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Moral Intuition:
A Novel Perspective on Ethically-Oriented Leadership and Ethically-Oriented Leader Development

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Abstract

This dissertation analyses the role of moral intuition process and moral intuition content in ethically-oriented leadership research. In recent years, increased attention has been devoted to ethically-oriented leadership theories with a focus on the "core moral component" (Hoch, Bommer, Dulebohn, & Wu, 2018, p. 524) of leadership. Most of the established ethically-oriented leadership models, as well as associated development frameworks, have been rooted in (1) the rational deliberation approach to and (2) a narrow perspective on human morality. Yet, a continually growing body of research indicates that a considerable part of moral functions involved in moral decision-making and behavior is less deliberative and more intuitive. Furthermore, new advancements in moral psychology have challenged the traditional narrow position to the moral domain, focusing on concerns of justice and welfare, and called for a more pluralistic perspective. The Moral Foundations Theory represents a prominent intuitionist and pluralistic theoretical framework in this field. So far, research on the particular implications of these pluralistic moral intuition approaches for the domain of ethically-oriented leadership remains lacking. Thus, I address the call for a more thorough theoretical and empirical investigation of the impact that the new components of moral intuition process and moral intuition content have on ethically-oriented leader development as well as ethical and unethical leadership perceptions. Moreover, I address open questions and conceptual limitations associated with moral intuitions and introduce an adapted and more differentiated version of the construct and its operationalization.

In the first part, I argue, how the field of ethically-oriented leader development benefits from the moral intuition perspective. I introduce a conceptual model of ethically-oriented leader development and propose a set of theoretical assumptions, which integrate the moral intuition process and moral intuition content. I highlight the theoretical implications of this new perspective as well as implications for practitioners and leaders themselves.

In the second part, I explore, how leaders' and followers' moral intuition content affects the co-creation of ethical and unethical leadership perceptions. In particular, I present the first empirical investigation of the impact of leaders' and followers' moral foundation congruence on leadership moralization and followers' perceptions of ethical leadership and unethical leadership. I present partial support for my theoretically derived expectations and report significant effects of congruence on the fairness, loyalty, and authority moral foundation on perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership. Furthermore, I present specific findings on the effects of the strength of congruence and the direction of discrepancies.

In the third part, I address open questions and conceptual limitations associated with the Moral Foundations Theory. I introduce an adapted version of the established conceptualization and operationalization of the construct. I argue that a more differentiated approach distinguishing between different perspective-specific moral foundation sensitivities is required. More specifically, I propose that individuals vary not only in a general sensitivity for moral aspects related to the five moral foundations ((1) care/harm, (2) fairness/cheating, (3) loyalty/betrayal, (4) authority/subversion, and (5) sanctity/degradation), but also in their foundation-specific victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivities. I present support for my theoretically derived expectations and report quantitative study results, which reveal that a model differentiating between four sensitivity perspectives per foundation fits the data better than a general sensitivity model with one perspective. Implications for theory, future research and practice are discussed.

“So far, about morals, I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad after.”

Ernest Hemmingway

1 Introduction and Research Questions

The series of corporate ethical scandals involving global players like Enron, Lehman Brothers or Volkswagen over the last two decades has raised new societal demands on leaders and promoted new accentuations in scientific leadership research (Brown & Treviño, 2006; Hoch, Bommer, Dulebohn, & Wu, 2018; Peus, Kerschreiter, Frey, & Traut-Mattausch, 2010; Sims & Brinkmann, 2002). All these cases had one thing in common: the scandals often evolved around leader misbehavior and leaders' prioritization of own benefits over ethical issues. While costs of bad leadership and leaders' unethical practices for followers, organizations and the society are on the rise (Schmid, Pircher Verdorfer, & Peus, 2017; Schyns & Schilling, 2013; Tepper, Simon, & Park, 2017), there has been a significant increase in demands for leadership styles emphasizing social, economic and ecological responsibility and encouraging leaders' moral behavior (Dinh, Lord, Gardner, Meuser, Liden, & Hu, 2014; Eisenbeiss, 2012; Hoch et al., 2018; Peus et al., 2010). This has led to the introduction of several ethically-oriented leadership models (Lemoine, Hartnell, & Leroy, 2018; Peus et al., 2010) with a "core moral component" (Hoch et al., p. 524). These "newer genre" (Hannah, Sumanth, Lester, & Cavarretta, 2014, p. 598) ethically-oriented leadership theories have received much attention in recent years (Cropanzano & Walumbwa, 2010; Dinh et al., 2014; Hoch et al., 2018; Peus et al., 2010), resulting in a continuously growing body of research published on this topic. While Hoch and colleagues (2018) reported that "a Google Scholar search for 'ethical leadership' yielded 2,090 results for 1980 to 2003 versus 16,200 results for the period 2003 to 2016" (p. 502), the same search has already produced 24.300 results for the time span of 2017 to 2018.

So far, research on the role of morality in leadership has not only comprehensively investigated outcomes of ethical and unethical leadership (Ng & Feldman, 2015; Krasikova, Green, & LeBreton, 2013; Schyns & Schilling, 2013), but also targeted the exploration of its

antecedents as well as effective approaches to ethically-oriented leadership development (Brown & Treviño, 2006; Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Egorov, Pircher Verdorfer, & Peus, 2016; Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012). However, two major points of criticism have been associated with ethically-oriented leadership research. As pointed out by Weaver and colleagues (2014), most of the established ethically-oriented leadership models, as well as associated development frameworks, have been rooted in (1) the rational deliberation approach to and (2) a narrow perspective on human morality. This may have significantly limited existing research efforts to explain leaders' moral behavior and decision-making and prevent ethical failures as outlined above.

First, the rational deliberation position to ethically-oriented leadership has been criticized in the following particular aspects. Ethically-oriented leaders have traditionally been assumed to have strong ethical values, to be aware of these values and to consciously apply these values in their decision-making and behavior (Weaver, Reynolds, & Brown, 2014). Yet, recent state-of-the-art empirical and conceptual research in moral psychology and behavioral ethics has challenged this perspective (Greene, 2015; Haidt, 2001; Reynolds, 2006; Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). Moral decision-making and moral behavior have been shown to be less deliberative, more emotionally laden, as well as more rationalizing than rational (Bargh, 2006; Haidt, 2001; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006; Reynolds, 2006). Thus, recently, in order to better understand the holistic processes that determine leaders' moral decision-making and behavior, leadership scholars paid increased attention to the dual process models of moral cognition, which integrate moral reasoning with an automatic, nondeliberative and emotionally laden moral intuition component (Fehr, Yam, & Dang, 2015; Haidt, 2001, 2012; Reynolds, 2006; Sadler-Smith, 2012; Weaver et al., 2014). This resulted in new theoretical advances in the field of ethically-oriented leadership research (Fehr et al., 2015; Weaver et al., 2014). More specifically, in addition to the traditional focus on moral reasoning, the constructs of moral intuition process and moral intuition content have been

framed as novel and promising determinants of ethically-oriented leadership and ethically-oriented leader development (Fehr et al., 2015; Sadler-Smith, 2012; Weaver & Brown, 2012; Weaver et al., 2014).

Second, research has criticized that ethically-oriented leadership theories rely on a "comparatively narrow view of what it means to be an ethical leader" (Fehr et al., 2015, p. 182), and that thus the moral domain is not covered appropriately. One of the most prominent approaches of ethical leadership has defined the construct as **"**the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct (…) and the promotion of such conduct to followers" (Brown et al., 2005, p. 120). While some ethically-oriented leadership models have failed to specify what constitutes 'normatively appropriate', others referred to established theoretical morality approaches, usually framed around aspects of justice (Eisenbeiss, 2012; Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, 1986) and care (Gilligan, 1982). While controversy persists as to whether the human moral beliefs are "about caring for people directly (Gilligan) or about more abstract principles of justice and rights, which ultimately afford people the greatest protections (Kohlberg)" (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p. 246), this discourse still leaves important parts of the moral domain uncovered. New advancements in moral psychology have challenged this position and called for a better integration of recent pluralistic approaches of morality (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2008; Weaver & Brown, 2012; Weaver et al., 2014). What individuals across cultures perceive as ethical or unethical may be rooted not only in a less deliberative process but also in a much broader moral domain (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2008; Graham et al., 2013; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997).

A recent theory of morality that addresses the outlined shortcomings (i.e. the limited focus on rational deliberation and the narrow conceptualization of the moral domain) is the Moral Foundations Theory [MFT] (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2008). The MFT (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2008) represents a prominent intuitionist and pluralistic theoretical framework in the field of moral psychology, which differentiates between five moral

foundations ((1) care/harm, (2) fairness/cheating, (3) loyalty/betrayal, (4) authority/subversion and (5) sanctity/degradation) upon which individuals develop their moral views (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2008). This theory is rooted in the key assumption that moral intuitions, determined by different sensitivities to five basic moral values, guide individuals' moral decision-making and behavior, while moral reasoning occurs post-hoc (Graham et al., 2013). Furthermore, scholars have begun to apply the MFT to specify the role of moral intuition process and content in ethically-oriented leadership (Fehr et al., 2015; Weaver & Brown, 2012; Weaver et al., 2014). For instance, the theoretical model may be applied to explain, why leaders tend to show different kinds of moral decision-making and behavior, as well as why followers come to view their leaders as ethical or unethical (Fehr et al., 2015; Weaver & Brown, 2012; Weaver et al., 2014). Still, whether and how leaders' moral intuition process and moral intuition content affect ethically-oriented leadership and the way it is perceived by followers has not been investigated empirically yet. First conceptual research has also outlined potential implications of the MFT for the field of ethically-oriented leader development (Sadler-Smith, 2013; Weaver et al., 2014), but so far, the proposed theoretical links between moral intuition, moral foundations, and ethically-oriented leader development have remained vague and thus, require further specification and empirical exploration. Furthermore, several open questions remain with regard to the current conceptualization and operationalization of the MFT, which have been the subject of an ongoing discussion in the pertinent field. A major criticism concerns the number and content of the five moral foundations as not being conclusive (Fehr et al., 2015; Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012; Suhler & Churchland, 2011).

Against this background, the main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the significance of this new research stream for the field of ethically-oriented leadership research and to gain a better understanding of the impact moral intuition process and content have on ethically-oriented leadership and its development. Relying on the current state of knowledge, in the following chapters, I will (1) specify the role of moral intuition in ethically-oriented

leadership, discuss the implications of the moral intuition approach for the domain of ethically-oriented leader development, and introduce a new conceptual ethically-oriented leader development model, (2) empirically investigate the impact of moral foundation congruence between leaders and followers on followers' perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership, and (3) outline implications for future research by addressing limitations in the current conceptualization of the moral foundations construct, discussing its theoretical adaptations and introducing a revised moral foundation sensitivity measure. Below, I will briefly introduce the specific questions guiding the individual chapters.

The first question is: *How can the moral intuition approach be systematically integrated into ethically-oriented leader development frameworks?* I will address this research question in the first chapter and outline how moral intuition relates to ethically-oriented leadership and how ethically-oriented leader development benefits from the moral intuition perspective. Specifically, in this chapter, I will offer an overview of current ethically-oriented leader development approaches (Avolio, 2010; Kvalnes, & Øverenget, 2012; Lohrey, 2016; Skarlicki & Latham, 1997) and link the moral intuition theory to this field. I will develop a conceptual model of ethically-oriented leader development and introduce a set of theoretical propositions, which integrate the moral intuition process and moral intuition content (Graham et al., 2013; Sadler-Smith, 2012; Weaver et al., 2014). In particular, I will develop propositions, which extend the current concept of leaders' ethical competence (Pohling, Bzdok, Eigenstetter, Stumpf, & Strobel, 2016) by explicitly considering the significance of moral intuitions and promoting leaders' ability to integrate both systems – moral reasoning and moral intuition – as its key element. Furthermore, I will examine theoretical and practical implications of these propositions for scholars, practitioners, and leaders themselves.

The second question I address in this dissertation is*: Does leaders' and followers' moral intuition content impact followers' ethical and unethical leadership perception, and if so, how?* The answer will be elaborated in the second chapter by empirically investigating, how leaders'

and their followers' sensitivity for specific moral foundations may shape ethical and unethical leadership perceptions. Recently, Fehr and colleagues (2015) introduced their conceptual work on leadership moralization – the process through which followers ascribe moral relevance to leaders' behaviors and come to perceive these behaviors as morally right or wrong. In this chapter, I will present the first empirical investigation of the impact leaders' and followers' moral foundation congruence has on leadership moralization and followers' perceptions of ethical leadership and unethical leadership (De Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2008). In particular, I will test the hypotheses that as the objective congruence between leader and follower moral foundations increases, (1) the follower perceptions of ethical leadership will increase and (2) the follower perceptions of unethical leadership will decrease. By reporting the analysis of objective congruence scores (Verquer, Beehr, & Wagner, 2003; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005) by means of polynomial regression with surface response analysis (Edwards, 1994; Shanock et al., 2010, 2014), I will present partial support for my theoretically derived expectations. I will report significant effects of congruence on the fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, and authority/subversion moral foundations on perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership. Moreover, I will present specific findings on the effects of the strength of congruence and the direction of discrepancies. Finally, I will discuss theoretical and practical implications of these empirical insights.

The third question to be addressed in this dissertation is*: Do individuals vary only in a general sensitivity for moral aspects related to the five moral foundations or are there more perspective-specific sensitivities to be considered?* I will address open questions and conceptual limitations associated with the MFT in this third chapter and introduce an adapted and more differentiated version of the construct and its operationalization. More specifically, I will address the question of whether individuals vary only in a general sensitivity for moral aspects related to the five moral foundations or whether they also vary in their foundation-specific victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivities. Research on the related construct of

justice sensitivity (Baumert, Halmburger, & Schmitt, 2013; Fetchenhauer, & Huang, 2004; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005; Schmitt, Baumert, Gollwitzer, & Maes, 2010) demonstrated that people differ not only in a general sensitivity to injustice, but also in the perspective specific victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivities, which determine how quick people perceive a norm violation, how intensively they react on it, and how strong their desire is to maintain norm consistence in their own decisions and behaviors. I will test the prediction that the same perspective-specific framework can be applied to the moral foundation construct. I will report the results of a quantitative study, in which I investigated this question by adapting the wording of the original version of the Moral Foundation Questionnaire [MFQ] (Graham et al., 2011) and developing four scales per foundation to capture the victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivity for each moral foundation in line with the operationalization of the perspective-specific justice sensitivities introduced by Schmitt and colleagues (2010). The results of this study partly support my theoretically derived expectations. More specifically, it will be shown that a model differentiating between four sensitivity perspectives per foundation fits the data for the care/harm, fairness/cheating, authority/subversion and sanctity/degradation – but not the loyalty/betrayal foundation – better than a general sensitivity model with one perspective. Finally, I will outline directions for future research in this field.

2 Taming the Emotional Dog: Moral Intuition and Ethically-Oriented Leader Development[1]

2.1 Introduction

From the Deepwater Horizon disaster to Volkswagen's Dieselgate to Wells Fargo's fake accounts, the last years did not disappoint on corporate scandals. All these scandals have one thing in common: leaders placed profits over ethical issues. Fortunately, also positive examples were able to break into the headlines such as 3M, which has recently been placed on the list of world's most ethical companies for a fourth year in a row. 3M is particularly known for its strong moral leadership principles that every employee, from the lowest to the highest rank, must adhere to, and which is reinforced in annual performance evaluations.

With such examples in mind, leadership ethics has become a major theme in current management research. The basic question in this field is whether and to what degree leader behaviors and the exercise of influence are consistent with ethical values. Related to this is the question of what steps can be taken to develop "moral" (Cropanzano & Walumbwa, 2010) or "ethically-oriented" leaders (Peus et al., 2010), respectively.

Current research and practice in the field of ethically-oriented leadership and leader development is typically characterized by two main assumptions. First, although the pertinent literature has adopted "a more descriptive and predictive socially scientific approach to ethics and leadership" (Brown & Treviño, 2006, p. 595), a normative perspective suggesting what leaders "should" do is nonetheless implicit to this paradigm. Specifically, ethically-oriented leadership usually frames ethical leader behavior around concerns of welfare (i.e., caring for others) and justice (Eisenbeiss, 2012). The second assumption is that ethically-oriented leadership is inherently rational and thus, uses a rational deliberation approach to ethical

[1] This chapter is based on a paper by Egorov, Pircher Verdorfer, and Peus (2018), published at the Journal of Business Ethics.

decision-making. Specifically, it is thought that ethically-oriented leaders think carefully about ethical decisions and consciously influence followers through principles and values that embrace what he/she has defined as right behavior (Weaver et al., 2014). These two assumptions are also reflected in current attempts of ethically-oriented leader development. On the one hand, they usually focus on developing leader behaviors traditionally considered morally positive (most notably interacting fairly and showing concern for the welfare of others, see e.g., Barling, Weber, & Keloway, 1996; Depiano, & McClure, 1987; Dvir, 2002; Lohrey, 2016; Skarliki & Latham, 1997). On the other hand, they typically intend to promote deliberative ethical decision-making of leaders, predominantly based on normative knowledge and moral reasoning (e.g., Bebeau, 2002; Kvalnes, & Øverenget, 2012).

Undoubtedly, such attempts represent highly useful routes to ethically-oriented leader development. Yet, so far, there is no definite consensus in the pertinent literature about whether they provide an exhaustive approach to the processes and content of effective ethically-oriented leader development. Most notably, a continuously growing body of research has reframed ethical decision-making (including leader ethical decision-making) around automatic and intuitive affective reactions (Haidt, 2001; Reynolds, 2006; Weaver et al., 2014). The focus of this moral intuition framework differs from the traditional, rational deliberation approach not only with regard to the process by which individuals make ethical decisions (i.e., intuitive reactions vs. reflective reasoning processes). Rather, it differs also with regard to the normative underpinning of ethical decision-making in that it broadens the moral domain of intuitions beyond classic concerns of welfare and justice (Graham et al., 2013). However, whereas the moral intuition paradigm indicates that much leader ethical decision-making is intuition-based (Weaver et al., 2014), specific implications for ethically-oriented leader development are missing from the pertinent literature. This is unfortunate from both, a theoretical and, perhaps even more importantly, practical perspective. From a theoretical perspective, it is unfortunate because it undermines our understanding of how ethically-oriented leader development works

and which factors actually drive development. From a practical perspective, it appears that current approaches of ethically-oriented leader development may not use their full potential, if the influence of moral intuitions is not properly taken into account (Weaver et al., 2014).

With this void in mind, the main purpose of this chapter is to introduce moral intuition as an important complementary perspective for ethically-oriented leader development, paving the way for more holistic, practical approaches in this area. To this aim, first, I provide a brief delineation of current approaches in the field of ethically-oriented leadership and leader development. Specifically, I suggest that the underlying basis of these approaches is the ethical competence of leaders (Pohling et al., 2016), yet the role of moral intuitions is not adequately considered in this notion of ethical competence. Second, I introduce moral intuition theory, focusing on the central *processes* and the *content* of moral intuitions. Third, I introduce a conceptual model and develop a set of propositions reflecting the implications of moral intuition for the development of ethically-oriented leaders. In doing so, I provide an extended understanding of leaders' ethical competence, explicitly considering the influence of moral intuitions and promoting the ability to integrate both systems – moral reasoning and moral intuition – as its key element.

2.2 Theoretical Background

2.2.1 Ethically-Oriented Leadership

The current leadership literature identifies four main approaches that are usually considered morally positive and thus, reflect ethically-oriented leadership (Cropanzano & Walumbwa, 2011; Hoch et al., 2016; Peus et al., 2010). A highly influential theoretical perspective in this field is the ethical leadership construct as conceptualized by Brown, Treviño, and Harrison (2005). According to their definition, an ethical leader is a morally integer person who models normatively appropriate behaviors (most notably fairness and concern for others) and actively uses position power to reinforce ethical conduct among followers. Another

prominent ethically-oriented leadership approach is authentic leadership (Avolio & Gardner, 2005; Walumbwa, Avolio, Gardner, Wernsing, & Peterson, 2008). Authentic leaders have been described as exhibiting high levels of self-awareness and, as the label implies, authenticity. Most importantly, however, authentic leadership "encompasses an inherent ethical/moral component", describing "an ethical and transparent decision making process" (Avolio & Gardner, 2005, p. 324) in accordance with internal moral standards and values (Walumbwa et al., 2008). A third perspective in the field of ethically-oriented leadership is servant leadership, which frames the main responsibility of leaders around the ideal of altruism and service (Greenleaf, 1977). As such, a servant leader is characterized by the inherent desire to help others to succeed and growth, combined with a strong sense of stewardship (Liden, Wayne, Zhao, & Henderson, 2008; Van Dierendonck, 2011). The fourth lens through which scholars have looked at ethically-oriented leadership is spiritual leadership (Fry, 2003; Reave, 2005). Spiritual leadership emphasizes that leaders need to care about the "inner life" of followers, meaningful work, and a sense of community (Duchon & Plowman, 2005). According to Fry (2003), spiritual leaders display and convey hope and faith in a meaningful future and show genuine concern for the wellbeing of others.

Taken together, each of these approaches offers unique insights into what leaders may actually do to align followers towards a purposeful and ethical direction. Yet, in the present chapter it is argued that the common ground of all these approaches is that they require leaders who exhibit ethical competence. According to Pohling and colleagues (2016), ethical competence refers to conscious decisions and actions in a given situation that is characterized by moral elements (i.e., the situation contains moral imperatives). It involves normative knowledge, the consideration of the consequences of one's actions on others, a sense of obligation towards one's moral principles, and the willingness to persist in one's principles when faced with distractions and obstacles.

Although Pohling and colleagues (2016) recognize that ethical decisions can include automatic and affective elements, they focus on ethical behavior as a process of rational deliberation. This is particularly evident when the notion of ethical competence is linked to the ethically-oriented leadership approaches that we mentioned above (i.e., ethical, authentic, servant, and spiritual leadership). Ethical leaders, for instance, explicitly ask "what is the right thing to do", before making a decision (Brown et al., 2005, p. 125), weight alternative courses, and actively discuss ethical values with followers. In a similar vein, authentic leaders are guided "by internal moral standards and values" instead of pressure from outside and "objectively analyze all relevant data before coming to a decision" (Walumbwa et al., 2008, p. 95). Also servant leaders are generally described as courageous (Van Dierendonck & Nuijten, 2011) and taking "a resolute stand on moral principles" (Sendjaya & Cooper, 2011, p. 419). Finally, spiritual leaders are seen as role models, who consciously rely on "spiritual ideas, such as integrity, honesty, and humility" to exert influence over followers (Reave, 2005, p. 655; see also Brown & Treviño, 2006).

2.2.2 Current Approaches of Ethically-Oriented Leader Development

Overall, whereas leadership development describes the growth of a collective (i.e., leaders, followers, teams, and organizations) to be effective in leadership processes, leader development refers to the individual leader (Clarke, 2012; Day & Dragoni, 2015). Thus, building upon the discussion above, individual ethically-oriented leader development implies a change or improvement from an individual leader's current level of ethical competence to a more complex and sophisticated level. Overall, with a few exceptions (Avolio, 2010; Lohrey, 2016), little systematic evidence on specific methods and outcomes of ethically-oriented leader development is available. Yet, with the root in the traditional rational deliberation perspective of ethical competence, existing approaches generally aim at conveying normative knowledge and developing conscious ethical decision-making (Weaver et al., 2014). A common vehicle for teaching normative knowledge in organizations (including leaders), most notably in terms

of formal rules and norms, is computer-based learning (Weaver et al., 2014). Participants view online lectures, read scenarios, answer questions and then receive feedback on their ethical performance. Such courses, however, have been criticized because of their focus on a "fixed body of knowledge" (Mollie, 2015, p. 342) as well as their limited effects on participants' actual beliefs and behaviors in real life. In a similar vein, an important goal of many leadership development interventions, including the field of ethically-oriented leader development, is to familiarize leaders with the specific behaviors and ethical principles that pertain to a particular leadership style (see Lohrey, 2016 for an overview). Moreover, such interventions often focus on specific skills that are necessary for implementing these behaviors and principles. Skarlicki and Latham (1997), for instance, trained union leaders in the administration of justice principles (e.g., suppressing personal biases, active listening) whereas other interventions focus more on giving social support (Smoll, Smith, Barnett, & Everett, 1993), showing individualized consideration (Barling, Weber, & Kelloway, 1996) and leaders' interactions with their teams (Lawrence, & Wiswell, 1993). Commonly used techniques in such trainings include lectures, case studies, role-playing, and group discussions (see Lohrey, 2016 for an overview).

In contrast to the approaches above, other attempts focus more on explicitly deliberative ethical-decision making, most notably moral reasoning. This notion is rooted in constructive-developmental theories of leader development (McCauley, Drath, Palus, O'Connor, & Baker, 2006), especially those in the tradition of Kohlberg and his work on cognitive moral development (Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2000). The main premise of these approaches is that leaders with higher levels of moral reasoning are more likely to make ethical decisions (Brown & Treviño, 2006; Eisenbeiss, 2012). As the name implies, moral reasoning represents an inherently rationalistic concept and has a strong focus on concerns of justice and equality when it comes to forming moral judgments. A central assumption of these approaches is that developmental movement in moral reasoning is driven by cognitive conflict and socially expanded perspective taking (Snarey & Samuelson, 2008). Thus, a commonly used

method in ethically-oriented leader development interventions and programs is ethical dilemma discussion, focusing on explicit values (e.g., Kvalnes, & Øverenget, 2012; Lerkiatbundit, Utaipan, Laohawiriyanon, & Teo, 2006; Linstrum, 2009).

In summary, the predominant focus in current ethically-leader development approaches is on deliberative and rational factors, most notably the promotion of normative knowledge and moral reasoning. Against this background, the following parts of this paper are devoted to the argument that the development of ethically-oriented leaders is more effective, if the focus on conscious processes and contents is expanded by integrating moral intuition.

2.2.3 Moral Intuition Theory

In understanding the ethics of leadership specifically and ethical behavior more generally, it is important to differentiate between two aspects, namely the *process* by which individuals reach moral judgments and the *content* underlying the moral judgment (Haidt, 2001; Graham et al., 2013; Weaver et al., 2014). With regard to the *process*, traditional approaches have seen the processes underlying ethical behavior ruled by rational and conscious reasoning (Dember, 1974; Neisser, 1967; Rest, 1986). Interestingly, this predominant focus on rationality is reflected in common societal and cultural maxims such as “look before you leap” or “think before you act” (Lieberman, 2000, p. 109). According to this position, ethically-oriented leadership is a product of deliberative processes and leaders’ conscious decisions. However, recent theoretical and empirical research has challenged this view by critically addressing the question of the real proportion of conscious reasoning as opposed to intuitive processes in judgment and behavior (Haidt, 2001; Kahneman, 2011; Liebermann, 2000; Reynolds, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). As pointed out by Sonenshein (2007), rationalist approaches are strongly limited by an insufficient consideration of equivocality and uncertainty in social environments and an overestimation of explicit reasoning as a necessity for moral judgment and behavior.

A growing number of studies provide evidence that a great part of our cognitive and behavioral processes occurs automatically and elude our mind's control (Bargh, 2006; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Greene, 2015; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Reynolds, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). A pioneering and highly influential work in this regard is Haidt's (2001) Social Intuitionist Approach of Moral Judgment. Haidt (2001) describes moral judgments as arising from an interplay of two processes, namely moral intuition and moral reasoning. A basic principle of this model is the primacy and centrality of emotional moral intuitions in every single moral judgment. Specifically, "moral intuition can be defined as the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion" (Haidt, 2001, p. 818). More specifically, the construct is characterized as a "rapid (i.e., automatic), nondeliberative (i.e., noninferential), evaluative experience that often is emotionally laden (i.e., accompanied by affective reactions, such as disgust, anger, elevation, etc.)" (Weaver et al., 2014, p. 101). In this context, Haidt (2001) introduced his famous metaphor, presenting moral intuition as an "emotional dog", wagging its tail (i.e., moral reasoning). In other words, the emotional dog guides moral judgments and wags its rational tail post hoc in order to justify the primary intuitive response. This theoretical assumption has been confirmed in numerous experiments and also neural correlates were identified that support this claim (Cushman, Young & Hauser, 2006; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 2001; Luo et al., 2006). With regard to leadership, these findings indicate that before a leader (or follower) starts a conscious evaluation, an intuitive and automatic response to the situation is likely to already exist. Then, the automatic response is followed by conscious moral reasoning, which, in general, tends to justify the affective reaction.

Beside the *process* of moral intuition, also the *content* of moral intuition is important for my framework. This means, the same situations may trigger different intuitive responses and promote divergent moral judgments across different leaders depending on their specific

moral intuition *content*. A highly influential theory of human morality, concerned with describing and understanding regularities in moral judgment as well as moral disagreement across individuals and cultures is the Moral Foundations Theory [MFT] (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2008; Graham et al., 2011; Graham et al., 2013). Concretely, MFT has been developed as a "nativist, cultural-developmentalist, intuitionist, and pluralist approach to the study of morality" (Graham et al., 2013, p. 14). That said, MFT has four essential implications. First, morality represents a partially innate construct, implying that innate structures, "organized in advance of experience" (Graham et al., 2013, p. 7) precede socialization processes. Second, the impact of cultural environments is accentuated as a guiding factor in the process of moral development. Third, in line with Haidt's (2001) position, the *process* of moral intuition is emphasized as a key variable in moral judgment and decision-making. Fourth, Graham and colleagues (2013) suggest a pluralistic morality approach and expand the previous, somewhat narrow concerns of justice and welfare (Brown et al., 2005; Gilligan, 1982; Kohlberg, 1981). Particularly, the authors introduce a theoretical model originally comprising five *content* domains of moral intuition. These five moral foundations represent the *content* domains of (1) care/harm (concerns about a reduction of suffering and increasing of well-being), (2) fairness/cheating (concerns about a decrease of cheating and an increase of justice, trustful interactions and reciprocity), (3) loyalty/betrayal (concerns about a need of coalition building and punitive actions against outgroups), (4) authority/subversion (concerns about hierarchical relationships) and (5) sanctity/degradation (concerns about purity and an avoidance of contaminants) (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt, 2012).

A person's basis of morality, his/her sensitivity for specific moral aspects and the readiness to violate certain moral principles depend on the characteristics of his/her moral foundations (Graham et al., 2013). While emphasizing some moral foundations more, a person may attach less importance to other moral intuition *contents* (Graham & Haidt, 2012; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009). As outlined by Palazzo and colleagues (2012), individuals are not

always aware of moral issues pertaining to both their own behaviors and the behaviors of others. Therefore, MFT offers a useful explanatory framework for cultural and interindividual variability of moral judgments (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2008). For example, reactions towards whistleblowing may vary strongly depending on a person's most pronounced moral foundations. Whether the act is judged from a fairness and caring perspective versus a loyalty and authority perspective may provoke a completely different intuitive response (Weaver & Brown, 2012). In light of the fairness and caring foundation, a whistleblower shows morally appropriate behavior in that he/she is uncovering abuses and outrages within her or his organization to intervene against and prevent further violations of these foundations. In light of the loyalty and authority foundation, the same person is acting against the organization and the leadership whereby violating these foundations. Thus, the same behavior is seen as morally reprehensible. In line with Weaver and colleagues (2014), this means that the *content* of moral intuition is related to both moral behavior and how moral behavior is perceived and evaluated.

Taken together, I argue that the consideration of moral intuition has important implications for our understanding of what constitutes the ethical competence of leaders and thus, the development of ethically-oriented leaders. The current definition of the ethical competence construct comprises different qualities of normative knowledge, self-awareness of as well as commitment to own moral principles, and their application in forms of morally appropriate and responsible behavior in morally relevant situations (Eigenstetter, Strobel, & Stumpf, 2012; Pohling et al., 2016). However, following the assumption of primacy and centrality of the moral intuition *process* and distinct sensitivities for moral intuition *contents*, we need to broaden this limited rational perspective on the construct. Accordingly, a leader may perceive a situation as morally relevant depending on his/her moral intuitions (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2008; Graham et al., 2013). Also, the exclusiveness of consciousness in subsequent moral decisions and behaviors has been questioned (Haidt, 2001; Reynolds, 2006; Sadler-Smith, 2012). The awareness for and commitment to own moral principles may be limited as long as

superordinate implicit and intuition-based moral structures in form of moral foundations are not considered (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2008; Graham et al., 2013). Therefore, I propose that the ability to integrate both, the theoretical perspectives of the rational deliberation approach as well as the moral intuitionist approach, and the two resulting systems – moral reasoning and moral intuition – represents a crucial part of ethical competence to be addressed in ethically-oriented leader development processes (see Figure 1).



Figure 1. A conceptual model of ethically-oriented leader development: a simplified integration of the rational deliberation and the moral intuitionist perspectives.

2.2.4 The Role of Moral Intuition for Ethically-Oriented Leader Development

Based on the above, in this section I explicate the conceptual framework and develop a series of propositions, integrating the theoretical position of the moral intuitionist approach and specifying the role of moral intuition for ethically-oriented leader development (Figure 2).



Figure 2. A conceptual model of ethically-oriented leader development: Propositions of the moral intuitionist approach.

As shown in Figure 2, it is theorized that a more comprehensive development of leaders' ethical competence and thus ethically-oriented leaders involves the promotion of moral knowledge (Proposition 1), self-awareness of moral intuition (Proposition 2), the integration of moral pluralism (Proposition 3) as well as the development of moral intuition (Proposition 4 and 5). In what follows, each proposition is described in detail.

2.2.4.1 Understanding Morality: The Role of Moral Knowledge on Moral Cognition

Two assumptions that appear in recent theoretical works on moral intuition (Weaver et al., 2014; Fehr et al., 2015) are of particular relevance for the present approach. First, moral intuition process as well as specific themes of the moral foundations may translate into actual leadership behaviors and values. According to Fehr et al., (2015), the care/harm foundation for

instance is akin to genuinely people-oriented leadership such as servant leadership (Van Dierendonck, 2011). Moreover, themes of the fairness foundation are embedded in authentic leadership (Walumbwa et al., 2008) as well as in the concept of ethical leadership (Brown et al., 2005). The sanctity/degradation foundation can be found in dimensions pertaining to spiritual leadership (Fry, 2003; Sendjaya, 2015). Second, it is proposed that followers perceive their leaders as ethical when the leader behavior is consistent with their own moral foundations or the moral foundations endorsed by the organizational culture.

With the above in mind, neither the construct of ethical competence nor ethically-oriented leader development can be adequately conceptualized and understood without considering moral intuitions – *process* and *content* – of relevant agents, most notably leaders and followers. On the one hand, it is plausible that the behavior of leaders is substantially influenced by moral intuitions and on the other hand, moral intuitions of followers may influence how leaders are perceived. However, current ethically-oriented leadership theories normally assume that leaders are fully aware of their own ethical values and principles and use them to shape the ethical atmosphere in their teams (Weaver et al., 2014). The moral intuition approach explicitly contradicts this view: "Leaders might not fully know the values that guide their decisions, and as a result would have difficulty articulating those values and principles to others. Alternatively, ethical values and principles that are expressed to followers might not reflect the moral intuitions that actually guide leaders' judgments, but rather constitute post hoc accounts that attempt to defend the leader's automatically generated intuitions in organizationally or socially conventional ways" (Weaver et al., 2014, p. 111).

Building on this, it is argued that a basic element of developing ethically-oriented leaders is to acquaint leaders with a basic understanding of the partially unconscious nature of morality and ethical decision-making. In other words, leaders need to learn that their ethical decisions and intentions are a product not only of reasoning processes but also intuitional reactions. Following Sadler-Smith (2012), the acquisition of such moral knowledge and the

formation of a more sophisticated moral metacognition represent a crucial developmental milestone required in managers' and leaders' education and an important prerequisite for reflection on and the integration of deliberative and intuitive ethical decision-making (see also Weaver et al., 2014). In other words, this moral knowledge on the interplay of moral reasoning and moral intuition increases the complexity of leaders' mental representation of moral issues. By that, it helps leaders to monitor and regulate moral processes in a more differentiated and context-specific manner (Hacker, Dunlosky, & Graesser, 2009; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Hanna, Avolio & May, 2011). Explicit learning – a process where individuals are aware of occurring changes in their knowledge structures (Dane & Pratt, 2007) – offers the foremost methodological approach to the formation of such new moral knowledge structures. That said, the following proposition is developed:

> *Proposition 1:* Promoting explicit moral knowledge about moral cognition and the interplay of moral reasoning and moral intuition in ethical decision processes will be positively related to ethically-oriented leader development.

2.2.4.2 Knowing Oneself: Self-Awareness of Moral Intuition

Explicit knowledge about the complexity of moral judgment is an important yet not sufficient route to enabling leaders "to understand their own propensities to deliberation or intuition, the factors that influence the activation of each, and the ways leaders can balance each kind of moral judgment in appropriate fashion" (Weaver et al., 2014, p. 111). That said, it is argued that a second cornerstone of effective development of ethically-oriented leaders is promoting their self-awareness of moral intuitions by integrating them in leader self-reflection. This is not trivial given that seeking critical feedback (from others as well as trough self-observation) and the accurate introspective analysis of critical feedback information is highly challenging (Nesbit, 2012). In fact, there is evidence that the way individuals integrate feedback in their self-concept can be seriously biased, which seems to limit the promise of self-reflective practice for leader development to some extent (Duval & Silvia, 2002). Self-reflection on moral

intuitions might even be seen as paradoxical, given that intuitions are only partially available to direct introspection. However, as a first step (Proposition 1) it might be sufficient that leaders develop a basic deliberative knowledge that their moral judgments are influenced by moral intuition and that reasoning is often post hoc and biased. Then leaders need to develop their self-knowledge of their cognitive, affective and behavioral responses to moral stimuli, which shape their moral judgments and behavior (Sadler-Smith, 2012). Self-awareness and self-knowledge have been introduced as crucial factors in leader development processes (Day, 2000; Day, Fleenor, Atwater, Sturm, & McKee, 2014). It is argued that leaders' awareness and knowledge of their general (and stable) sensitivity for certain aspects of morality as well as their readiness to violate other subjectively less relevant domains represent a pivotal aspect of these constructs – especially with regard to ethically-oriented leader development. The strength and direction of leaders' moral judgments across different situations and experiences are significantly affected by their moral intuition *process* and *content* and here, MFT offers a valid approach to conceptualization and operationalization (Graham et al., 2013). The use of moral intuition self-assessment tools can be a viable approach helping leaders to obtain insights into their moral foundations (Graham et al., 2011). Furthermore, case studies focusing on foundation specific contents could be selected or designed and applied in leader development interventions "to evoke affective responses (i.e. moral intuitions) and" be "analyzed both objectively (in terms of telos, internal and external goods, and of compassion/suffering, hierarchy, reciprocity, purity, and affiliation) and subjectively (in terms of evoked affective moral responses)" (Sadler-Smith, 2012, p. 368). All these methods may contribute to the ethically-oriented leader development process in at least two ways.

First, clarity of values and principles is a major requirement of several ethically-oriented theories, though, following Weaver and colleagues' (2014) review results, leaders' awareness of principles and values guiding their ethical decision-making is often limited. For instance, drawing on the example introduced above, a leader may initially judge an act of

whistleblowing as morally wrong and then start looking for justifications and particular arguments for his/her judgment (Weaver & Brown, 2012). However, leader's post-hoc process of moral reasoning may be significantly biased, restricting the validity of arguments he/she identifies (Haidt, 2001). Following the assumptions of the intuitionist approach, a leader might even conclude: "I don't know, I can't explain it, I just know it's wrong" (Haidt, 2001, p. 814). Making superordinate implicit and intuition-based moral structures more salient significantly contributes to the requirement of awareness of own moral principles and therefore represents a major development goal.

Second, leaders' self-awareness and self-knowledge of the particular valence of their moral foundations shape the understanding of their actual state of moral intuition development. This is seen as a substantial prerequisite for developing a learning orientation where leaders consciously monitor their emotional reactions to moral issues (Nesbit, 2012) and engage in active emotion-regulation strategies, most notably trough reappraisal or reframing in order to develop the desired target state. In fact, recent research indicates that the use of reappraisal promotes the ability of executive control to reduce emotional effects (Cohen, Henik, & Moyal, 2012). In order to better monitor, regulate and integrate the single processes of ethical decision-making (Proposition 1), leaders require an understanding of their moral reasoning on the one hand but also moral intuition process and content on the other hand. Against this background, the second proposition is developed:

> *Proposition 2:* Leaders' self-reflective practice with a focus on moral intuition process and content will be positively related to ethically-oriented leader development.

2.2.4.3 Expanding One's Own Perspective: Integrating Moral Pluralism

The MFT challenges the established monist perspective on human morality by specifying a pluralistic morality theory with multiple moral domains (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Therefore, an important implication of the MFT is that leaders and followers may differ considerably in terms of their moral intuitions – in particular in their

sensitivity for different content domains of morality – and thus, also with regard to their assessment if a situation contains moral content. As discussed earlier in this chapter, this moral diversity may affect leaders' and followers' interactions in several ways. Therefore, leaders need to learn to consider and apply the implications of moral pluralism in their ethically-oriented leadership practices. This is delineated in more detail in three specific areas below.

First, traditional approaches of ethically-oriented leadership posit that ethical leaders act as role models and promote moral awareness and behavior among followers (Brown et al., 2005; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). The assumption of a pluralistic morality construct challenges this proposition of a generalized effect on moral awareness and moral behavior and requires a more differentiated analysis. With regard to moral awareness, it has explicitly been argued that the construct includes both, the conscious and unconscious (i.e., intuitive) recognition of moral aspects of a particular situation (Miller et al., 2014; Reynolds, 2006; Robertson et al., 2007; Sparks, 2015). However, it would seem misleading to treat moral awareness as a generalized awareness for moral issues instead of considering different, content-specific types of moral awareness related to different moral foundations (e.g., awareness for the moral domain of fairness or awareness for the moral domain of loyalty). Therefore, different types and aspects of ethically-oriented leadership may increase the salience of specific moral foundations-related content and divergent types of moral awareness.

Second, with regard to behavioral effects, ethically-oriented leadership is usually associated with a general promotion of moral behavior among followers (Cropanzano & Walumbwa, 2010). However, also here it seems important to consider distinct behavioral effects, depending on which aspects of ethically-oriented leadership followers may moralize or not (Fehr et al., 2015). Generally, moralization is defined as the process of ascription of moral relevance to an observed action (Rozin, 1999; Rozin, Markwith, & Stoess, 1997). Whenever an individual observes a subjectively morally relevant action, he/she judges it as morally right (positive moralization) or morally wrong (negative moralization). Consequently, the process of

leadership moralization describes followers' perceptions of a leader's actions as morally right or wrong (Fehr et al., 2015). Discrepancies in followers' and leaders' moral foundations as well as followers' moral foundations and moral foundations endorsed by an organizational culture have important consequences for how followers perceive their leaders and, more importantly, whether they moralize their actions (Egorov, Kalshoven, Pircher Verdorfer, & Peus, 2017; Egorov & Pircher Verdorfer, 2017; Fehr et al., 2015). In this regard, Fehr and colleagues (2015) theorize that the process of moralization promotes value-consistent behaviors of followers due to followers' motivation to maintain their moral self-regard and their moral reputation. However, following Fehr and colleagues (2015), leadership moralization does not promote moral behavior in general, but rather a particular kind of value-consistence. Within this argumentation, followers are motivated to behave pro-socially (i.e., showing voluntary behaviors intended to benefit and help others within or beyond the organization) when they moralize leader behavior that is consistent with the care/harm and the fairness/cheating foundation. Pro-organizational behavior (i.e., promoting the organization's interests) results from the moralization of leader behavior referring to the loyalty/betrayal and sanctity/degradation foundations. When followers moralize leader behavior relating to the authority/subversion moral foundation, they are more likely to engage in genuine pro-leader behavior (i.e., promoting the leader's interests). Furthermore, an important assumption in the work of Fehr and colleagues (2015) is that moralization can also result from alignment between leader behavior and the moral foundations of the organizational culture. In fact, the culture of an organization, defined as the "shared beliefs and values guiding the thinking and behavioral styles of members" (Cooke & Rousseau, 1988, p. 245) can also be described in terms of moral foundations. Notably, even if followers disagree with the moral foundation of their organization's culture, they understand "what it means to be moral in a given organization at a given point in time" (Fehr et al., 2015, p. 186) and thus, come to view the leader as ethical. That said, also organizations differ considerably with regard to what behaviors are considered

ethically legitimate or unacceptable. For example, humanitarian and development organizations are usually focusing on care and compassion as basic moral values whereas in traditional military organizations, the focus may be more on loyalty and authority. Thus, it is also important for leaders to consider both whether their actions are moralized depending on followers' moral views as well as depending on the ethical preferences of the culture they are embedded in.

Third, the diversity of the morality construct is thought to affect interpersonal exchange processes between leaders and their followers. Much research in recent years has highlighted that differences and disagreements in moral concepts and moral intuitions of groups and individuals are associated with poor and conflictory relations and interactions (Graham et al., 2013; Kesebir & Pyszczynski, 2011; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). In the field of political research, Ditto and Koleva (2011, p. 332) have addressed the problem of moral empathy gaps, caused by the insensitivity for moral intuitions of the others and characterized by "the failure to apprehend another's moral mind […] – an inability to simulate, and therefore appreciate, the visceral responses that motivate another person's moral concerns". Here, moral reframing may offer a promising approach to a more appropriate handling of the challenges of moral diversity (Feinberg & Willer, 2013). Debating challenging issues with individuals with divergent moral intuitions is less difficult when arguments are reframed in terms of the moral foundations of the counterpart. In their recent study, Feinberg and Willer (2013) could minimize differences in environmental attitudes of liberals and conservatives as soon as pro-environmental rhetoric was reframed in terms of moral foundations emphasized by conservatives. Leaders may apply this strategy to reframe their messages and negotiate decisions in different ways dependent on their followers' moral foundations. This specific individualized consideration approach may prevent conflicts and increase the efficacy of leaders' ethical actions and appeals.

With these contingencies in mind, it seems critical that leaders develop and cultivate a decent understanding and awareness of how their moral intuitions interact with their followers

and the organizational environment. Leaders need to be aware that the "my perspective is my reality"-approach has its pitfalls. They need to apply their knowledge on moral pluralism and to reflect in and on their moral judgments and behaviors (Sadler-Smith, 2012). This may help strengthen what Sekerka, Godwin, and Charnigo (2014) refer to as "moral curiosity", describing leaders' intrinsic motivation to "explore multiple perspectives and examine how they can improve their responses, choices, and actions" (p. 712).

In summary, these three implications of moral pluralism for ethically-oriented leadership cumulate in the following proposition:

> *Proposition 3:* The inclusion of moral foundations endorsed by the followers as well as the organizational culture in leaders' self-reflective practice promoting integration of moral pluralism will be positively related to ethically-oriented leader development.

2.2.4.4 Shaping the Moral Profile: Development of Moral Intuition

A crucial question is whether and to what degree ethically-oriented leader development may include the possibility to develop and shape moral intuition of leaders. Given that current ethically-oriented leadership styles such as servant or authentic leadership have a strong focus on fairness and care, leader development may benefit from approaches that nurture related moral foundations. From a strictly formal viewpoint however, ethically-oriented leader development can address different moral foundations depending on what is taken to be morally right. For instance, ethically-oriented leader development in the field of traditional military leadership may focus more on concepts of duty and loyalty. Likewise, in the field of religious and spiritual leadership promoting the sanctity/degradation moral foundation may become more important.

With regard to the genuine process of moral intuition development, Haidt (2001) regards moral intuition as a result of both genetic predisposition and personal experiences, embedded in a specific cultural environment. Specifically, he proposes three factors guiding the developmental process of human morality, which are (1) selective loss, (2) immersion in custom

complexes and (3) peer socialization (Haidt, 2001). *Selective loss* considers the phenomenon of the decrease or even loss of the ability to shape new moral intuitions beyond a sensitive developmental period. According to this view, children are born with dispositions to a certain range of moral foundations. Then, specific foundations that are unique to their cultural environment are shaped during a sensitive period in late childhood and adolescence associated with a high neural plasticity in related areas of the brain (Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990). *Custom complexes* describe how development within a culture occurs. Specifically, custom complexes represent cultural practices and related values, beliefs, and rules. It is important to note that this "cultural knowledge" is not limited to explicit concepts, nor is it always explicitly taught to children. Rather, adopting and acquiring cultural knowledge widely relies on processes of implicit learning, observing, imitating, and participating in culture-specific activities and practices, often without a conscious intention to learn. Finally, it is assumed that the most influential agent in this socialization process is the *peer group* and moral values are thus predominantly shaped and internalized through peer socialization.

With regard to ethically-oriented leader development, a strict interpretation of the above socialization processes would lead to a rather pessimistic view, given that the shaping of moral intuitions appears as fully restricted to sensible periods in late childhood and adolescence. However, this view has been challenged by moral education research and most scholars agree that "education and the acquisition of new information challenges and changes previous intuitions" (Lacewing, 2015, p. 412) beyond sensible phases in childhood and adolescence. In fact, research has consistently shown that intuitive moral judgments of adults are not static and can be altered by social and situational factors (Pizarro & Bloom, 2003). For example, Eden, Tamborini, Grizzard, Lewis, Weber, & Prabhu (2014) recently conducted a longitudinal, quasi-experimental study in which college students were exposed to morally relevant media content over a period of eight weeks. After the intervention, an effect on participants' moral intuition demonstrated by an increased salience of specific media content related moral foundations was

confirmed. Further support for this notion comes from other theoretical frameworks that stress the role of implicit and automatic aspects of moral functioning. Most notably, the social-cognitive approach to moral intuition (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez et al., 2006) incorporates moral development in the context of the development of personality, positioning the "moral personality" as a function of chronically accessible moral schemas. Schemas represent "organized knowledge structures that channel and filter social perceptions and memory" (Lapsey & Narvaez, 2004, p. 195). Accordingly, moral schemas facilitate moral information processing. Central to this approach is that moral schemas and their accessibility are thought to result from frequent and consistent experience, including high degrees of implicit learning (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Lapsey & Narvaez, 2004). The process of implicit learning is characterized by an acquisition and storage of new knowledge structures without conscious awareness (Reber, 1989; Stadler & Frensch, 1998). People "observe connections and encode these relationships without the conscious awareness of the connection or of the processes involved in doing so" (Adkins, 2011, p. 385). Following Reber (1989), this implicit learning promotes the development of implicit knowledge, which in turn is required and applied in intuition-based judgments. Individuals with such elaborated and highly accessible schemas understand and solve moral issues more "intuitively" i.e., automatically and with less cognitive effort. However, while explicit learning occurs more quickly, implicit learning and the formation of implicit knowledge structures and moral intuitions is a long and ongoing process. For this reason, a purposeful development of moral schema and moral intuitions is associated with "a repeated experience, practice, correction of errors, instruction, role modeling, coaching, feedback, and reflection in and on moral actions in a given domain across multiple situations, collectively, and over time" (Sadler-Smith, 2012, p. 368).

Putting together the above arguments indicate that leaders' moral intuitions are dynamic and malleable, opening new perspectives for the developmental grounding of ethically-oriented leadership. Hence, the following proposition is made:

Proposition 4: Repeated and consistent exposure to moral foundation specific contents will promote leaders' moral intuition development (comprising development of moral intuition process and content) and be positively related to ethically-oriented leader development.

2.2.4.5 The Crucial Role of Moral Environment: Engaging in Moral Interactions

In addition to proposition four, it is suggested that the most promising way to "educate" leaders in moral intuition is to engage in ethically demanding situations and interactions (see Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004, 2006). This is in line with traditional approaches that are rooted in Kohlberg's approach of moral education which showed that moral reasoning can be promoted by putting individuals in a "moral environment" (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989). This means that individuals are given the opportunity to engage in real human relationships rather than abstract moral discussion. In the same vein, the social intuitionist model stresses the importance of social interactions, most notably peer influence, in the development of moral intuitions (Haidt, 2001). In fact, interacting in groups fosters perspective taking and looking at social issues from different sides may result in the experience of multiple competing intuitions. This, in turn, is expected to trigger cognitive appraisals of the intuitive moral reactions (Pizarro & Bloom, 2003) allowing individuals to modify their moral intuitions. Accordingly, feedback from relevant others may help leaders to challenge their intuitive moral judgments, offer new perspectives and thus stimulate cognitive reappraisal. The accuracy of this feedback represents a crucial factor in the development and trajectory of moral intuitions (Adkins, 2011; Hogarth, 2001). At that, wrong or inaccurate feedback not questioning unethical behavior may be perceived as a reward of this behavior and thus even reinforce it (Adkins, 2011). With regard to ethically-oriented leader development, leaders need thus be systematically trained to recognize their interdependence with others resulting in greater receptiveness to others' input and the willingness to ask for critical feedback (see Owens, Johnson, & Mitchell, 2013). Ethically-oriented leader development approaches need to equip leaders with opportunities to

refine their moral sense practically, gather feedback and reflect on their experiences (Sadler-Smith, 2012).

Nevertheless, it is helpful to know that the principles delineated above are not entirely new but are, in parts, already represented in moral development processes with a focus on moral knowledge and moral reasoning. Previous work by Kohlberg and other colleagues (Power et al., 1989; Dufresne & Offstein, 2012; Snarey & Samuelson, 2008) already highlighted the significance of engagement in social interactions and practicing moral judgment and moral behavior. Yet, the application and adaption of established methods and practices to purposefully develop moral intuitions has not been proposed so far and represents a unique contribution to this field. While common approaches of ethical competence and ethically-oriented leader development are limited by their narrow focus on reasoning, it is proposed to expand and select current leader development practices and methods by integrating moral intuition as a complementary target variable to be developed. Building on this, the following proposition is made:

> *Proposition 5*: Moral interactions with significant role-models and peers will promote leaders' moral intuition development (comprising development of moral intuition process and content) and will be positively related to ethically-oriented leader development.

2.3 Discussion

Recently, research has started to expand the traditional understanding of ethically-oriented leadership by stressing the critical role of moral intuitions in the leadership process (Fehr et al., 2015; Weaver et al., 2014). Against this background, the purpose of the present chapter was to explore the importance of moral intuition for ethically-oriented leader development (Figure 2). In what follows, I examine theoretical implications and, even more important, practical considerations of this moral intuitionist approach for practitioners in the

field of ethically-oriented leader development as well as ethically-oriented leaders themselves, highlight future research directions, and discuss potential limitations (Figure 3).



Figure 3. A conceptual model of ethically-oriented leader development: Propositions of the moral intuitionist approach and implications for development practice.

2.3.1 Theoretical Implications

At the outset of this chapter, the argument was presented that traditional approaches to ethically-oriented leader development usually seek to increase the ethical competence of leaders (Pohlig et al., 2016); yet, assuming that ethical competence reflects predominantly deliberative and intendedly rational processes. On this basis, a conceptual model was developed comprising a set of propositions that build on each other and that substantiate the significance of moral intuition for a more comprehensive understanding of ethical competence and thus, eventually, ethically-oriented leader development.

Given that how we form moral judgments is considerably influenced by moral intuitions, the notion of ethical competence should not be limited to entirely conscious decision-making, especially when it comes to leader development. While Pohlig and colleagues (2016) do not deny the existence of automatic and affective proportions in ethical decision-making, they merely stress the ability to "verbalize one's post hoc reasons of one's primarily intuitive-driven moral judgments" (p. 469), as a precondition for entering a moral discourse. My moral intuitionist approach is in line with this requirement, while making four important supplements. First, a comprehensive understanding of ethical competence in the area of ethically-oriented leader development needs to include moral knowledge about principles of moral cognition, comprising moral reasoning and moral intuition (Proposition 1). Second, it requires leaders' self-awareness of their own moral intuition and values of moral foundations (Proposition 2). Third, ethical competence must consider an appropriate comprehension of moral pluralism and the interactions of divergent moral positions endorsed by the actors involved – particularly leaders, their followers as well as the organizational culture (Proposition 3). Finally, as moral cognition comprises both rational deliberation and moral intuition, it is argued that efficient ethically-oriented leader development needs to address both areas. While traditional ethically-oriented leader development approaches are limited by a narrow focus on fostering moral reasoning, it is proposed that future holistic approaches also need to promote an intended and purposeful development of leaders' moral intuition (Proposition 4 and 5). In summary, these four propositions describe important components of a wider developmental process. While each component is important and can stimulate development, no component is sufficient on its own to achieve comprehensive advancement in ethical competence. Yet, as outlined in the theoretical propositions, and illustrated in Figure 2 (reflected in the dashed arrows), a chronological development order is seen as the most effective route to ethically-oriented leader development.

2.3.2 Practical Considerations

Besides its theoretical contribution, this work has important implications for the practice of ethically-oriented leader development. While it is not my aim herein to introduce a concrete leader development curriculum based on the theoretical propositions, I outline potential routes to such interventions (Figure 3).

With regard to moral intuition and its significance for ethical competence as well as ethically-oriented leader development, practical applications are challenged to create holistic and continuous developmental approaches, which promote normative knowledge and the development of moral reasoning on the one hand, and strengthen leaders' ability to integrate moral intuition and moral reasoning in their decisions and practices on the other hand.

From my theoretical framework follows that efficient ethically-oriented leader development is best achieved by successively implementing the features specified in my propositions (i.e., promoting moral knowledge and self-awareness of moral intuition, integrating moral pluralism, and developing moral intuitions).

In terms of leaders' moral knowledge (Proposition 1), developmental practices (e.g., trainings and coaching) need to promote leader's explicit learning and the acquisition of deliberative knowledge on the interplay of moral reasoning and moral intuition. Furthermore, such interventions need to support leaders' moral growth by increasing leaders' self-awareness and self-knowledge in terms of moral intuition (Proposition 2). Elements of self-assessment and reflection on individual and group level may contribute to this process. The application of self-assessment tools such as the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) or the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale (Graham & Haidt, 2012; Graham et al., 2009) on individual level and moral foundation-specific business ethics cases (Sadler-Smith, 2012) on group level offer a highly promising path to the development of this specific aspect of self-awareness and self-knowledge. Such moral foundations self-assessment tools may offer leaders a first introspection in the "extent to which they endorse, value, and use these five foundations,

providing an opportunity to better understand moral diversity" (Graham et al., 2011, p. 2) and their own moral intuition. While these tools have not been developed for the purpose of diagnostic self-assessment, their instructed application in training contexts may nonetheless help stimulate reflection. Furthermore, the use of moral foundation-specific business cases (Sadler-Smith, 2012) may promote further development of these first insights and facilitate their practical application. In his work, Sadler-Smith (2012) offers a first overview of real-life business examples, which relate to single moral foundations, can be applied in the creation of such moral foundation-specific business ethics cases and may facilitate leaders' application of theoretical insights on their daily work routines.

Next, the argument is reinforced that ethically-oriented leader development approaches would benefit from expanding leaders' understanding of morality in terms of moral pluralism (Proposition 3). Although the integration of followers' moral intuitions and moral foundations endorsed by the organizational culture in leaders' moral judgments and moral behavior remains a challenging objective, it is proposed that ethically-oriented leader development frameworks can increase the awareness of moral pluralism as a first step and, based on this, offer specific training for its practical application in the long run. Alongside explicit learning, it is argued that different forms of "collaborative ethical discourse" (Sekerka, et al., 2014, p. 712) will contribute to the development of leaders' awareness of moral pluralism. In particular, an application of Gentile's (2010) Giving Voice to Values Program by Adkinson (2011) is viewed as a promising exercise to develop this ability, especially the "A tale of two stories" – exercise. This reflection exercise comprises two different tasks. Leaders are encouraged to remember work related experiences where their values were in conflict with expected decisions and behaviors. Furthermore, they are also encouraged to remember the particular organizational conditions associated with the incidents as well as their reactions of speaking up or not (Gentile, 2010). Reflecting on different personal cases and sharing them with other peers offers a variety of real-life experiences with different conflicting values and moral principles as well as different

organizational cultures. Additionally, it illustrates strategies to integrate own and divergent moral viewpoints of others and highlights organizational conditions, which can promote or prevent ethical judgments and behavior as well as the communication of values (Adkins, 2011; Gentile, 2010). This may stimulate the re-evaluation and reframing of past experiences and help develop and anticipate new strategies for future actions. Furthermore, based on the above, developmental approaches can equip leaders with skills to proactively handle and manage moral pluralism. For instance, leaders may learn to adapt their influence and communication practices and to reframe their arguments depending on moral foundations of their followers as well as the organizational culture. In fact, recent research illustrates that the same topics can be framed in "different moral terms […] to improve communication between opposing sides" (Feinberg & Willer, 2013, p. 61).

Finally, practical applications should provide leaders with opportunities to engage in challenging, heterogeneous experiences with morality and diverse moral foundations in social interactions with coaches, role models and peers in order to promote implicit learning processes and the development of moral intuitions (Proposition 4 and 5) (Sadler-Smith, 2012). Such interventions could particularly benefit from including different forms of "play (scenarios, simulations, role-plays, outdoor experiences, games and other forms of play)" (Kark, 2011, p. 512). Specifically, play may offer promising ways to challenge moral (self-)views, which represent an important part of individuals' social identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002) and are thus particularly prone to self-enhancement and self-protection strategies (Hepper, Gramzow, & Sedikides, 2010; McLeod, 2004). In fact, play can "encourage departures from existing norms and procedures by allowing people to suspend requirements for consistency and rationality, and, as they play with possibilities, develop new skills or self-images" (Kark, 2011, p. 512). More specifically, given that play requires safe spaces free of external pressure and evaluation "to try out new and untested identities, thoughts, and behavior" (Kark, 2011, p. 512), it seems a particularly promising tool through which leaders can explore new moral viewpoints and

mindsets practically without a fear of consequences. Moreover, play may encourage leaders to rewrite past ethical reactions and failures by trying out and making new experiences with the pluralistic moral domain. In manifold forms of play and interactive group tasks, participants can take different roles and investigate different perspectives on moral issues, affects and emotions as well as moral schemata triggered by the activation of different moral foundations. Thereby, structured reflection and feedback processes may enhance learning and transfer and can facilitate participant's perception of analogies and implications for their own leadership practice (Anseel, Lievens & Schollaert, 2009; Burke & Hutchins, 2007; Day et al., 2014; DeRue, Ashford & Myers, 2012).

2.3.3 Implications for Ethically-Oriented Leaders

Besides the implications for the practice of ethically-oriented leader development, I deem it useful to specify implications for leaders themselves (Figure 3). Specifically, the presented framework offers suggestions on how leaders may best use their knowledge and awareness about moral cognition and, in particular, what to trust and follow more, their moral intuition or moral reasoning. Though several scholars have tackled this question, the literature remains rather ambiguous on this matter. For instance, in line with Simon (1987), Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith (2003, p. 261) described the skill to use both moral intuition (i.e., the "habits of mind") and reasoning (i.e., "active thinking") and the ability to switch between the two systems as a crucial managerial competence. Regans (2007) looked at this question from an organizational perspective and stressed that "organizations need well-honed, non-conscious reflexive moral intuitions, but they also need to "blunt the impact of others" by encouraging more conscious reflective moral reasoning" (p. 985). Based on the framework I presented, it is certainly a good advice for leaders to follow the maxim "Look before you leap". Specifically, this means first to consider different moral intuition-based perspectives and then to integrate them in moral reasoning in their decisions (Shapiro & Spence, 1997). This is in line with

Weaver et al.'s (2014) conclusion that "perhaps one key element of ethics training is developing an ability to exert some degree of cognitive control over intuition, so that trained individuals are better prepared to manage their immediate intuitive reactions to situations" (p. 20).

At the same time, controlling moral intuition and promoting more moral reasoning is just one plausible proposition. Under specific circumstances, moral intuitions may provide valid judgments without any conscious cognitive control. This means that leaders could engage in developing their moral intuition and learn to activate and trust the intuition-based processing in their decisions. Following implications from general research on intuition, the quality and effectiveness of intuitive judgment is determined by two factors: domain knowledge and task characteristics (Dane & Pratt, 2007). The more domain-specific knowledge and the more advanced the expert schemata are, the higher is the efficacy and accuracy of intuition-based decisions (Klein, 2003). Experts in a specific morality domain deal with associated moral problems and dilemmas more quickly because they draw on more and better-organized moral "schemas" than novices (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez et al., 2006; Sadler-Smith, 2012). Though, this expertise is highly domain-specific and so, the situational context needs to be considered. On the other hand, task characteristics or the structure of the problem represent another influencing variable. It ranges on a continuum from (1) intellective tasks characterized by a "definite objective criterion of success within the definitions, rules, operations, and relationships of a particular conceptual system," to (2) judgmental tasks represented in "political, ethical, aesthetic, or behavioral judgments for which there is no objective criterion or demonstrable solution" (Laughlin, 1980, p. 128). Especially in the area of judgmental tasks – particularly in the area of moral and ethical judgments – there is a high rate of effective and accurate intuitive judgments, leaders with moral expertise can trust and follow (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Haidt, 2001).

2.3.4 Directions for Future Research

The integration of moral intuition in ethically-oriented leader development and the proposed applications suggest multiple avenues for future research. Naturally, given the constitutive nature of this work, empirical studies will be needed to test whether our propositions hold.

An essential practical implication of my approach refers to the framework of training that would explicitly consider moral intuition when seeking to enhance leaders' ethical competence. Thus, an important direction for future research is to develop and evaluate such training programs. By using different training setups in terms of intensity, duration, and frequency, researchers can investigate short and long-term effects of such interventions and, at best, identify optimal configurations. Related to this, another issue that my framework prompts, refers to the optimal implementation order of my propositions. While promoting a chronological order as the most effective approach, it is argued that each component can, at least partially, contribute to the development of ethical competence and thus ethically-oriented leader development on its own. Thus, an interesting future direction is to actually examine the relative importance of each component in the entire development process and to test whether their chronological implementation tends to produce the best outcome or whether a more random order has similar effects.

Furthermore, future research should look at existing ethical leader development approaches by explicitly adopting a moral intuition perspective. At this point, once again, it is emphasized that in this work I do not propose a new methodological development approach with unique tools, which have not been discussed in the field of leadership development before. In fact, the training literature reports a number of programs with a particular moral background that incorporate many of the elements described herein, yet without referring to moral intuition. In line with Weaver et al. (2014, p. 19) "the extent to which conventional training and education approaches account for or influence moral intuition processes and content is not clear",

especially in terms of ethically-oriented leader development. For instance, Dufresne and Offstein (2012) investigated the development program at the United States Military Academy at West Point (USMA) as an inspiring example of an action-learning approach toward moral development of future military leaders. At USMA, all cadets engage in a 4-year curricular program, designed to practice and apply their theoretical knowledge, recognize moral issues, and "to continually and progressively challenge them on core ethical and moral issues" (Dufresne & Offstein, 2012, p. 577). This program includes elements of implicit learning, most notably holding rotational leadership positions, combined with reflection cycles. It would be highly interesting for researchers to include moral intuition as a mechanism and outcome variable in the evaluation of such programs. On this basis, practitioners may better understand how existing development tools can be purposefully used or adapted within an intuition-based development framework. At the same time, new tools can be developed that are inherently intuition-specific.

Finally, whereas I focused on individual ethically-oriented leader development, it would be useful in future research to broaden my framework to ethically-oriented leadership development. Leadership development goes beyond individual leader development in that it adopts a more collective focus and involves different levels of analysis (Clarke, 2012; Day & Dragoni, 2015). Most notably, it would be useful to address the moral intuitions of followers and their importance for implicit leadership theories. In a similar vein, future research should examine whether and to what degree moral intuitions may be shared among team members. On this basis, it would be interesting to explore the implications of my framework for related leadership development approaches, such as training for followers, training for followers and leaders together, and team development (Clarke, 2012).

2.3.5 Limitations

Although my work makes several contributions, it is important to consider its limitations. First, a comment regarding Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist approach to moral judgment and the MFT (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2008) is warranted. Both theoretical models have been criticized in different aspects (Fine, 2006; Gray et al., 2012; Pizzaro & Bloom, 2003; Suhler & Churchland, 2011). A major criticism on the social intuitionist approach focuses on its position to the primacy of moral intuition, which is in contrast to further dual-process approaches illustrating divergent patterns of interaction between conscious and not conscious parts of moral cognition (Reynolds, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). I partly agree with the criticism and do not claim that information processing in every situation is guided by the primacy of emotional intuition while all deliberative reasoning processes occur post-hoc. Though, the significance of moral intuition is pivotal for a differentiated understanding of moral cognition as well as ethically-oriented leadership and has to be integrated and addressed in future ethically-oriented leader development approaches appropriately.

A commonly voiced criticism of the MFT is that the five foundations described so far may not be conclusive (Fehr et al., 2015; Gray et al., 2012; Suhler & Churchland, 2011). In fact, there is initial evidence for the existence of additional moral foundations, such as concerns for liberty versus oppression (Iyer et al., 2012). I agree with this notion as well as with Fehr et al. (2015, p. 202), stating that the "MFT's ability to be revised is one of its most important strengths, since it enables researchers to expand and revise the theory when new evidence becomes available". Yet, the unique merit of the MFT is that it expands human morality beyond traditional concerns for justice and welfare. Future research may identify further or alternative moral dimensions; what matters is that ethically-oriented leadership and leader development take the implications of moral pluralism into account.

Related to this point, a potential criticism may relate to the inherently descriptive nature of the MFT (Graham et al., 2013) and assume that my theoretical framework would

inappropriately use it as a normative approach for ethically-oriented leadership. I am fully aware that ethically-oriented leadership theories are characterized by a normative perspective, an accentuation of specific moral foundations as well as related values and an explicit perspective on specific leadership practices to be right and others to be wrong. Whereas I do not propose that all values should be treated equally, I simply emphasize the significance of moral pluralism and the diversity of leaders' and followers' moral views. Thus, ethically-oriented leaders need a comprehensive understanding of what others may consider morally right or wrong and of how these evaluations are formed, in order to better anticipate, impart and set examples of these normative elements.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the link between certain moral foundations and different leadership styles has been addressed only theoretically so far (Fehr et al., 2015; Weaver et al., 2014), whereas empirical evidence is scarce (Egorov et al., 2017). Thus, there remains a need for a more thorough empirical examination of this relation.

The critical aspects delineated above may have an essential impact on the testability of my propositions. While the challenges to measure an increase in leaders' knowledge on moral reasoning and intuition as well as their understanding of moral pluralism may be manageable, the assessment of the awareness of own moral foundations and of the level of development of own moral intuition represents an ambitious objective. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) and the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale (Graham & Haidt, 2012; Graham et al., 2009) are promising tools, though both measures have not been developed for the purpose of diagnostic self-assessment. The validity and reliability of these direct measures are limited and require further development. Related to this, implicit measures may represent a better way to capture the intuitive parts of morality (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).

2.3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, implications of moral intuitionism for ethically-oriented leader development have been explored. Whereas the incipient body of knowledge on moral intuition provides a reasonable basis for my propositions, some claims remain provisional until research provides empirical evidence. Nevertheless, building upon Haidt's (2001) metaphor of the emotional dog, it is concluded that in addition to developing the rational tail, we need as well to focus on the emotional dog wagging it, in order to obtain the optimal impact of ethically-oriented leader development interventions.

3 It's a Match: Moralization and the Effects of Moral Foundations Congruence on Ethical and Unethical Leadership Perception[2]

3.1 Introduction

Over the last 15 years, leadership ethics has become a rapidly developing research area in organizational behaviour and has substantially contributed to our understanding of misconduct in work contexts. Overall, this line of research is concerned with the practice or violation of certain moral principles in the process of leading. Ethical leaders are generally characterized as honest, considerate, and fair. They are willing to share power and make clear what is expected of employees in terms of ethical conduct (Brown & Treviño, 2006). Unethical leaders, in turn, are described as oppressive, abusive, and exploitative (De Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2008; Tepper et al., 2017), reflecting harmful methods of influence (Schyns & Schilling, 2013). Research in this field typically relies on follower perceptions of leader behaviour (Den Hartog, 2015; Tepper et al., 2017). While perceptions of ethical leadership have been consistently linked to a wide array of positive work outcomes, i.e., favourable job attitudes as well as motivational and performance outcomes (Ng & Feldman, 2015; Treviño & Brown, 2014), there is strong evidence for the negative effects of unethical leadership perceptions such as reduced follower wellbeing and increased levels of counterproductive work behaviours (Schyns & Schilling, 2013).

While much is known about the outcomes of ethical and unethical leadership perceptions, our understanding of the formation of such perceptions remains underdeveloped. The majority of research on ethical and unethical leadership is based on a leader-centric perspective, viewing followers as mere recipients of leader influence in predicting outcomes.

[2] This chapter is based on a paper by Egorov, Kalshoven, Pircher Verdorfer, and Peus (2019), published at the Journal of Business Ethics.

While there is increasing awareness in the general leadership literature that leadership represents a co-created process between leaders and followers (Hernandez, Eberly, Avolio, & Johnson, 2011; Uhl-Bien, 2006), little attention has been devoted to the role followers and, even more importantly, the interplay of leaders and followers may play in the ethical and unethical leadership process (Lemoine, Hartnell, & Leroy, 2018; Thoroughgood, Sawyer, Padilla, & Lunsford, 2018). Thus, we know little about how leader and follower characteristics interact in shaping follower perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership. In fact, what leaders actually do and how they are eventually perceived by followers seems not to be a linear relationship and the same behaviour of a leader can be perceived differently by different followers. This is particularly true for ethical and unethical leader behaviours, because despite the moral principles specified in ethical and unethical leadership models, leaders and followers may considerably differ in their subjective conception of what is morally right and wrong.

With this shortcoming in the current literature in mind, the main purpose of the research presented in this chapter is to empirically investigate the role of leader-follower moral congruence, that is a fit in the notion of what is morally right and wrong, for followers' perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership. Specifically, I adopt a moral intuitionist and moral pluralist approach to moral congruence (Weaver et al., 2014) and draw on the MFT (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Graham et al., 2013), which proposes that a set of universal moral foundations, i.e., deep-rooted intuitions about right and wrong, guide ethical decision-making. Previous research indicates that moral intuitions influence both behaviour and perception (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Graham et al., 2013; Weaver et al., 2014). On this basis, using leadership moralization theory, which describes the process through which a perceiver attributes moral relevance to observed behaviour (Fehr et al., 2015), my theoretical model posits that leader-follower congruence in moral foundations is positively associated with perceptions of ethical leadership and negatively associated with perceptions of unethical leadership.

In testing this model, I seek to extend the current literature in several ways. First, I

expand prior research by going beyond leader-centric approaches, addressing recent calls for examining the role of followers in co-creating perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership (Lemoine et al., 2018; Thoroughgood et al., 2018). The inclusion of leaders' and followers' subjective conceptions of what is morally right and wrong contributes to a better understanding of this dynamic, co-creational process (Uhl-Bien, Riggio, Lowe, & Carsten, 2014). Second, my study expands the literature on moral congruence by investigating leader-follower congruence in diverse moral intuitions (Weaver et al., 2014). Previous work in this field has focused on deliberate moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981), yielding inconclusive results (Jordan, Brown, Treviño, & Finkelstein, 2011). I thereby respond to recent calls in the extant literature (Brown and Mitchell, 2010; Lemoine et al., 2018; Weaver et al., 2014) for more thoroughly considering the role of moral intuitions, as the deeper-rooted moral system, for perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership. Third, theorizing on leadership moralization has so far exclusively focused on ethical leadership. By including followers' perceptions of unethical leadership, I aptly address Fehr et al.'s (2015, p.184) prompt that leader-follower moral congruence and moralization are also relevant for unethical leadership.

3.2 Theoretical Background

3.2.1 Ethical and Unethical Leadership

Perceptions of ethical leadership are usually described with different leader behaviours including acting fairly, accepting voice, exhibiting consistency and integrity, demonstrating responsibility for one's behaviours, rewarding ethical conduct, and being apprehensive for others (Brown et al., 2005; Kalshoven, Den Hartog, & De Hoogh, 2011, 2013). De Hoogh and Den Hartog (2008) distinguish three elements of ethical leadership based on the work by Brown and colleagues (2005). The first element is labelled fairness, which is defined as "leaders being honest, trustworthy, fair and caring. Such leaders make principled and fair choices and structure work environments justly" (De Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2008, p. 298). Second, Brown and

colleagues (2005) argue that ethical leaders facilitate ethical behaviours among followers by applying transactional means of management such as clear communication of expectations, rewards, and punishments. In keeping with this aspect of ethical leadership, De Hoogh and Den Hartog (2008) highlight the importance of what they call "role clarification". It refers to the clarification of expectations and responsibilities so that employees are clear on what is expected from them. Next, Brown and colleagues (2005) show that ethical leaders provide followers with voice. Building on that, De Hoogh and Den Hartog (2008) define the third element of ethical leadership as "allowing followers a say in decision making and listening to their ideas and concerns" (p. 298) and introduce this factor as power sharing.

Besides the focus on ethical leadership, a steadily growing body of research investigates different forms of unethical leadership, such as petty tyranny (Ashforth, 1994), abusive supervision (Tepper, 2000), supervisor undermining (Duffy, Ganster, & Pagon, 2002), and, most recently, exploitative leadership (Schmid et al., 2017). However, the construct that has not only been theoretically posited but also empirically shown to be directly opposed to ethical leadership is despotic leadership (Aronson, 2001; De Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2008). Despotic leadership is based on personal dominance and authoritarian behaviour that serves the self-interest of the leader and that is self-aggrandizing and exploitative of others (Aronson, 2001). Such despotic leaders are controlling, vengeful, and domineering (House & Howell, 1992; McClelland, 1975; Naseer, Raja, Syed, Donia, & Darr, 2016). Overall, despotic leaders do not behave in socially constructive ways and are insensitive to the needs of others. In line with theoretical assumptions, De Hoogh and Den Hartog (2008) – who are among the few scholars who studied ethical and unethical leadership in the same study – in fact showed a high negative relation between despotic and ethical leadership (r = -.56). Based on this argument, despotic leadership is operationalized as a type of unethical leadership in this study.

3.2.2 Moral Congruence and Perceptions of Ethical and Unethical Leadership

Theory and research are increasingly recognizing that moral congruence, that is congruence between leaders' and followers' notion of what is morally right and wrong, plays an important role in the process of ethical and unethical leadership (Brown and Mitchel, 2010; Fehr et al., 2015; Lemoine et al., 2018). While previous research has predominantly looked at moral congruence in terms of congruence in leaders' and followers' moral reasoning (Jordan et al., 2013), recent research stressed that more deep-rooted intuitions about what is right and wrong may have a stronger impact in this regard (Haidt, 2001; Lemoine et al., 2018; Weaver et al., 2014). The reason for this is that deliberate moral judgments are often rationalizations for intuitive reactions, which precede and guide moral reasoning processes (Greene, 2015; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2012; Reynolds, 2006). One of the most influential and extensive theories that describe individuals' deep-rooted and intuitive moral systems is the MFT (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Graham et al., 2013). In the following parts of this chapter, I develop the argument that perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership are, to some degree, a function of congruence between leaders' and followers' moral foundations.

3.2.3 Moral Foundations Theory

The MFT is described as an intuitionist and pluralist approach to the study of morality (Graham et al., 2013). It assumes that morality is partially innate and then further developed and differentiated within a specific social context and culture. Importantly, a core tenet of MFT is that moral judgments are strongly driven by intuitive factors, meaning that they happen automatic, nondeliberative and are often emotionally laden. Moral intuition is defined as "the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion" (Haidt, 2001, p. 818). With regard to the content of moral intuitions, MFT is rooted in a pluralistic view of morality (Haidt & Joseph 2004;

Shweder et al., 1997; Weaver et al., 2014). Thus, it differs from monistic approaches with their traditional focus on concerns of welfare and fairness (cf., Brown & Treviño, 2006; Weaver et al., 2014). Specifically, MFT proposes five moral foundations that are thought to be responsible for differences in morality across individuals and cultures. These five foundations are: (1) care/harm, (2) fairness/cheating, (3) loyalty/betrayal, (4) authority/subversion and (5) sanctity/degradation (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt, 2012). According to MFT, the degree to which individuals are sensitive to and prefer certain moral principles, or whether they are willing to violate them, is a function of their moral foundations. A condensed overview of triggers and moral principles pertaining to the moral foundations is presented in Table 1.

Table 1

The moral foundations, original triggers and moral principles

Moral Foundation	Care / Harm	Fairness / Cheating	Loyalty / Betrayal	Authority / Subversion	Sanctity / Degradation
Original Triggers	Suffering, distress, or threat to one's kin	Cheating, cooperation, deception	Threat or challenge to group	Signs of high and low rank, dominance and submission	Waste products, diseased people
Relevant Moral Principles	Caring, kindness	Fairness, justice, honesty, trust-worthiness	Loyalty, patriotism, self-sacrifice	Obedience, deference	Temperance, chastity, piety, cleanliness

Note. Overview of original triggers and relevant moral principles pertaining to moral foundations. Adapted from "Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism," by J. Graham, J. Haidt, S. Koleva, M. Motyl, R. Iyer, S. Wojcik, & P. H. Ditto, (2013). *Advances in experimental social psychology, 47*, 55-130. Copyright 2013 by Elsevier

3.2.4 Moral Foundations and Ethical and Unethical Leadership

MFT implies that leaders and followers may differ in their endorsement of each of the five moral foundations, which are likely to uniquely affect moral behaviours as well as perceptions of moral behaviours (Weaver & Brown, 2012; Weaver et al., 2014). As outlined by Egorov and Pircher Verdorfer (2017, p. 3), "when leaders differ in their sensitivity for certain aspects of morality and the willingness to violate them, they may adopt a different explicit and implicit understanding of leadership and thus prefer (and avoid) specific forms of leadership behaviours". In a similar vein, Fehr and colleagues (2015) theoretically connected leaders' moral foundations to specific leader behaviours and moral approaches to leadership, respectively. This includes also potential relationships with ethical leadership. For example, leaders' fairness moral foundation is assumed to be linked to pro-social behaviours represented in the fairness dimension of ethical leadership, while the authority moral foundation is assumed to be linked to pro-leader behaviours of the role clarification dimension of ethical leadership. However, Fehr and colleagues (2015) remained silent about potential links between other moral foundations such as loyalty or sanctity and ethical leadership. In a similar vein, they did not cover how moral foundations may relate to unethical types of leadership.

Furthermore, since also followers vary in their sensitivity for certain content domains of morality, their moral foundations are likely to affect how they perceive and evaluate leader behaviours (Weaver et al., 2014). For instance, the higher the sensitivity for fairness or authority concerns, the higher the likelihood that leadership and specific leader behaviours associated with these foundations will be perceived as ethical and violations of these foundations as unethical.

3.2.5 Moral Foundations Congruence and Leadership Moralization

Based on the discussion above, it is argued that leader-follower congruence in moral foundations plays an important role for the perception of ethical and unethical leadership. To

specify how this process works, I draw on the leadership moralization theory (Fehr et al., 2015), a theory that explicitly addresses the mechanism through which followers come to perceive their leaders' behaviours as morally right or wrong.

In general, moralization is the process of ascription of moral relevance to an object or behaviour (Rozin, 1999; Rozin et al., 1997). Specifically, it is thought that whenever an individual observes a subjectively morally relevant action, he or she judges it as morally right (i.e., positive moralization) or morally wrong (i.e., negative moralization). In line with this, Fehr and colleagues (2015) proposed that followers' perceptions of ethical leadership are rooted in a moralization process which depends on whether there is congruence in followers' moral foundations and observed leadership behaviours. More specifically, they argued that followers may positively moralize leadership behaviours and, in consequence, perceive their leaders as ethical, when the leader behaviour is consistent with their own moral foundations. Although they did not explicitly write about unethical leadership, their theoretical approach suggests that followers are likely to perceive their leaders as unethical if the observed leader behaviours oppose followers' moral foundations.

In line with Weaver and colleagues (2014), I go one step further and assume that leader-follower moral foundations congruence significantly contributes to the perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership. Specifically, leaders are thought to engage in specific leader behaviours based on their moral foundations (Fehr et al., 2015; Sadler-Smith, 2012). Followers, in turn, are thought to perceive and interpret these behaviours based on their moral foundations (Fehr et al., 2015; Weaver et al., 2014). Differently put, leadership practices, which emphasize certain aspects of morality are likely to be positively moralized by followers with a high sensitivity for related moral foundations. For instance, leadership practices reflecting fair treatment of followers are more likely to be positively moralized by followers scoring high on the fairness moral foundation. Accordingly, this positive moralization may contribute to followers' ethical leadership perceptions (Fehr et al., 2015). On the other hand, leadership

practices violating certain values and moral principles are likely to be negatively moralized by followers with a high sensitivity for related moral foundations. In keeping with this, leaders who do not share their followers' moral points of view are likely to make decisions and act in a way that violates these followers' moral principles – intentionally or unintentionally. Consequently, this negative moralization is likely to contribute to unethical leadership perceptions (Fehr et al., 2015).

At this point, it is important to note that the existing literature does not provide sufficient evidence to specify hypotheses on each foundation, nor to predict the relative strength of the proposed congruence effects. As previously mentioned, traditional morality approaches would limit the focus on the care and fairness foundations, and overall, first theoretical assumptions on the relationship between ethical and unethical leadership and specific moral foundations are scarce and remain, so far, rather vague. Hence, I seek to explore how patterns of leader-follower moral congruence on all moral foundations will relate to follower perceptions of ethical leadership as a consequence of positive moralization on the one hand and unethical leadership as a consequence of negative moralization on the other hand. Thus, based upon the research reviewed above, the following hypotheses were specified:

Hypothesis 1: As the congruence between leader and follower moral foundations increases (i.e., care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation), the follower perceptions of ethical leadership will increase.

Hypothesis 2: As the congruence between leader and follower moral foundations increases (i.e., care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation), the follower perceptions of unethical leadership will decrease.

3.3 Method

3.3.1 Participants and Procedure

Data were collected via surveys from leaders and followers in different organizational contexts in both profit and non-profit sectors in the Netherlands. An accompanying letter explained the research purpose, the voluntary nature of participation, assured confidentiality, and provided the possibility to ask questions. Surveys were returned anonymously and directly to the university in pre-stamped envelopes. Matching codes were used to link the leader and employee questionnaires. In total, 68 leaders and 109 follower questionnaires were returned, resulting in response rates of 66 % and 53 %. 67 dyads could be matched by the same subject ID. The average age of managers was 44.77 years (*SD* = 11.40); 20.6% were women. The average age of employees was 36.14 years (*SD* = 11.96); 50.9% were women.

3.3.2 Measures

3.3.2.1 Moral Foundations Congruence

Moral foundations congruence between leaders and their followers can be conceptualized and operationalized in different ways. For example, "perceived" congruence refers to followers' perceptions of how well their foundations fit with those of their leaders, while "subjective" congruence is based on followers' self-assessments and their assessments of their leaders' moral foundations on the same scale (Edwards & Cable, 2009; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005; Verquer et al., 2003). In contrast, in the present study, "objective" moral foundations congruence was assessed by calculating the similarity between leader and follower self-reported moral foundations (Edwards & Cable, 2009; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005; Verquer et al., 2003). I focus on objective congruence because I propose that leaders' moral foundations impact their leader behaviors. In turn, followers' moral foundations are expected to determine how followers moralize these behaviors. Specifically, leaders and followers rated their moral foundations with the 20-items MFQ (Graham et al., 2011). The MFQ operationalizes the five focal moral

foundations and comprises two parts, each comprising 10 items. The first part assesses questions about moral relevance (instruction: "When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?"; sample items were: "Whether or not some people were treated differently from others" or "Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority"). Responses were given on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all relevant) to 6 (extremely relevant). The second part assesses moral judgments (instruction: "Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement"; sample items were: "People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong" or "I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural"). The response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). For each of the five moral foundations, a composite score was calculated by combining the relevance and judgment scores. Cronbach's alpha for the overall measure was .77.

3.3.2.2 Ethical Leadership

To assess perceptions of ethical leadership, follower ratings were collected with the measure described and used in De Hoogh and Den Hartog (2008). This measure covers three dimensions of ethical leadership: morality and fairness (e.g., "my supervisor means what he/she says, is earnest"), role clarification (e.g., my supervisor explains what is expected of each member of the group"), and power sharing (e.g., "my supervisor allows subordinates to have influence on critical decisions"). Responses were given on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree)* to 7 (*strongly agree*). Cronbach's alpha for the combined ethical leadership measure was .90.

3.3.2.3 Unethical Leadership

To operationalize unethical leadership perceptions, despotic leadership was assessed. This construct was captured with the 6-item measure described in De Hoogh and Den Hartog (2008). Again, responses were anchored on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly*

disagree) to 7 (*strongly agree*). A sample item was: "My supervisor expects unquestioning obedience of those who report to him/her". Cronbach's alpha was .75.

3.3.3 Analytic Strategy

To test the main hypotheses, data were analysed using polynomial regression with response surface analysis (Edwards, 1994; Shanock et al., 2010, 2014). This method has recently been recommended as a more precise and robust analytic alternative to traditional approaches using difference scores in congruence research (Edwards & Cable, 2009; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). A major criticism of the use of difference scores addresses the reduction of three-dimensional relationships between independent factors and the dependent variable to a two-dimensional structure (Edwards, 2002; Riggs & Porter, 2017). In contrast, using polynomial regression with response surface analysis permitted a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between follower and leader moral foundations and ethical and unethical leadership perceptions. Specifically, it allowed to examine in detail how the level of agreement, the degree of as well as the direction of discrepancy of follower and leader moral foundations affect the ethical and unethical leadership perceptions. With regard to direction, it allowed to explore whether leaders' or followers' sensitivity to a certain moral foundation was more important for the prediction of the focal ethical and unethical leadership perceptions. Furthermore, in contrast to traditional regression models, this approach also allowed to test for non-linear relations.

Follower and leader moral foundation ratings were mean-centered for the polynomial regression analysis. In separate analyses, ethical and unethical leadership were regressed on a centered follower moral foundation, a centered leader moral foundation, the square of a centered follower moral foundation, the product of a centered follower moral foundation and centered leader moral foundation, and the square of a centered leader moral foundation (Shanock et al., 2010). The equation to test for relationships between the perceived leadership

style and leader and follower moral foundations using polynomial regression is:

$$Z = b_0 + b_1X + b_2Y + b_3X^2 + b_4XY + b_5Y^2 + e$$

Z is a dependent variable (e.g., ethical leadership), *X* is predictor 1 (e.g., follower fairness moral foundation), and *Y* is predictor 2 (e.g., leader fairness moral foundation). B_0 is the constant, b_1 is the unstandardized coefficient for the centered follower moral foundation, b_2 is the unstandardized coefficient for the centered leader moral foundation, b_3 is the unstandardized coefficient for the squared centered follower moral foundation, b_4 is the unstandardized coefficient for the product of the centered follower and leader moral foundation, and b_5 is the unstandardized coefficient for the squared centered leader moral foundation. Using the coefficients b_1 - b_5, we applied the response surface methodology to illustrate relationships between the independent variables and leadership outcomes in three-dimensional graphs.

In contrast to traditional regression analysis, the results of a polynomial regression analysis are evaluated by four surface test indices (a_1 - a_4) instead of single regression coefficients (Figure 4) (Edwards, 2002; Shanock et al., 2010).



Figure 4. Response surface analysis.

The line of $X = Y$, the congruence axis, represents the congruent match of leader and follower moral foundations. The line perpendicular to this congruent line is the incongruence axis of $X = -Y$, where leader and follower moral foundations are not in agreement. $A_1 = (b_1 + b_2)$ represents the slope of the line of perfect agreement (Shanock et al., 2010). It determines whether the change of the independent variable along the congruence axis is flat (slope = 0) or non-flat (positive slope > 0, or negative slope < 0) (Tsai et al., 2017). $A_2 = (b_3 + b_4 + b_5)$ represents the curvature along the line of perfect agreement (Shanock et al., 2010). It indicates whether the change of the independent variable along the congruence axis is linear or curvilinear (Tsai et al., 2017). $A_3 = (b_1 - b_2)$ is the slope of the line of incongruence. It shows whether the change of the independent variable along the incongruence axis is flat (slope = 0) or non-flat (positive slope > 0, or negative slope < 0) (Tsai et al., 2017). $A_4 = (b_3 - b_4 + b_5)$ represents the curvature of the line of incongruence (Shanock et al., 2010). It indicates whether the change of the independent variable along the incongruence axis is linear or curvilinear (Tsai et al., 2017).

3.4 Results

3.4.1 Measurement Model

Before testing the proposed hypotheses, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in AMOS was used to see if the factor structure of the measures fit the data well. For all latent variables, items rather than item parcels were used as indicators. In the first step, the structural validity of the leadership measures (i.e., ethical and despotic leadership) was examined separately. In line with De Hoogh and Den Hartog (2008), support was found for a first-order factor model in which items were allowed to load onto their respective factors (i.e., morality and fairness, role clarification, power sharing, and despotic leadership) and the factors were allowed to correlate with each other ($\chi^2 = 403.37$, $df = 224$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 1.80$, CFI = .86, RMSEA = .08). The four-factor structure was clearly preferable over a model in which all items loaded onto a single

factor ($\chi^2 = 756.10$, $df = 230$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 3.28$, CFI = .58, RMSEA = .13, $\Delta\chi^2_{(6)} = 352.19$, $p < .001$, ΔCFI = .28). These results show that some of the obtained statistics were below established thresholds, such as the CFI with a value clearly below .95 (West, Tylor, & Wu, 2012). A closer look at the factor loading revealed that this pattern resulted primarily from items pertaining to the despotic leadership measure. While the separate assessment of a three-factorial ethical leadership model yielded a proper fit ($\chi^2 = 170.67$, $df = 116$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 1.47$, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .06), a separate single-factor model of despotic leadership produced weak fit statistics ($\chi^2 = 473.59$, $df = 9$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 4.73$, CFI = .86, RMSEA = .16). Although model fit could be improved by reducing the number of items, I deemed this not a proper strategy. Model fit is, at least to some degree, also a function of sample characteristics as well as the ratio of sample size to the number of variables (West et al., 2012). Since I was interested in capturing the phenomena under investigation in accordance with their original theoretical underpinning (De Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2008), all subsequent analyses are based on the full measures.

Next, a second-order model was tested, in which the three ethical dimensions loaded on a higher-order ethical leadership factor whereas despotic leadership was included as a separate factor. The factor loadings pertaining to the higher-order ethical leadership factor ranged from .73 to .85 ($p < .001$). The factor correlation between the higher-order ethical leadership factor and despotic leadership was -.61 ($p < .001$). The fit of this model was slightly inferior to the fit of the first-order solution ($\chi^2 = 431.13$, $df = 226$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 1.90$, CFI = .84, RMSEA = .08, $\Delta\chi^2_{(2)} = 27.94$, $p < .001$, ΔCFI = .02), which is in line with the results reported by De Hoogh and Den Hartog (2008). Thus, I followed their procedure. Given that the fit of the higher-order factor model approached that of the first-factor model, the higher order structure appears as more parsimonious and thus, I used a composite score for ethical leadership in order to test my hypotheses.

With regard to the moral foundation measure, I was not able to generate a proper solution in the CFA. In fact, all theoretically viable models yielded a covariance matrix that is

not positive definite, suggesting either that the model is wrong or that the sample is too small (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1982). Overall, research on the factor structure of the MFQ is scarce and in addition, in most studies, especially those in non-English speaking countries, the degree of fit is below traditional criteria (e.g., Bowman, 2010; Bobbio, Nencini, & Sarrica, 2011; Yilmaz, Harma, Bahçekapili, & Cesur, 2016). Nonetheless, since these studies generally suggest that the 5-factor structure of the MFT provides a better fit than alternative models, it is plausible that my estimation problems are caused by the small sample size and not by theoretical misspecification.

3.4.2 Hypothesis Testing

Table 2 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables from leaders and followers.

Table 2

Means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables from leaders and followers

Variable	Mean	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1. Follower Age	36.14	11.96																
2. Leader Age	44.77	11.40	.41**															
3. Follower Level of Education	2.54	1.31	-.10	-.03														
4. Leader Level of Education	2.08	1.10	-.26**	-.03	.22*													
5. Follower Care MF	3.93	.76	-.10	-.05	.08	-.06												
6. Follower Fairness MF	4.50	.61	-.05	.02	.00	-.24**	.35**											
7. Follower Loyalty MF	3.70	.63	-.16	-.05	.10	.07	.29**	.34**										
8. Follower Authority MF	3.75	.75	-.27**	.00	.03	.14	.26**	.18*	.48**									
9. Follower Sanctity MF	4.25	.75	.09	.03	-.11	-.13	.18*	.38**	.39**	.35**								
10. Leader Care MF	3.69	.75	.01	.25**	.12	.35**	.19*	.00	-.09	-.03	-.07							
11. Leader Fairness MF	4.44	.62	.04	.28**	.05	.14	.21*	.10	.00	.09	-.02	.43**						
12. Leader Loyalty MF	4.24	.55	-.14	.07	.15	.20*	.11	-.18*	-.07	-.01	-.06	.34**	.30**					
13. Leader Authority MF	3.83	.74	-.17	.00	.26**	.25*	.16	-.13	.06	.05	-.09	.19*	.16	.44**				
14. Leader Sanctity MF	4.33	.70	.11	.13	-.05	.10	-.07	-.07	.01	-.02	.10	.16	.10	.23**	.26**			
15. Ethical Leadership	5.14	.74	.13	.14	-.09	-.14	-.05	.16	.09	.10	.11	-.02	-.13	-.17	-.23**	.07		
16. Despotic Leadership	2.68	.93	-.22*	-.25**	.11	.23**	.08	-.15	.15	.11	.06	.04	-.04	.19*	.25**	-.01	-.50**	

**$p < 0.01$

* $p < 0.05$

Table 3 and 4 show the results of polynomial regression analysis – Table 3 for ethical leadership and Table 4 for despotic leadership. All coefficients are unstandardized unless otherwise noted. In a first step, I controlled for age and education in the prediction of ethical and despotic leadership ratings (Model 1). In the next step (Model 2 and 3), the coefficient for the centered follower moral foundation (b_1), the coefficient for the centered leader moral foundation (b_2), the coefficient for the squared centered follower moral foundation (b_3), the coefficient for the product of the centered follower and leader moral foundation (b_4), and the coefficient for the squared centered leader moral foundation (b_5) were entered. The resulting three-dimensional graphs of the response surface analyses based on the coefficients (b_1-b_5) are presented in Figure 5 (ethical leadership) and Figure 6 (despotic leadership).

Hypothesis 1 predicted a significant positive relationship between leader-follower moral foundations congruence and perceived ethical leadership. Out of five moral foundations, congruence effects were found for three: fairness, loyalty, and authority. For the other two foundations (i.e., care and sanctity), no such effects were revealed. Hence, Hypothesis 1 is partially confirmed. Below, the obtained patterns are delineated in detail.

The degree of leader follower discrepancy on the fairness moral foundation was negatively related to ethical leadership (a_4 = -.47, p = .032; R^2=.17, p = .009). Ethical leadership ratings decreased more sharply as the degree of discrepancy on the fairness foundation increased (see Table 3). Toward the right and left of the line of incongruence, where follower and leader fairness moral foundations become more discrepant, ethical leadership ratings decrease (see Figure 5). In addition, a significant effect of the direction of discrepancy on the fairness moral foundation was revealed (a_3=.39, p = .013; R^2 = .17, p = .009) (see Table 3). The significant positive a_3 score indicates that ethical leadership ratings are higher when follower fairness moral foundation scores are higher than leader fairness moral foundation scores than vice versa (see Figure 5). Toward the right of the line of incongruence where high follower fairness moral foundation scores are combined with low leader fairness moral foundation

scores, ethical leadership scores are relatively high. Ethical leadership ratings are relatively low when low follower fairness moral foundations scores are combined with high leader fairness moral foundations scores (toward the left of the line of incongruence).

The degree of leader follower discrepancy on the loyalty moral foundation was negatively related to ethical leadership (a_4 = -.56, p = .026; R^2 = .19, p = .003). Ethical leadership ratings decreased more sharply as the degree of discrepancy on the loyalty foundation increased (see Table 3). Toward the right and left of the line of incongruence, where follower and leader loyalty moral foundations become more discrepant, ethical leadership ratings decrease (see Figure 5). Furthermore, a significant effect of the direction of discrepancy on the loyalty moral foundation (a_3 = .37, p = .011; R^2 = .19, p = .003) was also found. The significant positive a_3 score indicates that ethical leadership ratings are higher when follower loyalty moral foundation scores are higher than leader loyalty moral foundation scores than vice versa (see Table 3). Toward the right of the line of incongruence where high follower loyalty moral foundation scores are combined with low leader loyalty moral foundation scores, ethical leadership scores are relatively high. Ethical leadership ratings are relatively low when low follower loyalty moral foundations scores are combined with high leader loyalty moral foundations scores (toward the left of the line of incongruence).

Table 3

Leader-follower moral foundation congruence as a predictor of ethical leadership

		Fairness Moral Foundation	Loyalty Moral Foundation	Authority Moral Foundation	Care Moral Foundation	Sanctity Moral Foundation
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Constant	5.08**	4.77**	4.86**	4.86**	5.25**	5.04**
Follower age	-.01	-.01	.00	-.01	-.01	.00
Follower education level	-.04	-.02	-.02	.00	-.05	-.03
Leader age	.01*	.02**	.01*	.01*	.01*	.01+
Leader education level	-.10	-.04	-.07	-.06	-.11	-.09
Follower moral foundation (FMF)		.21+	.08	.08	-.04	.10
Leader moral foundation (LMF)		-.18+	-.29*	-.29**	.01	.07
FMF^2		-.18	.04	.07	-.07	-.04
FMF x LMF		.19	.57**	.21+	.36	.14
LMF^2		-.10	-.03	-.05	-.09	.00
R^2	.06	.17**	.19**	.16*	.12+	.09
ΔR^2	.03	.10**	.12**	.09*	.06+	.02
Congruence line ($F = L$)						
Slope: $a_1=(b_1+b_2)$		.03	-.21	-.21	-.05	.11
Curvature: $a_2=(b_3+b_4+b_5)$		-.09	.58+	-.19	.02	.06
Incongruence line ($F = -L$)						
Slope: $a_3=(b_1-b_2)$		.39*	.37*	.37**	-.03	.01
Curvature: $a_4=(b_3-b_4+b_5)$		-.47*	-.56*	.23	-.52**	-.36

Note. $N = 136$. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. Tests of significance were two-tailed.
**$p < 0.01$
* $p < 0.05$
+ $p < 0.05$



Figure 5. Response surface analysis: Ethical leadership.

Finally, while the degree of leader-follower discrepancy on the authority moral foundation was not significantly related to ethical leadership perceptions, the data indicated a significant effect of the direction of discrepancy (a_3 = .37, p = .002; R^2 = .16, p = .014) (see Table 3). The significant positive a_3 score reveals that ethical leadership ratings increase when follower authority moral foundation scores are higher than leader authority moral foundation scores than vice versa (see Figure 5). Toward the right of the line of incongruence where high follower authority moral foundation scores are combined with low leader authority moral foundation scores, ethical leadership scores are relatively high. Ethical leadership ratings are relatively low when low follower authority moral foundations scores are combined with high leader authority moral foundations scores (toward the left of the line of incongruence).

Hypothesis 2 stated a significant negative relationship between leader-follower moral foundations congruence and despotic leadership. As above, congruence effects were revealed for the moral foundations of fairness, loyalty, and authority but not for the other foundations (i.e. care and sanctity). This lends partial support to Hypothesis 2. Below, the obtained patterns are explicated in detail.

The degree of leader follower discrepancy on the fairness moral foundation was positively related to despotic leadership (a_4 = .72, p = .012; R^2 = .19, p = .002). Despotic leadership ratings increased more sharply as the degree of discrepancy on the fairness foundation increased (see Table 4). Toward the right and left of the line of incongruence, where follower and leader fairness moral foundations become more discrepant, despotic leadership ratings increase (see Figure 6).

Table 4

Leader-follower moral foundation congruence as a predictor of despotic leadership

		Fairness Moral Foundation	Loyalty Moral Foundation	Authority Moral Foundation	Care Moral Foundation	Sanctity Moral Foundation
Variables	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Constant	3.18**	3.24**	3.34**	3.34**	3.04**	3.09**
Follower age	-.01	-.01	-.01	.00	.00	-.01
Follower education level	.06	.06	.03	.02	.07	.07
Leader age	-.02*	-.02*	-.02*	-.02*	-.02*	-.02*
Leader education level	.16	.12	.14+	.14+	.17+	.16+
Follower moral foundation (FMF)		-.12	.24+	.06	.06	.12
Leader moral foundation (LMF)		.02	.36*	.31**	.03	.05
FMF^2		-.00	-.06	-.13	-.04	.02
FMF x LMF		-.47*	-.52*	-.27+	-.17	.09
LMF^2		.25	-.03	-.06	.16	.10
R^2	.12**	.19**	.19**	.21**	.15*	.14*
ΔR^2	.09**	.13**	.13**	.15**	.08*	.07*
Congruence line ($F = L$)						
Slope: $a_1=(b_1+b_2)$		-.10	.58**	.37*	.09	.17
Curvature: $a_2=(b_3+b_4+b_5)$		-.22	-.61	-.46+	-.05	.21
Incongruence line ($F = -L$)						
Slope: $a_3=(b_1-b_2)$		-.14	-.10	-.25	.03	.07
Curvature: $a_4=(b_3-b_4+b_5)$		.72*	.43	.08	.29	.03

Note. $N = 136$. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. Tests of significance were two-tailed.
**$p < 0.01$
* $p < 0.05$
+ $p < 0.05$



Figure 6. Response surface analysis: Despotic leadership.

In contrast to Hypothesis 2, agreement in follower and leader loyalty moral foundation ratings was positively related to despotic leadership in a linear way ($a_1 = .58$, $p = .009$; $R^2 = .19$, $p = .002$). Despotic leadership ratings increased as both follower and leader loyalty scores increased (see Table 4). The lowest level of despotic leadership is at the front end of the congruent axis, where follower and leader loyalty foundations are both low and increase toward the back corner where follower and leader loyalty foundations are both in agreement and high (see Figure 6).

Finally, also agreement in follower and leader authority moral foundation ratings was positively related to despotic leadership in a linear way ($a_1 = .37$, $p = .019$; $R^2 = .21$, $p = .001$) (see Table 4). Despotic leadership ratings increased as both follower and leader authority scores increased. At the front end of the congruence axis where follower and leader authority foundation scores are both low, despotic leaderships ratings are low. At the back, where scores are both high, despotic leadership ratings are high (see Figure 6). In summary, a significant association with leader follower congruence was found on the fairness, loyalty and authority foundations. The direction of the congruence effect varied.

3.5 Discussion

This study was motivated by a desire to better understand the interplay of leaders and followers in the co-creation of ethical and unethical leadership perceptions. Against this backdrop, the effects of leader-follower moral foundations congruence on followers' perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership were tested. Building upon moral foundations theory and the notion of moralized leadership, the results revealed that the level of moral foundations congruence as well as the direction of discrepancy between follower and leader moral foundations were related to followers' ethical and unethical leadership perceptions. In what follows, I first discuss the obtained congruency patterns for each of the tested moral

foundations (i.e., fairness, loyalty, authority, care and sanctity) and then outline the overarching theoretical implications of my research.

3.5.1 Fairness Moral Foundations Congruence

As predicted, I found a positive relation of fairness moral foundations congruence to ethical leadership perceptions and a negative relation to despotic leadership perceptions. In other words, the higher the fit between followers and leaders in their sensitivity to issues of fairness, the higher the ethical leadership perceptions and the lower the despotic leadership perceptions. Unexpectedly, this holds for both congruence in high and low levels of sensitivity. This pattern can be explained by the following theoretical assumptions. First, it is assumed that actual leader behaviour is a function of leader moral foundations and, thus, it is plausible that leaders scoring high on the fairness moral foundation show more associated behaviours (e.g. treating followers fairly) and less violations of it (e.g., followers' discrimination) and are thus perceived as more ethical and less despotic by followers (Graham et al., 2013; Weaver et al., 2014). Second, followers high on the fairness moral foundation are more likely to positively moralize and considerate fair leader behaviours, as reflected in the notion of ethical leadership (Fehr et al., 2015) and negatively moralize unfair leader behaviours as reflected in the notion of despotic leadership. At the same time, however, the data revealed that perceptions of ethical leadership also increased and perceptions of despotic leadership decreased, when both leaders and followers are low on the fairness moral foundation. In line with the discussion above, a potential explanation for this is that leaders low on the fairness moral foundation are less inclined to engage in behaviours associated with this foundation. However, followers low on the fairness moral foundation are less sensitive to the lack or violation of such behaviours and, thus, may still positively moralize these leadership forms and create high ethical leadership perceptions. These followers may also less likely negatively moralize these behaviours and not perceive them as despotic.

3.5.2 Loyalty Moral Foundations Congruence

With regard to the loyalty moral foundation, the results show a more differentiated pattern. In line with Hypothesis 1, a positive relation of loyalty moral foundations congruence to followers' ethical leadership perceptions was found. Analogous to fairness moral foundations congruence, the higher the congruence between followers and leaders in both high as well as low sensitivity to issues of loyalty, the higher were the ethical leadership perceptions. However, in contrast to Hypothesis 2, when both leaders and followers scored high on the loyalty moral foundation, followers' perceptions of despotic leadership increased. It is plausible that leaders with a high sensitivity for loyalty are more concerned with organizational goals and less with the interests of single employees (Fehr et al., 2015) or with societal norms (Kalshoven, van Dijk, & Boon, 2016). Followers high on the loyalty moral foundation may also have the tendency to behave in line with the benefit of the organization at the expense of the loyalty to societal norms, but still perceive such leader behaviours as a lack of loyalty towards themselves, negatively moralize them, and perceive these leaders as despotic.

3.5.3 Authority Moral Foundations Congruence

With regard to the authority moral foundation, the results revealed no relation between congruence on this foundation and ethical leadership. This suggests that the degree of congruence in followers' and leaders' moral sensitivity for aspects of authority does not relate to followers' ethical leadership perceptions. In contrast to this, it was related to perceptions of despotic leadership. Data revealed that perceptions of despotic leadership increased, when leaders' and followers' both scored high on the authority moral foundation. When leaders' and followers' sensitivity for authority aspects was on a low level, also perceptions of despotic leadership were low. A potential explanation for this pattern is that the authority foundation is inherently associated with a concern for hierarchy as well as associated responsibility (Graham et al., 2013). In this view, social hierarchies are associated with beneficial relationships upwards

and downwards. As outlined by Graham and colleagues (2013), individuals scoring high on this foundation emphasize respect and obedience as central virtues. Leaders high on this dimension are expected to be more motivated by status and self-serving motives, which is likely to foster despotic leadership (Fehr et al., 2015). Followers with the same preference may show an increased acceptance for and positively moralize such status and authority-motivated behaviours, but only as long as their leaders sufficiently address their "duties associated with their position on the social ladder" (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012, p. 185). If the same leaders fail to fulfil their responsibilities, abuse their social status and organizational position and exploit their followers, these leader behaviours are likely to become moralized negatively. Consequently, followers may come to perceive and judge these leaders as morally wrong or despotic. In the same vein, followers who are not particularly sensitive to aspects of authority may not moralize these behaviours and judge them as despotic at all.

3.5.4 Care and Sanctity Moral Foundations Congruencies

Care/harm and sanctity/degradation moral foundation congruencies did not account for ethical or despotic leadership perceptions. This suggests that these morality aspects may be less relevant for the ethical dimension of leadership. These findings challenge the usual focus on caring as an essential aspect of ethical leadership (Brown et al., 2005; Kalshoven et al., 2011). Brown and colleagues (2005) argue that ethical leaders who are nurturing, caring, and respectful have positive relationships with their followers and these relationships are a fruitful ground for ethical conduct among followers. However, it is helpful to note that ethical leadership goes beyond leader consideration behaviour (Fehr et al., 2015). Hence, while congruence in the care foundation might be important for perceptions of leadership considerate behaviours, this is not necessarily the case for ethical leadership. Notably, ethical leaders sometimes need to take uncomfortable and unpopular decisions, especially when faced with contrasting expectations and ethical dilemmas. Furthermore, it is important to note that measures of ethical and unethical

leadership used in this study do not sufficiently cover the full spectrum of concerns associated with the moral domain, but are rather rooted in certain normative views. Aspects of caring and sanctity are covered only by a rather limited degree, while aspects associated with fairness, loyalty and authority are emphasized more strongly (De Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2008; Fehr et al., 2015). Yet, these aspects may nonetheless be important sources of leaders' and followers' individual notions of what is morally right and wrong.

3.5.5 Additional Findings: Direction of Moral Foundation Discrepancy

To investigate the interplay between leader and follower moral foundations in more detail, an exploratory approach was adopted. So far, I have focused on the level of congruence. Yet, the data permit also a closer look at the direction of discrepancy. In particular, if leaders and followers differ in their endorsement of a certain moral foundation, what counts more for ethical and unethical leadership perceptions: endorsement among leaders or followers? In other words: does it matter whether leaders or followers are more sensitive for a certain moral foundation or is it just a question of alignment? An exploratory analysis revealed an interesting effect of the direction of discrepancy in the fairness, loyalty and authority moral foundations on perceptions of ethical leadership. More specifically, it was found that ethical leadership ratings increased when followers had higher scores on these foundations than leaders, but not vice versa. This indicates that followers' sensitivity for the fairness, loyalty, and authority moral foundations affected followers' perceptions of ethical leadership more strongly as compared to leaders' sensitivity. For unethical leadership perceptions, no such directional effects were obtained.

3.5.6 Theoretical Implications

The reported results have a number of theoretical implications. My findings support the notion of ethical and unethical leadership as a social construction and enhance knowledge on

how this construction occurs. At the same time, they provide valuable extensions to prior attempts in this field exploring the role of different forms of moral congruence. Jordan and colleagues (2013) looked at leader-follower moral congruence in moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2000) and found no clear support for congruence effects on the perception of ethical leadership. Yet, they obtained initial evidence that perceptions of ethical leadership were maximized when the leader's level of moral reasoning was greater than that of the follower. Building upon this previous work, and including perceptions of unethical leadership into the equation as well, the results of this study suggest that also moral intuitions, especially those of followers, play an important role when it comes to the moralization of leadership. One the one hand, this is in line with the contentions of Brown and Mitchell (2010) that congruence in deliberate moral reasoning is not necessarily positive. Rather, when diverging moral intuitions, as the deeper and emotionally valenced moral system (Weaver et al., 2014), are involved, it can even cause more tensions. I add to this stream of research by adding that the higher the leader-follower moral foundations congruence, the more likely it is that leaders' behaviours are positively moralized and perceived as ethical leadership; the lower the leader-follower moral foundations congruence, the more likely it is that leaders' behaviours are negatively moralized and perceived as unethical leadership.

Furthermore, as an exploratory result, this study indicates that beside the level of congruence, also the direction of discrepancy between leaders' and followers' moral foundations matters for perceptions of ethical leadership. Specifically, it was found that followers' moral foundations drive the prediction of ethical leadership perceptions more strongly, relative to leaders' moral foundations. This is an interesting contrast to the results reported by Jordan et al. (2013), who found that ethical leadership perceptions were better predicted by leader's level of moral reasoning as compared to follower's level of moral reasoning. These patterns suggest that moral foundations may be more influential in determining followers' perceptions, while they may be less influential in determining leaders'

behaviours. While previous research often exclusively focused on leader characteristics, these preliminary findings further accentuate the role of followers in the leadership process (Uhl-Bien et al., 2014). Interestingly, no such direction of discrepancy effects were found for unethical leadership perceptions. This indicates that in this specific co-construction process, leaders' and followers' notion of what is morally right and wrong may matter more equally. Yet, this interpretation is clearly preliminary and future research should investigate the potentially differential co-creational roles of leaders and followers in ethical and unethical leadership processes in more detail.

Another theoretical implication of this study is that it is among the first that applied a pluralistic morality approach in order to predict perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership. Whereas previous studies have framed morality exclusively around aspects of welfare and fairness (Weaver et al., 2014), MFT offers a pluralistic perspective comprising also moral beliefs pertaining to authority, loyalty and sanctity (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Graham et al., 2013). An important contribution of this study is thus that not only the fairness moral foundation but also loyalty and authority seem to be linked to perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership (De Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2008). In contrast, congruence on the care moral foundation seems to be less important than generally assumed in ethical leadership research, so far. The topic of moral pluralism has been widely discussed in moral behaviour research and has recently also been gaining increasing attention in moral approaches to leadership (Egorov & Pircher Verdorfer, 2017; Lemoine et al., 2018; Weaver et al., 2014). These findings underscore the need to consider that unethical and ethical leadership models adhere to specific normative principles and these principles can vary across models. The two theoretical models of ethical and despotic leadership used herein represent two particular normative views on what it means to be an ethical or unethical leader. They seem to be more connected with some moral foundations than with others. While Brown and colleagues (2005) referred to ethical leadership as "the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct" (p. 120), these findings suggest that leaders'

and followers' perceptions of 'normatively appropriate' are significantly affected by the congruence in their moral foundations. Other moral approaches to leadership (i.e. servant leadership or authentic leadership) may comprise more specific components, which reflect a different set of moral foundations (Fehr et al., 2015). Accordingly, depending on which particular type of ethical and unethical leadership is examined, different congruence patterns in moral foundations may become relevant.

3.5.7 Practical Implications

Besides its theoretical contributions, my research has several implications for practice. First, leaders should be aware that the "my perspective is my reality"- approach has its pitfalls, especially when it comes to the ethical dimension of leadership (Egorov, Pircher Verdorfer, & Peus, 2018). Moral equivocality in organizations as well as a high cognitive load in increasingly fast-paced and volatile work contexts may bias leaders' judgments and promote unethical decisions and behaviours without leaders' awareness (Palazzo et al., 2012; Sonenshein, 2007). The same is true for their followers and maybe further organizational stakeholders who, in addition, may be guided by divergent moral foundations. Leaders can greatly benefit from gaining more awareness of how moral foundations may impact their decisions and behaviours (Egorov et al., 2018; Sadler-Smith, 2012, 2016). It can help them to better understand why and under what specific circumstances followers may perceive their behaviours as ethical or unethical and react differently to their leadership practices and influence attempts. Thus, the effectiveness of ethical leadership development programs may be improved by incorporating systematic reflection on moral foundations (Sadler-Smith, 2012; Weaver et al., 2014). Recently, Egorov and colleagues (2018) introduced a conceptual model of ethically-oriented leader development, which specifies how moral intuitions, and in particular MFT, can be integrated in a more holistic development approach. The authors proposed to (1) develop leaders' moral knowledge on moral cognition, (2) increase leaders' self-awareness of their moral intuition and

moral foundations, (3) promote leaders' comprehension of moral diversity and moral foundations endorsed by their followers and organizational culture, and (4) purposefully develop leaders' moral intuitions process and content – particularly leaders' moral foundations.

Related to the above, the maxim "Look before you leap" may help leaders to become more aware of and to thoughtfully look at their own moral foundations and the moral foundations of their followers. This can aid them in implementing the right moral reminders in their work and proactively promoting desired ethical behaviours among followers. At the same time, leaders may also learn to proactively activate and trust their moral intuition in decision processes (Egorov et al., 2018; Dane & Pratt, 2007). On this basis, they may also promote awareness of moral intuition and moral foundations among their followers and, thus, alter their responses.

3.5.8 Limitations and Future Research

Although this work expands our understanding of the social construction of ethical and unethical leadership, it is not without limitations. First, with the cross-sectional nature of this study, causality is not clear. However, it seems doubtful that followers' perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership would affect their moral foundations self-ratings or vice versa. Moreover, leaders' self-ratings of moral foundations are independent from follower ratings. Nevertheless, future research should not only replicate the results presented herein, but also adopt experimental and longitudinal designs to more thoroughly investigate causal relationships.

Second, common method bias (CMB) may be an issue as the moral foundations of the followers and leadership perceptions were collected from the same source. However, I was interested in individual moral foundations and perceptions and, thus, the use of self-reports was appropriate (Conway & Lance, 2010). Moreover, in line with Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon and Podsakoff (2003) evaluation apprehension was reduced by ensuring respondent

anonymity. Also, psychological separation of measurement was applied in that items for different constructs were separated and instructions and response formats varied accordingly. Yet, future research may improve the measurement strategy by introducing a time lag between collecting follower moral foundations self-ratings and measuring leadership perceptions. In keeping with this, a strength of the current study includes its multi-source nature in calculating the objective fit indices pertaining to leader and follower moral foundations scores.

A third limitation of this study is that the focal measures showed relatively weak fit statistics in the confirmatory factor analyses. Although the factorial validity could be improved by the elimination of specific items, especially with regard to the measurement of despotic leadership, it was preferred to stay in line with the original operationalization provided by De Hoogh and Den Hartog (2008). Future research should replicate these results with alternative measures of unethical leadership such as the integrative measure developed by Thoroughgood, Tate, Sawyer and Jacobs (2012). Such studies would also benefit from using alternative ethical leadership measures such as Kalshoven et al.' (2011) Ethical Leadership at Work Questionnaire and integrating a broader range of moral leadership forms such as authentic and servant leadership (Lemoine et al., 2018). In the same vein, I recognize that the construct validity of the moral foundations measure may be somewhat limited. Yet, as Conway and Lance (2010, p. 329) point out, it can be very difficult to provide extensive evidence for construct validity in every case, "especially when the area of research is relatively new and innovative, and the availability and most appropriate type of evidence may vary case by case". On the other hand, this moral foundations measure produced distinct relationships with theoretically relevant outcomes, which increases the confidence in its validity (Conway & Lance, 2010). Nevertheless, future research may benefit from using improved measures of moral foundations, as they hopefully become available.

Finally, it will be useful in future research to investigate the interplay of deliberate moral reasoning and moral intuition when studying the role of moral congruence in relation to ethical

and unethical leadership. As Brown and Mitchell (2010) stressed, leaders and followers "might use the same principled reasoning to justify a very different set of moral intuitions" (p. 597). In line with recent calls (Thoroughgood et al., 2018), such studies would particularly benefit from using inductive approaches. Interviews with leaders and followers would allow a more in-depth assessment of how explicit moral beliefs as well as moral intuitions shape leader behaviours and how leader-follower congruence in them shapes follower perceptions of leader behaviours. Still, also the application of multi-method approaches combining qualitative and quantitative methods as well as explicit and implicit measures (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005) would allow for a more precise and holistic analysis of the heterogeneous moral congruence construct and its role in ethical and unethical leadership processes.

3.5.9 Conclusion

Not only for ethical, but also for practical and financial reasons, it is critical for organizations to increase ethical while reducing unethical leadership. Thus, organizational research needs to develop a solid understanding of the co-creation of ethical or unethical leadership processes between leaders and followers as well as their perceptions. Increasing populism and overly emotive debates on important social and political issues, such as migration, ecology, or health care, illustrate how different people perceive and judge morally relevant information. Also, it shows that moral debates are not inherently a matter of reason, but strongly influenced by intuitive moral foundations. The same is true for organizational members, including leaders and followers. The results from this study suggest that the consideration of congruence in moral foundations offers a fruitful approach to better understand why individuals come to view others as ethical or unethical. In organizational contexts, the degree and direction of congruence in moral foundations between leaders and followers appear as essential precursors to leadership moralization and followers' perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership. It is our hope that this research will spur researchers to further examine the effects

of moral congruence and moralization in the process and social construction of ethical and unethical leadership as well as ethical leadership development approaches.

4 Moral Foundations Sensitivity: A Perspective-Specific Moral Foundations Approach[3]

4.1 Introduction

In recent years, ongoing examples of public corporate scandals and rising costs of morally inappropriate leadership practices have brought attention to "newer genre" (Hannah et al., 2014, p. 598) leadership theories with an additional "core moral component" (Hoch et al., p. 524) beside the traditional focus on managerial tasks (Eisenbeiss, 2012; Peus et al., 2010, Schyns & Schilling, 2013). These "ethically-oriented" (Peus et al., 2010, p. 198), "positive leadership forms" (Hoch et al., 2018, p. 502) have highlighted the significance of leaders' moral beliefs as well as leaders' role as moral managers (Brown & Treviño, 2006; Brown & Mitchell, 2010). However, individuals differ in what they consider moral and immoral, their emotional and cognitive reactions to immoral acts as well as their efforts to maintain moral consistence (Eisenbeiss, 2012; Graham et al., 2013; Lovaš, & Wolt, 2002; Schmitt, Baumert, Fetchenhauer, Gollwitzer, Rothmund, & Schlösser, 2009; Schmitt et al., 2010). So far, this variance has not been considered and integrated sufficiently in current ethically-oriented leadership approaches (Akinci, & Sadler-Smith, 2011; Sadler-Smith, 2012; Treviño et al., 2006; Weaver et al., 2014).

In order to explain these interindividual differences in leaders' moral judgment, decision-making and behavior, it is necessary to consider recent findings in basic research on the morality construct. The MFT represents a prominent theoretical framework in moral psychology, which specifies five moral foundations upon which individuals develop their moral views (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2008). Recently, the MFT has been linked to leadership research, offering a promising route to the explanation of interindividual variances in leaders' moral beliefs and behaviors. The moral foundations have been shown as relevant

[3] This chapter is based on a working paper by Egorov and Steinberg (2019) currently being prepared for submission.

antecedents of ethically-oriented leadership styles and followers' perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership (Egorov et al., 2019; Fehr et al., 2015) as well as important target variables in ethically-oriented leader development (Egorov et al., 2018).

However, even though the MFT represents an established and empirically supported advancement in the field of moral psychology, the theory suffers from serious limitations, while several open questions remain. On the one hand, critics have highlighted the general terminological and conceptual weaknesses of the theoretical model especially with regard to the premises of the innateness and modularity of human morality (Suhler & Churchland, 2011). On the other hand, a major criticism concerns the number and content of the five moral foundations as being not conclusive (Fehr et al., 2015; Gray et al., 2012; Suhler & Churchland, 2011). As pointed out by Suhler and Churchland (2011), there may be further alternative foundations representing "basic moral values exhibited by humans across various cultures" (p. 2106), which could be equally integrated in the MFT. For instance, concerns for liberty versus oppression have already been proposed as a sixth additional moral foundation (Iyer et al., 2012).

An additional point of criticism that has not received much attention, is at the center of this paper. The MFT proposes a general sensitivity for each of the five moral foundations (Graham et al., 2013), although it is not clear whether people indeed vary in their domain-specific sensitivities, i.e. for moral foundations, or whether sensitivities are not only content but also perspective-dependent. Specifically, a consideration of established monistic theoretical models in the field of morality and justice research contrasts with this assumption of a general sensitivity. Comprehensive research on the construct of justice sensitivity (Baumert et al., 2013; Fetchenhauer, & Huang, 2004; Schmitt et al., 2005) demonstrated that people differ not only in a general sensitivity to injustice, but also in the perspective-specific victim, observer, beneficiary and perpetrator sensitivities (Baumert, Schlösser, & Schmitt, 2014; Schmitt et al., 2010). While the observer, beneficiary and perpetrator justice sensitivities represent different forms of general concerns for justice, victim sensitivity reflects just fears of exploitation and a

sense of "justice for the self" (Schmitt et al., 2010, p. 215). So far, previous work has not addressed the question of, whether the same perspective-specific framework should be applied in pluralistic morality concepts such as the MFT. From a theoretical point of view, a more differentiated moral foundation sensitivity approach would likely contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of interindividual varieties in moral judgment, decision-making and behavior. In particular, it may allow for more precise predictions of recently associated dependent variables such as donation behavior (Nilsson, Erlandsson, & Vastfjall, 2016), decisions and behaviors in experimental public goods games (Schier, Ockenfels, & Hofmann, 2016), attitudes towards climate change (Dickinson, McLeod, Bloomfield, & Allred, 2016) or political ideology (Iyer et al., 2016; Rempala, Okdie, & Garvey, 2016) and therefore increase the incremental validity of the moral foundations construct. A perspective-specific moral foundations sensitivity approach may also significantly impact current research insights in leadership research. For instance, already established links between moral foundations and variables such as ethically-oriented leadership styles, perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership (Egorov et al., 2019; Fehr et al., 2015; Weaver et al., 2014) as well as ethically-oriented leader development (Egorov et al., 2018; Sadler-Smith, 2012) may require a revision and, in consequence, allow for an increased amount of explained variance in these constructs.

Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to bridge this research gap and to examine, whether individuals vary not only in a general sensitivity for moral aspects related to the five moral foundations, but also in their foundation-specific victim, observer, beneficiary and perpetrator sensitivities. Hence, a major goal of this research is the initial exploration of the factorial structure of a perspective-specific moral foundations construct and the testing of the validity of an associated moral foundations measure. Thus, first, a perspective-specific moral foundation sensitivity construct is introduced and second, a perspective-specific adaptation of the MFQ is tested.

4.2 Theoretical Background

4.2.1 Moral Foundations

The MFT represents a pluralistic approach to human morality. The theoretical model is rooted in the assumption that "human morality is derived from or constrained by multiple innate mental systems, each shaped by a different evolutionary process" (Graham et al., 2013, p. 6). The theory outlines a theoretical framework with five moral foundations. These moral foundations represent distinct content aspects of a broad conceptualization of the moral domain, which are specified as (1) care/harm (i.e., focus on the reduction of suffering and increase in one's well-being), (2) fairness/cheating (i.e., focus on a decrease of cheating and an increase of justice, fair und trustful interactions and reciprocity), (3) loyalty/betrayal (i.e., focus on a need of coalition building and punitive actions against outgroups), (4) authority/subversion (i.e., focus on hierarchical relationships), and (5) sanctity/degradation (i.e., focus on purity and cleanliness and an avoidance of contaminants).

These five moral foundations are proposed to be rooted in evolutionary responses to adaptive challenges people have faced throughout the history of humankind (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2008). From this evolutionary psychological point of view, in order to overcome frequent obstacles and to increase their survival, people developed certain social frameworks and behavioral patterns, which determined the evolution of our moral domain today. The main challenges that contributed to the formation of the five moral foundations have been seen in (1) acts of protection and caring for children (care/harm moral foundation), (2) promotion of trustful partnerships (fairness/cheating moral foundation), (3) formation of cohesive coalitions (loyalty/betrayal moral foundation), (4) development of beneficial relationships within hierarchies (authority/subversion moral foundation) and (5) avoidance of diseases (sanctity/degradation moral foundation) (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt, 2012). All these challenges are linked to situational triggers that evoke emotional reactions and a moral intuition-based response associated with a "sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral

judgment, including an affective valence (good–bad, like–dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion" (Haidt, 2001, p. 818). An overview of the prototypical triggers of the five foundations as well as associated emotions is presented in Table 5.

Table 5

The moral foundations, original triggers, moral principles and characteristic emotions

Moral Foundation	Care / Harm	Fairness / Cheating	Loyalty / Betrayal	Authority / Subversion	Sanctity / Degradation
Original Triggers	Suffering, distress, or threat to one's kin	Cheating, cooperation, deception	Threat or challenge to group	Signs of high and low rank, dominance and submission	Waste products, diseased people
Relevant Moral Principles	Caring, kindness	Fairness, justice, honesty, trust-worthiness	Loyalty, patriotism, self-sacrifice	Obedience, deference	Temperance, chastity, piety, cleanliness
Characteristic Emotions	Compassion for victim; anger at perpetrator	Anger, gratitude, guilt	Group pride, rage at traitors	Respect, fear	Disgust

Note. Overview of original triggers, moral principles pertaining to moral foundations and characteristic emotions. Adapted from "Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism," by J. Graham, J. Haidt, S. Koleva, M. Motyl, R. Iyer, S. Wojcik, & P. H. Ditto, (2013). *Advances in experimental social psychology, 47*, 55-130. Copyright 2013 by Elsevier

Therefore, in view of the morally pluralistic approach of the MFT, individuals' moral beliefs are represented in varying general sensitivities for each of these moral foundations. Furthermore, a person's willingness to violate certain moral principles also depends on his/her moral foundation sensitivities (Graham & Haidt, 2012). Hence, this new theoretical model offers a strong explanatory framework for the interindividual variability of moral judgments

and behaviors (Graham et al., 2009, 2013; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2008). Whether people develop certain political attitudes, perceive something as morally right or wrong or are prone to show certain leadership practices may be linked to their moral foundation sensitivities (Egorov et al., 2018; Graham et al., 2011; Iyer et al., 2012; Weaver et al., 2014;).

4.2.2 Justice Sensitivity

Linking the MFT to research on justice sensitivity (Schmitt et al., 2010; Schmitt et al., 2005) challenges the assumption of a general sensitivity for each of the five foundations. Specifically, a steadily growing body of research shows that individuals differ rather systematically with regard to how they react towards perceived injustice (Baumert, Gollwitzer, Staubach, & Schmitt, 2011; Baumert & Schmitt, 2009; Maltese, Baumert, Schmitt, & MacLeod, 2016; Schmitt, Neumann & Montada, 1995). While much research has focused on the effects of organizational injustice and leaders' norm violations on victims, these injustice experiences also comprise indirectly involved observers, beneficiaries and, last but not least, perpetrators (Mikula, Petri, & Tanzer, 1990; Schmitt et al., 2005). Justice matters to all people, but individuals differ in their reactions to injustice and their efforts to maintain justice depending on their role in the injustice experience. Schmitt and colleagues (2005) could show that certain personality dispositions at the trait level determine these reactions. In particular, the authors propose that individuals differ in divergent aspects of their stable justice sensitivity. In this, they distinguish between four aspects: victim sensitivity, observer sensitivity, beneficiary sensitivity, and perpetrator sensitivity. Following this theoretical conceptualization, people experience injustice depending on these four perspective sensitivities. A person with a high degree of victim sensitivity would show a strong response to injustice when becoming a victim of unjust processes, but the same person could be challenged less by experiences of injustice in the role of an observer, perpetrator or beneficiary. Furthermore, Schmitt and colleagues (2010) established that these four justice sensitivities had different links to socially desirable traits such

as empathy or social responsibility and not desirable traits such as machiavellianism or distrust. For instance, Gollwitzer and colleagues (2009) demonstrated in an online-based public goods game experiment that beneficiary justice sensitivity and observer justice sensitivity were positively related to prosocial behavior, while victim justice sensitivity was positively related to the opposite antisocial behaviors. Numerous studies have demonstrated that "observer and beneficiary sensitivity reflect a genuine concern for the justice of others, whereas victim sensitivity contains, as an additional element, the fear of being exploited, and, thus, reflects a concern for justice for the self" (Schmitt et al., 2010, p. 215). So, with regard to research from the field of justice sensitivity, we already know that whether a person shows pro- and antisocial behaviors and perceives unfair treatments as ethically right or wrong, also depends on "relatively stable individual differences in attitudes, beliefs, and personality factors" (Schmitt et al., 2005, p. 212), which determine certain perspective-specific trait justice sensitivities and not an undifferentiated general justice sensitivity construct.

4.2.3 The Four Perspectives of Moral Foundation Sensitivity

In this chapter, I propose that there is a need to bridge the gap between the monistic and pluralistic morality research streams and to integrate both theoretical perspectives on varieties in ethical-judgment and decision-making, moral sensitivities and associated effects on attitudes and social behavior. Thus, I link the pluralistic approach with regard to the content of human morality, on the one hand, to the multiple perspectives approach with regard to the sensitivity to this content, on the other hand. Therefore, I introduce a more differentiated and perspective sensitive conceptualization of the moral foundation construct. In particular, I propose that, analogous to research on justice sensitivity and interindividual perspective-specific varieties in reactions to perceived injustice, the current conceptualization and operationalization of moral foundations must also be complemented by four different perspective-specific sensitivities for each of the moral foundations (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1987; Schmitt et al., 2010). In

addition to a general care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation sensitivity, I assume individual varieties in stable victim sensitivity, observer sensitivity, beneficiary sensitivity, and perpetrator sensitivity for each of the moral foundations to determine how quick people perceive a foundation specific norm violation, how intensively they react to it and how strong their desire is to maintain norm consistence in their own decisions and behaviors.

The original reliable and valid operationalization of the moral foundation construct has been represented in the MFQ (Graham et al., 2011) – a measure that captures the theoretically-grounded conceptualization of the broad moral domain comprising moral concerns of care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion and sanctity/degradation. I introduce an adapted operationalization of the moral foundation construct differentiating between victim sensitivity, observer sensitivity, beneficiary sensitivity, and perpetrator sensitivity for each of the moral foundations and investigate the relation of these sensitivities to each other. As an example, Table 6 illustrates, how an original MFQ item capturing a general sensitivity for the care/harm moral foundation is rendered in four different perspective-specific adaptations of victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator care/harm moral foundation sensitivities.

Table 6

Adaptation of an original MFQ care/harm moral foundation item in four different perspective-specific victim, observer, beneficiary and perpetrator care/harm moral foundation sensitivity items

Instruction	*When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?*
Original Care/Harm Moral Foundation Item	Whether or not someone suffered emotionally.
Victim Sensitivity Item	Whether or not I suffered emotionally.
Observer Sensitivity Item	Whether or not someone suffered emotionally.
Beneficiary Sensitivity Item	Whether or not someone suffered emotionally and I gained something because of that.
Perpetrator Sensitivity Item	Whether or not I let somebody suffer emotionally.

I expect that a four-factorial model differentiating between a victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivity for each of the five moral foundations will fit the data better than a one-factorial model.

Hypothesis 1: The moral foundation sensitivity construct is best represented by a four-factorial structure (victim, observer, beneficiary and perpetrator perspective) for each moral foundation subscale (care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation). This four-factor model is preferable over a model with a one-factorial structure for each moral foundation subscale.

4.3 Method

4.3.1 Sample

Data were collected via online surveys from a non-representative convenience sample made up of international students at the faculty of economics from a large German university. Data collection took place with one measurement. Here, we measured participants' Moral Foundation Sensitivity (Graham et al., 2011). In total, data from 382 participants was collected. The average age of participants was 23.9 years (*SD* = 1.89); 33.9% were women; 13.1% did not specify the gender.

4.3.2 Measures

4.3.2.1 Moral Foundation Sensitivity

To assess Moral Foundation Sensitivity, I used the MFQ introduced by Graham and colleagues (2011). I applied the original version of the measure, which captures five moral foundations and contains 30 items – 6 items for each moral foundation. Each moral foundation scale comprised two subscales which assessed the levels of (1) relevance of (instruction: "When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?") and (2) agreement to (instruction: "Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement") moral foundation-related statements. Following Graham and colleagues (2011), the two subscales address different processes associated with moral cognition, in that "the "relevance" subscale may better assess explicit theories about what is morally relevant, and the "judgments" subscale may better assess actual use of moral foundations in judgment" (p. 8).

Besides using the original version of the MFQ, I applied four adapted scales, resembling the original wording as closely as possible, in order to capture the perspective-specific sensitivity for each moral foundation in line with the operationalization of victim, observer, beneficiary and perpetrator justice sensitivity introduced by Schmitt and colleagues (2010). The

adapted version of the measure contained 120 items. Every moral foundation was captured with 24 items – 6 items for each perspective-specific moral foundation sensitivity.

The victim sensitivity relevance subscale captures levels of relevance of moral foundation-related statements for the process of individual moral judgment from a victim perspective (sample item: "Whether or not some people were treated better than me" or "Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty towards me"). Responses were given on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*not at all relevant)* to 6 (*extremely relevant*) in the first part. The victim sensitivity agreement subscale captures individual agreement with foundation-related statements framed from a victim perspective (sample item: "Even if it were to my detriment, justice is the most important requirement for a society" or "I should be loyal to my family members, even when they have done me wrong"). Responses were given on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*).

The observer sensitivity relevance subscale captures the levels of relevance of moral foundation-related statements for the process of individual moral judgment from an observer perspective (sample item: "Whether or not some people were treated differently than others" or "Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty"). Responses were given on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*not at all relevant)* to 6 (*extremely relevant*) in the first part. The observer sensitivity agreement subscale captures individual agreement with foundation-related statements framed from an observer perspective (sample item: "Justice between others is the most important requirement for a society" or "People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong"). Responses were given on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*).

The beneficiary sensitivity relevance subscale captures the levels of relevance of moral foundation-related statements for the process of individual moral judgment from a beneficiary perspective (sample item: "Whether or not I was treated better than others" or "Whether or not I receive something that others ought to have, because someone showed a lack of loyalty").

Responses were given on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*not at all relevant)* to 6 (*extremely relevant*) in the first part. The beneficiary sensitivity agreement subscale captures individual agreement with foundation-related statements framed from a beneficiary perspective (sample item: "If I profit from it, justice is the most important requirement for a society" or "I should be loyal to my family members, even when they have done something wrong, as long as I profit from it."). Responses were given on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*).

The perpetrator sensitivity relevance subscale captures the levels of relevance of moral foundation-related statements for the process of individual moral judgment from a perpetrator perspective (sample item: "Whether or not I treated some people better than others" or "Whether or not I showed a lack of loyalty"). Responses were given on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*not at all relevant)* to 6 (*extremely relevant*) in the first part. The perpetrator sensitivity agreement subscale captures individual agreement with foundation-related statements framed from a perpetrator perspective (sample item: "It gets me down when I violate standards of justice, which is the most important requirement for a society" or "I should be loyal to my family members, even when they have done something wrong"). Responses were given on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*). The overall reliability in terms of internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) for all moral foundation subscales was .94 (Cronbach, 1951).

4.3.3 Data Analysis

The data analysis targets each moral foundation separately and comprises a descriptive analytical approach at the item and scale level as well as a confirmatory factor analysis.

First, descriptive statistics at the item level (means, standard deviations, item-test correlations and factor loadings) and scale level (means, standard deviations, skewness, kurtosis, tau-equivalent reliability and correlations among scales) were computed.

Second, in order to test the factorial validity of the adapted perspective-specific moral foundation measure, a series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) was applied, using the Lavaan Package in R (Rossel, 2012). The CFAs were provided separately for each foundation. Specifically, the factor structure of the model specified in Hypothesis 1 was tested by comparing the fit of three different models: (1) a model with a one-factorial structure of a general moral foundation sensitivity not allowing for error correlations, (2) a model with a one-factorial structure of a general moral foundation sensitivity allowing for error correlations and (3) a model with a four-factorial structure of victim, observer, beneficiary and perpetrator sensitivity allowing for error correlations. Following Schmitt and colleagues (2010), I allow for error correlations between items with a similar semantic content. As the same moral concern represented in the original MFQ item is reframed in four different perspectives, these errors can represent certain moral foundation-related concerns, which may have "generated unique variance that was consistent across perspectives" (Schmitt et al., 2010, p. 221).

The model fit was evaluated by conventional fit criteria of $Chi^2(\chi^2)$, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) (Jackson, Gillaspy, & Purc-Stephenson, 2009). The comparison of the models was evaluated by difference scores of the χ^2 and CFI fit indices of the specified models (Kline, 2015; Putnick & Bornstein, 2016). Recent research has questioned the established procedure of model comparison by a single criterion of significance of $\Delta\chi^2$ and proposed a combination of multiple criteria comprising alternative fit indices such as the **Δ**CFI as a more valid approach (Chen, 2007; Meade, Johnson, & Braddy, 2008; Putnick & Bornstein, 2016). Usually, reported cut-off values for differences in CFI vary between .002 and .02 (Chen, 2007; Meade et al., 2008; Rutkoswki & Svetina, 2014). As there is no definite consensus, Putnick and Bornstein (2016) pointed out that researchers would need to find the appropriate cut-off criteria for their individual purpose. As the exploration of a perspective-sensitive measurement of moral foundations represented a new field of research, I concluded that a more conservative criterion of changes in **Δ**CFI of ≥.02

would represent an appropriate cut-off value in this study.

4.4 Results

In the following, I will first present the results of the descriptive analytical approach at the item and scale level and, second, lay out the results of the confirmatory factor analysis. All results are presented for each moral foundation separately.

4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Moral Foundation Questionnaire Items and Scales

Below, descriptive statistics at the item level and scale level are reported separately for each of the five moral foundations.

4.4.1.1 Care/Harm Moral Foundation

The item statistics of the care/harm moral foundation scale are presented in Table 7 and Table 8. The distribution of care/harm moral foundation data was not symmetric across the victim, observer, beneficiary and perpetrator subscales. All four subscales showed a slight negative skewness – data sets were skewed left. Furthermore, data across the observer, beneficiary and perpetrator subscales were heavy-tailed relative to a normal distribution. The kurtosis values of these three subscales were slightly positive. Several items showed low item-test correlations. Across all subscales, items 17, 23 and 28 showed low factor loadings. On average, participants were more perpetrator sensitive (M = 4.66) than victim, observer or beneficiary sensitive. The lowest scores were shown for beneficiary sensitivity (M = 4.42). The reliability in terms of internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) for all four care/harm moral foundation subscales was not high (Cronbach, 1951). All four subscales were found to be not highly consistent ($\alpha \leq .7$).

Table 7

Primary factor loadings of care/harm moral foundation items as estimated from the accepted confirmatory factor model

Items	Factor loadings of items			
	Victim	Observer	Beneficiary	Perpetrator
careV1	.70			
careV6	.68			
careV11	.67			
careV17	.33			
careV23	.20			
careV28	.22			
careO1		.63		
careO6		.69		
careO11		.62		
careO17		.44		
careO23		.21		
careO28		.33		
careB1			.67	
careB6			.55	
careB11			.66	
careB17			.18	
careB23			.19	
careB28			.34	
careP1				.71
careP6				.77
careP11				.69
careP17				.48
careP23				.26
careP28				.38

Table 8

Item statistics of the care/harm moral foundation scale

Items	Victim			Observer			Beneficiary			Perpetrator		
	M	*SD*	r_{it}	*M*	*SD*	r_{it}	*M*	*SD*	r_{it}	*M*	*SD*	r_{it}
careV1	4.55	1.14	.65									
careV6	4.68	1.17	.68									
careV11	4.98	1.05	.63									
careV17	3.46	1.30	.58									
careV23	4.10	1.49	.55									
careV28	5.04	1.31	.50									
careO1				4.31	1.13	.63						
careO6				4.69	.97	.65						
careO11				4.74	1.22	.62						
careO17				4.15	1.14	.60						
careO23				4.15	1.54	.57						
careO28				4.96	1.37	.61						
careB1							4.57	1.10	.63			
careB6							4.53	1.10	.54			
careB11							4.67	1.23	.61			
careB17							3.62	1.31	.45			
careB23							4.19	1.62	.58			
careB28							4.93	1.43	.59			
careP1										4.68	1.14	.70
careP6										4.72	1.04	.70
careP11										4.95	1.15	.68
careP17										4.21	1.19	.63
careP23										4.24	1.56	.62
careP28										5.13	1.38	.62

The associated care/harm scale statistics are presented in Table 9. The observer and perpetrator subscales showed the highest correlation (r = .86). The lowest correlation (r = .65) was found for the perpetrator and victim as well as for the beneficiary and victim subscales.

Table 9

Descriptive Statistics of the care/harm moral foundations scales and correlations among the scales as estimated from the accepted confirmatory factor models

	Victim	Observer	Beneficiary	Perpetrator
Descriptive statistics of the care/harm moral foundations scales				
M	4.47	4.50	4.42	4.65
SD	.74	.75	.73	.81
Skewness	-.42	-.73	-.56	-.84
Kurtosis	.05	1.30	.69	1.25
Alpha	.62	.66	.56	.72
Correlations among the scales/factors				
Observer	.66	1	.65	.86
Beneficiary	.65	.74	1	.71
Perpetrator	.65	.86	.71	1

4.4.1.2 Fairness/Cheating Moral Foundation

The item statistics of the fairness/cheating moral foundation scale are presented in Table 10 and Table 11. The distribution of fairness/cheating data was not symmetric across the victim, observer, beneficiary and perpetrator subscales. All four subscales showed a slight negative skewness – data sets were skewed left. Furthermore, data across the observer and perpetrator subscales were heavy-tailed relative to a normal distribution. The kurtosis values of these two subscales were positive. On average, participants were more observer sensitive ($M = 4.45$) than victim, beneficiary or perpetrator sensitive. The lowest scores were shown for victim sensitivity ($M = 3.87$). Across all subscales, items 18, 24 and 29 showed the lowest factor loadings. The observer sensitivity subscale and the perpetrator sensitivity subscale were found to be fairly consistent ($\alpha \geq .7$) (Cronbach, 1951). Consistencies across the victim and beneficiary sensitivity subscales were relatively low ($\alpha \leq .7$) (Cronbach, 1951).

Table 10

Primary factor loadings of fairness/cheating moral foundation items as estimated from the accepted confirmatory factor model

Items	Factor loadings of items			
	Victim	Observer	Beneficiary	Perpetrator
fairV2	.52			
fairV7	.67			
fairV12	.66			
fairV18	.38			
fairV24	.50			
fairV29	.14			
fairO2		.68		
fairO7		.72		
fairO12		.71		
fairO18		.43		
fairO24		.53		
fairO29		.20		
fairB2			.58	
fairB7			.72	
fairB12			.61	
fairB18			.25	
fairB24			.11	
fairB29			.22	
fairP2				.68
fairP7				.72
fairP12				.74
fairP18				.53
fairP24				.58
fairP29				.26

Table 11

Item statistics of the fairness/cheating moral foundation scale

Items	Victim			Observer			Beneficiary			Perpetrator		
	M	*SD*	r_{it}	*M*	*SD*	r_{it}	*M*	*SD*	r_{it}	*M*	*SD*	r_{it}
fairV2	4.43	1.02	.58									
fairV7	4.90	.89	.63									
fairV12	5.05	.96	.65									
fairV18	4.49	1.14	.56									
fairV24	4.76	.99	.62									
fairV29	2.97	1.38	.45									
fairO2				4.39	1.00	.71						
fairO7				4.69	.95	.72						
fairO12				4.73	1.03	.71						
fairO18				4.93	1.02	.61						
fairO24				4.93	.92	.61						
fairO29				3.02	1.38	.49						
fairB2							4.05	1.18	.61			
fairB7							4.48	1.07	.59			
fairB12							4.69	1.02	.55			
fairB18							4.60	1.27	.56			
fairB24							4.43	1.27	.48			
fairB29							3.09	1.40	.50			
fairP2										4.21	1.15	.73
fairP7										4.77	1.04	.70
fairP12										4.71	1.08	.76
fairP18										4.86	1.01	.67
fairP24										4.60	1.15	.71
fairP29										2.99	1.37	.49

The associated fairness/cheating scale statistics are presented in Table 12. The perpetrator and observer subscales showed the highest correlation (r = .82). The lowest correlation (r = .59) was found for the perpetrator and beneficiary subscales.

Table 12

Descriptive Statistics of the fairness/cheating moral foundations scales and correlations among the scales as estimated from the accepted confirmatory factor models

	Victim	Observer	Beneficiary	Perpetrator
Descriptive statistics of the fairness/cheating moral foundations scales				
M	4.43	4.45	4.22	4.36
SD	.61	.66	.66	.76
Skewness	-.37	-.72	-.25	-.93
Kurtosis	.13	1.63	-.13	1.86
Alpha	.57	.69	.52	.75
Correlations among the scales/factors				
Observer	.65	1	.63	.82
Beneficiary	.63	.63	1	.59
Perpetrator	.64	.82	.59	1

4.4.1.3 Loyalty/Betrayal Moral Foundation

The item statistics of the loyalty/betrayal moral foundation scale are presented in Table 13 and 14. The distribution of loyalty/betrayal data was not symmetric across the victim, beneficiary and perpetrator subscales. These three subscales showed a slight positive skewness – data sets were skewed right. The distribution of observer sensitivity subscale data was symmetric. Furthermore, data across all four subscales were heavy-tailed relative to a normal distribution. The kurtosis values of all four scales were positive. On average, participants were more victim (M = 3.84) and observer (M = 3.84) sensitive than beneficiary or perpetrator sensitive. The lowest scores were shown for perpetrator sensitivity (M = 3.58). Across all subscales, items 16, 19, 25 and 30 showed the lowest factor loadings.

Table 13

Primary factor loadings of loyalty/betrayal moral foundation items as estimated from the accepted confirmatory factor model

Items	Factor loadings of items			
	Victim	Observer	Beneficiary	Perpetrator
loyalV8	.54			
loyalV13	.94			
loyalV16	.19			
loyalV19	.01			
loyalV25	.08			
loyalV30	.09			
loyalO8		.52		
loyalO13		.89		
loyalO16		.15		
loyalO19		.04		
loyalO25		.20		
loyalO30		.16		
loyalB8			.55	
loyalB13			.90	
loyalB16			.21	
loyalB19			.08	
loyalB25			.00	
loyalB30			-.01	
loyalP8				.49
loyalP13				.96
loyalP16				.21
loyalP19				.02
loyalP25				.13
loyalP30				.14

Table 14

Item statistics of the loyalty/betrayal moral foundation scale

Items	Victim			Observer			Beneficiary			Perpetrator		
	M	*SD*	r_{it}	*M*	*SD*	r_{it}	*M*	*SD*	r_{it}	*M*	*SD*	r_{it}
loyalV8	5.01	.94	.41									
loyalV13	4.80	1.01	.54									
loyalV16	2.52	1.47	.56									
loyalV19	2.61	1.29	.51									
loyalV25	4.17	1.30	.46									
loyalV30	3.51	1.26	.50									
loyalO8				4.77	1.02	.53						
loyalO13				4.37	1.09	.60						
loyalO16				2.19	1.31	.50						
loyalO19				3.72	1.12	.46						
loyalO25				4.23	1.24	.56						
loyalO30				3.73	1.15	.51						
loyalB8							4.64	1.06	.37			
loyalB13							4.30	1.14	.53			
loyalB16							2.36	1.35	.51			
loyalB19							2.92	1.37	.58			
loyalB25							3.60	1.35	.49			
loyalB30							4.08	1.26	.48			
loyalP8										4.92	1.07	.45
loyalP13										4.53	1.16	.59
loyalP16										2.13	1.31	.64
loyalP19										2.49	1.33	.53
loyalP25										4.36	1.21	.50
loyalP30										3.05	1.25	.49

The associated loyalty/betrayal scale statistics are presented in Table 15. The perpetrator and observer subscales showed the highest correlation ($r = .72$). The lowest correlation ($r = .49$) was found for the observer and beneficiary subscales as well as for the perpetrator and beneficiary subscales.

Table 15

Descriptive Statistics of the loyalty/betrayal moral foundations scales and correlations among the scales as estimated from the accepted confirmatory factor models

	Victim	Observer	Beneficiary	Perpetrator
Descriptive statistics of the authority/subversion moral foundations scales				
M	3.77	3.83	3.65	3.58
SD	.61	.61	.62	.65
Skewness	.22	-.00	.42	.28
Kurtosis	.42	1.45	.29	1.08
Alpha	.39	.48	.38	.50
Correlations among the scales/factors				
Observer	.61	1	.49	.72
Benefeciary	.58	.49	1	.49
Perpetrator	.63	.72	.49	1

4.4.1.4 Authority/Subversion Moral Foundation

The item statistics of the authority/subversion moral foundation scale are presented in Table 16 and Table 17. The distribution of data was nearly symmetrical, with skewness of the victim, beneficiary and perpetrator sensitivity subscales being very small. The observer sensitivity subscale showed a slight negative skewness – data were skewed left. Furthermore, data across the victim and perpetrator subscales were heavy-tailed relative to a normal distribution. These two subscales showed high positive kurtosis values. On average, participants were more observer sensitive (M = 3.79) than victim, beneficiary or perpetrator sensitive. The lowest scores were shown for victim sensitivity (M = 3.01). Across the victim, observer and beneficiary subscales, items 26 and 31 showed the lowest factor loadings. With regard to the perpetrator subscale, items 26 and 31 showed low factor loadings, while item 20 showed a negative loading. Consistencies across the four authority/subversion moral foundation subscales were relatively low ($\alpha \leq .6$) (Cronbach, 1951).

Table 16

Primary factor loadings of authority/subversion moral foundation items as estimated from the accepted confirmatory factor model

Items	Factor loadings of items			
	Victim	Observer	Beneficiary	Perpetrator
authorV3	.61**			
authorV9	.51**			
authorV14	.48**			
authorV20	.42**			
authorV26	.02			
authorV31	.10*			
authorO3		.78**		
authorO9		.40**		
authorO14		.54**		
authorO20		.49**		
authorO26		.17**		
authorO31		.27**		
authorB3			.67**	
authorB9			.47**	
authorB14			.42**	
authorB20			.38**	
authorB26			.15*	
authorB31			.21**	
authorP3				.74**
authorP9				.53**
authorP14				.54**
authorP20				-.19**
authorP26				.14*
authorP31				.22**

**$p < 0.01$
* $p < 0.05$

Table 17

Item statistics of the authority/subversion moral foundation scale

Items	Victim			Observer			Beneficiary			Perpetrator		
	M	*SD*	r_{it}	*M*	*SD*	r_{it}	*M*	*SD*	r_{it}	*M*	*SD*	r_{it}
authorV3	4.26	1.07	.57									
authorV9	2.97	1.31	.64									
authorV14	4.10	1.11	.55									
authorV20	4.44	1.16	.53									
authorV26	2.66	1.34	.38									
authorV31	3.36	1.34	.43									
authorO3				3.77	1.16	.69						
authorO9				2.96	1.26	.55						
authorO14				3.77	1.14	.60						
authorO20				4.64	1.11	.59						
authorO26				3.79	1.32	.48						
authorO31				3.81	1.21	.53						
authorB3							3.57	1.18	.40			
authorB9							3.01	1.26	.34			
authorB14							3.77	1.15	.32			
authorB20							4.20	1.24	.37			
authorB26							2.91	1.36	.14			
authorB31							3.33	1.39	.31			
authorP3										3.89	1.24	.57
authorP9										3.00	1.30	.51
authorP14										3.97	1.18	.50
authorP20										1.98	1.16	-.17
authorP26										2.62	1.29	.20
authorP31										3.41	1.30	.38

The associated authority/subversion scale statistics are presented in Table 18. The perpetrator and observer subscales showed the highest correlation (r = .66). The lowest correlation (r = .53) was found for the perpetrator and victim subscales.

Table 18

Descriptive Statistics of the authority/subversion moral foundations scales and correlations among the scales as estimated from the accepted confirmatory factor models

	Victim	Observer	Beneficiary	Perpetrator
Descriptive statistics of the authority/subversion moral foundations scales				
M	3.63	3.79	3.47	3.14
SD	.63	.69	.68	.64
Skewness	.12	-.34	.15	.09
Kurtosis	.82	.43	.32	1.02
Alpha	.44	.59	.51	.43
Correlations among the scales/factors				
Observer	.59	1	.58	.66
Benefeciary	.58	.58	1	.58
Perpetrator	.53	.66	.58	1

4.4.1.5 Sanctity/Degradation Moral Foundation

The item statistics of the sanctity/degradation moral foundation scale are presented in Table 19 and Table 20. The skewness across all four sanctity/degradation sensitivity subscales was very small. The distribution of data was nearly symmetrical. Furthermore, victim sensitivity subscale data were slightly heavy-tailed and observer sensitivity subscale data were slightly light-tailed relative to a normal distribution. The victim sensitivity subscale showed positive kurtosis values and the observer sensitivity subscale negative kurtosis values. On average, participants were more beneficiary sensitive (M = 3.39) than victim, observer or perpetrator sensitive. The lowest scores were shown for victim sensitivity (M = 2.94). Across all subscales, items 15 and 32 showed the lowest factor loadings. The observer sensitivity subscale and the perpetrator sensitivity subscale were found to be fairly consistent ($\alpha \geq .7$) (Cronbach, 1951). Consistencies across the victim and beneficiary sensitivity subscales were relatively low ($\alpha \leq .7$) (Cronbach, 1951).

Table 19

Primary factor loadings of sanctity/degradation moral foundation items as estimated from the accepted confirmatory factor model

Items	Factor loadings of items			
	Victim	Observer	Beneficiary	Perpetrator
sanctityV4	.49**			
sanctityV10	.53**			
sanctityV15	.36**			
sanctityV21	.60**			
sanctityV27	.48**			
sanctityV32	.32**			
sanctityO4		.43**		
sanctityO10		.57**		
sanctityO15		.36**		
sanctityO21		.66**		
sanctityO27		.61**		
sanctityO32		.34**		
sanctityB4			.41**	
sanctityB10			.51**	
sanctityB15			.30**	
sanctityB21			.70**	
sanctityB27			.63**	
sanctityB32			.27**	
sanctityP4				.44**
sanctityP10				.52**
sanctityP15				.31**
sanctityP21				.65**
sanctityP27				.65**
sanctityP32				.30**

**$p < 0.01$
* $p < 0.05$

Table 20

Item statistics of the sanctity/degradation moral foundation scale

Items	Victim			Observer			Beneficiary			Perpetrator		
	M	*SD*	r_{it}	*M*	*SD*	r_{it}	*M*	*SD*	r_{it}	*M*	*SD*	r_{it}
sanctityV4	4.35	1.21	.59									
sanctityV10	3.76	1.42	.61									
sanctityV15	2.46	1.51	.64									
sanctityV21	4.35	1.28	.61									
sanctityV27	3.61	1.31	.59									
sanctityV32	2.27	1.36	.54									
sanctityO4				4.20	1.25	.56						
sanctityO10				3.66	1.39	.60						
sanctityO15				2.42	1.50	.62						
sanctityO21				3.31	1.43	.66						
sanctityO27				3.46	1.33	.66						
sanctityO32				2.38	1.39	.58						
sanctityB4							4.26	1.28	.55			
sanctityB10							3.92	1.39	.59			
sanctityB15							2.44	1.51	.54			
sanctityB21							3.62	1.43	.68			
sanctityB27							3.59	1.42	.67			
sanctityB32							2.51	1.41	.49			
sanctityP4										4.37	1.22	.56
sanctityP10										3.90	1.41	.58
sanctityP15										2.50	1.59	.59
sanctityP21										3.49	1.51	.66
sanctityP27										3.46	1.39	.67
sanctityP32										2.35	1.36	.54

The associated sanctity/degradation scale statistics are presented in Table 21. The perpetrator and observer subscales showed the highest correlation (r = .86). The lowest correlation (r = .69) was found for the perpetrator and victim subscales.

Table 21

Descriptive statistics of the sanctity/degradation moral foundations scales and correlations among the scales as estimated from the accepted confirmatory factor models

	Victim	Observer	Beneficiary	Perpetrator
Descriptive statistics of the sanctity/degradation moral foundations scales				
M	3.47	3.24	3.39	3.34
SD	.81	.85	.82	.85
Skewness	.04	.10	-.00	-.00
Kurtosis	.29	-.26	-.05	.03
Alpha	.64	.67	.62	.65
Correlations among the scales/factors				
Observer	.74	1	.77	.86
Beneficiary	.71	.77	1	.73
Perpetrator	.69	.86	.73	1

As outlined above, the internal consistency of several subscales was relatively low compared to established standards (Cronbach, 1951). The internal consistency of the original measure was also low due to the specific conceptualization approach chosen by Graham et al. (2011). Graham and colleagues (2011) intentionally prioritized the full representation of the heterogeneous aspects of each foundation before high internal item consistency (see also Gough, 1979, 1984; John & Soto, 2007).

4.4.2 Factor Validity

In the following, the results of the confirmatory analyses are reported. Specifically, as outlined above, the comparison of three different models is reported separately for each of the five moral foundations. Thus, the first model had a one-factorial structure, which followed the assumption of a general sensitivity for each moral foundation proposed by Graham and colleagues (2011). The second model also had a one-factorial structure and allowed for error correlations between items with a similar semantic content and wording. The third model had a four-factorial structure of victim, observer, beneficiary and perpetrator sensitivity per foundation and allowed for error correlations between items with same semantic content.

4.4.2.1 Care/Harm Moral Foundation

The first model with a one-factorial structure that did not allow for error correlations, did not fit the care/harm moral foundation data ($\chi 2$ (252, N = 382) = 3164, $p < .01$, RMSEA = .174, CFI = .42). The second model with a one-factorial structure that did allow for error correlations showed a reasonable fit ($\chi 2$ (216, N = 382) = 547, $p < .01$, RMSEA = .063, CFI = .93). The more constrained third model that allowed for error correlations and specified a four-factorial structure of victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivity fitted the data well ($\chi 2$ (210, N = 382) = 348, $p < .01$, RMSEA = .042, CFI = .97) and significantly better than the second model ($\Delta\chi 2$ (6, N = 382) = 199, $p < .01$; ΔCFI = .04). An overview of the comparisons of all three care/harm moral foundation models is presented in Table 22. The primary factor loadings of the 24 care/harm moral foundation items ranged from .18 to .77 – an overview is presented in Table 7.

Table 22

Results of confirmatory factor analyses: Care/harm moral foundation

Model	χ^2	df	χ^2/df	CFI	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	ΔCFI
One-Factor Model	3163.594**	252	12.55	.415	.174		
One-Factor Model (corr. residuals)	547.34**	216	2,53	.933	.063	2.616**	0.518
Four-Factor Model (corr. residuals)	348.16**	210	1.66	.972	.042	199**	.039

Note. Δχ2 represents the difference in χ2 values and ΔCFI the difference in CFI values between the respective model and the next less constrained model.

**p<.01

4.4.2.2 Fairness/Cheating Moral Foundation

The first one-factorial model that did not allow for error correlations did not fit the fairness/cheating moral foundation data ($\chi 2$ (252, N = 382) = 2197, p < .01, RMSEA = .142, CFI = .53). The second model with a one-factorial structure that did allow for error correlations showed a relatively poor fit ($\chi 2$ (216, N = 382) = 787, p < .01, RMSEA = .08, CFI = .86). A more constrained model that allowed for error correlations and specified a four-factorial structure of victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivity fitted the fairness/cheating moral foundation data well ($\chi 2$ (210, N = 382) = 648, p < .01, RMSEA = .074, CFI = .89) and significantly better than the second model with a one factorial structure ($\Delta\chi 2$ (6, N = 382) = 138, p < .01; ΔCFI = .03). An overview of the comparison of all three fairness/cheating moral foundation models is presented in Table 23. The primary factor loadings of the 24 fairness/cheating moral foundation items ranged from .11 to .74 – an overview is presented in Table 10.

Table 23

Results of confirmatory factor analyses: Fairness/cheating moral foundation

Model	χ^2	df	χ^2/df	CFI	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	ΔCFI
One-Factor Model	2196.577**	252	8.72	.529	.142		
One-Factor Model (corr. residuals)	787.711**	216	3.642	.862	.083	1.410**	.333
Four-Factor Model (corr. residuals)	648**	210	3.09	.894	.074	138**	0,032

Note. Δχ2 represents the difference in χ2 values and ΔCFI the difference in CFI values between the respective model and the next less constrained model.

**p<.01

4.4.2.3 Loyalty/Betrayal Moral Foundation

Neither one-factorial models, nor the proposed third model with a four-factorial structure fitted the loyalty/betrayal moral foundation data. The covariance matrix of latent variables was not positively definite. This case of improper solutions in structural equation models and confirmatory factor analyses is known as the so-called *Heywood Case* and usually refers to conditions in which model estimates are represented in "correlations greater than one or constrained at one or a variance that is negative or constrained to zero" (Chen, Bollen, Paxton, Curran, & Kirby, 2001, p. 469). Therefore, negative error variances found in the loyalty/betrayal data represent a wide-spread statistical phenomenon (Chen et al., 2001; Jöreskog, 1969; Jöreskog & Lawley, 1968) and are mostly rooted in model misspecification as well as small sample sizes (Bollen, 1987; Dillon, Kumar, & Mulani, 1987). With regard to the loyalty/betrayal moral foundation data, misspecification is regarded as highly plausible.

4.4.2.4 Authority/Subversion Moral Foundation

The first one-factorial model that did not allow for error correlations did not fit the authority/subversion moral foundation data well ($\chi 2$ (252, N = 382) = 2255, p < .01, RMSEA = .144, CFI = .41). The second model with a one-factorial structure that did allow for error

correlations showed a significantly better fit ($\chi 2$ (216, N = 382) = 487, p < .01, RMSEA = .057, CFI = .92). The more constrained third model that allowed for error correlations and specified a four-factorial structure of victim, observer, beneficiary and perpetrator sensitivity fitted the fairness/cheating moral foundation data well ($\chi 2$ (210, N = 382) = 396, p < .01, RMSEA = .048, CFI = .95) and significantly better than the second model with a one-factorial structure ($\Delta\chi 2$ (6, N = 382) = 91, p < .01; **Δ**CFI = .03). An overview of the comparisons of all three authority/subversion moral foundation models is presented in Table 24. The primary factor loadings of the 24 authority/subversion moral foundation items ranged from -.19 to .78 – an overview is presented in Table 16.

Table 24

Results of confirmatory factor analyses: Authority/subversion moral foundation

Model	χ^2	df	χ^2/df	CFI	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	ΔCFI
One-Factor Model	2255.378**	252	8.95	.414	.144		
One-Factor Model (corr. residuals)	486.558**	216	2.25	.921	.057	1.769**	.507
Four-Factor Model (corr. residuals)	396**	210	1.88	.946	.048	91**	0,025

Note. Δχ2 represents the difference in χ2 values and ΔCFI the difference in CFI values between the respective model and the next less constrained model.

**p<.01

4.4.2.5 Sanctity/Degradation Moral Foundation

The first model with a one-factorial that did not allow for error correlations did not fit the sanctity/degradation moral foundation data ($\chi 2$ (252, N = 382) = 3728, p < .01, RMSEA = .19, CFI = .36). The second model with a one-factorial structure that did allow for error correlations showed a reasonable fit ($\chi 2$ (216, N = 382) = 591, p < .01, RMSEA = .067, CFI = .93). The more constrained third model that allowed for error correlations and specified a four-factorial structure of victim, observer, beneficiary and perpetrator sensitivity fitted the

sanctity/degradation moral foundation data well ($\chi 2$ (210, N = 382) = 459, p < .01, RMSEA = .056, CFI = .95) and significantly better than the second model with a one factorial structure ($\Delta\chi 2$ (6, N = 382) = 133, p < .01; ΔCFI = .02). An overview of the comparisons of all three sanctity/degradation models is presented in Table 25. The primary factor loadings of the 24 sanctity/degradation moral foundation items ranged from .27 to .70 – an overview is presented in Table 19.

Table 25

Results of confirmatory factor analyses: Sanctity/degradation moral foundation

Model	χ^2	df	χ^2/df	CFI	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	ΔCFI
One-Factor Model	3728.114**	252	14.79	.362	.19		
One-Factor Model (corr. residuals)	591.304**	216	2.74	.931	.067	3.137**	.569
Four-Factor Model (corr. residuals)	458.802**	210	2.18	.954	.056	133**	0,023

Note. Δχ2 represents the difference in χ2 values and ΔCFI the difference in CFI values between the respective model and the next less constrained model.

**p<.01

4.5 Discussion

As pointed out by Graham and colleagues (2011), moral psychology is "currently experiencing a renaissance as social psychologists, neuroscientists and behavioral economists begin to treat moral judgment and decisionmaking as a central topic of inquiry" (p. 368). The MFT represents a prominent example of new pluralistic approaches that present a broader conceptualization of the moral domain and specify moral aspects beyond the traditional concerns of helping vs. harming and fairness vs. cheating (Graham et al., 2013). Recently, this theory has been linked to the field of ethically-oriented leadership research as an innovative, pluralistic and promising theoretical approach to, on the one hand, understanding, predicting

and promoting ethically-oriented leadership and leaders' moral judgment, decision-making and behavior, and, on the other hand, to preventing unethical leadership practices and leaders' ethical misconduct (Egorov & Pircher Verdorfer, 2017; Egorov et al., 2018; Fehr et al., 2015; Weaver et al., 2014). Nevertheless, this theoretical model has been discussed controversially in the scientific community (Fehr et al., 2015; Gray et al., 2012; Suhler & Churchland, 2011). Thus, the purpose of this study was to address criticism on the factorial structure of the model and to integrate the theoretical assumptions of a pluralistic morality construct as well as a perspective-specific sensitivity concept. In doing so, this study initially explored a perspective-specific moral foundation sensitivity approach and tested an adapted moral foundation questionnaire version. To the best of my knowledge, this was the first study to question the assumption of a general sensitivity for each of the five moral foundations and to test a perspective-specific moral foundations measure. It was predicted that the moral foundation sensitivity construct would be best represented by a four-factorial structure (victim, observer, beneficiary and perpetrator perspective) for each moral foundation subscale (care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation).

My results provide partial support for the theoretical assumption specified in Hypothesis 1. Specifically, my results demonstrate that a model differentiating between four sensitivity perspectives per foundation fits the data for the care/harm, fairness/cheating, authority/subversion and sanctity/degradation better than a general sensitivity model with one perspective. Neither the one-perspective nor the four-perspectives models fit the data for the loyalty/betrayal moral foundation, which may be related to very low item factor loadings and poor reliabilities of all four loyalty/betrayal moral foundation subscales.

In general, these study findings highlight the significance of a perspective-specific approach to moral foundations and the need for a more differentiated sensitivity measure for each moral foundation. Particularly, these results indicate that people vary not only in a general sensitivity for the moral foundations, but also in their specific victim, observer, beneficiary, and

perpetrator sensitivities for the moral aspects of care/harm, fairness/cheating, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. Therefore, the way people perceive foundation-related norm violations and to which extent they are engaged in efforts to maintain norm consistence in their judgments and behaviors, may be determined by individual variance in perspective-specific sensitivities for each moral foundation.

4.5.1 Implications for Future Research and Limitations

In this study, I investigated a specific aspect associated with the factorial structure of the moral foundation construct, which may address current shortcomings and significantly contribute to a more appropriate adjustment of the theoretical model, an adaptation of the associated operationalization and an increase in its criterion-related validity. On the basis of this initial investigation, future studies will increase the current understanding of variance in individuals' moral judgments, moral decision-making and moral behavior. However, given the constitutive nature of this work, additional research will be needed to substantiate and expand the findings presented herein.

First, the generalizability of my findings is limited. Data were generated from a non-representative convenience sample of students from a large German university. Future research will have to replicate the measurement with large heterogeneous and population representative, cross-cultural samples. As highlighted by Graham and colleagues (2011), cross-cultural differences in moral foundation scores were found. An investigation of cross-cultural differences in perspective-specific moral foundation sensitivity as well as the associated affects and cognitions is required. Furthermore, the small sample size limits the impact of the current findings and needs to be addressed by future research.

Second, the initial adaptation of the MFQ tested and reported in this study did not fit established psychometric criteria sufficiently. The reliability and validity of this measure in its current state of development remain limited. Hence, a state-of-the-art validation process of this

operationalization of a theoretically adjusted moral foundation construct is required. Future research will need to focus on an investigation of the psychometric properties of this perspective-specific MFQ version. More specifically, future research will need to (1) adjust the current theoretical definition of the construct and develop an appropriate conceptual definition that transposes a general domain-dependent sensitivity into perspective-dependent victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator moral foundation sensitivities, (2) to integrate current findings and to further specify the measurement model that fits the adapted theoretical concept, and (3) to finalize and test the set of items appropriately capturing this new structure (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Podsakoff, 2011). Future studies investigating the content validity of this moral foundation sensitivity measure will need to test the construct's relation to further justice and moral sensitivity measures. Future investigations of its criterion-related validity will need to link this perspective-specific moral foundation measure to a selection of relevant outcomes associated with moral judgment, moral decision-making and moral behavior (Lawshe, 1975; Messik, 1995).

Third, the original MFQ (Graham et al., 2011) as well as the adapted perspective-specific moral foundation sensitivity measure used in this study are explicit self-report measures. This methodological strategy has been associated with several limitations, as the perspective-specific sensitivities for moral foundations may be rooted in automatic affects and attitudes, which are better captured with implicit measures (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). More work is needed to test the convergent validity of this explicit perspective-specific moral foundation measure and future research could address the outlined limitation by also integrating implicit moral foundation measures and investigating their theoretical and empirical relation (Greenwald et al., 1998; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005).

Fourth, the reported distinctiveness of victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator moral foundation sensitivity is limited by significant correlations between the subscales. Across

all moral foundations, varying correlations were found, indicating that these sensitivities shared an amount of variance. With regard to all five moral foundations, the highest correlations were found for the observer and beneficiary subscales. Yet, all subscales still covered unique aspects. Further research is required to explore the unique links of these aspects to the personality space as well as to related and unrelated variables.

Finally, a practical application of these preliminary results may allow for more precise predictions of affective, cognitive and behavioral outcomes. Future research needs to investigate these preliminary insights and to integrate the findings in the current understanding of the role, individuals' moral foundations play. For instance, variance in a wide range of variables such as intentions to donate and donation behavior (Nilsson et al., 2016), decisions and behaviors in experimental public goods games (Schier et al., 2016), attitudes towards climate change (Dickinson et al., 2016), political ideology (Iyer et al., 2016; Rempala et al., 2016), as well as leadership styles, leadership perceptions and behaviors (Egorov et al., 2019; Egorov et al., 2018; Fehr et al., 2015; Weaver et al., 2014) has been explained by individuals' moral foundations. With regards to the current findings, these established theoretical links of the construct and related outcomes require further investigations. Variances in these outcomes may be better explained by a perspective-specific moral foundation sensitivity.

In this context, research on the link between moral foundations and ethically-oriented leadership may offer two illustrating examples (Egorov et al., 2018; Fehr et al., 2015; Weaver et al., 2014). First, recently, Egorov and colleagues (2018) introduced a conceptual model proposing that the development of a general sensitivity for certain moral foundations would contribute to ethically-oriented leader development. Following current findings, it may be worth investigating whether a more differentiated approach, i.e. developing leaders' observer, beneficiary and perpetrator sensitivity and decreasing their victim sensitivity, better fits this purpose. Second, recent research (Egorov et al., 2019) suggests that moral foundation congruence between leaders and followers accounts for incremental validity in followers'

ethical and unethical leadership perceptions. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether the general effects found for the fairness/cheating, authority/subversion and loyalty/betrayal moral foundations need to be revised and effects of congruences in perspective-specific sensitivities for these moral foundations tested.

4.5.2 Conclusion

Research on the MFT has been attracting growing attention. The significance of implications of this new morally pluralistic approach has been tested and demonstrated in a variety of applied fields of research (Dickinson et al., 2016; Egorov et al., 2018; Fehr et al., 2015; Iyer et al., 2012; Nilsson et al., 2016; Schier et al., 2016). Nevertheless, my results present compelling evidence that this research field is still in its early stage of development. Future research on a perspective-specific moral foundation sensitivity concept will offer a new avenue to this theoretical research stream and promises extensive implications for its predictive validity and practical application.

5 General Conclusions

This dissertation set out to systematically integrate a moral intuition perspective into the study of ethically-oriented leadership. Novel morality theories such as the MFT (Haidt & Joseph, 2008; Graham et al., 2013) have gained increasing attention and have been associated with a "renaissance" in moral psychology (Graham et al., 2011). However, in contrast to innovative findings in basic morality research, applied fields of research such as organizational behavior in general and, specifically, ethically-oriented leadership and leader development have been lacking new approaches and frameworks integrating these insights (Treviño et al., 2006; Weaver et al., 2014).

Taken together, this dissertation and its studies significantly contribute to the limited body of knowledge on the role of the novel pluralistic moral intuition approach in ethically-oriented leadership research. In particular, in this dissertation, I addressed the call for a more comprehensive theoretical and empirical investigation of the impact of moral intuition process and content on ethically-oriented leader development as well as ethical and unethical leadership perceptions. Furthermore, focusing on moral intuition content, I addressed limitations of the current conceptualization of the MFT and introduced an adapted and more differentiated version of the established conceptualization and operationalization of the construct.

In chapter 2, I investigated the research question, how the moral intuition approach can be systematically integrated into ethically-oriented leader development frameworks. I developed and introduced a conceptual ethically-oriented leader development model, which specified that ethically-oriented leader development needs to, on the one hand, promote leaders' ethical competence by increasing (1) leaders' moral knowledge about principles of moral cognition, which comprises moral reasoning and moral intuition, (2) leaders' self-awareness of their own moral intuition as well as (3) leaders' comprehension of moral pluralism and interactions of divergent moral perspectives. On the other hand, this model also suggests that

ethically-oriented leader development needs to (4) promote an intended and purposeful development of leaders' moral intuition. This conceptual model offers a new promising and complementing perspective on current ethically-oriented development efforts.

In chapter 3, I addressed the research question, whether and how leaders' and followers' moral intuition content impacts ethical and unethical leadership perceptions. Specifically, in the present study, I tested the effects of leader-follower moral foundations congruence on followers' perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership. Building upon moral foundations theory and the notion of moralized leadership, my results revealed that the level of moral foundations congruence as well as the direction of discrepancy between follower and leader moral foundations were related to followers' ethical and unethical leadership perceptions. These results support the notion of ethical and unethical leadership as a co-creation and enhance knowledge on the role of moral intuition content in this process. Furthermore, these findings highlight the aspect of moral pluralism in ethically-oriented leadership. While established ethically-oriented leadership models have been rooted in a narrow view on morality, considering moral aspects associated with justice and welfare, my results reveal the significance of a broader moral domain accounting for incremental validity in followers' ethical and unethical leadership perceptions.

Finally, in chapter four, I addressed the need for a more differentiated moral intuition content approach. In particular, I investigated the question, whether individuals vary only in a general sensitivity for moral aspects related to the five moral foundations or also in their foundation specific victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivities. Thus, I adapted the current version of the moral foundation measure and tested a perspective specific moral foundation operationalization. The results of my study supported my theoretical assumption and demonstrated that a model differentiating between four sensitivity perspectives per foundation fits the data for the care/harm, fairness/cheating, authority/subversion and sanctity/degradation better than a general sensitivity model with one general perspective. These

findings highlight an urgent need for an adapted theoretical approach to moral foundations as well as a more differentiated analysis of leaders' and followers' moral foundation sensitivity and associated effects on the construction of ethically-oriented leadership perceptions. Furthermore, my results indicate that if ethically-oriented leader development processes are really to benefit from an integration of moral intuition content, they may require a more differentiated approach to moral foundation sensitivity.

5.1 General Implications for Theory and Practice

I have discussed specific implications for theory, practice and future research in chapters two, three and four in detail. Nevertheless, I want to highlight the main overall theoretical contribution of this dissertation. My work presents a valuable contribution to a better integration of moral intuition process and moral intuition content in the field of ethically-oriented leadership research. The main implications for the pertinent literature are as follows.

First, my research outlines a new theoretical pathway to ethically-oriented leader development and presents a conceptual model that substantiates the significance of moral intuition for a more comprehensive understanding of leaders' ethical competence. Second, my research adds to the very limited understanding of the role of the moral intuition construct in the leadership moralization process and, in doing so, offers a new theoretical perspective on followers' perceptions of ethically-oriented leadership. Third, my research addresses criticism on current conceptualization and operationalization of the moral foundations construct, introduces an initial exploration of an adapted perspective-specific moral foundation sensitivity measure, and discusses findings presented in this dissertation against this backdrop. These preliminary results on a perspective-specific moral foundation sensitivity measure reported in chapter 4 may allow for more precise predictions of affective, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes than the established operationalization of the moral foundations construct. For instance, a perspective-specific moral foundations approach may account for incremental

validity in variables such as intentions to donate and donation behavior (Nilsson et al., 2016), decisions and behaviors in experimental public goods games (Schier et al., 2016), attitudes towards climate change (Dickinson et al., 2016), political ideology (Iyer et al., 2016; Rempala et al., 2016), as well as leadership styles, leadership perceptions, and behaviors (Egorov et al., 2019; Egorov et al., 2018; Fehr et al., 2015; Weaver et al., 2014), which have been associated with the moral foundations construct.

This dissertation also offers several implications for practice. First, as moral intuition process and content have been proposed to represent relevant factors in ethically-oriented leader development, they are useful for practitioners in this field as well as leaders themselves. The results may support practitioners in developing and applying holistic and individually tailored ethically-oriented leadership development approaches, promoting leaders' ability to use their moral reasoning as well as their moral intuition in their moral decision-making and moral behavior processes appropriately. With regard to the presented findings, leaders themselves are also challenged, on the one hand, to learn, when to reflect on their intuition-based responses and to integrate those in their deliberate moral reasoning and, on the other hand, when to trust and follow their expertise-based intuitive judgments (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Furthermore, as outlined in chapter 3, ethically-oriented leaders need to learn that a "my perspective is my reality"-approach is not appropriate – neither for them nor for their followers – and need to establish a clear communication on explicit values as well as moral intuitions guiding moral judgments and decisions between them and their followers, in order to reduce moral biases and blind spots and decrease the amount of unethical practices in their organizations. My results reveal, how different sensitivities to moral foundations significantly impact what employees perceive as ethical or unethical. Thus, in order to deal with moral pluralism appropriately, organizations are encouraged to create a culture of diversity and tolerance. Organizations are challenged to promote moral imagination among their employees and to empower them to take

different moral perspectives into account, in order to validate and to improve their moral decision-making and behavior (Johnson, 1993; Palazzo, 2012).

Nevertheless, this dissertation may also highlight that current findings on the link between moral intuition and ethically-oriented leader development as well as between moral foundations and ethically oriented leadership perceptions require further investigation. For instance, practitioners may benefit more from investing in a purposeful development of observer, beneficiary and perpetrator sensitivities than in a development of a self-oriented victim sensitivity.

Future research will need to further investigate these insights, adapt the theoretical approach to moral intuition and moral foundations, adjust its practical implications and further contribute to a holistic perspective on the moral component of leadership. Overall, as pointed out in chapter 2 and building on the metaphor of the emotional dog, the results reported in this dissertation provide compelling evidence that it is time for ethically-oriented leadership research to stop focusing only on the rational tail, but also to pay appropriate attention to the emotional dog wagging it.

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