48	0	0	0.714285714	-1.315714286	-0.45	1.731104882	0.02025	
s2ATB	3.939764	90	37	90	37	0	2.642857143	0.812857143	-0.45	3.375598786	0.2025	
sATB	1.933602	98	0	98	0	0	2.642857143	0.812857143	-0.45	3.375598786	0.2025	
IATB	14.772144	107	0	107	0	0	2.642857143	0.812857143	-0.45	3.375598786	0.2025	
sOTW	0.183212	113	0	113	0	0	2.642857143	0.812857143	-0.45	3.375598786	0.2025	
sOTW	0.426037	128	0	128	0	0	2.642857143	0.812857143	-0.45	3.375598786	0.2025	
OTW	14.537534	128	0	134	0	0	2.642857143	0.812857143	-0.45	3.375598786	0.2025	
sTOT	5.5193785	134	0	135	0	0	2.642857143	0.812857143	-0.45	3.375598786	0.2025	
sTOT	2.3494209	135	0	140	0	0	2.642857143	0.812857143	-0.45	3.375598786	0.2025	
ITOT	14.867951	144	0	151	0	0	2.642857143	0.812857143	-0.45	3.375598786	0.2025	
		151	0	159	17	2	1.214285714	0.142857143	-0.815714286	0.665389786	0.094336735	
		173	0	177	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		173	0	177	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		177	0	182	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		179	0	185	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		182	0	188	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		185	0	200	4	0	0.285714286	-1.744285714	-0.45	3.042528633	0.02025	
		188	0	205	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		228	4	228	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		204	0	232	2	6	0.142857143	0.428571429	-1.887142857	-0.021428571	3.561308163	0.000459184
		205	0	235	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		228	258	258	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		232	2	261	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		235	0	269	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		258	0	272	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		261	0	273	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		281	0	275	11	7	0.785714286	0.5	-1.244285714	0.05	1.548248939	0.02025
		272	0	283	1	0	0.071428571	-1.958571429	-0.45	3.836002041	0.2025	
		273	0	297	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		275	11	298	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		283	1	299	4	1	0.285714286	-1.744285714	-0.378571429	3.042528633	0.143316327	
		297	0	311	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		298	0	315	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		299	0	318	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		311	0	321	6	1	0.428571429	0.071428571	-1.801428571	-0.378571429	2.564573469	0.143316327
		315	0	327	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		318	0	328	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		321	6	329	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		327	0	330	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		328	0	339	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		329	0	342	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		330	0	345	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		339	0	354	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		342	0	360	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		345	0	372	3	0	0.214285714	0.071428571	-1.815714286	-0.378571429	3.29818367	0.143316327
		350	0	382	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		360	0	384	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		372	3	392	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		382	0	398	20	0	1.428571429	-0.801428571	-0.45	3.86176327	0.02025	
		384	0	402	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		392	0	404	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		398	0	418	0	0	0.785714286	-1.244285714	-0.378571429	1.548248939	0.143316327	
		398	0	422	2	0	0.142857143	-1.887142857	-0.45	3.561308163	0.02025	
		404	0	439	0	7	0.285714286	0.5	-1.744285714	0.05	1.042528633	0.02025
		404	0	442	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		418	11	455	8	3	0.571428571	0.214285714	-1.458571429	-0.235714286	2.127439812	0.05561224
		422	0	458	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		439	4	474	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		442	0	482	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		458	8	489	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		459	0	500	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		474	0	505	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		482	0	509	4	5	0.285714286	0.357142857	-1.744285714	-0.092857143	3.042528633	0.008622449
		499	0	511	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		500	0	513	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		505	0	521	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		509	0	539	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		511	0	558	1	0	0.071428571	-1.958571429	-0.45	3.836002041	0.2025	
		513	0	573	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		521	0	577	11	2	0.214285714	0.142857143	-1.815714286	-0.378571429	3.29818367	0.094336735
		539	0	590	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		539	0	591	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		573	0	607	19	0	1.357142857	-0.872857143	-0.45	4.52736753	0.02025	
		577	3	610	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		590	0	627	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		591	0	631	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		607	0	637	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		610	0	650	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		627	0	651	0	3	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		631	0	652	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		637	0	664	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		637	0	664	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		651	0	685	1	0	0.071428571	-1.958571429	-0.45	3.836002041	0.2025	
		652	0	688	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		654	0	698	13	2	0.928571429	-1.101428571	-0.378571429	1.211444986	0.094336735	
		676	34	695	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		685	1	718	0	0	0.071428571	-1.958571429	-0.45	3.836002041	0.2025	
		686	0	720	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		686	13	721	2	721	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		695	0	729	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		718	1	730	10	1	0.714285714	0.071428571	-1.315714286	-0.378571429	1.731104882	0.143316327
		720	0	733	0	0	0.214285714	-1.815714286	-0.378571429	3.29818367	0.05561224	
		721	0	737	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		729	0	742	1	0	0.071428571	-1.958571429	-0.45	3.836002041	0.2025	
		730	0	757	0	0	0.071428571	-1.958571429	-0.45	3.836002041	0.2025	
		730	10	765	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		733	0	772	23	0	1.642857143	-0.387142857	-0.45	1.64897592	0.02025	
		737	0	778	1	0	0.071428571	-1.958571429	-0.45	3.836002041	0.2025	
		737	0	789	1	0	0.071428571	-1.958571429	-0.45	3.836002041	0.2025	
		742	1	796	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		742	0	809	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		757	1	818	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		765	0	821	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		772	23	851	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		778	1	860	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		789	1	869	1	0	0.071428571	-1.958571429	-0.45	3.836002041	0.2025	
		796	0	876	1	1	0.071428571	-1.958571429	-0.378571429	3.836002041	0.143316327	
		796	0	879	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		809	0	883	0	4	0.285714286	-1.744285714	-0.45	3.042528633	0.02025	
		818	0	889	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		821	0	903	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		851	0	904	0	0	0	0	-2.03	-0.45	4.1209	
		860	0	905	0	0	0.428571429	-1.601428571	-0.378571429	2.564573469	0.143316327	
		869	1	908	7	3	0.5	0				

11.4.11 Schwedt/Oder – C4

11.4.11.1 Schwedt/Oder – C4 – Phase 1

687	114	2759	Monday	17:05:46	6211	2093	1108.61	7223	7223	0	2538	2538	0	7223	2538	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
688	11	274	Tuesday	09:38:57	7628	3445	98.28	8248	8248	0	1913	1913	0	8248	1913	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
689	91	1178	Thursday	14:48:35	4697	2048	881.00	7613	7613	0	2148	2148	0	7613	2148	37	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
701	37	1349	Monday	09:32:52	4221	1721	384.78	8286	8286	0	1465	1465	0	8286	1465	54	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
713	143	3060	Saturday	19:55:37	7205	2701	1393.28	7205	7205	0	879	879	0	8882	879	74	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
732	85	2959	Thursday	14:16:22	6901	2501	627.30	7613	7613	0	2148	2148	0	7613	2148	72	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
74	123	2296	Thursday	17:57:40	4507	1307	1196.11	7271	7271	0	2460	2460	0	7271	2460	31	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
756	114	380	Saturday	17:01:54	7391	3382	1103.17	7759	7759	0	2002	2002	0	7759	2002	61	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
766	100	1709	Sunday	16:34:48	3717	1227	1088.00	7125	7125	0	2636	2636	0	7125	2636	16	Engine Anomaly	Central ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.
76	130	2226	Saturday	16:38:32	4387	1246	1264.22	7759	7759	0	2002	2002	0	7759	2002	19	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
762	5	1184	Saturday	09:25:19	4678	2038	42.22	8072	8072	0	489	489	0	8072	489	54	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
775	87	209	Friday	14:23:36	7743	3465	839.36	7564	7564	0	2197	2197	0	7564	2197	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
787	136	2054	Wednesday	19:13:21	3992	1135	1322.28	8980	8980	0	781	781	0	8980	781	2	Engine Out	UA approaches Emergency landing site
788	68	1392	Friday	13:24:21	4122	1646	607.25	7711	7711	0	2000	2000	0	7711	2000	33	Connection Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
790	117	130	Saturday	17:19:02	7849	3468	1131.75	7759	7759	0	2002	2002	0	7759	2002	20	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
797	127	2322	Saturday	19:21:08	4656	1349	1235.22	7759	7759	0	2002	2002	0	7759	2002	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
802	15	1233	Thursday	07:23:55	4531	1939	139.89	8394	8394	0	1367	1367	0	8394	1367	4	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
816	54	1563	Thursday	11:12:41	3528	1386	52.117	7808	7808	0	1953	1953	0	7808	1953	38	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
816	63	3290	Thursday	16:05:12	7708	3084	808.67	7613	7613	0	2148	2148	0	7613	2148	54	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
819	62	2507	Sunday	12:01:03	5288	1619	601.75	7174	7174	0	2587	2587	0	7174	2587	67	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
822	129	2005	Wednesday	18:27:16	5281	1916	1265.47	7223	7223	0	2538	2538	0	7223	2538	66	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
840	25	1159	Sunday	08:22:20	4737	2087	237.22	8736	8736	0	1025	1025	0	8736	1025	4	Engine Out	Central ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.
845	54	2854	Tuesday	11:14:44	6445	2226	524.58	8004	8004	0	1757	1757	0	8004	1757	73	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
850	19	705	Wednesday	07:46:28	6377	2972	177.47	8345	8345	0	1416	1416	0	8345	1416	17	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
855	25	1918	Saturday	08:23:34	3766	1121	229.28	8004	8004	0	1757	1757	0	8004	1757	12	Engine Anomaly	Central ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.
866	131	3053	Friday	19:42:18	5459	2507	1270.53	7662	7662	0	2069	2069	0	7662	2069	89	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
867	54	3038	Saturday	11:11:41	5523	2537	519.47	7125	7125	0	2636	2636	0	7125	2636	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
869	84	2989	Monday	14:10:25	6570	2359	817.36	7564	7564	0	2197	2197	0	7564	2197	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
872	7	1284	Thursday	06:37:11	4387	1841	62.00	8394	8394	0	1367	1367	0	8394	1367	11	Engine Anomaly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
873	10	2352	Friday	09:56:49	5450	1997	94.69	8443	8443	0	1318	1318	0	8443	1318	23	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
876	16	350	Monday	07:28:20	7484	3403	147.25	8296	8296	0	1465	1465	0	8296	1465	29	Connection Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
888	101	3503	Saturday	15:55:53	7939	3205	884.83	7711	7711	0	2000	2000	0	7711	2000	61	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
891	128	2984	Friday	18:27:52	6265	2338	1246.44	7662	7662	0	2069	2069	0	7662	2069	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
899	116	398	Wednesday	17:13:38	7345	3367	1122.72	7223	7223	0	2538	2538	0	7223	2538	70	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
922	39	3480	Monday	09:35:21	7928	3334	292.28	8296	8296	0	1465	1465	0	8296	1465	59	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
922	39	1628	Friday	09:45:20	3728	1149	375.58	8394	8394	0	1367	1367	0	8394	1367	78	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
924	8	3323	Sunday	09:46:21	7776	3147	77.28	9419	9419	0	342	342	0	9419	342	82	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
927	110	416	Wednesday	16:38:33	7298	3352	1064.25	7223	7223	0	2538	2538	0	7223	2538	54	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
929	59	1675	Friday	11:42:28	3767	1131	570.78	7711	7711	0	2000	2000	0	7711	2000	28	Generator Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
929	5	1594	Friday	06:25:58	3804	1380	84.31	8443	8443	0	1318	1318	0	8443	1318	39	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
931	8	1980	Sunday	06:43:31	3809	1385	72.25	9419	9419	0	342	342	0	9419	342	50	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
94	117	181	Wednesday	17:16:07	7785	3468	1131.89	7223	7223	0	2538	2538	0	7223	2538	35	Connection Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
949	74	769	Thursday	13:08:27	6146	2881	714.08	7613	7613	0	2148	2148	0	7613	2148	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
954	82	2174	Tuesday	11:02:52	6083	2023	504.80	8004	8004	0	1757	1757	0	8004	1757	67	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
960	11	1556	Monday	07:01:02	3837	1395	101.75	8296	8296	0	1465	1465	0	8296	1465	4	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
984	66	1486	Thursday	12:22:47	3940	1494	638.00	7808	7808	0	1953	1953	0	7808	1953	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
985	61	1546	Friday	14:06:14	3850	1480	613.72	7564	7564	0	2197	2197	0	7564	2197	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
989	105	3293	Tuesday	16:13:58	7730	3128	1023.28	7320	7320	0	2441	2441	0	7320	2441	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
991	48	2195	Thursday	10:38:33	4230	1195	464.28	7808	7808	0	1953	1953	0	7808	1953	19	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
996	62	1881	Tuesday	12:00:01	3762	1104	600.06	8004	8004	0	1757	1757	0	8004	1757	68	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
997	39	1459	Wednesday	09:44:44	3887	1538	274.58	8296	8296	0	1465	1465	0	8296	1465	69	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
999	40	750	Friday	09:49:26	6215	2895	382.42	8394	8394	0	1367	1367	0	8394	1367	16	Engine Anomaly	Central ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.

11.4.11.2 ***Schwedt/Oder – C4 – Phase 2***

523	113	176	Friday	16:55:42	7792	3489	1092.86	7662	0	2099	2099	0	7662	2099	41	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA approaches Emergency landing site
529	114	2277	Thursday	17:04:59	4530	1297	1092.86	7271	0	2490	2490	0	7271	2490	70	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
53	124	736	Thursday	18:00:59	6266	2919	1201.67	7271	4	2490	2490	0	7271	2490	21	Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
53	30	199	Thursday	09:50:01	7768	3490	283.39	8296	0	1465	1465	0	8296	1465	51	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA approaches Emergency landing site
53	01	2634	Sunday	14:50:58	6751	1847	128.96	6979	1	2762	2762	0	6979	2762	66	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
556	34	2993	Wednesday	08:17:58	7007	2270	329.97	8296	1	1465	1465	0	8296	1465	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
566	12	431	Thursday	13:39:54	4040	1981	128.96	7271	0	2490	2490	0	7271	2490	70	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
575	79	2116	Monday	13:39:54	7157	2187	139.54	7564	9	2197	2197	0	7564	2197	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
584	20	1395	Monday	14:53:49	4966	1406	128.96	8296	0	1465	1465	0	8296	1465	39	Connection Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
585	69	119	Thursday	12:38:07	7891	3467	663.56	7808	0	1953	1953	0	7808	1953	39	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
587	17	3404	Thursday	07:39:09	8072	2523	1092.86	8072	489	8072	8072	0	8072	8072	73	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
587	39	3417	Saturday	09:47:55	7896	3268	379.89	8004	0	1757	1757	0	8004	1757	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
597	106	2810	Tuesday	16:19:02	6395	2197	1031.72	7320	0	2441	2441	0	7320	2441	19	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
601	80	2940	Saturday	14:46:26	6501	2258	1092.86	7111	0	2500	2500	0	7111	2500	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
608	26	3506	Saturday	09:32:00	7940	3358	804.00	8004	0	1757	1757	0	8004	1757	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
611	120	2111	Monday	15:41:33	7906	3388	1092.86	7906	0	1953	1953	0	7906	1953	69	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.
626	83	2929	Wednesday	14:04:28	6482	2236	807.45	7613	0	2148	2148	0	7613	2148	52	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
632	131	891	Tuesday	18:42:09	5644	2708	1270.25	7320	0	2441	2441	0	7320	2441	10	Engine Anomaly	UA approaches Emergency landing site
637	47	896	Sunday	10:30:38	5661	2623	431.08	7174	0	2587	2587	0	7174	2587	63	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
641	143	241	Thursday	19:51:23	7899	3457	1388.64	8833	0	928	928	0	8833	928	29	Connection Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
643	130	3077	Saturday	19:39:55	7252	2754	1296.53	7759	0	2002	2002	0	7759	2002	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
647	103	456	Wednesday	19:57:40	7159	3307	996.11	7223	0	2538	2538	0	7223	2538	72	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
650	114	2133	Thursday	17:04:44	4155	1174	1197.92	7271	0	2490	2490	0	7271	2490	8	Engine Out	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
664	63	2023	Saturday	12:06:06	3938	1126	610.19	7125	1	2636	2636	3	7125	2636	20	Engine Out	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
665	63	926	Sunday	12:04:19	5967	2867	607.22	7174	0	2587	2587	0	7174	2587	3	Engine Out	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
672	107	2132	Sunday	16:23:47	4153	1173	1038.64	7125	0	2636	2636	0	7125	2636	40	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
681	80	3396	Tuesday	13:47:49	7896	3343	779.72	7759	0	2002	2002	0	7759	2002	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
683	80	2011	Tuesday	08:44:14	3918	1154	73.72	8248	2	1513	1513	0	8248	1513	89	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
685	30	2985	Saturday	08:54:23	6507	2351	280.67	8004	2	1757	1757	0	8004	1757	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
687	52	2011	Monday	11:03:20	7052	2905	855.93	7906	3	1953	1953	0	7906	1953	63	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
688	19	2202	Tuesday	07:48:54	4233	1244	181.53	6248	0	1513	1513	0	6248	1513	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
689	110	1092	Thursday	18:39:38	4978	2223	1096.08	7271	0	2490	2490	0	7271	2490	70	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
691	20	1954	Saturday	08:29:14	3718	1161	548.72	8004	0	1757	1757	0	8004	1757	77	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
727	127	1153	Tuesday	16:19:13	4776	2099	1232.06	7320	0	2441	2441	0	7320	2441	66	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
728	103	3507	Thursday	14:06:39	7897	3398	809.42	7613	0	2148	2148	0	7613	2148	45	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
729	91	2726	Thursday	14:51:06	6591	2027	888.19	7613	0	2148	2148	0	7613	2148	4	Engine Out	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
730	100	1217	Thursday	13:40:00	4578	1971	1056.67	7125	0	2636	2636	0	7125	2636	23	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
730	110	3317	Tuesday	10:43:15	7767	2139	1072.11	7320	0	2441	2441	0	7320	2441	1	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
742	99	1045	Sunday	13:35:12	5139	2319	988.07	6979	0	2762	2762	0	6979	2762	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
747	54	1225	Friday	11:12:09	4554	1955	530.25	7111	0	2500	2500	0	7111	2500	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
750	102	641	Monday	15:52:05	6602	3075	986.83	7564	0	2197	2197	0	7564	2197	23	Generator Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
777	56	229	Sunday	11:16:22	7110	3460	537.31	7174	0	2587	2587	0	7174	2587	37	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
778	141	2745	Monday	19:43:45	6160	2285	1372.92	8833	0	928	928	0	8833	928	75	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
780	24	1068	Wednesday	08:16:20	5050	2272	227.22	8296	0	1465	1465	0	8296	1465	73	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
789	75	1403	Monday	13:15:19	4098	1427	725.55	7564	0	2197	2197	0	7564	2197	62	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
813	123	226	Monday	17:54:22	7662	3422	1190.61	7223	0	2538	2538	0	7223	2538	37	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
818	16	2226	Saturday	07:31:23	4307	1246	152.33	9272	0	489	489	0	9272	489	36	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
818	96	157	Saturday	16:16:12	7817	3449	927.00	7171	0	2587	2587	0	7171	2587	79	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
836	135	3073	Saturday	19:09:59	7946	3409	1316.64	8862	2	879	879	0	8862	879	18	Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
844	81	832	Thursday	13:49:31	5914	2748	782.53	7613	0	2148	2148	0	7613	2148	29	Connection Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
856	29	1585	Tuesday	09:46:26	3853	1356	277.39	8394	0	1387	1387	0	8394	1387	67	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
864	53	3430	Wednesday	11:09:52	7897	3283	516.47	7808	0	1953	1953	0	7808	1953	59	GCS Override Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
869	135	2404	Monday	19:08:05	4900	1498	1313.47	8833	0	928	928	0	8833	928	22	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
873	116	2959	Friday	17:17:38	6567	2297	1129.39	7662	0	2099	2099	0	7662	2099	37	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
882	53	1852	Sunday	11:07:19	3741	1139	512.20	7174	0	2587	2587	0	7174	2587	48	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	UA approaches Emergency landing site
901	8	3091	Friday	09:05:09	7726	3101	86.94	8443	0	1318	1318	0	8443	1318	80	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
903	48	2494	Sunday	10:39:06	5241	1988	485.17	7174	0	2587	2587	0	7174	2587	37	Short Circuit / Overload	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
912	83	327	Tuesday	14:00:24	7516	3418	850.67	7759	0	2002	2002	0	7759	2002	71	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
916	84	2089	Saturday	14:09:06	4060	1150	815.19	7111	0	2500	2500	0	7111	2500	30	Connection Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
924	30	148	Sunday	08:49:07	7828	3469	283.25	8736	0	1025	1025	0	8736	1025	68	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	UA approaches Emergency landing site
930	132	2382	Saturday	18:50:07	7852	3226	1286.66	7759	0	2002	2002	0	7759	2002	75	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
930	60	2171	Saturday	11:48:48	4245	1199	591.33	7125	0	2636	2636	0	7125	2636	69	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
941	13	1400	Wednesday	07:52:30	4104	1632	320.83	8345	0	1416	1416	0	8345	1416	16	Engine Anomaly	Central ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.
951	63	24	Saturday	12:52:51	7932	3438	604.78	7125	0	2636	2636	0	7125	2636	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing).	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
97	62	508	Saturday	11:57:50	6974	3222	996.39	7125	0	2636	2636	1	7125	2636	34	Connection Failure	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
974	80	2125	Sunday	13:45:46	4137	1169	776.28	6979	0	2762	2762	0	6979	2762	72	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
981	50	2470	Monday	10:50:45	5157	1559	484.61	7906	0	1953	1953	0	7906	1953	67	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
987	63	2377	Sunday	14:03:43	4641	1420	806.22	6979	2	2762	2762	1	6979	2762	21	Engine Fire	UA structural desintegration - Debris Impact
988	17	708	Monday	07:34:47	6367	2967	157.97	8296	0	1465	1465	0	8296	1465	15	Engine Anomaly	Central ground impact point below flight path with B/G Ratio.
990	70	2907	Monday	12:45:31	6731	2396	690.86	7906	1	1953	1953	0	7906	1953	68	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
99	17	800	Monday	07:34:56	6032	2804	168.22	8296	0	1465	1465	0	8296	1465	73	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
993	79	1050	Saturday	13:38:11	5087	2289	763.64	7111	0	2500	2500	0	7111	2500	78	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path

11.4.12 Kemberg – C5

11.4.12.1 Kemberg – C5 – Phase 1

776	84	3229	Saturday	11:18:03	8846	3346	530.08	7153	7153	0	2648	2646	0	2435	2430	0	971	971	0	9503	2817	19	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
776	95	1187	Thursday	10:20:00	8304	2930	434.06	7839	7839	0	1960	1960	0	2741	2739	0	665	665	0	10578	1626	8	Engine Out	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
788	102	710	Thursday	16:23:43	7501	3037	839.56	7790	7790	0	2009	2009	0	2758	2749	0	648	648	0	10539	2857	20	Generator Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
794	47	2508	Wednesday	08:52:24	7208	3448	387.08	8625	8625	0	1274	1274	0	2844	2833	0	562	562	0	11360	1826	3	Engine Out	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
796	113	1114	Thursday	18:19:01	6438	2930	831.72	7790	7790	0	2009	2009	0	2758	2747	0	648	648	0	10537	2857	81	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
796	125	2024	Sunday	15:22:26	8615	2937	5242.04	7298	7298	0	2101	2101	0	2730	2710	0	648	648	0	10514	2857	71	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
796	23	1884	Sunday	07:21:52	8681	2937	185.17	8094	8094	0	2101	2101	0	2730	2718	0	298	298	0	10513	2857	8	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
798	13	350	Monday	08:55:15	8508	3698	92.08	8280	8280	0	1519	1519	1	2948	2938	0	480	480	0	11218	1973	40	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Delta Impact
803	87	1881	Thursday	15:30:26	8238	1146	781.00	7620	7620	0	2107	2107	0	2741	2737	0	665	665	0	10574	2172	8	Engine Out	UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
807	82	3520	Monday	12:48:03	9030	3795	486.11	8250	8250	0	1960	1960	0	2741	2735	0	665	665	0	10574	2525	85	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
815	78	983	Thursday	15:44:05	7135	3450	474.86	8133	8133	0	1666	1666	2	2741	2732	0	665	665	0	10665	2331	82	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Delta Impact
831	164	1388	Thursday	19:33:17	8856	2382	1353.47	8988	8988	0	931	931	1	3194	3186	0	222	222	0	12034	1153	83	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Delta Impact
837	70	2142	Thursday	11:48:25	6118	1709	577.36	8133	8133	0	2107	2107	0	2741	2735	0	665	665	0	10628	2331	71	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
838	67	2778	Saturday	11:32:19	7788	2429	563.89	7153	7153	0	2046	2046	0	2741	2735	0	665	665	0	10668	2331	19	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
839	84	1486	Monday	10:44:59	5735	2214	774.97	8711	8711	0	2008	2008	0	2680	2680	0	971	971	0	10428	2331	19	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
877	47	3071	Thursday	08:53:54	9016	3844	389.86	8329	8329	0	1470	1470	0	2646	2632	0	871	871	0	9505	2817	12	Degradation of altitude	UA approaches Emergency landing site
882	164	1181	Sunday	18:32:29	6214	2902	1354.07	7947	7947	0	2038	2038	0	2716	2705	0	290	290	0	12017	1172	47	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
889	65	1073	Thursday	15:20:04	5707	3781	612.54	7153	7153	0	2101	2101	0	2730	2723	0	665	665	0	10574	2331	41	Central Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA structural degradation - Delta Impact
891	171	204	Friday	15:07:59	8658	2981	811.22	7498	7498	0	2103	2103	0	2737	2732	0	699	699	0	10118	2332	71	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	Central UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
900	138	725	Thursday	15:43:22	7544	3623	972.31	7790	7790	0	2009	2009	0	2758	2752	0	648	648	0	10542	2857	57	OCIS Overide Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
911	102	2981	Thursday	15:48:48	8241	2938	846.72	8098	8098	0	2103	2103	0	2737	2732	0	787	787	0	10548	2858	38	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
913	153	1473	Friday	18:38:38	5758	2250	1354.39	7498	7498	0	2203	2203	0	2724	2716	0	682	682	0	10512	2985	34	Generator Failure	Central UA ground impact tangential to trajectory
921	39	1158	Monday	07:31:11	6208	2846	182.00	8280	8280	0	1519	1519	0	2948	2933	0	480	480	0	11219	1979	28	Generator Failure	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
931	67	2125	Sunday	11:31:25	6043	1701	552.39	7251	7251	0	2548	2548	0	2603	2609	0	903	903	0	9730	3451	21	Engine Fire	UA structural degradation - Delta Impact
934	29	2503	Wednesday	08:03:30	8241	2787	259.83	8625	8625	0	1274	1274	0	2844	2837	0	562	562	0	11362	1826	60	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	UA approaches Emergency landing site
938	28	2843	Thursday	08:18:02	7488	2237	239.08	8329	8329	0	1470	1470	0	2646	2639	0	871	871	0	9720	1881	72	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
945	127	2093	Thursday	18:31:11	8182	2759	1029.17	7386	7386	1	2401	2401	0	2700	2708	0	886	886	0	9516	2857	62	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
948	141	3340	Monday	11:41:29	8909	3540	1186.14	7153	7153	0	2046	2046	0	2707	2700	0	1005	1005	0	9502	2857	78	Separation of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
965	127	1907	Thursday	18:29:48	7813	2759	1046.89	7486	7486	0	2401	2401	0	2707	2700	0	903	903	0	10136	2857	17	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
966	112	544	Friday	15:13:16	8058	3648	922.11	7498	7498	0	2107	2107	0	2737	2730	0	699	699	0	10136	3002	14	Engine Assembly	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
968	126	1844	Monday	10:52:48	7834	3941	654.08	8054	8054	0	2101	2101	0	2730	2741	0	290	290	0	12054	3011	62	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the UA	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
969	107	1284	Wednesday	18:18:31	8021	2939	825.26	7839	7839	0	1960	1960	0	2741	2741	0	665	665	0	10231	2858	17	Engine Fire	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
972	158	3381	Saturday	18:05:53	8781	3268	1330.81	8688	8688	0	833	833	0	3082	3068	0	324	324	0	12034	1157	3	Engine Out	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
973	174	1013	Sunday	15:24:42	5448	2931	841.17	6988	6988	0	2891	2891	0	2939	2933	0	387	387	0	8546	3058	14	Degradation of altitude	Central UA ground impact point below flight path
974	111	785	Monday	08:50:00	7425	3669	84.72	8280	8280	0	1519	1519	0	2948	2948	0	480	480	0	11216	1979	22	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
981	118	2814	Monday	15:51:15	7963	2951	985.42	7741	7741	0	2004	2004	0	2765	2765	0	716	716	0	10458	2774	19	Engine Assembly	UA approaches Emergency landing site
987	48	3521	Sunday	09:28:48	9031	3786	388.03	8623	8623	0	1178	1178	0	3031	3020	0	375	375	0	11443	1851	25	Generator Failure	UA approaches Emergency landing site
990	167	687	Monday	18:47:14	7955	3682	1319.72	8986	8986	0	833	833	0	3194	3194	0	222	222	0	12138	1058	46	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	Central UA ground impact point below flight path

	UADayPit	Hit	TOT_ATB	Hit_TOT_OTW	UADayPitCor	Hit_TOT_mean_ATB	Hit_TOT_mean_OTW	Hit_TOT_mean_ATB/Hit_TOT_mean_OTW	Hit_TOT_mean_ATB/Hit_TOT_mean_OTW	k_x_cross_ATB	k_x_cross_OTW	b_x_cross_ATB^2	b_x_cross_OTW^2
rPubs	1400	10	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
rEubs	215	25	0	25	0	0	0	0	0.21428571	0.21428571	0.14285714	0.14285714	
rEubs_cor	200	41	0	41	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
rMisses	14	52	0	52	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
x_cross_ATB	0.00837429	56	0	56	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
x_cross_OTW	0.00837429	64	0	64	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
c2ATB	0.0082451	66	0	66	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
c2OTW	0.00918867	85	0	85	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
cATB	21.3328751	91	0	91	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
cOTW	0.00189071	92	0	92	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
tOTW	0.00487752	101	0	101	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
tOTW	26.8180341	108	0	108	0	2	2	0	0.14285714	0.08671429	0.10285714	0.04	
tOTW	0.00710052	112	0	112	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
tOTW	0.11567595	113	0	113	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
cTOT	26.6317775	120	0	120	0	1	1	0	0.07142857	0.08671429	0.01428571	0.04	
		154	0	154	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		156	0	156	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		159	0	159	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		163	0	163	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		178	0	178	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		206	0	206	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		206	0	206	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		229	0	229	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		238	0	238	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		238	0	238	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		255	0	255	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		255	0	255	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		265	0	274	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		270	0	284	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		271	0	308	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		274	0	314	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		294	0	319	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		308	0	321	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		311	0	328	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		319	0	329	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		321	0	332	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		328	0	369	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		329	0	370	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		332	0	374	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		369	0	386	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		370	0	388	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		374	0	389	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		386	0	390	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		388	0	397	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		389	0	398	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		390	0	414	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		397	0	421	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		398	0	426	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		414	0	427	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		421	0	432	25	0	0	0	1.785714286	0.08671429	0.04	2.94879592	
		421	0	439	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		426	0	443	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		427	0	454	2	3	0	0	0.21428571	0.14285714	0.32857143	0.121232875	
		432	25	454	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		432	0	455	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		439	0	472	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		443	0	474	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		443	0	476	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		451	0	490	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		454	0	495	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		455	0	496	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		472	0	505	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		474	0	521	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		474	0	535	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		476	0	545	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		480	0	547	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		495	0	554	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		496	0	555	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		505	0	572	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		521	0	575	0	4	4	0	0.285714286	0.08671429	0.245714286	0.04	
		526	0	576	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		545	0	584	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		547	0	588	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		554	0	607	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		555	0	615	0	0	0	0	0.07142857	0.08671429	0.01428571	0.04	
		572	0	616	0	2	0	0	0.14285714	0.08671429	0.10285714	0.04	
		575	0	626	5	3	0	0	0.357142857	0.21428571	0.28571429	0.08377469	
		576	0	629	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		584	0	633	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		588	0	636	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		607	0	637	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		615	0	641	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		616	0	642	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		626	0	649	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		629	0	651	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		633	0	658	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		636	0	669	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		637	0	671	24	2	0	0	1.74285714	0.14285714	0.14285714	2.7083751	
		641	0	674	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		642	0	675	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		649	0	687	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		651	0	688	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		658	0	694	0	1	1	0	0.07142857	0.08671429	0.01428571	0.04	
		669	0	698	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		671	0	700	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		674	0	705	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		675	0	708	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		675	0	712	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		687	0	727	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		688	0	740	1	1	0	0	0.07142857	0.08671429	0.01428571	0.04	
		694	0	743	0	0	0	0	0.14285714	0.08671429	0.10285714	0.04	
		698	0	745	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		700	0	747	0	2	1	0	0.07142857	0.08671429	0.01428571	0.04	
		705	0	751	0	1	0	0	0.07142857	0.08671429	0.01428571	0.04	
		708	0	753	0	0	0	0	0	0.08671429	0.08671429	0.04	0.04
		712	0	758	0	0	0	0	0</				

11.4.12.2 *Kemberg – C5 – Phase 2*

700	79	1620	Sunday	12:30:30	5643	2014	650.83	7281	7281	0	2548	2548	0	2503	2498	0	903	903	0	9749	2451	75	Degradation of attitude	LA approach Emergency landing site
702	101	580	Tuesday	14:48:23	80717	3262	888.87	7862	7862	0	2707	2741	0	2741	2740	0	865	865	0	2772	38	Short Circuit / Overheat	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
707	133	730	Sunday	16:53:59	7326	3522	1088.81	7386	7386	0	2481	2481	0	2481	2516	0	886	886	0	2087	73	Degradation of attitude	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
712	159	1700	Friday	14:59:50	56229	1918	666.89	7481	7481	0	2669	2669	0	2669	2669	0	899	899	0	3023	38	OC's Overide Wrong comments to the flight control surfaces.	Central LA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate	
715	72	2410	Monday	11:06:04	6880	1966	584.88	7740	7740	0	2775	2767	0	2775	2767	0	831	831	0	2089	71	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central LA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate	
722	41	3281	Monday	06:35:18	62377	2675	626.83	7520	7520	0	2638	2638	0	2638	2634	0	860	860	0	1939	30	Connection Failure	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
725	81	2111	Thursday	18:25:18	8869	2763	753.83	7740	7740	0	2638	2638	0	2638	2638	0	848	848	0	2087	30	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
732	133	1530	Thursday	18:56:10	5697	2148	1058.81	7530	7530	0	2499	2499	0	2499	2497	0	903	903	0	3402	7	Engine Out	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
735	29	3298	Thursday	08:54:01	8637	3486	288.79	8239	8239	0	2499	2499	0	2499	2499	0	911	911	0	1881	41	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	LA approach Emergency landing site	
738	44	2384	Monday	08:37:20	6713	1874	362.22	8359	8359	0	1470	1470	0	1470	1470	0	885	885	0	1881	22	Generator Failure	LA approach Emergency landing site	
742	29	3298	Thursday	09:13:48	8987	3577	323.80	8329	8329	1	1470	1470	0	1470	1470	0	945	945	0	2016	18	Engine Anomaly	Central LA ground impact point below Right path with BG Ratio.	
743	53	1625	Monday	16:21:04	5643	2014	435.14	7741	7741	0	2058	2058	0	2058	2058	0	831	831	0	10504	289	9 Engine Fail	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
748	101	2900	Monday	09:41:42	8172	2703	862.88	8688	8688	0	2891	2891	0	2891	2891	0	787	787	0	3058	22	Generator Failure	LA approach Emergency landing site	
748	38	1627	Monday	08:56:27	5642	2011	434.11	8359	8359	0	1470	1470	0	1470	1470	0	885	885	0	2089	19	Engine Fail	Central LA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate	
749	32	3228	Wednesday	08:38:46	8862	3389	284.84	8235	8235	1	1274	1274	0	1274	1274	0	862	862	0	11362	73	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	LA approach Emergency landing site	
772	28	2028	Wednesday	08:17:11	5906	1700	228.87	8525	8525	0	1374	1374	0	1374	1374	0	862	862	0	11362	24	Generator Failure	LA ground impact tangential to trajectory	
786	43	3228	Friday	08:38:46	8862	3389	284.84	8235	8235	1	1274	1274	0	1274	1274	0	862	862	0	11362	8	Engine Out	LA ground impact tangential to trajectory	
794	19	2028	Wednesday	10:09:30	7145	2064	1316.81	8888	8888	0	1274	1274	0	1274	1274	0	862	862	0	11362	1386	24 Generator Failure	LA ground impact tangential to trajectory	
794	19	2028	Wednesday	10:09:30	7145	2064	1316.81	8888	8888	0	1274	1274	0	1274	1274	0	862	862	0	11362	1386	24 Generator Failure	LA ground impact tangential to trajectory	
801	61	1611	Wednesday	10:50:50	5621	1922	612.80	8231	8231	0	1470	1470	0	1470	1470	0	860	860	0	11181	11	Engine Fail	Central LA ground impact point below Right path with BG Ratio.	
817	18	1585	Friday	07:26:46	5614	2101	144.64	8280	8280	0	1519	1519	0	1519	1519	0	484	484	0	11181	47	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	LA ground impact in right direction with deviating trajectory.	
818	122	871	Sunday	16:03:38	6823	3213	1008.80	7386	7386	0	2481	2481	0	2481	2481	0	886	886	0	2087	15	Engine Anomaly	Central ground impact point below Right path with BG Ratio.	
820	113	415	Wednesday	15:16:03	8383	3941	930.11	7839	7839	0	1980	1980	0	1980	1980	0	920	920	0	10516	289	15 Engine Anomaly	Central ground impact point below Right path with BG Ratio.	
831	41	2700	Friday	03:37:07	6233	1929	345.30	8437	8437	0	1372	1372	0	1372	1372	0	840	840	0	11281	19	Engine Fail	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
841	39	922	Monday	08:49:55	8168	3883	282.22	8329	8329	0	1470	1470	0	1470	1470	0	885	885	0	1881	4	Engine Out	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
853	79	2028	Saturday	12:32:30	8658	3950	654.19	7153	7153	0	2046	2046	0	2046	2046	0	871	871	0	11219	78	Connection Failure	LA approach Emergency landing site	
858	13	2960	Monday	07:02:44	8205	2729	106.26	8280	8280	0	1519	1519	0	1519	1519	0	480	480	0	11219	59	OC's Overide Wrong comments to the flight control surfaces.	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
880	115	448	Friday	15:28:04	8364	3522	848.76	7486	7486	0	2203	2203	0	2203	2203	0	699	699	0	3023	58	OC's Overide Wrong comments to the flight control surfaces.	Central LA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate	
880	109	3480	Saturday	19:41:09	9033	3781	1388.81	8986	8986	0	833	833	0	833	832	0	324	324	0	12019	1157	82 Separation of essential UA parts (ail or main wing).	LA structural disintegration - Delta Impact	
881	128	2268	Friday	17:30:20	7204	2158	628.83	7486	7486	0	2203	2203	0	2203	2203	0	699	699	0	1157	82	Separation of essential UA parts (ail or main wing).	LA structural disintegration - Delta Impact	
881	79	2338	Saturday	12:31:29	6883	1828	652.47	7153	7153	0	2426	2426	0	2426	2426	0	871	871	0	3617	39	Short Circuit / Overheat	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
881	79	2338	Saturday	12:31:29	6883	1828	652.47	7153	7153	0	2426	2426	0	2426	2426	0	871	871	0	3617	39	Short Circuit / Overheat	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
877	109	2888	Thursday	15:37:52	8888	2634	862.86	7839	7839	0	2107	2107	0	2107	2107	0	885	885	0	2712	28	Connection Failure	LA ground impact tangential to trajectory	
877	58	1284	Monday	10:35:30	6032	2637	458.19	7839	7839	0	2107	2107	0	2107	2107	0	885	885	0	2625	51	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	LA approach Emergency landing site	
878	9	303	Wednesday	18:40:23	8439	3951	61.38	8182	8182	0	1617	1617	0	1617	1617	0	862	862	0	11017	8	Separation of essential UA parts (ail or main wing).	LA structural disintegration - Delta Impact	
880	60	3113	Monday	10:57:59	8665	3138	498.64	7741	7741	0	2058	2058	0	2058	2058	0	831	831	0	2899	51	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (Oscillations)	LA approach Emergency landing site	
882	1	120	Wednesday	06:01:16	9610	3914	4.44	8262	8262	0	1617	1617	0	1617	1617	0	862	862	0	2799	37	Short Circuit / Flight Control Surfaces	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
900	124	1003	Saturday	16:13:37	6742	3152	1022.72	7832	7832	0	2107	2107	0	2107	2107	0	733	733	0	2940	72	Degradation of attitude	LA approach Emergency landing site	
902	111	1223	Thursday	15:30:00	6070	2670	665.28	7780	7780	0	2009	2009	0	2009	2009	0	648	648	0	10562	47	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	LA ground impact in right direction with deviating trajectory.	
908	61	931	Wednesday	10:59:20	8171	3884	498.32	8133	8133	8	2107	2107	0	2107	2107	0	733	733	0	10271	2867	81 Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the LA	LA structural disintegration - Delta Impact	
907	110	2281	Thursday	15:30:44	6067	3901	905.58	7780	7780	0	2009	2009	0	2009	2009	0	648	648	0	10562	2857	38 Short Circuit / Overheat	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
908	148	3317	Friday	18:08:19	8945	3465	1210.56	7486	7486	0	2203	2203	0	2203	2203	0	682	682	0	10213	2885	78 Degradation of attitude	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
909	39	3147	Saturday	10:58:50	8629	3921	905.58	8133	8133	0	1470	1470	0	1470	1470	0	733	733	0	10562	2857	38 Short Circuit / Overheat	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
911	56	210	Monday	10:04:12	8777	3978	470.56	7486	7486	0	2203	2203	0	2203	2203	0	682	682	0	10504	2889	50 OC's Overide Wrong comments to the flight control surfaces.	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
911	56	210	Monday	10:04:12	8777	3978	470.56	7486	7486	0	2203	2203	0	2203	2203	0	682	682	0	10504	2889	50 OC's Overide Wrong comments to the flight control surfaces.	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
922	63	3123	Thursday	11:42:47	8689	3142	812.83	8133	8133	0	1470	1470	0	1470	1470	0	860	860	0	2113	7	Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	Central LA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate	
925	19	162	Friday	08:04:26	8819	2887	81.88	8280	8280	0	1519	1519	0	1519	1519	0	484	484	0	11181	213	82 Separation of essential UA parts (ail or main wing).	LA structural disintegration - Delta Impact	
925	19	162	Friday	08:04:26	8819	2887	81.88	8280	8280	0	1519	1519	0	1519	1519	0	484	484	0	11181	213	82 Separation of essential UA parts (ail or main wing).	LA structural disintegration - Delta Impact	
925	19	162	Friday	08:04:26	8819	2887	81.88	8280	8280	0	1519	1519	0	1519	1519	0	484	484	0	11181	213	82 Separation of essential UA parts (ail or main wing).	LA structural disintegration - Delta Impact	
949	121	2818	Thursday	16:00:56	7394	2195	7349	7389	7389	0	2499	2499	0	2499	2499	0	903	903	0	3234	72	Degradation of attitude	LA approach Emergency landing site	
963	18	70	Thursday	07:34:43	8958	3919	141.19	8378	8378	0	1471	1471	0	1471	1471	0	814	814	0	2028	38	Connection Failure	Central LA ground impact point below Right path	
969	8	1208	Wednesday	08:28:40	6025	2571	44.47	8182	8182	3	1617	1617	0	1617	1617	0	862	862	0	11019	219	18 Engine Anomaly	Central LA ground impact point below Right path with BG Ratio.	
989	160	428	Wednesday	19:30:54	8389	3848	1381.53	8888	8888	0	831	831	0	831	831	0	205	205	0	12654	1138	80 Degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy.	LA approach Emergency landing site	

11.4.13 Bad Köstritz – C6

11.4.13.1 *Bad Köstritz – C6 – Phase 1*

O.R.C. 55.02 - Simulation Summary

Table with columns: LA Parameters, RTDOW (min), Wagon (in), LCP (in), FCS (in), and other simulation parameters.

Table with columns: Genetimed map parameters, Area (sq ft), PPL (ft), and other map-related parameters.

Table with columns: City, State, and other location-related parameters.

Table with columns: Sim File Path, Date, and other simulation file parameters.

Main simulation data table with columns: PPL, RTDOW, Wagon, LCP, FCS, and a large grid of numerical values representing simulation results for various parameters and locations.

Table with columns: Column, and a large grid of text-based simulation results, including notes on engine fire, degradation of lateral and horizontal navigation data, and other operational details.

960	136	1595	Monday	17:40:57	4021	4221	1108.28	2642	2842	0	929	929	0	4646	4646	0	1591	1591	0	7290	2020	81	Separation of essential LA parts (lat or main wing)	Central LA ground impact point below right path
964	26	1773	Friday	16:47:12	3782	4128	478.68	2621	2821	0	770	770	0	5023	5023	0	1380	1380	0	7014	1028	82	Separation of essential LA parts (lat or main wing)	LA structural disintegration - Debris Impact
965	144	3353	Sunday	16:25:17	7790	2040	1242.14	2608	2808	0	965	965	0	4420	4420	0	1810	1810	0	7035	2775	46	Wrong commands to the right control surfaces (Cyclic/roll)	LA approach Emergency landing site
968	120	3526	Thursday	16:54:24	3780	4020	1391.23	2678	2878	0	930	930	0	4646	4646	0	1591	1591	0	7290	2046	61	Wrong commands to the right control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the LA	Central LA ground impact point below right path
970	186	2780	Thursday	16:36:28	3880	3040	1381.58	3171	3171	21	940	940	0	4646	4646	0	1591	1591	0	7290	2060	62	Separation of essential LA parts (lat or main wing)	LA structural disintegration - Debris Impact
970	83	1344	Thursday	13:08:37	4021	4224	1711.05	2785	2785	0	786	786	1	4832	4832	0	1404	1404	0	7620	2150	21	Engine Fire	LA structural disintegration - Debris Impact
997	152	1912	Wednesday	17:21:12	4080	4228	1123.67	2642	2842	0	929	929	0	4646	4646	0	1591	1591	0	7290	2040	83	Separation of essential LA parts (lat or main wing)	LA structural disintegration - Debris Impact

11.4.13.2 *Bad Köstritz – C6 – Phase 2*

81	5	3348	Sunday	06:20:30	7502	2837	42 53	3446	3446	0	125	125	0	6145	6145	0	94	94	0	9981	210	25	Connection Failure	Central UA ground impact point below Right path
911	105	1071	Monday	15:00:40	3051	4162	801 14	2797	2797	0	804	804	0	4991	4991	0	1343	1343	0	7795	2025	46	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	UA ground impact in flight direction with deviating trajectory
918	20	3100	Tuesday	09:00:25	4990	2851	300 72	3071	3071	0	500	500	0	5427	5427	0	812	812	0	9498	1312	79	Dispersion of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	Central UA ground impact point below Right path
923	30	2301	Saturday	13:07:25	3080	2821	174 20	2821	2821	0	750	750	0	4892	4892	0	1362	1362	0	7716	2062	71	Dispersion of essential UA parts	Central UA ground impact point below Right path
928	50	2302	Saturday	16:24:40	3080	3023	144 63	2608	2608	0	860	860	0	4836	4836	0	1391	1391	0	7724	2005	25	Connection Failure	UA ground impact horizontal to trajectory
943	197	2367	Friday	18:30:52	4470	3474	1391 44	3321	3321	0	250	250	0	5739	5739	0	500	500	0	9080	750	42	Partial Lock of Flight Control Surfaces	Central UA ground impact point below Right path
945	70	2505	Tuesday	09:13:08	5070	3716	31 31	3446	3446	0	125	125	0	6145	6145	0	94	94	0	9981	210	25	Connection Failure	Central UA ground impact point below Right path
950	74	337	Friday	12:16:16	7331	3272	630 53	2821	2821	0	750	750	0	5053	5053	0	1186	1186	0	7814	1936	35	Connection Failure	UA ground impact horizontal to trajectory
954	101	1100	Tuesday	18:04:46	4990	4146	1303 03	3297	3297	0	304	304	0	5864	5864	0	375	375	0	8331	676	38	Short Circuit - Overheat	Central UA ground impact point below Right path
959	132	2590	Wednesday	17:21:44	5288	3246	1136 25	2642	2642	1	929	929	0	4523	4523	0	1716	1716	0	7885	2040	16	Engine Anomaly	Central ground impact point below Right path with BIG Platin

	UADAYProt	HIT_TOT_ATB	HIT_TOT_OTW	UADAYProt	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB/Ph	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW/Ph	x_h_cross_ATB	x_h_cross_OTW	(x_h_cross_ATB)^2	(x_h_cross_OTW)^2
rProbes	200	11	0	0	21	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
sATB	1.1038396	9	0	0	11	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
nEvents	193	0	0	0	21	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
nEvents_cor	178	2	3	2	2	3	0.142857143	-0.892142857	0.094285714	0.795918879	0.008889796	0.008889796
mission	14	43	0	0	43	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
x_cross_ATB	1.025	48	0	0	48	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
x_cross_OTW	0.12	48	0	0	50	0	1	0	0.071428571	-0.048571429	1.07125	0.002359184
s_cross_TOT	1.155	50	0	1	54	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		54	0	0	69	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
sATB	1.1038396	69	0	0	78	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
sATB	1.1038396	83	0	0	87	0	1	2.214285714	0.071428571	1.179285714	1.390747968	0.002359184
IATB	13.797039	87	31	1	87	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
sOTW	0.0137894	87	0	0	91	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
sOTW	0.174281	91	0	0	110	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
OTW	13.247554	110	0	0	123	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
sTOT	1.3268434	123	0	0	132	32	0	2.285714286	1.250714286	1.564286234	1.944286234	0.002359184
sTOT	1.1562194	132	32	0	134	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
ITOT	14.004907	134	0	0	138	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		138	0	0	143	0	1	1.214285714	0.179285714	-0.048571429	0.032143307	0.002359184
		143	17	1	148	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		148	0	0	153	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		153	0	0	158	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		158	0	0	163	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		163	0	0	168	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		168	0	0	173	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		173	0	0	178	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		178	0	0	183	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		183	0	0	188	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		188	0	0	193	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		193	0	0	198	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		198	0	0	203	1	0	0.071428571	-0.963571429	-0.12	0.928469898	0.0144
		203	1	0	211	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		211	0	0	222	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		222	0	0	234	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		234	0	0	243	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		243	0	0	250	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		250	0	0	258	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		258	0	0	269	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		269	0	0	280	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		280	0	0	292	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		292	0	0	296	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		296	0	0	311	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		311	0	0	319	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		319	0	0	330	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		330	0	0	337	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		337	0	0	352	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		352	0	0	359	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		359	0	0	376	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		376	0	0	377	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		377	0	0	382	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		382	0	0	380	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		380	0	0	383	0	0	0.214285714	-0.820714286	-0.12	0.673571939	0.0144
		383	0	0	386	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		386	0	0	397	0	2	0.142857143	-1.035	0.022857143	1.07125	0.000522449
		397	0	0	399	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		399	0	0	413	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		413	0	0	425	0	2	0.142857143	-0.892142857	-0.12	0.795918879	0.0144
		425	2	0	442	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		442	0	0	456	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		456	0	0	462	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		462	0	0	477	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		477	0	0	478	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		478	0	0	480	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		480	0	0	486	0	29	2.071428571	1.036428571	-0.12	1.07184184	0.0144
		486	0	0	507	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		507	0	0	508	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		508	0	0	513	0	0	0.142857143	-0.892142857	-0.12	0.795918879	0.0144
		513	0	0	523	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		523	0	0	525	0	0	0.428571429	-0.606428571	-0.12	0.367755612	0.000522449
		525	0	0	535	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		535	0	0	542	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		542	0	0	543	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		543	0	0	547	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		547	0	0	549	0	0	0.285714286	-0.749285714	-0.12	0.561420062	0.0144
		549	0	0	551	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		551	0	0	589	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		589	0	0	591	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		591	0	0	610	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		610	0	0	615	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		615	0	0	634	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		634	0	0	643	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		643	0	0	648	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		648	0	0	650	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		650	0	0	659	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		659	0	0	693	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		693	0	0	706	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		706	0	0	727	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		727	0	0	730	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		730	0	0	735	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		735	0	0	743	0	0	0.285714286	-0.749285714	-0.12	0.561420062	0.0144
		743	0	0	747	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		747	0	0	753	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		753	0	0	764	0	61	4.357142857	3.322142857	-0.12	11.03663316	0.0144
		764	0	0	767	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		767	0	0	776	0	0	0.214285714	-0.892142857	-0.12	0.795918879	0.008889796
		776	0	0	778	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		778	0	0	781	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		781	0	0	787	0	0	0.071428571	-0.963571429	-0.12	0.928469898	0.002359184
		787	0	0	803	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		803	0	0	805	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		805	0	0	811	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		811	0	0	823	61	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		823	61	0	823	0	0	0.142857143	-0.892142857	-0.12	0.795918879	0.0144
		823	0	0	830	2	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		830	2	0	838	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		838	0	0	843	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		843	0	0	845	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		845	0	0	850	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		850	0	0	854	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		854	0	0	860	1	0	0.071428571	-0.963571429	-0.12	0.928469898	0.002359184
		860	1	0	899	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		899	0	0	909	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		909	0	0	919	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		919	0	0	923	0	0	0	-1.035	-0.12	1.07125	0.0144
		923	0	0	930	3	0	0.142857143	-0.892142857	-0.12	0.795918879	0.0144
		930	3	0								

11.4.14 Kroppenstedt – C7

11.4.14.1 Kroppenstedt – C7 – Phase 1

756	132	2460	Sunday	19:29:31	5034	2882	1248:28	1310	1310	1	130	130	0	3078	3078	0	342	342	0	4980	472	80	Deposition of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
757	17	2264	Saturday	07:42:11	4462	3033	170:30	1308	1308	0	172	172	0	3778	3778	0	342	342	0	5144	314	51	Strong currents in the Right control surface (Cable/straps)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
757	14	2534	Thursday	08:23:10	4602	3046	38:31	1031	1231	1	209	209	0	3296	3296	0	724	724	0	4237	633	18	Engine Failure	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
773	23	2583	Wednesday	17:24:52	7042	3116	11:05	1105	1105	0	245	245	0	3075	3075	0	845	845	0	4270	1190	47	Control Loss of Flight Control Surfaces	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
781	1	2584	Wednesday	07:01:25	4056	2478	1:08	632	632	0	238	238	0	3339	3339	0	864	864	0	4168	805	25	Control Failure	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
785	113	2752	Monday	17:45:28	6544	2955	1:01	1051	1051	0	309	309	0	2854	2854	0	1158	1158	0	3885	1075	37	Short Circuit / Overheat	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
785	48	1234	Monday	14:30:23	4072	4644	3:54	1137	1137	0	303	303	0	3175	3175	0	1463	1463	0	4312	1146	9	Engine Out	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
793	104	1058	Tuesday	18:30:01	3246	4158	1:03:30	1030	1030	0	300	300	0	3105	3105	0	825	825	0	4170	1285	71	Deposition of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	Control UA ground impact point on a random Map coordinate
793	21	2264	Thursday	08:07:26	7042	3116	11:05	1105	1105	0	245	245	0	3075	3075	0	845	845	0	4270	1190	47	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
796	70	2918	Sunday	13:08:30	5207	2975	7:14	1110	1010	0	425	425	0	3010	3010	0	905	905	0	4130	1330	9	Engine Out	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
801	31	2262	Wednesday	09:00:26	4524	3025	11:05	1105	1105	0	188	188	0	3266	3266	0	805	805	0	4007	1081	80	Deposition of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
81	106	2648	Thursday	17:01:59	4931	2948	11:03:30	1072	1072	0	360	360	0	2994	2992	0	1056	1056	0	4024	1436	42	Deposition of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
814	40	1182	Thursday	10:01:43	4622	4095	4:02:39	1152	1152	0	288	288	0	3294	3296	0	1184	1184	0	4388	1072	21	Engine Failure	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
826	66	3237	Thursday	18:01:58	4946	2951	1:06:19	1091	1091	0	389	389	0	2834	2834	0	1186	1186	0	3885	1075	42	Control Loss of Flight Control Surfaces	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
834	54	3376	Monday	11:31:35	8281	3252	5:52:47	1137	1137	0	303	303	0	3278	3274	0	744	744	0	4411	1047	21	Engine Failure	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
835	48	2471	Tuesday	14:40:43	4943	2923	8:57:46	1130	1130	0	310	310	0	3290	3290	0	784	784	0	4350	1094	20	Control Loss of Flight Control Surfaces	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
837	110	3013	Thursday	17:16:05	8431	3076	11:26:55	1072	1072	0	308	308	0	2954	2954	0	1086	1086	0	4026	1434	75	Deposition of altitude	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
843	87	2822	Friday	14:43:31	6323	3242	8:59:22	1101	1101	0	339	339	0	3195	3195	0	825	825	0	4290	1164	80	Deposition of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
847	70	683	Sunday	14:00:42	6884	4238	8:01:17	1010	1010	0	425	425	0	3114	3114	0	905	905	0	4130	1330	9	Engine Out	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
853	30	1051	Saturday	09:00:04	3162	4126	3:00:25	1224	1224	0	216	216	0	3264	3264	0	805	805	0	4007	1081	80	Deposition of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
859	43	2268	Wednesday	10:22:05	4349	3000	4:38:31	1105	1105	0	245	245	0	3075	3075	0	845	845	0	4270	1190	47	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
861	50	1111	Friday	10:22:26	4622	4095	4:02:39	1152	1152	0	338	338	0	3190	3190	0	1164	1164	0	4320	1099	79	Deposition of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
862	36	3480	Wednesday	09:41:03	8414	3646	5:38:48	1152	1152	0	288	288	0	3294	3294	0	1186	1186	0	3885	1075	42	Control Loss of Flight Control Surfaces	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
862	36	3480	Wednesday	09:41:03	8414	3646	5:38:48	1152	1152	0	188	188	0	3356	3356	0	694	694	0	4008	852	37	Short Circuit / Overheat	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
866	114	2908	Sunday	17:30:17	5041	3165	11:52:51	1087	1087	0	303	303	0	3074	3074	0	1044	1044	0	4061	1299	79	Deposition of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
900	76	2174	Wednesday	10:44:47	4072	3107	7:14:47	1152	1152	0	288	288	0	2954	2954	0	1086	1086	0	4026	1374	74	Deposition of altitude	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
913	31	2268	Wednesday	09:00:47	4541	2974	11:05	1105	1105	0	188	188	0	3264	3264	0	805	805	0	4007	1081	80	Deposition of lateral and horizontal navigation data accuracy	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
917	104	3272	Sunday	10:38:44	7987	3382	10:54:55	1087	1087	0	303	303	0	2974	2974	0	1086	1086	0	4026	1399	1	Engine Out	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
921	10	672	Tuesday	09:00:43	4024	4229	1:04:46	1029	1029	0	231	231	0	3266	3266	0	805	805	0	4007	1081	80	Deposition of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
926	100	3242	Thursday	16:14:46	8126	3095	10:54:44	1072	1072	0	300	300	0	2994	2993	0	1086	1086	0	4026	1436	42	Deposition of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
942	41	2580	Thursday	08:29:03	4779	2981	4:45:30	1071	1071	0	209	209	0	3264	3263	0	805	805	0	4007	1081	80	Control Loss of Flight Control Surfaces	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
943	140	1400	Thursday	10:30:38	4078	2946	8:57:22	1144	1144	0	246	246	0	3294	3294	0	784	784	0	4388	1090	71	Deposition of altitude	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
943	89	2874	Friday	10:05:05	4767	3071	9:09:45	1101	1101	0	339	339	0	3195	3195	0	825	825	0	4290	1164	1	Engine Out	No Ground Effect
948	48	440	Thursday	10:49:41	3738	4160	4:52:53	1100	1100	0	240	240	0	3290	3290	0	784	784	0	4388	1029	9	Engine Out	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
963	12	2915	Thursday	07:11:04	3740	3333	11:46:43	1021	1021	0	209	209	0	3266	3266	0	724	724	0	4324	833	37	Short Circuit / Overheat	Control UA ground impact point below Right path
966	48	2981	Tuesday	10:50:29	5066	2988	6:58:42	1152	1152	0	288	288	0	3290	3290	0	784	784	0	4388	1072	83	Deposition of essential UA parts (tail or main wing)	UA structural degradation - Debris Impact
994	82	2946	Sunday	15:24:29	7053	3117	9:40:41	1015	1015	0	425	425	0	3110	3110	0	905	905	0	4130	1330	9	Engine Out	Control UA ground impact point below Right path

11.4.14.2 *Kroppenstedt – C7 – Phase 2*

93	74	1020	Tuesday	13:30:32	5453	4175	750.00	1130	1130	0	310	310	0	3256	3256	0	794	794	0	4360	1024	77	Degradation of altitude	Central LA ground impact point below Right path
933	114	1120	Tuesday	13:30:32	5071	4111	1101.00	1080	1080	0	300	300	0	3059	3054	0	823	923	0	4174	1026	37	Sheet Critical - Cleared	Central LA ground impact point below Right path
944	40	1750	Sunday	15:40:51	3571	3546	486.44	1031	1031	0	389	389	0	2874	2873	0	1146	1145	0	3324	1335	62	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces and/or the engine movements beyond the limitations of the LA	Central LA ground impact point below Right path
952	77	205	Sunday	15:40:54	7250	4215	730.26	1137	1137	0	333	333	0	3100	3100	0	825	825	0	4332	1328	25	Engine Failure	Central LA ground impact point below Right path
961	50	200	Friday	15:40:56	713	4208	344.28	1101	1101	0	330	330	0	3108	3114	0	825	825	0	4340	1108	72	Degradation of altitude	LA application of emergency landing data
967	50	1750	Sunday	15:40:51	3559	3523	368.08	1019	1019	0	425	425	0	3115	3115	0	923	923	0	4130	1330	19	Engine Fuel	Central LA ground impact point below Right path
98	40	1714	Monday	15:01:04	7048	3264	450.47	1137	1137	0	323	323	0	3076	3076	0	744	744	0	4412	1047	40	Wrong commands to the flight control surfaces (roll/roll)	LA Application of Emergency landing data
986	40	1051	Tuesday	10:32:17	5325	4158	453.45	1152	1152	0	288	288	0	3258	3253	0	794	794	0	4385	1072	79	Degradation of essential LA parts (ail or main wing)	Central LA ground impact point below Right path
988	100	2113	Tuesday	16:42:06	3201	3152	1071.64	1072	1072	0	368	368	0	2564	2563	0	1060	1060	0	4020	1434	16	Engine Assembly	Central ground impact point below Right path with ICG Paths

UADayProt	HIT_TOT_ATB	HIT_TOT_OTW	UADayProt	HIT_TOT_mean	ATB	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW	HIT_TOT_mean_ATB/Ph	HIT_TOT_mean_OTW/Ph	x_h_cross	ATB	x_h_cross	OTW	(x_h_cross ATB)^2	(x_h_cross OTW)^2	
nProbes	200	27	0	27	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
nEvents	192	30	0	30	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
nEvents_cor	178	48	0	48	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
missison	14	48	0	59	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
x_cross_ATB	0.085	64	0	64	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
x_cross_OTW	0.09	64	0	72	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
x_cross_TOT	0.175	72	0	73	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
s2ATB	0.0083007	87	0	83	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
sATB	0.0011881	83	0	89	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
IATB	11.641776	99	0	102	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
s2OTW	0.0089899	102	0	107	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
sOTW	0.0091122	107	0	123	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
iOTW	12.15082	107	0	135	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
s2TOT	0.0313814	123	0	138	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
sTOT	0.177148	138	0	139	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
iTOT	13.172338	138	0	147	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		145	0	145	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		147	0	173	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		156	0	156	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		173	0	197	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		196	0	196	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		197	0	205	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		198	0	220	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		198	0	222	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		205	0	224	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		220	0	237	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		222	0	248	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		224	0	275	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		237	0	280	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		246	0	286	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		248	0	298	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		275	0	300	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		280	0	307	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		286	0	309	0	2	0	0.142857143	-0.085	0.052857143	0.007225	0.002793878	0.007225	0.002793878	
		296	0	310	0	6	0	0.428571429	-0.085	0.338571429	0.007225	0.114630812	0.007225	0.114630812	
		300	0	315	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		307	0	324	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		309	0	326	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		309	2	334	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		310	6	341	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		315	0	345	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		324	0	353	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		326	0	354	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		334	0	358	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		341	0	369	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		345	0	384	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		345	0	389	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		353	0	404	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		354	0	407	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		358	0	414	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		369	0	416	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		384	0	426	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		389	0	438	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		404	0	464	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		407	0	467	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		414	0	469	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		416	0	485	1	2	0.071428571	0.142857143	-0.013571429	0.052857143	0.000184184	0.002793878	0.000184184	0.002793878	
		416	0	487	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		426	0	498	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		438	0	505	1	0	0.071428571	-0.013571429	-0.09	0.000184184	0.0081	0.0081	0.000184184	0.0081	
		444	0	514	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081
		467	0	521	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		469	0	522	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		485	1	532	2	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		487	0	536	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		499	0	546	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		505	0	552	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		514	0	557	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		521	0	561	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		522	0	576	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		532	0	577	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		536	0	578	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		546	0	584	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		552	0	586	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		557	0	591	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		561	0	592	2	4	0.142857143	0.285714286	0.057857143	0.195714286	0.003347449	0.038304082	0.003347449	0.038304082	
		576	0	612	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		577	0	613	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		578	0	616	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		584	0	630	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		586	0	631	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		591	0	655	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		592	2	658	5	0	0.357142857	0.714285714	-0.09	0.074061738	0.007225	0.000344898	0.007225	0.000344898	
		592	2	682	0	1	0.071428571	0.142857143	-0.085	-0.018571429	0.007225	0.000344898	0.007225	0.000344898	
		612	0	684	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		613	0	687	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		616	0	690	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		630	0	693	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		631	0	698	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		655	0	710	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		656	5	726	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		662	0	730	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		684	0	731	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.007225	0.0081	
		687	0	742	0	0	0	0	-0.085	-0.09	0.007225	0.0081	0.		