What Does it Take to Negotiate?
The Combined Effects of the Implicit Power Motive and the Explicit Affiliation Motive on Requests in a Salary Negotiation

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Acknowledgments

Knowing is not enough; we must apply. Willing is not enough; we must do.

(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe)

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List of Abbreviations

a) General abbreviations

AI  Activity Inhibition

cf. confer

e.g. exempli gratia

et al. et alii

i.e. id est

nAch Implicit need for achievement

nAff Implicit need for affiliation

nPow Implicit need for power

sanAch Explicit need for achievement

sanAff Explicit need for affiliation

sanPow Explicit need for power

vs. versus

b) Measurement methods

PSE Picture Story Exercise

TAT Thematic Apperception Test

UMS Unified Motive Scales

UMS 6 30-item version of the Unified Motive Scales
Abstract

This thesis focused on the roles of the two most important social motives—power and affiliation—in negotiations. Because negotiations constitute a typical and long-established form of social interaction, social motives are generally believed to influence their course and outcome.

In the present research, I emphasized the distinction between implicit and explicit motives. Implicit motives drive actions, whereas explicit motives steer actions in socially appropriate ways according to individuals’ opinions and goals and their specific social context. The implicit power motive as a desire to affect other people’s behavior and emotions may thus drive assertive and dominant negotiation behavior. The explicit affiliation motive reflects how much value a person consciously ascribes to social interaction; it may thus steer power-motivated behavior toward serving long-term social goals such as maintaining existing relationships or building new ones. The explicit affiliation motive may thus diminish effects of the implicit power motive on negotiation performance.

In addition, a special focus was placed on the effects of two negotiation conditions: negotiating for oneself or for another person. Individuals who normally refrain from asserting themselves, such as individuals who are low on the power motive and high on the affiliation motive, should nevertheless be assertive when negotiating for another person because assertive behavior for others is less likely to be socially sanctioned than assertive behavior for oneself.

In summary, this thesis was aimed at (1) examining the links between negotiation condition, the implicit power motive, and negotiation performance, (2) examining the effect of the explicit affiliation motive on the links between negotiation condition, the implicit power motive, and negotiation performance, and (3) researching the consequences of a prenegotiation arousal of both the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive.
In a first experimental study, I found that negotiation condition moderated the relation between the implicit power motive and negotiation performance operationalized as demands in the negotiation. In particular, the implicit power motive predicted demands in a negotiation for oneself, whereas it had no effect on demands in a negotiation for another person. As expected, this pattern indicates that individuals with a low implicit power motive do not refrain from being assertive when negotiating for someone else.

In a second experimental study, I analyzed the effects of the dispositional explicit affiliation motive, dispositional implicit power motive, and negotiation condition on negotiation performance operationalized as demands in the negotiation. The results did not support the prediction that a high explicit affiliation motive would diminish the effects of a high implicit power motive on demands in a negotiation for oneself but not in a negotiation for another person.

In a third experimental study, I examined the effects of arousing both the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive on negotiation performance operationalized as demands in the negotiation. Individuals whose implicit power motive had been aroused performed better in a negotiation than individuals whose explicit affiliation motive was also aroused and those with no motive arousal at all.

The present studies provide the first empirical evidence for the roles of both the dispositional and aroused implicit power motive in negotiations, additionally emphasizing the role of different negotiation conditions for individuals who are low on the power motive. Moreover, the present studies deliver the first evidence for the guiding role of the explicit affiliation motive in negotiations. The present research thus underscores the strong relevance of human motives in negotiations. Hence, the results may contribute to further research on the mechanisms of interactions between motives in negotiations as well as to practical derivations for negotiators and modifications of negotiation situations.
1 Introduction

Motivation is indeed central to negotiation - it is difficult, if not impossible to imagine an individual entering a negotiation without some motivational goal that he or she is pursuing, implicitly or explicitly, unconsciously or consciously.

(Carsten K. W. De Dreu)

Negotiations occur in almost every aspect of human interaction. Instances that require negotiation range from everyday situations (e.g., who is in charge of doing the dishes) to business negotiations (e.g., mergers and acquisitions or strikes by trade unions) to political negotiations that have influenced the course of history. A telling example of the importance of negotiation is the showdown between Premier Khrushchev and President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis at the height of the Cold War. Both parties had escalated the conflict by responding to the dominance threats and actions of the other party with further escalating actions, for example, with the strategic deployment of offensive missiles or a naval blockade. At a certain point, both parties stopped escalating the conflict. Instead, with the help of diplomacy and negotiations, they settled it peacefully. They thus pursued the long-term goal of peaceful coexistence and thereby prevented the eruption of a third world war.

Humans negotiate so that conflicts can be settled peacefully or, more generally, if they cannot pursue their goals without the cooperation of others (Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010). Thereby, negotiations as a type of human interaction are influenced by the specific characteristics and dispositions the negotiators bring to them. Thus, although there may be situational constraints that influence the course of negotiations, to a great extent, it is the dispositions of the negotiators that determine who exerts influence and who gives in (Gelfand & Brett, 2004). Among the various human dispositions, motives determine why people act in a certain way (McClelland, 1987). Aroused motives (i.e., individuals’ motivation; McClelland, 1987) are central to negotiations, and as highlighted by the quote given above, negotiations cannot be imagined without the influence of individuals’ motivational goals. The power motive and the
affiliation motive are the two most important social motives (Winter, Stewart, John, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998). Individuals high on the power motive enjoy having an impact on others and try to avoid being influenced by others (Winter, 1973). Individuals high on the affiliation motive, on the other hand, would rather give in on important issues than lose a friend or scare off a new acquaintance. In general, they like to establish or maintain positive relationships with others (Atkinson, Heyns, & Veroff, 1954).

Actual performance, such as behavior in a negotiation, is influenced by two different kinds of motives: Implicit motives are unconscious and can guide behavior without an individual's awareness. Explicit motives, by contrast, are part of an individual's self-concept and represent opinions, goals, and values (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989). Implicit motives are aroused by natural incentives in particular situations (McClelland, 1987). Natural incentives in a negotiation are, for example, dominance over another person, the exertion of influence, and the possibility of impressing a counterpart. Negotiations thus contain many natural incentives for arousing the implicit power motive. Explicit motives are aroused by the explicit social demands and goals a person wants to pursue in a certain situation (McClelland et al., 1989). Most important, negotiations do not take place in a social vacuum, and people may want to maintain their relationship with their negotiation partner beyond the negotiation situation. This is where the explicit affiliation motive comes into play and may diminish the impact of the implicit power motive.

In the present work, I analyzed two types of negotiation situations. First, people often negotiate outcomes that concern only themselves. For example, they negotiate the workload of a new job or try to agree on a good price for a car. Second, people often negotiate for others, such as when representatives negotiate on behalf of their departments or even organizations, diplomats represent different nations in negotiations, or a spouse relies on agents in a divorce negotiation. I argue that these two types of negotiation situations are affected by different types of motives: The first negotiation type constitutes a classical opportunity to exert influence and was thus expected to correspond with and possibly satisfy the implicit power motive. The second negotiation type (i.e., the negotiation for another person) is considered a more mature form of
behavior (McClelland, 1975; Sears, 1961; Winter, 1991). Therefore, individuals do not have to fear negative reactions and sanctions from their social environment (cf. Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Batson, 1987). Consequently, negotiations on the behalf of others may constitute opportunities to be assertive, but to simultaneously establish or maintain a friendly relationship, thus corresponding to the core desire of individuals high on the explicit affiliation motive. Also, individuals low on the implicit power motive, who have learned through socialization that dominant and assertive acts carried out on one’s own behalf lead to social sanctions (McClelland & Pilon, 1983), may nevertheless be assertive on behalf of another person and may be willing to negotiate for this person because they do not fear negative reactions in this specific situation.

On the basis of these considerations, in this thesis, I examined the effect of the implicit power motive on negotiation performance in two different negotiation situations. In addition, I expected the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive to conflict in a negotiation for oneself but to have a synergetic effect on performance in a negotiation for another person.

Accordingly, this thesis had three major goals: First, I aimed to examine the link between negotiation condition, the implicit power motive, and negotiation performance. Second, I additionally planned to consider the role of the explicit affiliation motive in the link between negotiation condition, the implicit power motive, and negotiation performance. Third, I intended to examine the consequences of a prenegotiation arousal of both the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive.

Thus, in this thesis, the concepts of motives and negotiation are important. I will therefore begin Chapter 2 by highlighting the relevance of motives for human behavior. I will continue by outlining the theoretical distinction between implicit and explicit motives, the different ways to measure them, the different incentives that arouse them, the different effects they have on performance, and finally their combined effects on performance. I will then go into detail regarding the two motives that are important for this thesis: First, I will introduce the implicit power motive and then the explicit affiliation motive. In the second part of Chapter 2, I will present the concept of negotiation, align it with the general concept of power and with the power and
affiliation motives in particular, present experimental paradigms and settings from negotiation research, and finally describe salary negotiations.

Thus, in this thesis, the roles of the power and affiliation motives in their dispositional and aroused forms will be linked to negotiation performance. In the present work, I will thus lay the basis for further research on implicit and explicit motives in negotiations and will derive practical implications for the role of negotiators as well as situational variables for the success of negotiations.
2 Theoretical concepts

2.1 Motives and motivation

Every action needs to be prompted by a motive.

(Leonardo da Vinci)

This quote emphasizes the fundamental role motives play in human behavior. Human motives are part of human personality and are considered the driving forces for behavior (McClelland, 1985, 1987). To thoroughly research motives as causes of human behavior, the environment must also be considered in terms of situations that provide special incentives for motivated behavior (Atkinson, 1964; Kehr, 2004b; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953; Schultheiss, 2001). Thus, to understand why a person acts in a certain way, it is necessary to consider motives as well as the situation in which the person performs a certain action. This interaction between personality and situational variables is a constitutive component of the basic motivational process (Heckhausen, 1977; McClelland; 1987; McClelland et al., 1953; Rheinberg, 2008).

Before describing this process in more detail, I will briefly illustrate how individuals acquire motive dispositions. An early definition of a motive by McClelland and colleagues (1953) helps to explain exactly how a motive develops: “A motive is the learned result of pairing cues with affect or the conditions which produced the affect” (p. 75). Accordingly, in the beginning of the learning process, an individual simply experiences positive or negative affect due to natural incentives, for example, a particular kind of food (McClelland, 1987). For the individual, these natural incentives represent positive or negative goal states that the person aims to approach or avoid (McClelland, 1987). Thus, people learn to identify cues that predict these goal states and the resulting positive or negative affect. When a variety of cues are consistently associated with certain goal states, “we may speak of a motive having been formed” (McClelland, 1987, p. 174). Hence, from then on, the basic motivational process illustrated in Figure 1 applies when an individual encounters motive-arousing cues or incentives.
If a cue in a situation arouses an individual's motive, the individual experiences affect that can lead to motivation. McClelland conceptualizes motivation as "an aroused motive to act in such a way as to satisfy the motive disposition that has been engaged by demands or arousal cues" (McClelland, 1987, p. 184., cf. 1.-4. in Figure 1). Thus, to satisfy the respective motive, motivation leads individuals to perform motivated behavior (McClelland, 1987, cf. 5. and 6. in Figure 1). According to Heckhausen (1977), it is not only the behavior itself that has incentive value but also the outcomes of the behavior and the consequences linked to the outcomes (cf. 6. - 8. in Figure 1).

In general, according to McClelland (1987), the satisfaction of a motive (i.e., the attainment of a positive goal state or the avoidance of a negative goal state) is reinforcing (see above). Thus, McClelland (1987) presents a comprehensive definition of a motive as "a recurrent concern for a goal state based on a natural incentive—a concern that drives, orients, and selects behavior" (p. 591).

Differences in motive strength evolve through individuals' experiences with the associations between cues, goal states, and affect (McClelland, 1987, see above). The more experiences an individual has with cues predicting certain goal states and affect, the more elaborate an individual's schematic representation of a certain motive will be (McClelland, 1987). Accordingly, motives are "arranged in a hierarchy of strength or importance within a given individual" (McClelland, 1965, p. 322). Thus, although the satisfaction of a motive is reinforcing in general, individuals do not pursue the satisfaction of all motives equally. Spangler (1992)
found evidence for this hierarchical structure in the form of a positive correlation between motive and behavior: The stronger the motive, the greater the probability that the individual will try to satisfy it with an adequate kind of behavior.

Research has mostly focused on the Big Three motives of achievement, affiliation, and power (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2010; McClelland, 1987; Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2010). They differ in the incentives that arouse them: People high on the affiliation motive have the “desire to establish, maintain, or restore warm relationships with other people” (Atkinson, Heyns, & Veroff, 1954, p. 406). People with a high achievement motive are concerned with “doing something better” (McClelland, 1987, p. 190) and achieving a standard of excellence (McClelland, 1987). “The power motive is the desire to have impact on other people, to affect their behavior or emotions” (Winter, 1992, p. 301; see Chapter 2.3 for a more detailed description of the power motive).

To illustrate the basic motivational process as specified above, consider the example of a negotiation: If a person’s power motive interacts with situational stimuli such as dominance cues in a negotiation, positive or negative affect can result. Assuming that a person has a high power motive, positive emotions should be provoked by dominance cues that signal the possibility of exerting influence over the behavior and emotions of another negotiator. In a negotiation, positive emotions regarding one’s influence over the other negotiator should lead to motivated behavior in terms of a highly motivated negotiation performance. Accordingly, the resulting outcome should be higher than the outcome of a person with a low power motive. Outcomes of negotiations are multifaceted; that is, on the one hand, the salary a person negotiates represents a material gain, but it might also reflect the achievement of the long-term goal of attaining a prestigious position. In addition, negotiation success may be accompanied by positive evaluations, be it one’s own or that of others (see Figure 1). This range of outcomes, in turn, can reinforce the promising character of the situation at the beginning of the motivational process (e.g., McClelland, 1987).
2.2 Implicit versus explicit motives

_In a very real sense, we have two minds, one that thinks and one that feels._

(Daniel Goleman)

In current research, motives are additionally categorized into implicit and explicit motives (McClelland et al., 1989). The term _implicit_ is appropriate because “the person is not explicitly describing him- or herself as having the motive” (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 691), whereas explicit motives are verbally represented and can be explicitly expressed (Schultheiss, 2007).

Implicit motives develop in early childhood prior to the development of language when infants experience affect due to natural incentives (McClelland et al., 1989). As described in Chapter 2.1, individuals learn to link these basic affective experiences to situational cues. This learning process can be conceived of as a physiologically based reinforcement process: Natural incentives evoke a motive-specific hormonal arousal that accompanies the experience of positive or negative affect (McClelland et al., 1989; Schultheiss, Campbell, & McClelland, 1999; Schultheiss & Rhode, 2002; Spangler, 1992). Accordingly, this learning process is nondeclarative, and consequently, implicit motives can be conceived of as nondeclarative networks (McClelland, 1980). Thus, implicit motives exist and evolve outside of the reach of conscious perception and control (McClelland & Pilon, 1983) and are therefore conceptualized as “non-conscious dispositions to experience specific types of incentives as rewarding” (Schultheiss, Jones, Davis, & Kley, 2008, p. 972). Consequently, implicit motives provide a rather general orientation toward goals that may provide incentives to satisfy them (McClelland et al., 1989).

By contrast, explicit motives “reflect social norms that help define more narrowly the areas in which those goals are to be accomplished” (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 692). Explicit motives are thus entangled with the norms and values of the social group in which the individual intends to accomplish his or her goals (i.e., explicit motives channel implicit motives into forms of behavior that are viewed as acceptable within a specific social context;
McClelland et al., 1989). Thus, ontogenetically explicit motives develop later than implicit motives because they require a well-developed self-concept that comprises knowledge about the values and priorities of a certain group (McClelland et al. 1989). In addition to people’s self-concept, explicit motives reflect opinions people have about themselves, and these opinions can be captured by direct measures or through conversations with others (Heckhausen, 2010; McClelland et al., 1989). According to Heckhausen and Kuhl (1985) and Klinger (1975), explicit motives “are characterized by organized thought; they start with an explicit goal that a person wishes for, then wants, then becomes committed to pursuing in various ways” (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 698).

To sum up, implicit motives provide a general orientation towards goals that is independent of situational demands. By contrast, explicit motives provide an orientation toward situational demands and ensure that when individuals accomplish their goals, they do not violate the norms of their social group. This dual mode of action of the two types of motives corresponds to McClelland’s (1980) theory that “implicit motives predict spontaneous behavioral trends over time, whereas self-attributed motives predict immediate specific responses to specific situations or choice behavior” (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 691). Accordingly, knowing the strength of both kinds of motives allows for more precise predictions of performance (McClelland et al., 1989). Before describing the improvements in prediction offered by taking both implicit and explicit motives into consideration (Chapters 2.2.5 and 2.2.6), I will explain their measurement (Chapter 2.2.1), the different kinds of incentives involved in implicit and explicit motives (Chapters 2.2.2 and 2.2.3), and how implicit and explicit motives affect performance when measured in their dispositional forms (Chapter 2.2.4).

### 2.2.1 Measurement

The fact that implicit and explicit motives are not equally accessible to consciousness (Chapter 2.2) has direct effects on their measurement. Due to the unconscious nature of implicit motives, they cannot be verbalized. Thus, McClelland (1965) presented the following
concept for the measurement of implicit motives: “The strength of the motive (its position in the individual's hierarchy of motives) is measured essentially by counting the number of associations belonging to this cluster as compared to others that an individual produces in a given number of opportunities” (p. 322). Because this associative cluster is inaccessible to consciousness (Chapter 2.2), implicit motives are assessed via indirect methods that can be traced back to the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Murray, 1938) in which participants are asked to write imaginative stories in response to pictorial cues. These stories are then content coded for implicit motive content.

By contrast, explicit motives are assessed by relying on participants’ introspection (James, 1890, Vol. II) and disclosure in the tradition of Allport’s (1937) trait concept. This assessment method is appropriate because explicit motives “involve analytic thought in the sense of people making complex judgements as to the degree to which certain statements apply to them” (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 698). The verbal representation of explicit motives (cf. Chapter 2.2) further facilitates the measurement of explicit motives assessed via self-assessment measures such as the Personality Research Form (PRF; Jackson, 1984) or the Unified Motive Scales (UMS; Gerstenberg & Schönbrodt, 2012). Historically, research has focused on the values that individuals explicitly ascribe to the Big Three motives and has examined their interaction with implicit motives as well as their impact on behavior (cf. Chapter 2.2.4). In this tradition, values have been assessed via several study-specific self-report measures (Biernat, 1989; deCharms, Morrison, Reitman, & McClelland, 1955; McClelland, 1985; Patten & White, 1977).

Nowadays, the most commonly used method for assessing implicit motives is the Picture Story Exercise (PSE), which was developed in its first format by McClelland in 1958 (Fodor, 2009; McClelland, 1987). In the PSE, participants are asked to write imaginative stories, which are subsequently coded for verbal images that contain the Big Three implicit motives: achievement, affiliation, and power. Both the TAT and PSE have the same underlying idea that “implicit motive strength is reflected in the motive-thematic story content, without much
distortion by cognitive interference, which would have to be expected if people were explicitly asked about their motives" (Kehr, 2004b, p. 480). In recent research, in addition to the pictorial stimuli used in the PSE, textual and verbal stimuli such as letters or short sentences have been used as stimulus materials (Jenkins, 1994; Magee & Langner, 2008; Winter & Langner, 2001; for a more detailed description, see the Methods section in Study 1; Chapter 4.2).

Text produced by participants, for example, is coded according to Winter’s (1991, 1994) *Manual for Scoring Motive Imagery in Running Text* and further analyzed according to standard procedures introduced by Schultheiss and Pang (2007). The current scoring conventions for the implicit power motive were based on early research on the scoring of the implicit power motive conducted by Veroff (1957) and Uleman (1966). Furthermore, the particularities of implicit motive scoring that still apply to current research conventions are easier to understand when early research is considered. Thus, before further explaining the standards and problems of the current motive scoring procedures, I will briefly present the research that Winter (1991) based his manual on.

Veroff (1957) developed the first scoring system for the implicit power motive. He examined TAT stories written by male students who were waiting to hear the results of an election for student office. Due to this special situation, Veroff expected the students to be in a specific state of power arousal and therefore examined their stories for power content and compared them with stories written by a control group that was not experiencing power arousal. However, this special situation of waiting for election results with no opportunity to influence them instead created a helpless and anxious state of mind that caused participants to express negative and defensive fantasies. Thus, most of the research on Veroff’s coding system suggests that it represents the negative, defensive, and avoidant aspects of the power motive (Winter, 1973). Consequently, Uleman (1966, as cited in Winter, 1973) tried to develop another scoring system with the help of an arousal condition that comprised an actual face-to-face interaction in a laboratory setting. Students were told to control and frustrate another person. Consequently, his scoring system captured a less defensive and more positive orientation toward power than Veroff’s system. This was presumably due to the fact that
“Uleman’s arousal involved the certainty of legitimate power, as opposed to the very uncertain anticipations among Veroff’s aroused subjects” (Winter, 1973, p. 59). In later work, Uleman differentiated his scoring system from Veroff’s by explicitly stating that it measures influence in terms of a confident, nonhierarchical style of interpersonal influence (Winter, 1973).

Thus, taking a closer look at the development of these two early scoring systems for power highlights the relevance of arousal conditions implemented to derive power categories in the respective scoring systems.

In light of this early research, Winter (1973) described a more comprehensive scoring system that contained both Veroff’s and Uleman’s components. To arouse power, he showed a film of John F. Kennedy’s inauguration speech to participants, arguing that “films might be an ideal way of capturing the full range of vivid experiences associated with power, yet under reasonably controlled laboratory conditions” (Winter, 1967, as cited in Winter, 1973, p. 62). With respect to content, he argued that Kennedy’s speech contained all of Weber’s types of power: rational-legal, traditional, and charismatic (Winter, 1973).

Reexamining Veroff’s, Uleman’s, and his own first scoring system, Winter (1973) developed his Revised n Power Scoring System. He excluded achievement strivings from the power categories, reanalyzed the stories written in response to the film excerpt with regard to Veroff’s categories, and finally rearranged the subcategories of each system and combined them where possible. The Revised n Power Scoring System was the predecessor of the currently commonly used Manual for Scoring Motive Imagery in Running Text (Winter, 1991, 1994). Winter’s (1991; Winter & Langner, 2001) scoring system can be applied to imaginative material in the forms of stories, letters, speeches, or interviews that a person writes in response to pictorial or textual stimuli. According to Winter’s (1991) manual, the power motive is scored whenever a character in a PSE story expresses a concern with strong forceful actions, fame and prestige, or the elicitation of emotional reactions in others in his or her wishes or actions.

In comparison with older scoring systems, Winter’s (1991, 1994) scoring system allows three major advances to be incorporated (for an overview of the problems of older scoring
systems, see Schultheiss & Pang, 2007). First, it constitutes an integrated scoring system because the Big Three motives are derived at the same time and can therefore be clearly differentiated from each other (Pang, 2010). Second, participants are given a limited amount of time to produce imaginative material, thus leading to a higher efficiency on the one hand (Schultheiss & Pang, 2007) and to comparability between studies on the other hand: For example, in both Winter and Langner’s (2001) and Magee and Langner’s (2008) studies, participants were given a limited amount of time of 20 min to write a letter. Third, it is possible to preselect imaginative material, be it pictures or other stimuli. This is reasonable because evidence suggests that different stimuli have different incentive value and “pull” for the Big Three motives (Schultheiss & Pang, 2007, p. 330; see also Pang & Schultheiss, 2005; Schultheiss & Schultheiss, 2014). For example, the implicit power motive can be optimally assessed by using a letter as the imaginative material, in response to which participants are asked to write an answer letter (Magee & Langner, 2008; Winter & Langner, 2001).

The scores obtained with Winter’s (1994) manual can represent either an individual’s cross-situationally stable motive disposition (e.g., Jenkins, 1994; Pang & Schultheiss, 2005; Winter, John, Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998) or an individual’s motivation that results from the interaction between situational cues and aroused motive dispositions (e.g., Atkinson, Heyns, & Veroff, 1954; Schultheiss, Wirth, & Stanton, 2004). Furthermore, motive scores can be obtained by scoring text documents such as historical letters or speeches (Herrmann, 1980; Winter, 1987, 1993, 2002, 2010; Winter & Langner, 2001).

The early scoring system described above had the aim of scoring individuals’ motivation (cf. McClelland et al., 1953; Uleman, 1966; Veroff, 1957; Winter, 1973). Nevertheless, in recent research, scoring systems have often been applied to assess dispositional motives (see above). Despite the conceptual distinction between motives and motivation, it is difficult to transfer this distinction to clear-cut assessment differences: The process of writing a story in response to stimulus materials has consummatory value because expressing the motivational drive reduces its strengths (Atkinson & Birch, 1970). Thus, there may be considerable fluctuations in motive strength in different PSE stories or even within one story.
This methodological particularity is intertwined with reliability issues. Consequently, the internal consistencies of this method of assessing implicit motives are often not satisfactory (.20 - .50; Pang, 2010). By contrast, test-retest reliability analyses usually yield satisfactory results (Schultheiss, Liening, & Schad, 2008; Schultheiss & Pang, 2007), indicating that “implicit motive scores are moderately stable over time” (Schultheiss & Pang, 2007, p. 326). A reanalysis of Schultheiss and colleagues’ (2008) study demonstrated that “each participant’s profile of responding to the eight picture cues remained moderately stable from one testing occasion to the next” (Schultheiss & Schultheiss, 2014, p. 6).

Most of the studies on implicit and explicit motives have reported that the two kinds of motives are uncorrelated (Biernat, 1989; Craig, Koestner, & Zuroff, 1994; deCharms et al., 1955; Job, Oertig, Brandstätter, & Allemand, 2010; King, 1995; Koestner, Weinberger, & McClelland, 1991; Rawolle, Schultheiss, & Schultheiss, 2013; Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2001; Stanton & Schultheiss, 2007). For a long time, researchers have tried to find reasons for this missing link and have tended to doubt either the usefulness or the methodological bases of the respective measurement methods (cf. McClelland et al., 1989). But since McClelland and colleagues (1989) introduced a conceptual distinction between implicit and explicit motives, research has undertaken efforts to improve and validate the respective measurement methods (Schultheiss, Yankova, Dirklikov, & Schad, 2009; Thrash, Maruskin, & Martin, 2012). Köllner and Schultheiss (2014) reported in a recent meta-analysis small but stable correlations between implicit and explicit motives of $r = .13$. Thus, even after correcting for sample error and measurement unreliability, an overlap in variance of only 1.7% was the result. According to the authors, this overlap is minuscule and can be considered evidence for independent constructs (i.e., distinct motivational systems). However, the small correlations between the two motivational systems (Emmons & McAdams, 1991; Köllner & Schultheiss, 2014; Thrash & Elliot, 2002) can be attributed to the fact that individuals have “some limited introspective access to their motivational needs” (Köllner & Schultheiss, 2014, p.15) and that “it is likely that at least some of a given individual’s experiences (or genes, for that matter) may have an impact on both motives and therefore may create an implicit-explicit correlation” (Thrash,
Cassidy, Markusin, & Elliot, 2010, p. 330). In summary, the basic conceptual distinction and different assessment methods for implicit and explicit motives have been established in the meantime (Thrash et al., 2010).

2.2.2 Task incentives versus social incentives for implicit motives versus explicit motives

As hinted at in Chapter 2.2., implicit motives are acquired in connection with affective arousal, whereas explicit motives are acquired in connection with an explicit understanding of the importance of the content of certain motives to the self (McClelland et al., 1989). Nevertheless, like implicit motives, explicit motives can drive, direct, and select behavior (McClelland et al., 1989). Accordingly, both kinds of motives can be aroused, and motivation is the result of an encounter between an appropriate incentive and a certain motive disposition (McClelland et al., 1989); motivation then causes the impulse to act, which then leads to actual behavior (McClelland, 1987; Schultheiss, 2008). However, there are differences in the types of incentive that can arouse the respective types of motives. According to McClelland and colleagues (1989), “implicit motives are chiefly activated by incentives experienced in doing something, whereas self-attributed motives are usually activated by explicit, often social, incentives such as rewards, prompts, expectations, or demands” (p. 693). Thus, implicit motives are aroused by task incentives, whereas explicit motives are aroused by social incentives (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 693).

In several studies, McClelland and colleagues (1989) tested the general hypothesis that “salient social incentives would combine with self-attributed motives to influence performance, whereas task incentives would influence performance in conjunction with implicit motives or needs” (p. 693). Accordingly, they found that an external social incentive in the form of an achievement incentive improved the performance of all participants, but especially of those high on the explicit achievement motive. For participants high on the implicit achievement motive, no such significant improvement in performance was found. It is of special interest
how the researchers operationalized the external social incentive: Participants had to learn picture-word pairs, and the explicit achievement motive was aroused by repeatedly giving participants hints about how to optimally retain or recall words. In the control condition, no such hints were given. Consequently, McClelland and colleagues’ (1989) comprehension of a social incentive was not confined to explicit social demands in a certain situation, but comprised “the way an activity is described” (p. 694).

In the second part of their experiment, McClelland and colleagues (1989) examined the implicit achievement motive. They varied the difficulty of an achievement task that was supposed to arouse the implicit achievement motive. As they hypothesized, participants high on the implicit achievement motive did better at a difficult achievement task in comparison with an easy task. By contrast, for participants low on the implicit achievement motive, the opposite pattern appeared. As expected, participants’ explicit affiliation motive did not interact with the difficulty of the task in the prediction of performance.

In another study, McClelland and colleagues (1989) examined task and social incentives for the power motive. Again, the social incentive was introduced by describing an activity in a certain way: Participants were told that their performance on a social perception task would predict their ability to manage others. The task incentive was represented by the social perception task itself: It was hypothesized (and found) that participants high on the implicit power motive would perform better on a task with power-related task incentives (to pick who is the boss in a picture) than participants low on the implicit power motive. By contrast, the implicit power motive did not predict performance on a task with affiliation-related task incentives. Controlling for the implicit power motive, the researchers additionally found that participants high on the explicit power motive performed better when given a power-related social incentive than those low on the explicit power motive; that is, when participants high on the explicit power motive were told that their performance would indicate their ability to manage others, they performed better than participants low on the explicit power motive. No such effect in favor of participants high on the explicit power motive was found without a power-related social incentive.
McClelland and colleagues’ (1989) findings suggest the following: Those high on an explicit motive (i.e., individuals who ascribe to themselves interest in certain goals) are “more apt to respond to an instruction that says [a certain] task is related to those goals than those who do not attribute those goals to themselves” (p. 695). By contrast, individuals high on a certain implicit motive perform better on a task if it corresponds to their respective motive but do not explicitly state goals related to or interest in the task. Because the studies by McClelland and colleagues (1989) examined the arousing effects of tasks and social incentives separately, no conclusions could be drawn about potential additive effects of the two kinds of incentives on performance.

But McClelland and colleagues (1989) contrasted social incentives corresponding to a person’s explicit motives with social incentives that conflicted with the person’s explicit motives. They found that a social incentive that conflicted with the person’s explicit motives led to worse performance than no external incentive at all. Participants high on the explicit power motive confronted with an explicit achievement incentive did even worse than when they were given no incentive at all. Thus, they performed as if they wanted to demonstrate that “the stated incentive of doing better did not interest them (because they were high in san Power)” (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 697). So for those participants, an explicit incentive even diminished performance.

2.2.3 Further incentives for implicit motives versus explicit motives

An additional distinction between incentives for implicit and explicit motives was made by Schultheiss (2001, 2008). He assumed that implicit motives are aroused by incentives that are represented in a nonverbal format, whereas explicit motives usually respond to incentives in a verbal-symbolic format. Accordingly, for the explicit achievement motive, Spangler (1992) found that it was related to performance when achievement-related verbal instructions were given but not in the absence of such instructions.
Goal imagery serves to translate incentives that arouse explicit motives into incentives that correspond with the implicit motive system. Goals are inherently part of the explicit motive system (Kehr, 2004b) and are thus usually verbally represented (Brunstein, 2010). Thus, if cues in the form of goals are made accessible to the implicit motive system, they have to be translated into a nonverbal format. A way to increase the congruence between persons’ implicit motives and their goals is goal imagery, “the perception-like mental representation of the pursuit and attainment of a goal” (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999, p. 5). Schultheiss and Brunstein (1999) found that, without goal imagery, participants’ implicit power motive had no effect on task performance in a tetris game. By contrast, when participants listened to goal imagery with content that reflected a power theme, their implicit power motive predicted performance compared with participants who listened to goal imagery with neutral content. Similarly, Job and Brandstätter (2009) compared an experimental group that listened to goal imagery with a special focus on motive-specific incentives with a control group with no imagery. They found that implicit motives positively predicted motive-congruent goal-setting only for participants in the imagery group.

In accordance, visions that constitute mental images of an ideal future (Kouzes & Posner, 1987) serve as incentives for implicit motives. Rawolle (2010) found a positive effect of an achievement vision on performance in a mental concentration task (d2 Test of Attention; Brickenkamp & Zillmer, 1998). Participants who listened to an achievement vision had lower latencies and a significant reduction in error rate on this task compared with participants who did not listen to an achievement vision. Accordingly, in another study, Rawolle (2010) found that the implicit power motive negatively predicted cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game only for participants in the power-vision condition but not for participants in the affiliation-vision condition.

Facial expressions can be conceptualized as another sort of nonverbal incentive and thus are supposed to arouse implicit motives. In particular, facial signals of friendliness and hostility arouse the implicit affiliation motive, whereas facial signals of dominance and submission
arouse individuals’ implicit power motive (Schultheiss & Hale, 2007; Schultheiss, Pang, Torges, Wirth, & Treynor, 2005).

Brunstein and Hoyer (2002) assessed the implicit and explicit achievement motives and aroused them separately with appropriate types of feedback (individual feedback for arousing the implicit achievement motive; normative feedback for arousing the explicit achievement motive). The authors found that an aroused implicit achievement motive positively predicted task performance in terms of reaction time on a concentration test, whereas an aroused explicit achievement motive positively predicted the probability of a decision to continue the task.

2.2.4 Effects of dispositional implicit and explicit motives on performance

In Chapters 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, I highlighted different incentives that are likely to arouse implicit and explicit motives and the distinct effects on behavior of the respective arousal. Regardless of these effects, the two kinds of motives—assessed in their nonaroused forms—also predict distinct forms of behavior (Schultheiss & Pang, 2007). Early research on the achievement motive in particular has concentrated on assessing it in its nonaroused form and has contrasted the effects of the implicit and explicit achievement motives.

DeCharms, Morrison, Reitman, and McClelland (1955) were the first to distinguish between the implicit achievement motive and what they called v Achievement because they assumed that individuals high on v Achievement “have been taught consciously to value achievement” (p. 2). They assessed v Achievement by letting participants describe or rate their own motives; v Achievement can thus be conceived of as the predecessor to the explicit achievement motive (cf. Chapter 2.2.1). DeCharms and colleagues (1955) hypothesized and found that individuals high on v Achievement “tend to be more responsive to authorities who tell them what is excellent and what is not” (p. 7): Individuals high on v Achievement rather shifted their opinions about artwork in the direction of an expert than individuals low on v Achievement. Moreover, v Achievement did not predict performance on a scrambled word
task, whereas the implicit achievement motive did (cf. Chapter 2.2.2 for the role of task incentives).

Biernat (1989, Study 1) assessed participants' implicit achievement motive and the value they ascribed to achievement. The implicit achievement motive significantly predicted performance on an achievement-related math task. The value ascribed to achievement significantly predicted participants' choice to serve as a group leader.

To sum up, research has identified different incentives for implicit and explicit motives. Implicit motives are aroused by task incentives (cf. Chapter 2.2.2), incentives that are represented in a nonverbal format (e.g., goal imagery, visions, or facial expressions), and individual feedback (cf. Chapter 2.2.3). By contrast, explicit motives are aroused by social incentives (cf. Chapter 2.2.2) and incentives that are represented in a verbal format such as goals and social demands (cf. Chapter 2.2.3). In accordance, dispositional implicit motives predict performance in tasks that are related to the respective motive, whereas dispositional explicit motives predict decisions that depend on others' opinions or situational choices (see above).

2.2.5 Theories on the combined effects of implicit and explicit motives

Now that I have presented the effects of aroused and nonaroused implicit and explicit motives on behavior, I will now focus on the combined effects of implicit and explicit motives. Before describing relevant empirical studies (Chapter 2.2.6), I will outline the theoretical combination of implicit and explicit motives with the help of three motivation models (Kehr, 2004b; Lewin, 1926; McClelland et al., 1989).

According to Lewin’s (1935) field theory, individuals act within a field that encompasses all forces that affect the individual at a given moment. Forces within the individual are needs and quasineeds (Lewin, 1926); the valences of objects in the environment act as forces outside the individual and are considered “the most important properties of the environment” (Lewin, 1935, p. 77). According to Lewin (1935), motivated behavior is the result of an
interaction between the individual and the environment. Before providing a detailed explanation of how the person and the environment interact, I will describe their constituent components.

Needs constitute fundamental drives, whereas quasineeds are the plans an individual makes and the intentions an individual has (Lewin, 1926). Needs parallel implicit motives in that both are not (or not easily) accessible to consciousness, whereas quasineeds are comparable to explicit motives in that both constitute the conscious intentions and goals an individual pursues (Kehr 2004c). According to Lewin (1926), needs and quasineeds can conflict with each other. He stated that one reason an individual might “forget” certain plans or intentions can be found in a conflicting and strong quasineed. By contrast, if plans are accompanied by a strong corresponding need, they are likely to succeed.

Lewin suggested that an individual experiences tension when a need or a quasineed is activated (Lewin, 1926, 1935). This tension sends the individual in the direction of objects or events that are likely to satisfy the need or quasineed (Lewin, 1926). Depending on the currently activated need, objects or events in the environment are more or less apt to reduce that tension (i.e., they have a different valence; Lewin, 1935). The more an object or event in the environment corresponds to a person’s activated needs or quasineeds, the higher its valence is (Lewin, 1963). If an object or event is opposed to an individual’s needs or quasineeds, it has a negative valence (Lewin, 1935). But objects or events do not necessarily have only a positive or only a negative valence.

With the help of a hypothetical scenario, I will briefly illustrate the effects of an event that encompasses positive as well as negative valences: Negotiating a high starting salary has the positive aspect of successful assertion, but at the same time, it has the negative aspect of affronting the other negotiator. Especially for an individual with a strong need to exert power and a high quasineed to establish friendly interactions with others, negotiating a high starting salary constitutes an approach-avoidance conflict. On the one hand, a high starting salary has a positive valence in that it can reduce the tension coming from an activated need to exert power. On the other hand, a high starting salary has a negative valence in that it does not
reduce the tension coming from an activated quasineed to affiliate with others. By contrast, for an individual with a strong need to exert power who does not have the quasineed to affiliate with others, negotiating a high starting salary has an exclusively positive valence, that is, no approach-avoidance conflict is likely to occur (for a systematic overview of approach-avoidance conflicts, approach-approach conflicts, as well as avoidance-avoidance conflicts and their respective relation to needs/motives and quasineeds/goals, see Kehr, 2004c).

To sum up, objects or events that correspond with an individual's activated quasineeds as well as his or her activated needs are likely to be obtained, whereas objects or events corresponding either to an individual's needs or to an individual's quasineeds are less likely to be obtained. In the following, I will outline how implicit motives (corresponding to Lewin's needs) and explicit motives (corresponding to Lewin's quasineeds) are suggested to interact according to more recent motivation models.

As already described in Chapter 2.2.2, McClelland and colleagues (1989) examined the effects of explicit and implicit motives on performance. In more detail, the authors found that task incentives arouse implicit motives and enhance their effects on performance, whereas social incentives strengthen the link between explicit motives and performance. Although the effects of incentives for explicit and implicit motives were examined separately, the authors hypothesized that “the presence of both types of incentives should summate to facilitate performing the act” (p. 697).

The more recent compensatory model of work motivation and volition (Kehr, 2004b) builds on the theoretical roots of McClelland's distinction between implicit and explicit motives. It integrates McClelland and colleagues' general ideas into a work motivation theory by stating that the two kinds of motives can conflict with one another or benefit each other. To complete the picture, it additionally takes one further component for successful behavior into account: perceived abilities. Thus, the three components from the compensatory model of work motivation and volition are implicit motives, explicit motives, and perceived abilities. Moreover, the compensatory model of work motivation and volition considers the possibility of a lack of overlap between the three components. Discrepancies between implicit and explicit motives
require volitional regulation (i.e., an individual then has to exert willpower to perform a certain act). If perceived abilities are lacking, problem solving is needed.

The two components of implicit and explicit motives are central to this work, so I will now discuss their relation according to the compensatory model of work motivation and volition in more detail. Implicit and explicit motives have different, conceptually independent effects on performance (see Chapters 2.2.2, 2.2.3, and 2.2.4): “Aroused implicit motives lead to affective preferences and implicit behavioral impulses.” By contrast, “activated explicit motives result in cognitive preferences and explicit action tendencies” (Kehr, 2004b, p. 482).

I will illustrate the difference between implicit and explicit motives with the help of a brief hypothetical scenario: An aroused implicit power motive in a negotiation is supposed to lead to positive emotional reactions and affective preferences for opportunities to exert influence in this situation (cf. Chapter 2.1): A person with an aroused implicit power motive may thus express a higher liking for exerting influence over the negotiation partner. This liking may then result in a behavioral impulse to engage in a situation that requires negotiating (i.e., the person tries to influence the negotiation partner with assertive behavior, including high salary offers). This presumably leads to a better result on behalf of that person. An aroused explicit affiliation motive in a negotiation leads to a higher relevance of affiliation-themed topics in this situation. If a person’s explicit affiliation motive is aroused, his or her cognitive preferences may shift toward building a positive relationship with his or her negotiation partner. This person then may show explicit action tendencies to bring a negotiation situation to a conciliatory end by maintaining the positive mood of the interaction partner.

If the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive were combined, the resulting behavioral impulses from the implicit power motive and the explicit action tendencies stemming from the explicit affiliation motive would probably work against each other. The behavioral impulse to be assertive in the negotiation situation is supposed to be incompatible with the explicit action tendency to affiliate with the negotiation partner. This discrepancy is probably reflected by decreased performance (i.e., poor negotiation behavior).
In general, there are two major ways in which implicit and explicit motives can interact. They can be either concordant and interact in predicting performance (i.e., explicit motives may then channel the effects of implicit motives; e.g., Brunstein & Maier, 2005; Lang, Zettler, Ewen, & Hülsheger, 2012; cf. Chapter 2.2.6) or discrepant: If there are discrepancies between the two kinds of motives, this can lead to “intrapersonal conflict because of conflicting behavioral tendencies, and […] result in impaired well-being and failure” (Kehr, 2004b, p. 483). This corresponds to the theorizing of McClelland and colleagues (1989), who stated that “a conflict between an implicit and a different self-attributed motive can lead to compromise behaviors” (p. 697).

If discrepant implicit and explicit motives are not aroused, their discrepancy may constitute a latent behavioral conflict according to the compensatory model of work motivation and volition (Kehr, 2004b). But “behavioral conflicts become manifest if implicit behavioral impulses (originating in aroused implicit motives) and explicit action tendencies (stemming from activated explicit motives) are incompatible at a given moment” (p. 483).

To sum up, theorizing by Lewin (1926), McClelland and colleagues (1989), and Kehr (2004b) predicts negative behavioral consequences from conflicting implicit and explicit motives. Nevertheless, until now, not much research has focused on the combined arousal of the two kinds of motives. In the following section, I will thus present studies that have either aroused the implicit or explicit motive (and measured the respective other motive as a disposition) or have addressed the effects of the combined implicit and explicit motive dispositions.

2.2.6 Studies on the combined effects of implicit and explicit motives

I will proceed in a chronological order, starting with research conducted prior to the official distinction between implicit and explicit motives introduced by McClelland and colleagues (1989) and continuing with more recent research.
Before McClelland and colleagues (1989) had established the distinction between implicit and explicit motives, research had focused on the role of values, adding a “cold” cognitive view to the “hot” view provided by motives (Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986). Sorrentino and Higgins (1986) suggested synergistic effects of motives and values in the prediction of behavior. What had commonly been labeled the channeling effect in later research (Lang et al., 2012; McClelland et al., 1989; Winter et al., 1998, cf. Chapter 2.2) had already been studied by French and Lesser (1964, as cited in Biernat, 1989) in the domain of the achievement motive: These researchers found that the values women held about achievement determined how their implicit achievement motive affected their performance. If participants valued a traditional female role, they performed better on a social skills task. If they valued women’s career orientation, they performed better on an intellectual skills task.

In the realm of the affiliation motive, Constantian (1981, as cited in McClelland, 1985) found that the expression of a high implicit affiliation motive (but not a low implicit affiliation motive) was influenced by the values participants held about solitude and affiliation. If participants valued solitude, their implicit affiliation motive was expressed through a preference for writing letters to friends. If participants valued affiliation, their implicit affiliation motive was expressed through a higher preference for taking a country walk with friends.

In this line of research, Patten and White (1977, Experiment 3) found that values attributed to achievement influenced performance only when the implicit achievement motive was aroused: Participants whose implicit achievement motive was aroused showed performance improvements only if they explicitly valued achievement but not if they did not explicitly value achievement.

Accordingly, Biernat (1989, Study 2) found that the implicit achievement motive influenced performance on a math task only if the value participants attributed to achievement was high: Participants high on the implicit achievement motive who explicitly valued achievement showed the best performance on the math task.
In more recent research, Lang and colleagues (2012) examined the effects of the implicit and explicit achievement motives and found that “the implicit achievement motive was more positively related to task and contextual performance when explicit achievement was high” (p. 1210).

Brunstein and Maier’s (2005, Experiment 3) results fit into this picture well: The authors predicted that when participants “experience difficulties in meeting a norm of social comparison, a strong explicit desire for achievement will channel the motivational energy carried by the implicit achievement motive into a vigorous concern for doing a task better than other individuals” (p. 208). The authors implemented a feedback condition to arouse the explicit achievement motive: Participants were given feedback stating that they had trouble achieving a social comparison norm. The results confirmed the predictions: In the feedback condition, participants high on the implicit and explicit achievement motives performed better (in terms of reaction time) than all other participants.

Schiepe-Tiska (2013) examined the effects of congruence between the implicit and explicit power motives on the experience of flow. Flow is defined as “a psychological state in which the person feels simultaneously cognitively efficient, motivated, and happy” (Moneta & Csikszentmihaly, 1996, p. 277). Schiepe-Tiska found that congruence between the implicit and explicit power motives led to a higher flow experience and a higher response accuracy on a power-related implicit learning task.

As a part of the explicit motive system (cf. Chapter 2.2.5), goals can be either motive-congruent or motive-incongruent. Schultheiss, Jones, Davis, and Kley (2008) found that congruence between personal goals and implicit motives predicted personal well-being.

In the more ample context of life goals, Hofer and Chasiotis (2003) and Hofer, Chasiotis, and Campos (2006) found that life goals corresponding to a person’s implicit motives led to enhanced life satisfaction.

Brunstein, Schultheiss, and Grässmann (1998) found that incongruence between the two motive systems had negative effects on emotional well-being: Progress toward motive-congruent goals accounted for students’ experiences of emotional well-being, whereas
progress toward motive-incongruent goals did not. Well-being was also reduced in participants with discrepancies between their implicit and explicit achievement motives (Baumann, Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2005).

Job, Oertig, Brandstätter, and Allemand (2010) examined the effects of explicit commitment to achievement and the aroused implicit achievement motive on eating behavior. The authors argued that unhealthy eating behavior, such as the consumption of snacks, appeared in light of stressors such as motive discrepancies. Achievement arousal consisted of an achievement task with three short subtasks. Participants high on the implicit achievement motive ate fewer snacks when their explicit commitment to achievement was high compared with when it was low. Participants low on the implicit achievement motive ate fewer snacks when their explicit commitment to achievement was low compared with when it was high. Thus, motive incongruence led to more unhealthy eating behavior in terms of more snack consumption. The same pattern of results was replicated in an applied setting for the implicit and explicit power motives.

Rawolle, Von Wallis, Badham, and Kehr (2015) examined and found that discrepancies between the implicit and explicit motives led to job burnout. Moreover, the authors found that this relation was mediated by intrinsic motivation; that is, participants with motive discrepancies reported lower levels of intrinsic motivation, which led to higher self-reported levels of job burnout.

Also in an applied setting, Kehr (2004a) examined the effect of discrepancies between managers’ implicit and explicit motives. Managers with discrepant implicit and explicit motives were predicted to have less volitional strength in terms of their proficiency in using volitional strategies. As predicted, these discrepancies led to decreases in volitional strength and consequently to reduced subjective well-being.

In summary, recent studies examining the combined effects of implicit and explicit motives have primarily focused on dispositional motives, demonstrating that motive congruence leads to positive effects on task and contextual performance, flow experience, and response accuracy on an implicit learning task as well as general feelings of well-being and life
satisfaction. Accordingly, motive discrepancies were found to lead to decreased well-being, unhealthy eating behavior, volitional depletion, and job burnout.

Only two studies have examined the effects of an aroused implicit achievement motive: If arousing the implicit achievement motive leads to discrepancies with the explicit achievement motive, this has negative effects on performance, whereas positive effects on performance result if the aroused implicit achievement motive is in accordance with the explicit achievement motive (Job et al., 2010). Accordingly, if arousing the implicit achievement motive leads to congruence with the explicit achievement motive, this leads to positive effects on performance in terms of reaction time (Brunstein & Maier, 2005).

In conclusion, most research has focused on effects of (in)congruence between different dispositional motives with the same motive content. Effects of dispositional or aroused motives with different motive content have not yet been examined.

2.3 The implicit power motive

*The fundamental concept in social science is power, in the same sense in which energy is the fundamental concept in physics. [...] The laws of social dynamics are laws which can only be stated in terms of power.*

(Bertrand Russell)

Russell (1938) suggested that power plays a fundamental role in society and moreover stated that the *love of power* is one of the strongest human motives: He claimed that “love of power is the chief motive producing the changes which social science has to study” (p. 6). This chapter is dedicated to this fundamental human motive and is split into three sections: First, I will focus on effects of the dispositional implicit power motive on behavior in competitions and competitive games because this behavior is supposed to be comparable to behavior in negotiations, which play a central role in this work. Second, I will illustrate the conditions and effects of an aroused implicit power motive because these conditions and effects are also central to this work. Finally, I will describe the development of the implicit power motive because these
developmental differences in childhood provide important explanations for the behavior of adults in negotiations.

For people high on the power motive, the most important incentive that guides their behavior is to be able to influence others (Schultheiss, Wirth, Torges, Pang, Villacorta & Welsh, 2005; Stanton & Schultheiss, 2009). In addition, they try to avoid being influenced by others (Winter, 1992) and try to avoid feelings of weakness and inferiority (Veroff, 1982).

Situations that provide many power-relevant cues are competitions and competitive games as they usually have a measurable outcome that clearly defines who wins and who is defeated (i.e., who had more influence over his or her opponent). In a competition, individuals high on the power motive should thus seek cues that provide information about their opportunities to exert influence. Schmalt (1987, Experiment 3) found this expected pattern: People high on the power motive were more sensitive to information about their prospects of success in a competition than individuals who were low on the power motive. In particular, in Schmalt’s (1987) study, participants played 30 rounds of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In this game, players can choose either to cooperate or to compete. A moderate win (point accumulation) rate for both players results if they cooperate with each other, whereas both players receive the lowest rates if they decide to compete. Winnings can be maximized if the first player gets his or her opponent to cooperate, whereas the first player competes. In Schmalt’s (1987) study, the responses of the opponent were manipulated; thus, participants had either a competitive opponent who made 80% competitive choices or a cooperative opponent who made 80% cooperative choices. If participants were asked for their expectation of being able to enact their intentions to compete or cooperate, participants high on the power motive adjusted it in accordance with the competitiveness of their opponent, whereas individuals low on the power motive did not.

Schnackers and Kleinbeck (1975) examined the success of individuals high on the power motive in another study that used a game-theory approach. In the so-called Con game, participants played three games that involved dice and cards and consisted of three rounds. They had the opportunity to build or break and to accept or reject coalitions with two other
players in order to maximize their points in each round. The results showed that individuals high on the power motive achieved more points in each round, usually won rounds, and gained more points from round to round than individuals low on the power motive. Moreover, the players’ coalition building was analyzed, showing that, in contrast to people who were low on the power motive, those who were high on the power motive made more coalition offers, had their offers accepted by others more often, received more coalition offers, and accepted those offers more often. When in a coalition, in contrast to people who were low on the power motive, those who were high on the power motive broke their coalitions more often, whereas their coalition partners broke them only rarely. In sum, Schnackers and Kleinbeck (1975) highlighted that the typical strategy plan of individuals high on the power motive was, after making another player accept their coalition offer, they renegotiated the agreed-upon allocation of points and changed it to their own advantage either by using threats or by emphasizing their own power position.

Also Quirin, Beckenkamp, and Kuhl (2009) found that the implicit power motive predicted participants’ tendency to maximize their own profit in a money distribution task; that is, participants high on the implicit power motive assigned more money to themselves and less money to a virtual other player. An earlier study by Terhune (1968) pointed in the same direction. He used a variation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game mentioned above and found that players high on the power motive tried to gain the most profit from their opponents and outwit them but expected their opponents to cooperate. Bludau (1976, as cited in Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2010) found that individuals high on the power motive compared with those high on the achievement motive were more competitive and preferred games with a lot of conflict.

Early research on the power motive concentrated on the correlates of actions, showing that the actions of individuals high on the power motive are often aimed at influencing and impressing others. They tend to participate in competitive sports and win more championships, hold office in student organizations, are more likely to be involved with radio stations or campus newspapers, and act more convincingly and influentially in student discussion groups.
and are at the same time perceived as less helpful. They tend to have prestigious possessions and spend their money on supplies for their room, they read power-oriented magazines, and they are members of organizations (McClelland, 1975; McClelland, Davis & Kalin, 1972; Winter, 1973). Moreover, the power motive correlates with a choice of professional careers that allow individuals to have influence over others within a legitimate institutional structure, such as “teaching, psychology, the ministry, business, or journalism” (McClelland, 1987, p. 283; see also Winter, 1992). People high on the power motive tend to assert themselves in friendships and adopt dominating, controlling, and organizing roles (McAdams, Healy, & Krause, 1984).

As I have now finished describing the bases of the power motive and the characteristics of individuals high on the power motive, the next section will discuss the consequences of arousing the power motive.

The implicit power motive can be aroused via nonverbal cues (see Chapter 2.2.3). Schultheiss, Wirth, and Stanton (2004) measured the arousal of the implicit power motive and the implicit affiliation motive after showing participants a film excerpt with a motive theme. They found a significant increase in power imagery in the Picture Story Exercise after participants watched 30 min of The Godfather - Part II (Coppola & Frederickson, 1976) and a significant increase in affiliation imagery after participants viewed The Bridges of Madison County (Eastwood & Kennedy, 1995). Moreover, men with high pre-movie testosterone levels showed a significant increase in testosterone after the film with the power theme but not after the film with the affiliation theme or a neutral film. Mazur and Booth (1998) showed an association between testosterone and dominance-related behavior in males. Accordingly, a common conclusion is that on a physiological level, the implicit power motive is associated with testosterone (Schultheiss et al., 1999; Schultheiss & Rhode, 2002; Stanton & Schultheiss, 2009; cf. Chapter 2.2). Thus, the finding by Schultheiss and colleagues (2004) is an indicator of implicit power motive arousal due to the power-related movie.
Several other studies have used physiological measures as indicators of an arousal of the implicit power motive. Males’ implicit power motive predicted increases in testosterone level after they imagined winning or actually won a competition (Schultheiss et al., 1999). A similar pattern was replicated by Schultheiss and Rhode (2002): The implicit power motive predicted increases in testosterone for males who won a contest and were low on activity inhibition. A study by Stanton and Schultheiss (2007) indicated that estradiol played an analogous role for women: The implicit power motive predicted estradiol increases for women who won a contest but predicted estradiol decreases for women who lost a contest. Wirth, Welsh, and Schultheiss (2006) found an association between a high power motive and high cortisol rates after losing a contest, indicating that individuals high on the power motive perceived a defeat as a stressful event. By contrast, individuals who were low on the power motive seemed to perceive a victory as stressful because they showed high levels of cortisol after winning a contest. To measure individuals’ physiological reactivity to a conflict situation, Fodor (1985) applied electromyogram measures. He showed that, relative to those low on the power motive, those high on the power motive showed greater physiological reactivity when asked to settle a conflict in their group in the role of the group leader.

In the following section, I will illustrate the development of a low compared with a high implicit power motive with special emphasis on the role that socialization plays in the development of a low implicit power motive in adulthood. When an infant begins to enjoy having impact, parents can either discourage or encourage this behavior. If the parents are encouraging, the infant develops an “elaborate schematic representation of the many different ways in which he or she can get pleasure from having impact” (McClelland, 1987, p. 173). The infant will connect other situations “through learning with power goals or incentives” (McClelland, 1987, p. 173). Thus, a high need for power develops if a person repeatedly experiences positive affect in situations that signal influence opportunities.

McClelland and Pilon (1983) longitudinally examined parents’ permissive or prohibitive behavior toward their child’s power-related behavior. They interviewed mothers when their
child was 5 years old regarding various child-rearing variables. They further assessed the implicit motives of the children with TAT scores 26 to 27 years later. They found that parents’ permissiveness for sex and aggression when the child was 5 significantly predicted a higher implicit power motive in adulthood. Variables contributing significantly to the factor permissiveness for sex and aggression were masturbation, sex play, aggression toward sibs, and aggression toward parents. Thus, children whose parents were not permissive had no opportunity to have positive experiences in power situations and therefore developed a lower implicit power motive than children with permissive parents.

To sum up, research has shown the important role of the implicit power motive in many areas of life. Individuals high on the implicit power motive have been shown to exert influence, be it in friendship, in their professions, or in one-on-one situations such as games or competitions. Especially with the help of competitive games, research has shown that individuals with a high implicit power motive obtain more points in competitions and increase their influence from round to round. The role of the implicit power motive in negotiations, in which influence is also indispensable, has yet to be researched.

2.4 The explicit affiliation motive

Of all the means to insure happiness throughout the whole life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friends.

(Epicurus)

Individuals high on the affiliation motive would probably agree with Epicurus’ quote: For them, positive and friendly interactions with others have great significance and incentive value and lead to positive emotions. The aim of the present chapter was to shed further light on the affiliation motive. The distinction between implicit and explicit motives introduced in Chapter 2.2 also applies to the affiliation motive. Thus, I will first describe the basics of the affiliation motive in general. After that, I will explain the explicit affiliation motive in more detail. Finally, I
will describe two concepts closely related to the explicit affiliation motive: the need to belong and the need for relatedness.

Atkinson, Heyns, and Veroff (1954) established the concept of the affiliation motive. Building on this conception, McClelland et al. (1989) phrased it as the “desire to establish, maintain, or restore warm relationships with other people” (p. 692).

Research has shown that people high on the affiliation motive—as compared with people low on the affiliation motive—are more likely to initiate social interactions (Boyatzis, 1973), interact more often with other people and thereby experience more positive affect (McAdams & Constantian, 1983), enjoy being with others, and interact more frequently in a positive manner (Exline, 1962; McClelland, 1985; Sokolowski, 2008). By doing these things, their goal is to provoke positive emotional reactions in others (Atkinson et al., 1954). They have more dyadic contact with their friends by listening to their friends, showing concern for their friends’ well-being, and disclosing things about themselves more often with their friends (McAdams, Healey, & Krause, 1984). If individuals high on the affiliation motive are alone, they more often express wishes to be with others than individuals low on the affiliation motive (McAdams & Constantian, 1983). Compared with individuals who are low on the affiliation motive, individuals who are high on the affiliation motive are more satisfied when they have the opportunity to work near their coworkers (Exline, 1962).

In social activities, individuals high on the affiliation motive try to maintain the good will of their interaction partners and do not like to engage in competitive interactions (McClelland, 1975; Terhune, 1968). They react more sensitively to social requests and the reactions of others and tend to comply with social requests (Walker & Heyns, 1962, as cited in Hill, 2009).

They avoid conflict and try not to control the behavior of others (Exline, 1962). This tendency was also shown in a political context: Politicians high on the implicit affiliation motive favored detente in their speeches and had a higher interpersonal orientation compared with their task orientation (Herrmann, 1980). Sorrentino and Field (1986) also found an orientation toward socioemotional leadership but not toward task leadership. Moreover, the authors reported that individuals high on the implicit affiliation motive had the highest verbal participation scores on a
group task. As judged by the other team members, the implicit affiliation motive predicted the following dimensions: *seems friendly, agrees, gives suggestions, and asks*. A sum score reflecting contributions to the group task was predicted by the implicit affiliation motive as well. In general, individuals who are high on the affiliation motive are sympathetic and compassionate toward others (Koestner & McClelland, 1992).

In an early study, Terhune (1968) found that participants high on the implicit affiliation motive cooperated less and became more suspicious as the riskiness of a competitive game increased. Also, Winter (2007) stated that individuals who are high on the implicit affiliation motive are more collaborative in a “safe,” noncompetitive environment. In a study by Karabenick (1977), participants high on the implicit affiliation motive did worse on an anagram task when it was presented as a competition compared with when it was framed as an individual task.

Thus, the affiliation motive differs from the power motive in many respects (cf. Chapter 2.3). Accordingly, the two motives have been found to be negatively correlated ($r = -.13$ to $- .32$; McClelland, 1987; see also Terhune, 1968).

In contrast to the implicit affiliation motive, which comprises the nonconscious desire to affiliate with other people, the explicit affiliation motive reflects how much value a person consciously ascribes to social interaction (Wegner, Bohnacker, Mempel, Teubel, & Schüler, 2015). Wong and Csikszentmihalyi (1991) found that participants with a high explicit affiliation motive more often expressed the wish to be with friends throughout the day compared with people with a low explicit affiliation motive.

As already described in Chapter 2.2.3, implicit and explicit motives differ in another aspect that is the direct result of the extent to which the two types of motives are accessible to consciousness: Implicit motives respond to nonverbal cues, whereas explicit motives respond to verbal cues. Wegner and colleagues (2015) found evidence for this mechanism for the implicit and explicit affiliation motives. They showed that the implicit affiliation motive was associated with the “pleasant nonverbal behavior” that racquet sportsmen showed toward their opponents. By contrast, the explicit affiliation motive was linked to “time spent in verbal team contact.”
Although some studies have shown arousal of the implicit affiliation motive (Schultheiss et al., 2004; cf. Chapter 2.3), to my knowledge, no studies have examined arousal of the explicit affiliation motive.

Two concepts that are closely related to the explicit affiliation motive are the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and the need for relatedness as part of self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 2000). Because not much research has addressed the role of the explicit affiliation motive in human interactions, I will outline the roles of these two needs in human interactions.

Baumeister and Leary (1995) hypothesized that the need to belong is a fundamental human motivation in that it should be found in all humans across cultures, although with different strengths and intensities. Human beings are thus supposed to “have a pervasive drive to form and maintain at least a minimum quantity of lasting, positive, and significant interpersonal relationships” (p. 497).

Parallel to the affiliation motive, the need to belong stimulates goal-directed behavior to satisfy it and is associated with positive affect when these goals are achieved. Thus, just like people high on the affiliation motive, individuals with a high need to belong strive to establish interpersonal contact and positive relationships. Reaching these goals, in terms of the consolidation of social bonds, leads to positive affect (e.g., Sternberg, 1986). By contrast, missing these goals (e.g., the breaking down of relationships) results in negative affect such as pain and protest (Hazan & Shaver, 1994). Parallel to the explicit affiliation motive, the strength and intensity of the need to belong is supposed to vary between individuals (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).

In contrast to the affiliation motive, the need to belong can be satisfied only through long-term relationships and not by mere contact with others. In addition, relationships need to encompass frequent contact to satisfy the need to belong. Accordingly, people invest resources in developing continuous social relationships (De Cremer & Leonardelli, 2003), and
individuals with a high need to belong view interactions with strangers as opportunities for establishing long-term contacts (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).

From a methodological viewpoint, the need to belong corresponds with the explicit affiliation motive because it is accessible to consciousness and therefore measured via explicit measures such as the Need to Belong Scale (NTBS; Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2013).

Thus, despite slight differences in how the need to belong and the explicit affiliation motive can be satisfied in the long run, they ought to play comparable roles in social interaction situations with a hitherto unknown stranger, the type of situation that is at the focus of the current work. More concretely, a high explicit affiliation motive and a high need to belong are likely to generally direct behavior toward establishing friendly relationships with these strangers. Therefore, in the following section, I will present studies that examined the need to belong within the context of a new relationship with hypothetical or real strangers.

Morrison and Matthes (2011) examined the effects of the need to belong on perceived consensus. The authors expected that individuals high on the need to belong would strive to affiliate with others and would therefore place high value on having their opinions accepted by others. In a first study, the dispositional need to belong predicted whether participants perceived that others agreed with their opinion, especially if this opinion was about a topic that was personally important to them. In a second study, participants primed with the need to belong tended to overestimate perceived consensus with respect to a topic that was personally important to them. Similarly, Williams, Cheung, and Choi (2000) showed that participants who were ostracized in a virtual throwball game conformed significantly more often to incorrect unanimous judgments of five others than participants who were included in the throwball game. In accordance, across several experiments, Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, and Schaller (2007) found that the experience of social exclusion led to efforts to establish new social contacts.

De Cremer and Leonardelli (2003) found that individuals high on the need to belong cooperated the most in a public goods dilemma. In addition, the authors found that the higher
individuals’ need to belong, the more uncertainty they expressed about whether their cooperation would be reciprocated.

Rios, Fast, and Gruenfeld (2015) examined the association between power and the need to belong. The authors hypothesized that a high power position would be associated with social distinctiveness, which is normally protected and maintained (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012; Magee & Smith, 2013). When a person high on power had a high need to belong, the distinctiveness of the power position was expected to be perceived as threatening the need to belong (Brewer, 1991). Therefore, the authors hypothesized and found across three experiments that participants high on power and high on the need to belong counteracted this feeling of threat with submissive behavior to minimize distinctiveness between themselves and others.

The need to belong is an integrative part of SDT: Ryan and Deci (2000a) stated that “Baumeister and Leary (1995) made the case very convincingly that there is a psychological need for relatedness” (p. 334). Thus, the authors of SDT themselves used the terms need to belong and need for relatedness simultaneously and as synonyms. As part of SDT, the need for relatedness can be conceived of as “the homonomous aspect of the integrative tendency of life, the tendency to connect with and be integral to and accepted by others” (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 7). SDT conceptualizes that autonomy, relatedness, and growth are the three basic psychological needs that constitute requirements for the optimal functioning, growth, and well-being of personality and cognitive structures (Ryan & Deci, 2002). Ryan and Deci (2002) emphasized the main difference between needs and motives: They conceptualized the basic needs as universal in that they represent innate requirements, whereas motives are acquired. Therefore, according to Deci and Ryan (2008), theories on motives focus on individuals’ learned differences in motive strength, whereas SDT examines the effects of need satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Apart from these traditionally different research foci, current research has tried to integrate propositions from both theoretical backgrounds (Schüler, Brandstätter, & Sheldon, 2013; Sheldon & Schüler, 2011). Sheldon and Schüler (2011) proposed that, according to SDT, there is a universal need for relatedness (i.e., the satisfaction of this need
is beneficial to everyone). Nevertheless, at the same time, individual differences in the desire for this same need exist (i.e., some individuals find interpersonal relations more rewarding than others; cf. Chapter 2.2.5). Schüler and colleagues (2013) argued that “the most important similarity between the two theories is the content of their main concepts” (p. 482); for example, both the need for relatedness and the affiliation motive deal with the importance of warm interpersonal relations. In accordance, in a series of empirical studies, Sheldon and Schüler (2013) found fundamental associations between the need for relatedness and the explicit affiliation motive. Moreover, both concepts are accessible to consciousness: The need to belong is measured with questionnaires such as the Intrinsic Need Satisfaction scale (INS scale; Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2004) or the Work-Related Basic Need Satisfaction scale (Van den Broeck, Vansteenkiste, de Witte, Soenens, & Lens, 2010). In sum, because of the comparability of the content of the two theoretical concepts and the similar methodological access to the concepts, I expected that they would have similar effects on the types of interactions with others that are central to the current work.

In much research on SDT, the need for relatedness has been assessed and examined in concert with the other two needs and has been found to predict, for example, well-being (Deci, Ryan, Gagné, Leone, Usunov, & Kornazheva, 2001; Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000), happiness (Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis, 1996), and vitality (Nix, Ryan, Manly, & Deci, 1999).

Because the current work did not focus on variables on this level of generality but rather focused on concrete interactive behavior toward another person, I will now present studies on the need for relatedness that dealt with feelings of connectedness, prosocial behavior, and cooperative behavior. The following studies used priming to produce an unsatisfied need state; that is, the studies aroused the need for relatedness to examine effects of an unsatisfied versus a satisfied need for relatedness.

A recent study by Pavey, Greitemeyer, and Sparks (2011) examined whether priming relatedness would lead to increased prosocial motives and behavior. In a first experiment, the authors found that a relatedness arousal led to a higher intention to volunteer for a charity and
to greater interest in volunteer work compared with experimental groups with autonomy, competency, or no arousal. In a second experiment, the relatedness manipulation led to higher prosocial intentions and higher values placed on feelings of connectedness toward others compared with the other three experimental groups. In a third experiment, the authors compared a relatedness arousal group with a control group that exhibited no arousal and found that in comparison with the control group, the experimental group donated more of the money they earned from participating to a charity. Hence, this series of experiments demonstrated that a relatedness priming leads not only to prosocial intentions but to actual prosocial behavior as well.

Prentice and Sheldon (2015) were interested in effects of a relatedness priming and relative intrinsic versus extrinsic value orientation (RIEVO) on cooperative behavior. RIEVO is considered an index of the extent to which cooperative behavior is perceived as rewarding: Intrinsic valuing ascribes importance to affiliation and contributing to a community, whereas extrinsic valuing emphasizes personal status, attractiveness, and financial success. Thus, the higher the RIEVO index is, the higher a person’s intrinsic value orientation compared with his or her extrinsic value orientation. In a first experiment, the results showed that participants high on RIEVO were more cooperative in a resource dilemma after a relatedness prime compared with participants with a neutral prime or participants low on RIEVO. In a second study, the same pattern of results appeared with another dependent variable: Participants high on RIEVO allocated fewer points to themselves on the Social Value Orientation Scale when primed with relatedness compared with participants with a neutral prime or participants low on RIEVO.

To sum up, the studies on relatedness priming indicated that relatedness has an effect not only on prosocial intentions but also on actual prosocial and cooperative behavior. Also, research on the need to belong indicated the great importance of social interactions and consensus with others for individuals high on the need to belong: They perceive greater consensus for their own opinion and tend to overestimate perceived consensus. They even conform to others’ incorrect judgments when ostracized and try to establish new social contacts when
they are socially excluded. They cooperate in social dilemmas and care about the cooperation of others in return. Moreover, they adjust their behavior and act submissively in order to avoid threatening their relationships with others.

These findings parallel research on the explicit affiliation motive in that individuals high on the explicit affiliation motive ascribe high importance to social interactions just as individuals high on the need to belong and need for relatedness do. In addition, research on the need to belong and need for relatedness has shown effects of ascribing high importance to social interactions on intentions and performance in social interactions, whereas no such findings exist for the explicit affiliation motive. Nevertheless, due to content-related and conceptual similarities, individuals high on the explicit affiliation motive are likely to show behavioral patterns that are similar to those of individuals high on the need to belong and need for relatedness.

2.5 Negotiations

*Like it or not, you are a negotiator. Negotiation is a fact of life. [...] Negotiation is a basic means of getting what you want from others.*

(Roger Fisher & William Ury)

Rubin and Brown (1975) emphasized that negotiations constitute the major mechanism of conflict resolution in our society. Therefore, definitions of negotiations are usually very general: Pruitt (1981) defined negotiations as “a form of decision making in which two or more parties talk with one another in an effort to resolve their opposing interests” (p. xi). More recently, Thompson and colleagues (2010) phrased it: “Anytime people cannot achieve their goals without the cooperation of others, they are negotiating” (p. 492). These goals can encompass materialistic content and goods as well as intangible entities or even both at the same time. For example, in salary negotiations, not only are the materialistic changes in employment contracts relevant, but also the increased status and prestige an employee may gain.
As the above-mentioned example hinted, it is not very simple to determine what constitutes the negotiation success of one or both parties. A rather technical consideration of equally distributed success is the Pareto-optimum: According to Pareto (1935), in Pareto-optimal situations, “any change to make any person better off would make someone worse off” (Thompson et al., 2010, p. 493). Early research on negotiation has typically focused on these rather mathematical considerations of negotiation situations (Thompson et al., 2010) and has assumed that the negotiators are completely rational (Bazerman et al., 2000). Accordingly, early research prescribed how negotiators would act if they were wise and all-knowing (Nash, 1951) and suggested that parties should reach Pareto-optimal settlements (Thompson et al., 2010), whereas this is only seldom the case in reality (Thompson & Hastie, 1990).

According to Carnevale and Pruitt (1992), this early research was dominated by the assumption that negotiators are concerned only with their own outcomes. This motivational orientation is called individualistic orientation and is part of the dual concern model (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). According to this model, two concerns a negotiator may have in a negotiation are a concern for his or her own outcome and a concern for the other party’s outcome. Accordingly, combining these two concerns, three other orientations beyond the individualistic orientation result: The altruistic orientation (an exclusive concern for the other party’s outcome), the cooperative orientation (a concern for both parties’ outcomes), and the competitive orientation (the desire to do better than the other party). Empirical research on the dual concern model has found support for its role in explaining the use of strategies and joint benefit in negotiations (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Gelfand, Fulmer, & Severance, 2010).

In reality, most negotiators are competitively or cooperatively oriented (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). The conflict that results from the two motives to cooperate and to compete is called the mixed-motive conflict (Schelling, 1960). For example, in dyadic negotiations, two negotiators must simultaneously cooperate to reach agreement and compete to protect their own interests (Komorita & Parks, 1995). Integrative negotiation outcomes (i.e., outcomes that satisfy both parties; Thompson et al., 2010) are more likely to occur with a cooperative orientation. By
contrast, distributive outcomes (i.e., outcomes that satisfy only one party; Thompson et al., 2010) are associated with a competitive orientation (Deutsch, 1998; Gelfand, Fulmer, & Severance, 2010).

In contrast to early research, which is considered normative in that it prescribed ideal negotiation behavior, descriptive research examines how negotiators actually make decisions and how they deviate from optimality or rationality (Bazerman et al., 2000). A major field of research in this realm is research on heuristics (Bazerman et al., 2000; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). On the one hand, heuristics in negotiations facilitate the ability to proceed in such kinds of complex situations, but on the other hand, heuristics lead to several systematic biases (Bazerman et al., 2000). In contrast to normative research, which focuses on rational behavior and the maximization of economic gains, descriptive research also includes social-psychological outcomes (i.e., relationship quality and satisfaction, interest in future interactions, or trust between negotiators; Thompson et al., 2010).

Early research on negotiations has examined the role of either individual differences or structural variables in the course of negotiations (Bazerman et al., 2000). Current reviews of negotiation research have established an integrated view of both personal and structural variables, acknowledging that both are important for negotiation outcomes (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Gelfand, Fulmer, & Severance, 2010; Komorita & Parks, 1995; Thompson et al., 2010). Gelfand and colleagues (2010) presented four contextual levels of analysis: individual-level psychological processes such as cognition, emotion, and motivation; social processes such as persuasion, communication, and competition or cooperation; social contextual factors such as different kinds of relationships, temporal perspectives, and technological contexts; and the cultural context. Thompson and colleagues (2010) established the following levels: intrapersonal, interpersonal, group, organizational, and virtual. The focus of the current thesis is located on the intrapersonal level because I examined a dyadic negotiation with a fictitious interaction partner. On the intrapersonal level, according to Thompson and colleagues (2010), the variables power, gender, and affect have received the most attention in recent years.
Because power and affiliation play central roles in this work, they will be described in more detail in Chapters 2.5.1 and 2.5.2. Chapter 2.5.1 explains the role of the general concept of power in negotiations, whereas Chapter 2.5.2 covers the importance of the power and affiliation motives in conflicts and crises.

The role of affect in negotiations is disputed (Thompson et al., 2010). There are studies that have reported positive effects of positive mood in negotiations (Forgas, 1998; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006) and others that have found negative effects of positive mood in negotiations (Forgas & Cromer, 2004; Hareli, David, Akron, & Hess, 2013). Because the influence of affect in negotiations is closely related to the power a negotiator has in a negotiation, the role of affect will be explained along with the general concept of power in Chapter 2.5.1. Most research on gender in negotiations has focused on salary negotiations. Therefore, the role of gender in negotiations will be explained in the context of salary negotiations in Chapter 2.5.4.

2.5.1 The general concept of power in negotiations

Power can appear in a twofold manner in negotiations: A negotiator has either structural power (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; French & Raven, 1959; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977) or personal power (Frost, 1987; McClelland, 1975; Pfeffer, 1992; Winter, 1973). Structural power is associated with objective resources and positions and is often measured in terms of a negotiator's best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA; Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 2011). A high BATNA equals high structural power: Individuals with a high BATNA are not as reliant on an agreement as individuals with a low BATNA.

Personal power is associated with either a persons' motivation to gain power (McClelland, 1975; Winter, 1973) or certain characteristics or traits such as Machiavellism (Christie & Geis, 1970), authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), and personal causation (deCharms, 1968). Already in early research on the implicit power motive,
Winter (1973) stressed the distinction between power as a motive (see Chapter 2.3) and other personal power attributes.

Moreover, persons can possess personal power in certain instances or across a certain period of time (cf. Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011). This last sort of power has often been studied with the help of vignettes or scenarios that are used to prime power in individuals. Commonly, research on primed power conceptualizes power as “an individual’s relative capacity to modify others’ states by providing or withholding resources or administering punishments” (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003, p. 265).

In accordance with Keltner and colleagues’ (2003) model, I propose that individuals who have a general desire to gain influence over others, which is characteristic of the implicit power motive, will show behavior that is comparable to individuals who have gained situational power due to a priming of power or structural advantages. The first type of person behaves in a powerful and assertive manner because he or she likes the feeling of influencing others, whereas the latter behaves powerfully because that kind of behavior corresponds to his or her assigned role. Regardless of the reasons for the respective behavior, it should be similar for the two groups of individuals.

More in detail, according to Keltner and colleagues’ (2003) model, determinants of power can be manifold: Individual, dyadic, within-group, or between-group variables predict a person’s high or low social power. A high implicit power motive would fall in the category of individual determinants of power, whereas a power priming would lead to enhanced power in a dyad or within a group. All these determinants of power influence if an individual has high or low social power.

If an individual disposes of high social power, approach tendencies result (such as attention to rewards, positive emotion, automatic cognition, and disinhibited state/trait driven behavior). If an individual disposes of low social power, inhibition tendencies result (such as attention to threats, negative emotion, systematic cognition, or inhibited/situationally constrained behavior; Keltner et al., 2003, p. 267).
Likewise, individuals high on the implicit power motive show behavior during competitions that can be conceived of as approach oriented (cf. Chapter 2.3): They are more sensitive to information about their prospects of success in a competition, tend to win competitions, and even improve their competitive behavior over the course of competitions; that is, they show trait-driven behavior, automatically evaluate information that is useful for their success, and pay a lot of attention to the reward of winning a competition.

Hence, in the following, I will work out parallels between individuals who have been primed with power and individuals with a high implicit power motive, arguing that both should show approach-oriented behavior in negotiations. In the following, for a better understanding, individuals primed with power will be termed high-power individuals or negotiators (in contrast to low-power individuals or negotiators who were not primed with power).

Research examining processes over the course of negotiations have repeatedly found that the impact of affect is closely related to power: Overbeck, Neale, and Govan (2010) found that high-power individuals tend to act in accordance with their own emotional state and are not oriented toward negotiation partners. Accordingly, the positive affect of high-power negotiators had more effect on agreement quality and integrative agreements than the positive affect of low-power negotiators (Anderson & Thompson, 2004). Furthermore, the trait of positive affect in high-power negotiators influenced negotiation outcomes more than the trait of positive affect in low-power negotiators and was the best predictor of an integrative negotiation outcome for the negotiators’ tendencies to trust each other (Anderson & Thompson, 2004). Thus, in accordance with Keltner and colleagues’ (2003) model, high-power negotiators in contrast to low-power negotiators showed behavior that was in accordance with their traits, and these traits tended to influence the course of their negotiations.

In accordance, low-power individuals are not influenced by their own but by the other negotiator’s emotions and concede more to an opponent who expresses anger than to an opponent who expresses happiness, whereas this pattern does not apply to high-power individuals (Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2004; Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead,
The opponent’s negative affect leads to more concessions from low-power negotiators than from high-power negotiators (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Wang, Northcraft, & Van Kleef, 2012). Low-power negotiators are generally more influenced by their opponent’s emotions in a negotiation compared with high-power negotiators (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). In a more general context, Anderson and Berdahl (2002) found this pattern as well: Low-power participants were more likely to notice threats (e.g., that their partner in a dyad expressed anger toward them). By contrast, high-power individuals experienced the opposite pattern and underestimated the partner’s threatening emotions toward them. Instead, they were oriented toward rewards (e.g., perceiving that their partner liked them). That is, in terms of Keltner and colleagues’ (2003) model, low-power negotiators, in contrast to high-power negotiators, show inhibition such that they align their behavior with situational requirements and make concessions if the situation requires it.

De Dreu and Van Kleef (2004, Experiment 3) found that low-power individuals adjusted their level of demand in a negotiation in accordance with questions asked by their high-power counterparts. The questions asked by the powerful counterpart contained expectations directed toward the low-power negotiation partner. Thus, this pattern suggests that low-power rather than high-power individuals are willing to comply with demands made of them. Again, this pattern of results can be conceived of as situationally constrained inhibited behavior (cf. Keltner et al., 2003).

By contrast, high-power negotiators are influenced more by their own social value orientation than by the reputation of their negotiation counterpart (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). The authors concluded that power may immunize people against situational pressures and allow them to freely express their internal processes.

Further evidence for these theoretical ideas has been provided from outside the context of negotiations: In general, in contrast to low-power individuals, high-power individuals tend to be oriented toward their personal value standards even if they are under social stress (Magee & Langner, 2008), show greater self-concept consistency (Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011), manage to act according to their internal traits (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001), and discount
advice from others in comparison with low-power individuals (See, Morrison, Rothman, & Soll, 2011; Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2011). In addition, they instrumentalize others and use them as means to their own ends (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Magee & Smith, 2013).

Moreover, high-power individuals show a higher action orientation in negotiations by initiating them and thereby profiting from a bargaining advantage (Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007). Research by Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) and by Schaerer, Swaab, and Galinsky (2015) has consolidated the finding that first offers function as anchors and thus lead to more favorable negotiation outcomes in the direction of the anchor. In addition, high-power individuals are more action-oriented in general and tend to take actions to counteract stimuli that work against their goals (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Kapoutsis, Volkema, & Nikolopoulos, 2012). That is, they channel their actions into goal-oriented behavior, persist longer in the face of obstacles, and are more likely to bring their goals to successful completion in comparison with low-power individuals (Guinote, 2007; Slabu & Guinote, 2010).

To sum up, situational power enhances the orientation toward inner processes and traits and results in a greater action and approach orientation of individuals. In accordance, individuals who are not disposed to engaging in situational power tend to orient their demands and actions toward the other negotiator, thus inhibiting their own behavior. These findings are in accordance with Keltner and colleagues’ (2003) model and parallel findings on the implicit power motive that can be interpreted as a higher action and approach orientation of individuals with a high compared with a low implicit power motive (see above and Chapter 2.3). In conclusion, individuals with a high implicit power motive are supposed to show approach-oriented behavior in negotiations just as individuals who have been primed with power.

2.5.2 The power and affiliation motives in conflicts and crises

Previous research has not examined the power motive in negotiations. As described in Chapter 2.3, the implicit power motive has been linked only to competitive games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma game or Con game. Also, the role of the explicit affiliation motive in
negotiations has not been addressed. Nevertheless, some research has examined the role of these two motives in an area closely related to negotiations: Political crises often encompass or are accompanied by negotiations. Thus, in the following section, I will describe research on the power and affiliation motives in the context of political crises by Winter (1993, 2007) and Langner and Winter (2001).

Winter (1993) examined the effects of the power and affiliation motives on political crises and conflicts. To do so, he scored British sovereign's speeches and analyzed the effects of the power and affiliation motives on war entry. He found that the implicit power motivation of British sovereigns was significantly higher in years in which Britain was at war than in its peaceful years. A descriptive tendency showed that the implicit affiliation motive was higher during peaceful years compared with war years. To be able to causally attribute war entry to the implicit power and affiliation motives, Winter (1993) analyzed only speeches given prior to the breakout of war either in the same year or 1 to 5 years before the war erupted. A difference score computed between the implicit power and affiliation motives was significantly higher in the years in which Britain entered a war and 1 year prior to war entry compared with completely peaceful years. This same difference was significantly lower 1 year before Britain ended a war compared with when it did not end a war.

In a similar manner, Winter (1993) analyzed letters written during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The difference score computed between the power and affiliation motives significantly decreased over the course of the crisis. By contrast, during another political crisis that led to World War I, the opposite pattern appeared: The difference between the power and affiliation motives significantly increased over the course of the crisis.

In the same vein, Langner and Winter (2001) analyzed why some crises escalate to war and others don't by highlighting the role of concessions in international crises. The authors selected official government public statements or government-to-government communications about international crises, such as the Munich Crisis, the Poland Crisis, the Bay of Pigs Crisis, and the Cuban Missile Crisis and analyzed them with regard to implicit power and affiliation motive content. They found that the implicit power motive in these documents was negatively
correlated with positive concessions in international crises but positively correlated with negative concessions, whereas for the implicit affiliation motive, the opposite pattern appeared.

In a second study, Langner and Winter (2001) varied the affiliation or power content of a letter written by Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis and asked participants to write an answer letter. The authors found that participants receiving a letter with affiliation content answered with high affiliation and low power imagery, whereas participants receiving a letter with power content showed the opposite pattern. As in the archival study, they found that participants’ power motive was significantly associated with negative concessions, whereas participants’ affiliation motive was significantly associated with positive concessions.

In a more recent study, Winter (2007) analyzed eight pairs of international crises of which one led to war and one led to peace. Documents such as diplomatic exchanges, speeches, statements, and broadcast commentaries were coded for the Big Three motives. The implicit power motive was higher in six of the eight crises that led to war compared with the crises that led to peace. The implicit affiliation motive was lower in five of the eight crises that led to war compared with the crises that led to peace, although, in contrast to the implicit power motive, there was no significant effect in an overall analysis of all eight crises.

2.5.3 Experimental paradigms and settings in negotiation research

In this chapter, I will present different experimental paradigms and settings that have been used in the study of negotiations. On the basis of this overview, I will explain why I implemented a virtual salary negotiation in the current work.

For a long time, research did not examine real-life negotiations but instead concentrated on competitive games among which the most prominent are the Chicken game, the Dictator game, the Con game, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Christie & Geis, 1970; Komorita & Parks, 1995; cf. Pruitt, 1981, 1998; cf. Rubin & Brown, 1975; cf. Chapter 2.3). The clear structure of these games, which include predetermined payoffs for certain actions, surely
allows the best control of most environmental factors (Gelfand et al., 2010; Rubin & Brown, 1975). But obviously, the practical relevance and external validity are reduced (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977).

In more recent research, the focus of game theory has changed from actual moves of negotiators in the above-mentioned games to their mental models about the game and how exactly they define, create, and perceive the game (cf. Bazerman et al., 2000; Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). According to Carnevale and Pruitt (1992), like negotiations, competitive games involve opposing interests, but subjects are usually not allowed to communicate, and this is the major difference between games and negotiations.

In recent years, the focus of research has shifted to simulated real-life negotiations that, for the most part, are conducted virtually (De Dreu, 1996; De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Hareli, David, Akron, & Hess, 2013; Johnson & Cooper, 2009; Nadler & Shestowsky, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006). There is research that has reported no differences in integrative agreement between face-to-face and virtual negotiation (Schweitzer, Brodt, & Croson, 2002; Suh, 1999). But there is also research that has found advantages in either virtual or face-to-face negotiations: Croson (1999) found that the final negotiation agreement reached in a virtual negotiation was more integrative than in a face-to-face negotiation. In addition, agreements in virtual negotiations have been found to be more equal than agreements reached in face-to-face negotiations (Bazerman et al., 2000; Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & McGuire, 1986). On the other hand, research has demonstrated that virtual negotiations result in lower profits than face-to-face negotiations (Arunachalam & Dilla, 1995; Croson, 1999; Moore, Kurtzberg, & Thompson, 1999; Stuhlmacher & Citera, 2005; Valley, Moag, & Bazerman, 1998) and suffer from higher rates of breakdown (Croson, 1999).

To sum up, the focus of research has shifted from competitive games to simulated real-life negotiations. Among these simulated real-life negotiations, research has shown inconsistent results with regard to whether face-to-face or virtual negotiations yield better results. Nevertheless, conducting a virtual salary negotiation that is not face-to-face but computer-mediated has two main advantages: First, it means that the negotiation procedure
can be standardized and environmental stimuli can be controlled for. Second, virtual negotiations represent a fruitful research area because they have great practical relevance (see Chapter 2.5.4) and will gain importance in current and future work environments (Arunachalam & Dilla, 1995; Barefoot & Strickland, 1982; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, & Thompson; Nadler & Shestowsky, 2006; Naquin & Paulson, 2003; Purdy, Nye, & Balakrishnan, 2000).

2.5.4 Salary negotiations

As already hinted at in Chapter 2.5, negotiations can occur in any conceivable context. According to Pruitt and Carnevale (1993, as cited in Gelfand et al., 2010), a distinction can be made between informal arenas and formal arenas. Informal arenas encompass interpersonal relations with friends and relatives, whereas formal arenas encompass international, industrial, and manager-subordinate relations. Thus, salary negotiations are surely allocated to the formal arena.

In the following section, I will exemplarily and briefly present different research questions that have been addressed with the help of salary negotiations. Then I will introduce applied research on salary negotiations to outline their relevance in practical contexts. Finally, I will describe findings on gender because gender has been the most thoroughly studied variable in the context of salary negotiations in recent years. Moreover, I will argue that although gender has considerable effects on salary requests, it is not believed to be confounded with the implicit power motive.

The paradigm of a salary negotiation has been used to explore a diversity of research questions: To name only a few, research has addressed effects of psychological distance on integrative negotiation outcomes (Giacomantonio, De Dreu, & Mannetti, 2010), the role of negotiator focus in satisfaction with negotiation outcomes (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), and the effect of first offers on negotiation outcomes (Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Husted Medvec, 2002).
Most research on salary negotiations in practice has examined their effects on the starting salaries of job candidates. Marks and Harold (2011) found that, across industrial branches, participants were able to increase their starting salary by an average of $5,000 through negotiation. Moreover, the authors showed that participants who used competing (high concern for their own outcome) or collaborating (high concern for their own outcome and the other’s outcome) styles further increased their starting salary compared with those who used other styles delineated from the dual concern model described in Chapter 2.5. Other styles are the compromising style (some level of concern for one’s own outcome and the other’s outcome) and the accommodating style (high concern for the other’s outcome and low concern for one’s own outcome).

O'Shea and Bush (2002) compared job candidates who either did or did not negotiate their starting salary. The authors found that participants who negotiated had an average difference between the initial salary offer and their actual starting salary of $1,500. By contrast, for participants who did not negotiate, this difference was negligible. Moreover, the authors found that women engaged in a negotiation as often as men and were as successful as men in terms of the resulting starting salary. Gerhart and Rynes (1991) found differences between women and men who negotiated their starting salary: Women who negotiated their starting salary received only a 2.7% salary increase due to this negotiation, whereas men received a 4.3% increase due to negotiation.

Also in laboratory settings, gender is one of the variables that has been studied most thoroughly in the context of negotiations (Stuhlmacher, 1998, 1999; Thompson et al., 2010). An effect reported in several studies is that women pay more attention to the framing of a negotiation situation and consequently often pursue a tactic of impression management (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Rudman & Glick, 1999; Rudman & Phelan, 2010; Tinsley, Cheldelin, Kupfer Schneider, and Amanatullah, 2009; Wade, 2001).

Amanatullah and Morris (2010) hypothesized that women would engage in impression management out of a fear that they would be socially sanctioned if they behaved too
assertively in a negotiation for themselves. Accordingly, Amanatullah and Morris (2010) found that women requested a significantly lower salary than men when negotiating for themselves. By contrast, when they negotiated for another person, they did not request a lower salary. Moreover, the authors found an explanation for this differential female behavior: Women fear social sanctions as a reaction to their assertive behavior. That is why they show fear of anticipated social backlash only when they negotiate for themselves but not when they negotiate for another person. Consequently, they request a lower salary when they negotiate for themselves than when they negotiate for another person.

In another study by Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013), participants were assigned the role of hiring manager and told they had to negotiate against a job candidate who was negotiating either for her own salary or for another person’s salary. In addition, the gender and the assertiveness of the negotiation style of the negotiation partner were manipulated. Participants were then asked to judge the backlash they would show toward their negotiation partner. Again, more backlash was expressed toward women who assertively negotiated their own salary. In addition, the authors found that female negotiators were also punished with social backlash if they nonassertively negotiated for another person. In a second study, Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013) found that assertive self-advocating women were attributed negative masculine traits (e.g., arrogance or entitlement), whereas nonassertive other-advocating women were attributed negative feminine traits (e.g., weakness).

In accordance, Bowles, Babcock, and Lai (2007) found that, compared with men, women were punished more for initiating negotiations and were usually not hired. In a second study, the authors found that both women and men were less willing to work with women who initiated negotiations compared with women who did not. No such effect was found for men. In a third study, results showed that, compared with men, women were less inclined to initiate negotiations when judged by external male evaluators. If external evaluators were female, no such effect was found.

In light of these gender differences in salary negotiations, the question that arises is whether these differences can be attributed to women and men’s power motives. But research
suggests that the power motive is not supposed to be linked to these gender effects in negotiations: Research has not shown systematic differences between women and men in the power motive (Winter, 1988; Winter & Stewart, 1976), and thus, it presumably does not constitute a causal variable that is linked to these gender differences in negotiation performance. Nevertheless, there are supposed to be similarities in the behavior of women and individuals who are low on the power motive: Like women, individuals who are low on the power motive have learned to associate negative reactions from their social environment with their own assertive actions (see Chapters 2.3 and 3 for hypotheses).

To sum up, research on salary negotiations can be considered a good indicator of research on negotiations in general: Across personality variables and contexts, salary negotiations have proven to deliver generalizable findings. Moreover, as described in Chapter 2.5.3, the research focus has shifted from competitive games to simulated real-life negotiations. Therefore, in the present thesis, I focused on a virtual salary negotiation because it could be considered an established paradigm that has demonstrated effectiveness from a content-related as well as from a methodological viewpoint.
The present research was aimed at examining the roles of affiliation and power in negotiations, which constitute a typical and long-established form of social interaction (Rubin & Brown, 1975). Accordingly, the two most important social motives—affiliation and power—are supposed to play an important role. On the one hand, negotiations typically involve dominance and can therefore be better understood when considering the desire to exert influence over others and to avoid being influenced by others. On the other hand, negotiations can be considered an occasion to implement one’s desire for a friendly interaction, a characteristic constituent of the affiliation motive.

Nevertheless, until now, research has not considered the role of these two important motives in negotiations. The implicit power motive has mainly been researched in the realm of competitions (cf. Chapter 2.3) and in the context of international crises (cf. Chapter 2.5.2). In negotiations, research has explored only the effects of enhanced power in certain instances. Nevertheless, theoretical parallels between individuals who hold power in certain instances and individuals with a high implicit power motive can be derived: Both are supposed to show approach-oriented behavior in terms of demanding requests in negotiations (cf. Chapter 2.5.1). Therefore, to address these gaps in previous research, in Study 1, I examined the role of the implicit power motive in a salary negotiation as a special form of negotiation. Salary negotiations have been shown to be a useful paradigm for studying different research questions and have great relevance for actual starting salaries (cf. Chapter 2.5.4). Offers in negotiations have been shown to serve as an anchor for subsequent counteroffers and to be a good indicator of the final agreed-upon outcome (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Therefore, I used salary requests as an indicator of negotiation performance.

The role of the interaction between the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive has yet to be examined in the context of salary negotiations as well. Research has examined interactive effects between other implicit and explicit motives (cf. Chapter 2.2.6), but rarely has it considered their effects on behavioral outcomes (e.g., salary requests in a
The present research and the main hypotheses

Moreover, until now, research has mainly focused on implicit and explicit motives with the same motive content and has examined whether congruence yields positive effects and discrepancies yield negative effects on several dependent variables (cf. Chapter 2.2.6). On the basis of the hitherto untested expectation that discrepancies between implicit and different explicit motives should lead to compromise behavior and declines in performance (cf. Chapter 2.2.5), I examined the roles of the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive in a salary negotiation in Study 2.

Until now, research has rarely considered the role of combined effects of aroused implicit and explicit motives: To my knowledge, research has only dealt with the effects of an arousal of the implicit achievement motive in combination with the dispositional explicit achievement motive (cf. Chapter 2.2.6). Therefore, building on Study 2, in Study 3, I examined effects of a manifest behavioral conflict (Kehr, 2004b; cf. Chapter 2.2.5), that is, an arousal of the implicit power motive as well as an arousal of the explicit affiliation motive.

Summing up, in the present research, I utilized the paradigm of a virtual salary negotiation to study the implicit power motive, which has not yet been studied in the context of salary negotiations (Study 1). In addition, I considered combined effects of the dispositional implicit power and explicit affiliation motives (Study 2) and combined effects of the aroused implicit power and explicit affiliation motives (Study 3) in salary negotiations.

I will now give an overview of the aims and the course of these three studies.

The aim of Study 1 was to examine the effect of the implicit power motive on salary requests in a negotiation for oneself or for another person. A classical salary negotiation for oneself is supposed to contain task incentives for the implicit power motive (cf. Chapter 2.2.2). Therefore, individuals high on the implicit power motive should request a higher salary than individuals low on the implicit power motive. This could be due to early socialization experiences. According to McClelland and Pilon (1983), a low implicit power motive can result from a socialization that is characterized by parents' low permissiveness with respect to their children's self-assertive acts. Thus, as adults, these individuals who are low on the implicit
power motive may have learned not to enjoy asserting themselves. Conversely, to be assertive for another person, instead of being assertive for oneself, should lead to the opposite behavioral pattern. Participants low on the implicit power motive should not refrain from being assertive for another person: This kind of behavior—in contrast to self-assertive behavior—is usually not negatively sanctioned (cf. Chapter 2.5.4). Therefore, in a negotiation for another person, individuals low on the implicit power motive would not be expected to request a lower salary than individuals high on the implicit power motive. Putting together the theoretical assumptions of both negotiation conditions (i.e., negotiating for oneself and for another person), I tested the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1**: Negotiation condition will moderate the relation between the implicit power motive and salary request. The implicit power motive will predict salary requests in a negotiation for oneself, whereas it will not predict salary requests in a negotiation for another person.

Study 2 was conducted to examine the interactive effect of negotiation condition, the implicit power motive, and the explicit affiliation motive on salary requests. As mentioned above, power and affiliation are supposed to have opposing effects on behavior. More concretely, McAdams (1985) stated that “affiliation motivation can act as a check on the power motive by channeling concerns for control and influence in prosocial, nurturant directions” (Winter, 2007, p. 921). In particular, motives in their explicit form can steer implicit motives (cf. Chapter 2.2.5). Therefore, I examined the combined effects of the explicit affiliation motive and the implicit power motive on salary requests.

In a classical salary negotiation for oneself in which assertion and dominance over another person is the focus, I expected the explicit affiliation motive to conflict with the implicit power motive (cf. Chapter 5.1). The main reason for this expected pattern was that individuals high on the implicit power motive are likely to compete in negotiations (cf. Chapter 2.3), whereas individuals high on the explicit affiliation motive are likely to cooperate (cf. Chapter 2.4). Moreover, assertive acts for oneself are often penalized by the social environment
The present research and the main hypotheses

(Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; McClelland & Pilon, 1983). Therefore, when being assertive for oneself, a friendly interaction is less likely to develop. Thus, I expected negative effects on salary requests when both motives were high.

By contrast, a negotiation for another person is supposed to be considered a more mature form of behavior (McClelland, 1975; Sears, 1961; Winter, 1991), and assertive behavior should therefore be socially penalized less than in a negotiation for oneself (Batson, 1987). Therefore, social exclusion as a response to assertive behavior is less likely to occur, and individuals high on the affiliation motive should consequently not refrain from being assertive in fear of this exclusion (cf. Chapter 2.4). In short, this special negotiation situation is supposed to better correspond to the goals and values of individuals high on the explicit affiliation motive (cf. Chapter 2.4). Again, I expected combined effects of the implicit power and explicit affiliation motives on salary requests. In contrast to the negotiation for oneself, I expected the two motives not to act against each other but to work together in predicting performance.

Summarizing the theoretical assumptions behind both negotiation conditions, I expected a three-way interaction between negotiation condition, the implicit power motive, and the explicit affiliation motive. I therefore tested the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2:** The interaction between negotiation condition, the implicit power motive, and the explicit affiliation motive will predict salary requests in that the explicit affiliation motive will differentially moderate the relation between the implicit power motive and salary requests in the two negotiation conditions. A high implicit power motive in combination with a low explicit affiliation motive will lead to higher salary requests in a negotiation for oneself than in a negotiation for another person. A high implicit power motive in combination with a high explicit affiliation motive will lead to higher salary requests in a negotiation for another person than in a negotiation for oneself. A low implicit power motive in combination with a high explicit affiliation motive as well as a low implicit power motive in combination with a low explicit affiliation motive will not differentially affect salary requests in the two negotiation conditions.
In Study 3, the hypotheses from Study 1 and Study 2 were extended to the effects of actual motivation (i.e., aroused implicit and explicit motives; cf. Chapter 2.1). In the two experimental conditions, either the implicit power and explicit affiliation motives or only the implicit power motive were aroused, whereas in the control condition, no motive arousal occurred. I tested the following hypothesis, which is analogous to the hypothesis from Study 1:

**Hypothesis 3.** Participants whose implicit power motive is aroused will request a higher salary than participants in the control condition.

As in Study 2, I expected that the situational arousal of both the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive would lead to performance declines (i.e., lower salary requests) as compared with a situation in which only the implicit power motive was aroused. I therefore tested the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 4.** Participants whose implicit power motive is aroused will request a higher salary when their explicit affiliation motive is not aroused than when it is aroused.

4 Study 1: The role of the implicit power motive in a negotiation for oneself and for another person

4.1 Introduction

The implicit power motive influences the outcomes of power-related tasks (McClelland et al., 1989) and is aroused in competitions (Schultheiss et al., 1999; Stanton & Schultheiss, 2007). Salary negotiations are competitive situations; however, surprisingly, research has not yet examined the role of the implicit power motive in this kind of situation. Because salary negotiations provide numerous task incentives that are apt to arouse the implicit power motive, it should play an important role in negotiation performance. In particular, a negotiation for oneself constitutes a classical dominance situation and should therefore arouse the implicit
power motive. This arousal should be reflected through assertive acts during the negotiation such as high salary requests. Accordingly, individuals high on the implicit power motive should request a higher salary than individuals low on the implicit power motive.

But what is the reason that individuals low on the power motive would refrain from being assertive in a salary negotiation for themselves? According to McClelland (1987), socialization plays an important role in the development of the implicit power motive, and individuals low on the implicit power motive may not have learned to enjoy asserting themselves due to their parents’ low permissiveness concerning sex and aggression (McClelland & Pilon, 1983; cf. Chapter 2.3). Thus, according to McClelland and Pilon (1983), individuals low on the implicit power motive may have learned that their social environment reacts negatively to assertive and powerful acts. Accordingly, classical dominance situations do not provide task incentives for them: Instead of enjoying the influence over another person, they fear social sanctions and therefore refrain from self-assertion. In terms of Keltner and colleagues’ (2003) model (cf. Chapter 2.5.1), they are attentive to threats and inhibit their behavior in favor of situational constraints (i.e., they align their behavior with the demands of the other negotiator). Consequently, they should request a lower salary than individuals high on the implicit power motive.

McClelland and Pilon’s study (1983) did not address parents’ reactions to their children’s assertive behavior on behalf of another person and the effects on their respective power motive scores as adults. Batson’s (1987) empathy-altruism hypothesis delivers a potential clue to the socialization processes that occur in reaction to assertive behavior on behalf of another person. According to Batson’s hypothesis, individuals expect to be rewarded when they help others. In addition, assertiveness for another person is considered a more mature and socially acceptable form of behavior than assertiveness for oneself (McClelland, 1975; Sears, 1961; Winter, 1991). Analogous to what McClelland and Pilon (1983) found, individuals may generally learn during socialization that assertiveness for another person is linked to positive reactions from the social environment. In terms of Keltner and colleagues’ (2003) model (cf.
Chapter 2.5.1), there are no social threats or situational constraints to cause individuals with a low implicit power motive to align their behavior with the demands of the situation in general or with the demands of the other negotiator in particular.

In other words, individuals who are low as well as those who are high on the power motive presumably do not fear social sanctions and therefore do not refrain from being assertive for another person. Consequently, assertive behavior for another person, in contrast to assertive behavior for oneself, is not a factor that is supposed to explain differences in adults’ power motive scores (cf. Chapter 3). Thus, regardless of whether an individual is high or low on the implicit power motive, they should request an equally high salary in a negotiation for another person. I therefore tested the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 1:* Negotiation condition will moderate the relation between the implicit power motive and salary request. The implicit power motive will predict salary requests in a negotiation for oneself, whereas it will not predict salary requests in a negotiation for another person.

To assess the implicit power motive, I implemented a method introduced by Langer and Winter (2001). In contrast to the PSE, it does not provide pictorial stimuli to assess the Big Three motives but instead involves a stimulus in the form of a letter that is specifically designed to assess the implicit power and affiliation motives (cf. Chapters 2.2.1 and 2.5.1).

To implement a negotiation situation that is as close to real-life negotiations as possible but simultaneously realizable in a laboratory setting, I chose to adapt a salary negotiation designed by Amanatullah and Morris (2010). This negotiation is especially compelling as it enables student participants to empathize with the role of a university alumnus who is currently searching for a job. To enhance the authenticity of the situation, this includes the exchange of text messages and additionally requires sending a picture and several voice messages. At the same time, it allows a high degree of standardization because participants all experience the same interaction with the negotiation partner: As in Amanatullah and Morris’ (2010) study,
the photograph of the negotiation partner was taken beforehand, his answers were prerecorded by an experimental confederate, and his offers were the same for all participants and involved the same figures as in Amanatullah and Morris’ (2010) study.

4.2 Method

Participants. I performed a power analysis using G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2007). Due to the absence of studies on effects of implicit motives on negotiation performance, I estimated the expected effect size on the basis of more general findings. For example, Wegner and colleagues (2015) found an effect of the implicit affiliation motive of \( R^2 = 0.13 \) on verbal behavior, which corresponds to a medium effect size. Therefore, I used a slightly more conservative estimate of \( R^2 = 0.10 \). Hence, a sample size of 100 participants was required to yield a power of 80%. Cohen (1992) proposed a power of 80% as a convention for general use: A larger value would result in a sample size exceeding the investigator’s resources, whereas a smaller value would increase the Type II error rate for rejecting a false null hypothesis. To account for experimental dropout inherent in the experimental paradigm (see Negotiation performance), I recruited 126 participants enrolled at Technische Universität München, who participated in exchange for course credit.

Because I decided to use the salary that was demanded in the final negotiation round as the dependent variable (see Negotiation performance), data from 30 participants were not used in further analyses because they did not negotiate for all five rounds. Six participants discovered that they were negotiating with a computer and were therefore excluded. Because they were supposed to be interacting with another person, it was crucial that participants started on time and that there were no technical problems that would have led to a delay in the time of the interaction. To ensure that problems in the experimental flow such as these did not threaten the cover story of there being a real interaction partner, seven additional participants had to be excluded. Thus, data from 83 participants were analyzed further (47 female, \( M_{\text{age}} = 24.89, \text{SD}_{\text{age}} = 3.76 \)).
Procedure. Participants registered to participate via an online platform at least 24 h before the respective experimental session. When arriving at the laboratory, they signed an informed consent form and were seated at an individual computer workspace. The whole study was conducted on this computer. First, participants had to read some general instructions: They were informed that their data would be analyzed anonymously, they were asked to switch off their mobile phones, and they were given information about the experiment (i.e., the cover story). The cover story was that the aim of the study was to examine how communication via letters, text messages, and audio messages would influence interaction outcomes in comparison with real face-to-face interactions.

Then, the implicit power motive was assessed using the same procedure used in Langner and Winter (2001). Participants read a brief Historical Background to the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Langner and Winter’s (2001) original text was translated into German by a native speaker (Appendix A “Historical background of the Cuban Missile Crisis”). Then participants read an abbreviated version of the original letter from Premier Nikita Khrushchev to the American President John F. Kennedy, written on October 26 (official German translation from Greiner, 1988, p. 319ff). Participants were asked to imagine that they were an advisor to John F. Kennedy and had to write an answer letter on his behalf. After 15 min, participants were informed that they should finish their letters within 5 min. After 20 min, they were asked to finish their letter and were thanked for writing it. Participants were then introduced to the general procedure for the computerized negotiation and shown exactly the same information as in Amanatullah and Morris’s (2010) study: They were told that the aim of the study was to examine the role of different kinds of communication media in negotiations. Participants were led to believe that they would be randomly assigned to one of two roles in a salary negotiation, either the applicant or the hiring manager, and that a random decision would determine who would start the negotiation. In fact, participants negotiated against a computer and were always assigned the role of the applicant. The negotiation was always started by the computer. Two negotiation conditions existed: Either participants negotiated their own salary (Appendix
C “Role description for the negotiation for oneself”) or they were asked to negotiate the salary for another person (Appendix D “Role description for the negotiation for another person”).

A photo of the participants was taken with the computer’s webcam, and they were asked to type in a nickname because both pieces of information would be presented to their counterpart directly before the beginning of the negotiation. Participants then read the applicant’s respective role description. They were then presented their counterpart’s name and photo. The fictitious counterpart always made a low first offer accompanied by a voice message with a brief explanation for the offer. This and all other voice messages that were supposedly recorded by the hiring manager were prerecorded by an experimental confederate. If participants did not choose to accept the first offer, they were asked to type in a counteroffer and explain it in a voice message that they chose from a list of five options. The limited list of choices was needed so that the prerecorded responses of the confederate would make sense. Thus, participants had to choose one of the standard answers and read it aloud to record it with the computer’s headset. If they decided to accept the hiring manager’s offer, they had to choose and record an explanation for this decision as well. In this case, the negotiation was over. As long as participants declined the hiring manager’s offers, the negotiation continued in this manner up to a maximum of five rounds.

After finishing the negotiation, the UMS (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012) were administered to assess participants’ explicit motives.1 Finally, the control items and biographical data were assessed, and participants were thanked and debriefed.

Implicit motives. All participants wrote their letter on the computer using Inquisit 3.0 (Millisecond Software, Seattle, WA). The letters were content-coded for the implicit power motive using Winter’s (1994) Manual for Scoring Motive Imagery in Running Text by a trained

1 As control scales, the Flow Short Scale (Vollmeyer, Rheinberg, & Engeser, 2003) and the 10-item Big Five Inventory (BFI; Rammstedt, 2007) were administered. They are not described further because they are not important for the analyses in Study 1.
Study 1: The role of the implicit power motive in a negotiation for oneself and for another person

and independent scorer who was blind to the hypotheses. According to the manual, power imagery is scored whenever a story character shows a concern about having an impact on others through strong and forceful actions that control, influence, help, impress, or elicit strong emotions in others. In addition, in accordance with Winter’s (1994) recommendations, a second scorer scored 58% of all letters. The Intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was used to determine Interrater reliability with the following formula: \[ \frac{\text{MS (between raters)} - \text{MS (within raters)}}{\text{MS (between raters)} + \text{MS (within raters)}} \]. The interrater reliability for the implicit power motive was 78%, which is considered excellent reliability (Meyer, Hilsenroth, Baxter, Exner, Fowler, Piers, & Resnick, 2002; Rawolle, Schultheiss, & Schultheiss, 2013). Scoring disagreements were resolved in the subsequent session by discussing the issues and finding a joint solution. The scores from these joint solutions were used as participants’ final scores.

PSE protocol length \((M = 260.20, SD = 95.80)\) was significantly correlated with participants’ overall implicit power motive score \((M = 3.96, SD = 1.80)\), \(r = .73, p < .001\). Therefore, I corrected the power motive score for protocol length with regression and converted the residuals to z-scores.

**Negotiation variables.** Prior to beginning the negotiation, participants were asked to indicate their prenegotiation aspirations such as reservation point, target point, anticipated opening offer, and fear of anticipated social backlash. All these variables were assessed to maximize comparability to the study conducted by Amanatullah and Morris (2010). To indicate their reservation point, participants were asked to type in an annual salary figure [in Euro]: “What is the lowest salary you are willing to accept [for your friend] in this negotiation? In other words, what is the least you would agree [for your friend] to earn at Alpha before choosing [advising your friend] to take the alternative job offer at Lambda?” They were asked to indicate their target point [in Euro]: What is the highest salary that you will strive to get [for your friend] in this negotiation? In other words, what is the ideal salary you want Alpha to agree to pay [your friend]?” To measure participants’ anticipated opening offer, they were asked: “If you are
given the opportunity to make the first offer in this negotiation, how much will you suggest Alpha to pay for your [as your friend’s] salary?”

I expected that the implicit power motive would not predict the variables reservation point, target point, or anticipated opening offer, indicating that participants with different levels of implicit power motive do not differ in their levels of explicit entitlement (see Chapter 4.3.1).

The fear of anticipated social backlash consisted of two items taken from Amanatullah and Morris (2010). The first item was “How much do you think you can reasonably ask for without the hiring manager’s perceiving you to be a pushy person?” The second item was “How much do you think you can reasonably ask for without causing the hiring manager to punish you for being too demanding?” The two items were again translated into German by a native speaker. As the two items are highly correlated ($r = .74, p < .01$), I computed their mean and named it *anticipated backlash*. The role of anticipated backlash will be further described in the further analyses section (Chapter 4.3.3).

**Negotiation performance.** I expected participants’ implicit power motive to be optimally aroused during the last negotiation round. Although there may be a consummatory effect due to the implicit motive assessment (cf. Chapter 2.2.1), on the basis of research on testosterone changes during competitions, I expected the implicit power motive to be aroused if individuals felt their own impact on others. Consequently, the implicit power motive should be aroused more the longer the negotiation continued. In accordance, Schultheiss and colleagues (1999) found that testosterone levels after a 10-min competition were significantly associated with the implicit power motive (cf. Chapter 2.3). Similarly, Gladue, Boechler, and McCaul (1989) found that the testosterone levels of individuals rose during a competition that lasted 25 min.

Thus, I expected that the effects of the implicit power motive on the salary negotiation, which took between 20 and 25 min in the current study, would also be most pronounced toward the end of the negotiation.

Consequently, the salary demanded in the final negotiation round was used as the dependent variable to assess negotiation performance and was subsequently named *salary*
request. Although requests in a negotiation do not represent the actual outcome of a negotiation, requests were chosen as a reliable proxy. Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) and Schaerer, Schwab, and Galinsky (2015) found that higher requests over the course of a negotiation do indeed lead to better negotiation outcomes.

Explicit motives. To assess explicit motives, I used the 30-item version of the UMS (UMS 6; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012) with 18 statements and 12 goals. The UMS 6 measures the explicit achievement, affiliation, and power motives. In the current study, only the explicit affiliation motive was analyzed. Participants rated their agreement with the 18 statements on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Accordingly, participants rated the importance of 12 goals on a scale ranging from 1 (not important) to 6 (extremely important). Schönbrodt and Gerstenberg (2012) reported values of Cronbach's alpha comparable to those from the Personality Research Form (PRF; Jackson, 1984). For the explicit power motive, Cronbach's alpha was .92 (compared with .90 for the PRF). In the current study, Cronbach's alpha for the explicit power motive was .85.

Control items. Afterwards, as in Amanatullah and Morris' (2010) study, participants were asked to rate the competitiveness of their negotiation style on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal). I expected that the implicit power motive would not predict differences in the self-rated competitiveness of negotiation style because the implicit power motive is not accessible to consciousness and is therefore not likely to predict questionnaire measures (cf. McClelland et al., 1989; Stanton, Hall, & Schultheiss, 2010). Moreover, participants were asked to rate their general assertiveness (self-rated assertiveness) on a scale ranging from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high). I expected that the implicit power motive would not predict levels of general assertiveness for the same reason as for the self-rated competitiveness of negotiation style.

Participants were then asked to speculate about the aim of the study. After I collected their biographical data, participants were thanked and debriefed orally. If they suspected that
they had not negotiated against a real negotiation partner, their data were excluded from the analyses (see above).

4.3 Results

4.3.1 Preliminary analyses

The age of the participants had no significant effect on salary request, $b = 85.83$, $SE = 142.42$, $t(82) = 0.60$, $r = .07$, $p = .548$. Gender had a marginally significant effect on salary request, $b = -1846.34$, $SE = 1056.05$, $t(45) = -1.75$, $r = .19$, $p = .084$. As research has shown that gender influences salary requests in a negotiation for oneself, I tested for this effect: Indeed, gender had an effect on salary request in the negotiation for oneself, $b = 3273.08$, $SE = 1377.55$, $t(45) = -2.38$, $r = .34$, $p = .022$. In this negotiation condition, women ($M = 37,726.92$, $SD = 2,489.91$) requested a significantly lower salary than men ($M = 41,000.00$, $SD = 6,443.58$). Gender did not predict the salary request in the negotiation for another person, $b = -78.57$, $SE = 1582.90$, $t(82) = -0.50$, $r = .01$, $p = .961$.

I examined the associations between the implicit power motive and the prenegotiation variables. As described in Chapter 4.2, reservation point, target point, and anticipated opening offer were assessed. The effect of the implicit power motive on reservation point was marginally significant, $b = -682.93$, $SE = 404.96$, $t(82) = -1.69$, $r = .18$, $p = .096$. The implicit power motive did not predict target point, $b = -313.98$, $SE = 494.69$, $t(82) = -0.65$, $r = .07$, $p = .521$, or anticipated opening offer, $b = -7.75$, $SE = 504.09$, $t(82) = -0.15$, $r = .00$, $p = .988$, thus implying that individuals who are high on the power motive do not differ in their explicit level of entitlement from those who are low. The implicit power motive did not predict fear of anticipated social backlash, $b = -500.62$, $SE = 476.05$, $t(82) = -1.05$, $r = .12$, $p = .296$.

The implicit power motive did not predict participants’ self-judged competitiveness, $b = -0.06$, $SE = 0.14$, $t(82) = 0.46$, $r = .05$, $p = .648$, or their self-rated assertiveness, $b = 0.17$, $SE = 0.12$, $t(82) = 1.39$, $r = .15$, $p = .169$. 
The correlations between all variables are displayed in Table 1. For all further analyses, the independent variables were z-standardized. The dependent variable salary request and the fear of anticipated social backlash were not z-standardized for reasons of better interpretability.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intercorrelations between Variables in Study 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Salary request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Negotiation condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. nPow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Anticipated backlash</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. N = 83. Salary request = salary request from the final negotiation round; nPow = implicit need for power corrected for the number of words; Anticipated backlash = fear of anticipated social backlash.

**p < .01.

4.3.2 Moderation analysis

To test Hypothesis 1, which predicted that negotiation condition would moderate the relation between the implicit power motive and salary request, I conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis. The first step included the implicit power motive and the dummy-coded negotiation condition variable. The second step additionally comprised their
multiplicative interaction term, which was significant, $F(3, 79) = 2.96, p = .037; R^2 = .10; \beta = -.35, t(83) = -2.57, p = .012^2$ (see Table 2).

Table 2

*Standardized Coefficients Predicting Salary Requests in an HMRA: nPow (Step 1), nPow and Negotiation condition (Step 2), nPow x Negotiation Condition (Step 3)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Salary request</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta$ Step 1</td>
<td>$\beta$ Step 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nPow</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation condition</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nPow x Negotiation Condition</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.35*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta R^2$</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta F$</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>6.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. $N = 83$. Salary request = salary request from the final negotiation round; nPow = implicit need for power corrected for the number of words.

* $p < .05.$

To further explore the nature of this interaction, I calculated the predicted values for salary request using regression slopes from the final regression equation at values of 1 SD above and below the respective means (cf. Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Figure 2 illustrates that negotiation condition moderated the relation between implicit power motive and salary request, indicating that in a negotiation for oneself, the implicit power motive positively

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2 Because gender has been shown to significantly affect salary requests (cf. Amanatullah & Morris, 2010) and because it had different effects in the two negotiation conditions in the present study as well (cf. Chapter 4.3.1), I controlled for it. I performed the same hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis described above with the only difference being that I entered gender in the first step. The results were significant, $F(4, 78) = 3.92, p = .006; R^2 = .17; \beta = -.42, t(83) = -3.12, p = .003$. The simple slope analysis also showed the same pattern of results.
predicted salary requests, $b = 2479.31$, $t(79) = 2.32$, $p = .023$. By contrast, in a negotiation for another person, the implicit power motive did not predict salary requests, $b = -237.48$, $t(78) = 0.45$, $p = .655$.

![Figure 2. Predicted values for salary request in the conditions negotiation for oneself and negotiation for another person depending on the implicit power motive. nPow = implicit power motive.](image)

Thus, Hypothesis 1, which proposed that negotiation condition would moderate the relation between the implicit power motive and salary request was supported.

### 4.3.3 Further Analyses

The results reported in Chapter 4.3.2 showed that the implicit power motive positively predicted salary requests for participants negotiating their own salary. I additionally tested whether the implicit power motive in this condition would account for an incremental part of the variance in the dependent variable salary request in addition to the explicit power motive. I therefore performed a hierarchical multiple regression analysis controlling for gender because gender is significantly associated with salary requests in this condition (cf. Chapter 4.3.1). Thereby, in the first step, gender was entered into the equation; in the second step, the explicit
power motive was entered; and in the last step, the implicit power motive was entered. The results showed that the implicit power motive accounted for an incremental part of the variance that was not explained by the explicit power motive, $F(3, 42) = 4.36, p = .009; R^2 = .24, \Delta R^2 = .12; \beta = .36, t(45) = 2.55, p = .015, 1-\beta = .82$. The explicit power motive did not account for differences in participants' salary requests (see Table 3).

Table 3  

*Standardized Coefficients Predicting Salary Requests in an HMRA: Gender (Step 1), sanPow (Step 2), and nPow (Step 3)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>$\beta$ Step 1</th>
<th>$\beta$ Step 2</th>
<th>$\beta$ Step 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.34*</td>
<td>-.35*</td>
<td>-.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sanPow</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nPow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta R^2$</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta F$</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>6.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 46. Salary request = salary request from the final negotiation round; sanPow = Mean scores on the explicit power motive; nPow = implicit need for power corrected for the number of words.  
*p < .05. **p < .01.*

To enhance the study’s comparability with Study 3 (Chapter 6) in which participants negotiated only for themselves and not for another person, I performed the following analyses only for participants who negotiated for themselves:

I analyzed the effects of the implicit power motive on the salary that participants actually left the negotiation with. This is the last salary that participants accepted or demanded. For this aim, 11 participants who did not negotiate for all five rounds were included in the analysis, which then comprised a total of 57 participants. The implicit power motive did not predict the
last salary participants accepted or demanded, $b = 1089.69, SE = 679.50, t(56) = 1.60, r = .38, p = .115, 1-\beta = 0.92$.

In addition, in order to further analyze the negotiation for oneself, I created a variable that captured how easily participants were willing to concede over the course of the negotiation. The negotiation ended prematurely if participants accepted a low offer from the computer or if they themselves made an offer lower than the computer’s next offer. Thus again, 11 participants who did not negotiate for all five rounds were included in the analysis, which then comprised a total of 57 participants. I computed a binary logistic regression with the two-alternative forced-choice data “gave in” coded as 1 and “did not give in” coded as 0. Thus, to analyze whether participants who were low on the implicit power motive were more likely to demand or accept a low salary than participants high on the implicit power motive, I computed a binary logistic regression with the categorical variable as the dependent variable and the implicit power motive as the independent variable. Participants low on the implicit power motive did not give in more often than participants high on the implicit power motive, $\beta = -0.52$, Wald test $\chi^2(1, N = 57) = 0.27, p = .601$.

To further examine the behavior of individuals who were low on the power motive, I examined its link to the fear of anticipated social backlash introduced by Amanatullah and Morris (2010).

According to McClelland and Pilon (1983), individuals low on the implicit power motive may have learned that their social environment reacts negatively to assertive and powerful actions (cf. Chapter 4.1). Therefore, they may have anticipated these negative social responses and reacted with a fear of anticipated social backlash (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). By contrast, as outlined in Chapter 4.1, assertive actions on behalf of others are not supposed to be punished during socialization and are therefore not supposed to be linked to the implicit power motive. Thus, individuals low on the implicit power motive should differ in their fear of
anticipated backlash and in their salary requests according to the negotiation condition they were in, whereas individuals high on the implicit power motive should not.

Thus, I expected an indirect effect of Negotiation Condition x Implicit Power Motive on salary request via anticipated backlash as this would indicate that only individuals low on the implicit power motive differed in anticipated backlash according to the negotiation condition and therefore requested a lower salary when negotiating for themselves than when negotiating for another person.

To be able to directly compare the roles of the two negotiation conditions for individuals low on the implicit power motive, I tested whether the implicit power motive would moderate the relation between negotiation condition and salary request via anticipated backlash. I conducted a moderated mediation analysis according to Hayes (2013; see Figure 3).³

³ I additionally tested a path model that contained Activity Inhibition (AI) instead of fear of anticipated social backlash. “AI represents a person’s inclination to restrain motivational and emotional impulses” (Langens, 2010, p. 107). AI is often associated with fear attributes. In the realm of the implicit power motive, these are, for example, fear of exerting power, fear of the counter-power of others, or fear of one’s power behavior failing (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2010, p. 209). None of the paths $a_1$, $a_2$, $a_3$, or $b$ were significant ($ps > .05$). Because AI was significantly correlated with word count, $r = .58$, $p < .001$, I corrected AI for word count and converted it into z-scores before entering it into the path model.
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Figure 3. Statistical model representing the moderated mediation analysis; Salary request (Y) = salary request from the final negotiation round; Anticipated backlash (M) = fear of anticipated social backlash; nPow (W) = implicit need for power corrected for the number of words; Condition (X) = negotiation condition; XW = interaction between condition and nPow.

The results indicated that the interaction between negotiation condition and implicit power motive had a significant indirect effect \((a_3 + b)\) on salary request via the mediator anticipated backlash. The direct effect disappeared \((c_3)\)\(^4\) (see Table 4).

\(^4\) As in the main analysis section, I performed the same moderated mediation analysis controlling for gender: The interaction between negotiation condition and implicit power motive also had a significant effect on salary request via the mediator anticipated backlash \((p_{a3} = .016; p_b < .001)\). In contrast to the analysis above, the direct effect was significant when gender was controlled for \((p_{c3} = .040)\).
Table 4

Model Coefficients for the Moderated Mediation Analysis Displayed in Figure 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antecedent</th>
<th>Coeff. SE</th>
<th>p</th>
<th></th>
<th>Coeff. SE</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X$ (Condition)</td>
<td>$a_1$ 1462.95 927.32 .119</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$c_1$ 660.99 892.74 .416</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$ (Anticipated backlash)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$b$ 0.590 0.107 &lt;.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$W$ (nPow)</td>
<td>$a_2$ 258.42 591.47 .663</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$W$ (nPow)</td>
<td>$a_3$ -1891.35 952.71 .051</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$c_3$ -1600.64 925.32 .088</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>$i_1$ 45045.04 618.94 .000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$i_2$ 12526.98 4839.59 .012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2 = 0.089$
$F(3, 82) = 2.56, p = .061$

$R^2 = 0.355$
$F(3, 82) = 10.71, p < .001$

Note. N = 83. Salary request = salary request from the final negotiation round, Anticipated backlash = fear of anticipated social backlash, nPow = implicit need for power corrected for the number of words, Anticipated backlash = fear of anticipated social backlash.

As displayed in Table 5, negotiation condition predicted salary requests for participants low on the implicit power motive ($W = -1$) as an indirect effect (left column). The direct effect for participants low on the implicit power motive was only marginally significant (right column).

The effect size $CJ$ was positive for participants low on the implicit power motive. Because negotiating for another person was dummy coded 1 and negotiating for oneself was dummy coded 0, this indicates that participants with a low implicit power motive ($W = -1$) negotiating for another person had significantly higher values on anticipated backlash (indicating less fear) and therefore requested a higher salary than participants who negotiated for themselves.

By contrast, participants with a high implicit power motive ($W = 1$) did not differ in anticipated backlash and in their salary requests according to the condition they were in.
**Table 5**

*Conditional Direct and Indirect Effects of Negotiation Condition on Salary Request at Values of nPow.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indirect effect</th>
<th>Direct effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W</td>
<td>GJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>1979.49</td>
<td>1979.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>863.34</td>
<td>863.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-252.82</td>
<td>-252.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 83. W = Values for the quantitative moderator nPow: Mean value of the moderator and values plus/minus 1 SD from the mean, GJ = Effect size of the conditional indirect effect of negotiation condition at values of nPow, CI = Confidence interval, \(\Theta_{x\rightarrow y}\) = Effect size of the conditional direct effect of negotiation condition at values of nPow.*

In addition to the implicit power motive, participants’ letters were coded for their two subforms: personalized and socialized power (McClelland, 1970, 1975; McClelland, Davis, Kalin, & Wanner, 1972) to test whether the personalized power motive would affect salary requests in a negotiation for oneself and whether the socialized power motive would affect salary requests in a salary negotiation for another person. This seems plausible because, according to McClelland (1975), the personalized power motive “is characterized by the dominance-submission mode: if I win, you lose” (p. 263). In personal dominance situations, people high on personalized power try to “win out over active adversaries” (McClelland, 1970, p. 36) and pursue their personal goals (McClelland et al, 1972). By contrast, people high on socialized power are well aware that “every victory means a loss for someone” (McClelland, 1970, p. 36). Thus, they are ambivalent about holding power, instead have “interest in impersonal conquests,” are concerned with “exercising influence for others” (McClelland, 1975, p. 263), and thereby use their power for the good of others (McClelland et al., 1972).

To score participants’ letters for the personalized and socialized power motives, I adopted Magee and Langner’s (2008) method. Thus, the letters were first coded according to Winter’s manual (1994). Sentences that met the criteria to be coded as one of Winter’s power
categories were then examined if they additionally met the requirements for socialized power (cf. McClelland et al., 1972). Thus, “an image was coded as socialized power motivation if it (a) involved a goal that benefits others; (b) expressed doubt about the ability to influence, control, or impress; or (c) indicated that power is dangerous, deceptive, or flawed” (Magee & Langner, 2008, p. 1550).

To enhance this study’s comparability to the study by Magee and Langner (2008), who tested effects of the personalized and socialized power motives in two different contexts, I tested whether the personalized power motive would predict the salary requests of participants who negotiated for themselves and whether the socialized power motive would have a significant effect on the salary requests of participants who negotiated for another person.

As I did with the overall implicit power motive score, I tested whether raw personalized and socialized power motive scores would be significantly correlated with word count. The PSE protocol length (M = 273.66, SD = 102.46) of participants negotiating for themselves was significantly correlated with participants’ personalized raw power motive score in the same condition (M = 3.35, SD = 1.74), r = .69, p < .001, but not with participants’ raw socialized power motive score in the same condition, (M = 0.85, SD = 0.97), r = .04, p = .77.

The PSE protocol length (M = 243.13, SD = 83.38) of participants negotiating for another person was significantly correlated with participants’ raw personalized power motive score in the same condition (M = 2.84, SD = 1.82), r = .73, p < .001, but was not significantly correlated with participants’ raw socialized power motive score in the same condition (M = 0.84, SD = 0.90), r = .06, p = .75. Thus, only the respective personalized power motive was corrected for word count in both negotiation conditions. Both power motive subforms were z-standardized.

As Magee and Langner (2008) did, I controlled for the respective other power motive subform by entering it into the hierarchical multiple regression first. Contrary to expectations, the personalized power motive did not predict the salary requests of participants who negotiated for themselves, $F(2, 43) = 1.12, p = .334$; $R^2 = .05$; $\beta = .19$, $t(46) = 1.17, p = .248$,
The socialized power had a marginally significant effect on the salary requests of participants who negotiated for another person, $F(2, 34) = 1.61, p = .216; R^2 = .09; \beta = -.33$, $t(36) = -1.78, p = .083$, $1-\beta = 0.43$.

### 4.4 Discussion Study 1

Study 1 was aimed at examining the role of the implicit power motive in negotiations for oneself and for another person. More specifically, I tested whether negotiation condition would moderate the relation between the implicit power motive and negotiation performance in terms of salary requests. As hypothesized, the implicit power motive positively predicted salary requests in the negotiation for oneself. As expected, the implicit power motive had no significant effect on salary requests in the negotiation for another person; that is, participants with a low implicit power motive and participants high on the implicit power motive showed similar behavioral patterns in this special negotiation condition. To establish an explanation for the different behavioral pattern of individuals low on the power motive in a negotiation for another person, I took into account the variable fear of anticipated social backlash. In the further analyses section, I reported the result that participants low on the power motive had more fear of anticipated social backlash in a negotiation for themselves than in a negotiation for another person and consequently request a lower salary. By contrast, individuals high on the power motive in different negotiation conditions did not differ in their fear of anticipated social backlash or in their salary requests.

Summing up, reactions and a fear of sanctions from the social environment are strong motivating forces for individuals who are low on the implicit power motive. Thus, in future research, it would be interesting to differentiate between the fear component of the implicit

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5 In the negotiation for oneself, gender had a significant effect on salary requests (cf. Chapter 4.3.1). Controlling for gender resulted in a marginally significant overall effect, $F(3, 42) = 4.11, p = .012; R^2 = .23; \beta = .29$, $t(46) = 1.97, p = .055$, $1-\beta = 0.89$. 
power motive and its hope or approach component. Until now, no systematic assessment method has existed (McClelland, 1987). McClelland (1987) described how to assess the fear of power, but his measure captures the “fear of power of others” (p. 404) and thus cannot be used to assess the fear of rejection of individuals low on the power motive. In the current study, I therefore assessed this kind of fear with items embedded in the negotiation scenario (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). In addition, I conducted an exploratory test of whether individuals’ AI, which contains power fear components (cf. Chapter 4.3.3; Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2010), would predict negotiation outcomes, but this was not the case. However, AI is conceptually different from a pure fear measure because it is entangled with motive scores expressed in imaginative material and tends to inhibit the expression of a strong implicit motive. Thus, it is also not ideal for capturing the fear associated with a low implicit power motive. It would therefore be desirable to develop and validate an instrument that can be used to distinguish between the hope and fear components of the power motive (cf. Pang, 2010, for the realm of the achievement motive).

As a control variable, the explicit power motive was assessed after the negotiation (cf. Chapter 4.2). Because the implicit power motive predicted the salary request only in the negotiation for oneself, I tested and found that the explicit power motive explained an incremental part of the variance that was not explained by the implicit power motive in this negotiation condition (Chapter 4.3.3). This result underscores the importance of carefully distinguishing between the different effects of implicit and explicit motives on behavior (cf. McClelland et al., 1989). The negotiation situation itself contained task incentives to arouse the implicit power motive (Chapter 4.1). Due to the description of the framework of the negotiation, there may be social incentives for capturing and communicating the dominating character of the negotiation situation, which might arouse the explicit power motive. Nevertheless, these factors are negligible because the course and framework of a negotiation had to be described prior to the negotiation situation, and no special emphasis was placed on the importance of exerting influence over the other negotiator. Thus, there were no social
incentives to arouse the explicit power motive, whereas the task incentives in the negotiation were apt to arouse the implicit power motive in a negotiation for oneself.

In the further analyses section, I described how participants’ letters were coded for personalized and socialized power and examined the relation between these two power motive subforms and the negotiation outcomes. I expected that the socialized power motive would predict negotiation outcomes in the negotiation for another person and that personalized power would predict negotiation outcomes in the negotiation for oneself. Contrary to my expectations, none of these relations were significant. In a study by Magee and Langner (2008), personalized and socialized power predicted the outcomes of two scenarios. In Study 1, the researchers examined the effects of the personalized power motive on the decision to escalate a conflict situation. The personalized power motive was assessed in exactly the same way as in the current study (cf. Chapter 4.3.3). After participants had finished their letters, they were asked to rank order seven policy response options in the order in which they would advise President John F. Kennedy to follow them. Because both the assessment of personalized power motive and the dependent measure in this study dealt with resolving the same conflict, Magee and Langner (2008) thoroughly controlled for the degree of escalation participants expressed in their letters. The results confirmed the expected pattern: In contrast to the socialized power motive, the personalized power motive predicted the advice to deliberate less and to escalate the conflict instead.

In Study 2, Magee and Langner (2008) examined the relation between participants’ socialized power motive and their decision in a healthcare context. The socialized power motive was assessed with the help of a method that differed from the one used in Study 1: Participants were asked to list their personal strivings. These strivings were then coded for the personalized and socialized power motives. Then, participants were asked to imagine themselves as a regulatory decision maker employed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) who had to make a decision about the approval of a new drug that prevents blood clots and heart attacks. The results confirmed the predictions: In contrast to their personalized
power motive, participants' socialized power motive significantly predicted their decision to introduce the drug to the market.

In both studies, the combination of the personalized and socialized power motives (i.e., the power motive sum score) did not predict any of the outcomes. Therefore, Magee and Langner (2008) underscored the importance of analyzing the two subforms of the implicit power motive separately. Nevertheless, in the current study, the personalized and socialized power motives did not account for negotiation outcomes in the respective negotiations for oneself or for another person. A possible explanation for this pattern could be the lack of situational specificity in the current study. Participants were not asked to rank order their pieces of concrete advice or to come to a decision in a specific context. Instead, the negotiations in the current study assessed a rather general form of behavior. In other words, in Magee and Langner's (2008) work, the dependent variable was assessed on a greater level of specificity and was more embedded in the content of the motive assessment than was the case in the current study. As advised by Schultheiss and Pang (2007), for motive assessment, it is a sound decision to choose stimuli that correspond as much as possible to the dependent measure one intends to measure. Thus, in future research, stimuli with negotiation content that pull socialized power as well as personalized power could be used to assess these two power motive subforms. In the realm of the dependent variable, more emphasis could be placed on the different purposes (i.e., to help another person or to reach one's own goals) of the two negotiation situations: Apart from different role instructions prior to the negotiation, the respective purpose could be emphasized more, even over the course of the negotiation.
Study 2: The role of the implicit power motive and explicit affiliation motive in a negotiation for oneself and for another person

5.1 Introduction

In Study 1, I analyzed the role of the implicit power motive in a salary negotiation for oneself or for another person. As expected, negotiation condition moderated the relation between the implicit power motive and the salary request. In particular, in a negotiation for oneself, the implicit power motive predicted negotiation performance in terms of salary requests. By contrast, in a negotiation for another person, the implicit power motive did not predict salary requests; that is, individuals low on the power motive requested as high a salary as individuals high on the power motive.

According to McClelland and colleagues (1989) and Kehr (2004b), explicit motives that are discrepant to the currently activated implicit motive can lead to performance deficits and compromise behavior (cf. Chapter 2.2.5).

In a classical negotiation for oneself, direct dominance over another person and self-assertion play important roles and are supposed to arouse the implicit power motive. Nevertheless, these behaviors are not beneficial to the goal of establishing friendly social interactions as usually pursued by individuals high on the explicit affiliation motive. Thus, the activation of the implicit power motive should be controlled and diminished by a high explicit affiliation motive. Basically, this is because “the affiliation motive is at the core of the cooperative orientation and […] in negotiation situations, it should therefore be associated with making concessions and accepting the concessions of others. In contrast, the implicit power motive should be an important component of the competitive orientation and should be associated with resistance to making concessions, or rejecting concessions made by the other side” (Winter & Langner, 2001, p. 714). Thus, a negotiation for oneself can arouse and satisfy the implicit power motive (Chapter 2.3), which leads individuals to compete. By contrast,
individuals high on the explicit affiliation motive wish to avoid being rejected by others (Chapter 2.4) and therefore tend to cooperate. Accordingly, the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive ought to conflict.

By contrast, in a negotiation for another person, the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive are not supposed to be directly opposed because asserting oneself for another person allows one to satisfy the explicit affiliation motive and the implicit power motive at the same time.

A major reason for this expected pattern is that, in a negotiation for another person, a fear of social rejection is less likely to occur (cf. Chapter 2.4). This is mainly because asserting oneself for the good of others is considered a more mature and socially acceptable form of behavior than self-assertion (McClelland, 1975; Sears, 1961; Winter, 1991). Therefore, negotiating for another person should not be socially sanctioned to the same extent as negotiating for oneself. An individual who assertively negotiates for another person may not expect others in general or the negotiation partner in particular to react negatively to one's high demands. Therefore, a friendly interaction becomes more probable than in a negotiation for oneself.

Accordingly, individuals high on the explicit affiliation motive who bargain assertively can nevertheless conform to the high value they ascribe to warm and positive social interactions (cf. Chapter 2.4). Thus, I expected that the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive would not have opposing effects on behavior. By contrast, their interaction was even potentially expected to have positive effects on behavior, thus enhancing the negotiation performance. These positive effects were expected to be especially pronounced when both motives were high.

To summarize the expectations for both negotiation conditions, I expected interactive effects of the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive in both negotiation conditions. Whereas in a negotiation for oneself, I expected the two motives to conflict in
predicting performance, I expected them to have synergetic effects on performance in a negotiation for another person. Accordingly, I tested the following hypothesis:

_Hypothesis 2:_ The interaction between negotiation condition, implicit power motive, and explicit affiliation motive will predict salary requests in that the explicit affiliation motive will differentially moderate the relation between the implicit power motive and salary requests in the two negotiation conditions. A high implicit power motive in combination with a low explicit affiliation motive will lead to higher salary requests in a negotiation for oneself than in a negotiation for another person. A high implicit power motive in combination with a high explicit affiliation motive will lead to higher salary requests in a negotiation for another person than in a negotiation for oneself. A low implicit power motive in combination with a high explicit affiliation motive as well as a low implicit power motive in combination with a low explicit affiliation motive will not differentially affect salary requests in the two negotiation conditions.

I measured both motives prior to the negotiation: the explicit affiliation motive in an online preassessment and the implicit power motive in the laboratory session immediately prior to the negotiation. To measure the implicit power motive, I implemented the same method that was used in Study 1. After that, also as in Study 1, participants conducted a virtual salary negotiation as done in Amanatullah and Morris (2010).

### 5.2 Method

**Participants.** I performed a power analysis using G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2007). Study 1 yielded an effect size of $R^2 = .10$ when gender was not controlled for and $R^2 = .17$ when gender was controlled for. Therefore, in the current study, I assumed a medium effect size of $R^2 = .15$. Thus, for a linear multiple regression with three predictors with $R^2 = .15$ and a power of 80%, a sample size of 77 participants was required.

As in Study 1, because I intended to run the analyses only on data that came from participants who negotiated for all five rounds and to account for experimental dropout (cf.
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Study 1), 133 participants who were enrolled at Technische Universität München or Ludwigs-Maximilians-Universität München participated. Seventy-three participants received course credit in exchange for their participation. An additional 60 participants were recruited from a sample of participants who were providing data for two bachelor theses.

Analogous to Study 1, data from 18 participants who did not negotiate for all five rounds were not used in further analyses. Another 12 participants discovered that they had negotiated against a computer and were therefore excluded. As in Study 1, a delayed starting time and technical problems led to the exclusion of another eight participants. Another three participants did not complete the online preassessment. Thus, data from 82 participants were analyzed further (45 female, $M_{age} = 23.60, SD_{age} = 3.01$).

Procedure. The study consisted of an online preassessment and a main part that took place in the laboratory. Participants registered to participate via an online platform or made an appointment with the Bachelor study students at least 24 h before the respective experimental session in the laboratory. In addition, they were told to fill out the preassessment online questionnaire at least 24 h before arriving at the laboratory. In the online preassessment, participants were asked to fill out the UMS 6 to assess their explicit motives systematically beforehand. At the beginning of the online survey, participants were asked to generate an anonymous code that they would need to participate in the laboratory part of the study.

The structure of the laboratory part of the study was similar to Study 1: When arriving at the laboratory, participants signed an informed consent form and were seated at an individual computer workspace. Participants were then asked to type in their anonymous code from the online part of the study. As in Study 1, the implicit power motive was assessed via a letter participants were asked to write in response to Premier Khrushchev’s letter to President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. After the implicit power motive was assessed, the computerized negotiation was introduced and conducted as in Study 1. Again, participants were randomly assigned to either the negotiation for oneself (Appendix C “Role description for the negotiation for oneself”) or to the negotiation for another person (Appendix D “Role
description for the negotiation for another person\(^6\)). The negotiation itself followed the exact same procedure used in Study 1.\(^6\)

At the end, control items regarding the interaction with the negotiation counterpart and biographical data were assessed, and participants were thanked and debriefed.

**Implicit motives.** All participants wrote their letter on the computer using Inquisit 3.0/4.0 (Millisdsecond Software, Seattle, WA). The letters were blind-content-coded for the implicit power motive using Winter’s (1994) *Manual for Scoring Motive Imagery in Running Text* by a trained and independent scorer. The scorer had exceeded 85% interscorer agreement with the calibration materials contained in the manual.

PSE protocol length \((M = 278.06, \ SD = 93.13)\) was significantly correlated with participants’ overall implicit power motive score \((M = 4.39, \ SD = 2.11)\), \(r = .489, \ p = .010\). Therefore, I corrected the power motive score for protocol length with regression and converted the residuals to z-scores.

**Explicit motives.** I used the UMS 6 (cf. Study 1; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012) to assess explicit motives. In the present study, Cronbach’s alpha for the explicit power motive was .87.

**Negotiation variables.** As in Study 1, participants had to indicate their prenegotiation aspirations such as reservation point, target point, anticipated opening offer, and fear of anticipated social backlash before they began negotiating. Again, because the two items assessing fear of anticipated social backlash were highly correlated \((r = .74, \ p < .01)\), I computed their mean and named it *anticipated backlash*.

**Negotiation performance.** As in Study 1, the demand made in the final negotiation round was used as the dependent variable to assess negotiation performance and was subsequently named *salary request*.

\(^6\) The only difference was that, after the third negotiation round, flow experience was administered for exploratory purposes with the Flow Short Scale (Rheinberg, Vollmeyer, & Engeser, 2003).
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Control items. As in Study 1, participants were asked to rate the competitiveness of their negotiation style on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal) and their self-rated assertiveness on a scale ranging from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high). Again, I expected that the implicit power motive would not predict levels of self-rated competitiveness or self-rated assertiveness. Participants were then asked to speculate about the aim of the study. After I collected their biographical data, the participants were thanked and debriefed. If they suspected that they had not negotiated against a real negotiation partner, their data were excluded from the analyses (see above).

5.3 Results

5.3.1 Preliminary analyses

Participants’ age had no significant effect on salary request, \( b = 200.53, SE = 171.63, t(82) = 1.17, r = .13, p = .246 \). Gender significantly influenced salary requests, \( b = -2.773.41, SE = 994.67, t(82) = -2.79, r = .30, p = .007 \).

As in Study 1, the implicit power motive did not predict reservation point, \( b = 495.80, SE = 343.50, t(82) = 1.44, r = .16, p = .153 \), or target point, \( b = 123.78, SE = 410.80, t(82) = 0.30, r = .03, p = .764 \). But the effect on participants’ anticipated opening offer was marginally significant, \( b = -739.27, SE = 425.27, t(82) = -1.74, r = .19, p = .086 \). As in Study 1, the implicit power motive did not predict fear of anticipated social backlash, \( b = -469.56, SE = 416.92, t(82) = -1.13, r = .13, p = .263 \).

Again, the implicit power motive did not predict participants’ self-judged competitiveness, \( b = -0.13, SE = 0.13, t(82) = -0.99, r = .11, p = .328 \), or their self-rated assertiveness, \( b = -0.06, SE = 0.11, t(82) = -0.53, r = .06, p = .595 \).

Correlations between all variables are displayed in Table 6, and descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 7. For all further analyses, the independent variables were z-standardized.
The dependent variable salary request was not z-standardized for reasons of better interpretability.

Table 6

**Intercorrelations between Variables in Study 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Salary request</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.298**</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gender</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>-.091</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Negotiation condition</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.122</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. nPow</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. sanAff</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 82. Salary request = salary request from the final negotiation round, nPow = implicit need for power corrected for the number of words, sanAff = Mean scores on the explicit affiliation motive.  **p < .01.*

Table 7

**Means, Standard Deviations, and Confidence Intervals (95%) of Variables in Study 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>95% CI low</th>
<th>95% CI high</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Salary request</td>
<td>40,513.41</td>
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<td>39,440.73</td>
<td>41,570.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. sanAff</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>4.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 82. Salary request = salary request from the final negotiation round, sanAff = Mean scores on the explicit affiliation motive, CI = Confidence interval.*

### 5.3.2 Moderation analysis

According to Hypothesis 2, the interaction between negotiation condition, the implicit power motive, and the explicit affiliation motive should predict the salary request: The higher participants’ implicit power motive and explicit affiliation motive in the negotiation for oneself,
the lower their salary request should be; the higher participants’ implicit power motive and explicit affiliation motive in the negotiation for another person, the higher their salary request should be.

To test Hypothesis 2, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed, controlling for gender. The first step included the control variable gender, the second step included the dummy-coded variable negotiation condition, the implicit power motive, and the explicit affiliation motive. The third step additionally comprised the three multiplicative two-way interaction terms between negotiation condition, implicit power motive, and explicit affiliation motive. In the final step, the multiplicative three-way interaction term was entered, and it was not significant, $F(8, 73) = 2.29, p = .030; R^2 = .20; \beta = -.02, t(82) = -0.14, p = .889, 1-\beta = 0.93$ (see Table 8).
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Table 8

*Standardized Coefficients Predicting Salary Requests in an HMRA: Gender (Step 1), nPow, sanAff, and Negotiation condition (Step 2), nPow x Negotiation Condition, sanAff x Negotiation Condition, and nPow x sanAff (Step 3), and nPow x sanAff x Negotiation Condition (Step 4)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Salary request</th>
<th>β Step 1</th>
<th>β Step 2</th>
<th>β Step 3</th>
<th>β Step 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.30**</td>
<td>-.29*</td>
<td>-.25*</td>
<td>-.25*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>sanAff</td>
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<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation condition</td>
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<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nPow x Negotiation Condition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sanAff x Negotiation Condition</td>
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<td></td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nPow x sanAff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.24*</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nPow x sanAff x Negotiation Condition</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-.02</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
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<td>.11</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta R^2$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta F$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.77</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. $N = 82$. Salary request = salary request from the final negotiation round, nPow = implicit need for power corrected for the number of words, sanAff = Mean scores on the explicit affiliation motive.

*p < .05. **p < .01.

Because the two-way interaction between the implicit power motive and negotiation condition was significant in the final step of the analysis, $F(8, 73) = 2.29, p = .030; R^2 = .20; \beta = .30, t(82)= 2.28, p = .026$, I tested this two-way interaction in a separate hierarchical multiple regression analysis. The first step included gender, the second step additionally included the implicit power motive and negotiation condition, and the final step additionally included their multiplicative two-way interaction, which was marginally significant, $F(4, 77) = 3.36, p = .014; R^2 = .37; \beta = .24, t(82)= 1.84, p = .070, 1-\beta = 1.00.$
5.3.3 Further Analyses

According to Winter et al. (1998), power and affiliation can be conceived of as the two most important social motives. As explained in Chapter 2.3, negotiations constitute situations that inherently arouse the power motive due to their numerous dominance constituents. Nevertheless, in social interactions, the implicit affiliation motive might also affect salary requests in the negotiation. Thus, it appears reasonable to take a closer look at the interplay between the implicit affiliation motive and the explicit power motive and at potential conflicts between these two motives.

In the negotiation for oneself, I expected that a conflict between the implicit affiliation motive and the explicit power motive would occur if both motives were high and would consequently lead to low salary requests. Participants with a high implicit affiliation motive may perceive the negotiation as an opportunity to establish a friendly relationship. In addition, the implicit affiliation motive “has a strong component of fear of Rejection in it” (McClelland & Pilon, 1983, p. 569). Thus, participants with a high implicit affiliation motive should behave nonassertively. If their explicit power motive (i.e., the explicit goal to exert influence) is also high, this should lead to a behavioral conflict and a poor negotiation performance.

By contrast, participants low on the implicit affiliation motive have no desire to establish a friendly relationship during the negotiation and do not fear being rejected by the other negotiator. Therefore, no conflict with the explicit power motive was expected to occur. Thus, participants with a low implicit affiliation motive and a high explicit power motive should exhibit no behavioral conflict and should therefore not exhibit a poor negotiation performance.

By contrast, I did not expect the implicit affiliation motive and explicit power motive to conflict in the negotiation for another person (cf. Chapter 5.1). This is most likely because, in this situation, less fear of social rejection was supposed to occur (cf. Chapter 4.3.3). Therefore, individuals with a high implicit affiliation motive and a high explicit power motive should be able to establish a friendly relationship as well as to realize their goal of being assertive. This positive combined effect was not expected to occur for participants with a high explicit power
motive and a low implicit affiliation motive. Thus, I expected that participants high on the explicit power motive and high on the implicit affiliation motive would request a higher salary in a negotiation for another person than participants high on the explicit power motive and low on the implicit affiliation motive.

To obtain implicit affiliation motive scores, I applied the same procedure as for the implicit power motive. The same scorer coded participants’ letters for the implicit affiliation motive. PSE protocol length ($M = 278.06$, $SD = 93.19$) was significantly correlated with participants’ overall implicit affiliation motive score ($M = .65$, $SD = 1.14$), $r = .284$, $p = .010$. Therefore, I corrected the affiliation motive score for protocol length with regression and converted the residuals into z-scores.

I tested a three-way interaction between implicit affiliation motive, explicit power motive, and negotiation condition. I performed a hierarchical multiple regression analysis, controlling for gender. The first step included the control variable gender, and the second step included the dummy-coded variable negotiation condition, the implicit affiliation motive, and the explicit power motive. The third step additionally comprised the three multiplicative two-way interactions between negotiation condition, implicit affiliation motive, and explicit power motive. In the final step, I entered the multiplicative three-way interaction term, which was not significant, $F(8, 73) = 3.64$, $p = .001$; $R^2 = .29$; $\beta = .07$, $t(82)= 0.41$, $p = .687$, $1-\beta = .99$ (see Table 9).
Study 2: The role of the implicit power motive and explicit affiliation motive in a negotiation for oneself and for another person

Table 9

*Standardized Coefficients Predicting Salary Requests in an HMRA: Gender (Step 1), nAff, sanPow, and Negotiation Condition (Step 2), nAff x Negotiation Condition, sanPow x Negotiation Condition, and nAff x sanPow (Step 3), and nAff x sanPow x Negotiation Condition (Step 4)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Salary request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β Step 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nAff</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sanPow</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation condition</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nAff x Negotiation Condition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sanPow x Negotiation Condition</td>
<td>.36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nAff x sanPow</td>
<td>-.35**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nAff x sanPow x Negotiation Condition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2$ | .09 | .12 | .28 | .29 |
$\Delta R^2$ | .09 | .03 | .16 | .00 |
$\Delta F$ | 7.77 | 1.00 | 5.56 | 0.16 |

*Note. N = 82. Salary request = salary request from the final negotiation round, nAff = implicit need for affiliation corrected for the number of words, sanPow = Mean scores on the explicit power motive. *p < .05. **p < .01.

Contrary to expectations, the three-way interaction between the implicit affiliation motive, the explicit power motive, and negotiation condition was not significant (see Table 9). The two-way interaction between the explicit power motive and negotiation condition was significant (see Table 9). More important, the interaction between the implicit affiliation motive and the explicit power motive significantly predicted salary requests in the final step of the analysis, $F(8, 73) = 3.64, p = .001; R^2 = .29; \beta = -.41, t(82) = -2.23, p = .029$ (see Table 9). To examine whether the conflict between the implicit affiliation motive and explicit power motive would
predict salary requests independent of negotiation condition, I tested this two-way interaction in a separate hierarchical multiple regression analysis: The first step included gender, the second step additionally included the implicit affiliation motive and the explicit power motive, and the final step additionally included their multiplicative two-way interaction, which was significant, $F(4, 77) = 5.21, p = .001; R^2 = .46; \beta = -.31, t(82) = -3.01, p = .004, 1-\beta = 1.00$.

To further explore the nature of this interaction, I calculated the predicted values for salary request using the regression slopes from the final regression equation at values of 1 SD above and below the respective means (cf. Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Figure 4 illustrates that a high explicit power motive negatively moderated the relation between the implicit affiliation motive and salary request, indicating that participants high on the implicit power motive requested a higher salary when they were low on the implicit affiliation motive than when they were high on the implicit affiliation motive, $b = -2099.66, t(78) = 3.00, p = .004$. By contrast, a low explicit power motive did not moderate the relation between the implicit affiliation motive and salary request, indicating that people low on the implicit power motive did not differ in their salary requests in accordance with their implicit affiliation motive, $b = 863.92, t(78) = 1.45, p = .153$. 

Study 2: The role of the implicit power motive and explicit affiliation motive in a negotiation for oneself and for another person

As in Study 1, I tested whether the relations between negotiation condition, implicit power motive, and explicit affiliation motive would be mediated by fear of anticipated social backlash. Neither the direct nor the indirect effect was significant.

5.4 Discussion Study 2

In Study 2, I extended my research on the implicit power motive from Study 1 to the explicit affiliation motive, which is supposed to work as an antagonist of the implicit power motive (cf. Chapter 5.1). I therefore expected that the explicit affiliation motive would diminish the effects of the implicit power motive on negotiation performance in a negotiation for oneself. Because the negotiation for another person allows for a friendlier interaction than a negotiation for oneself (cf. Chapter 5.1), I expected an additive positive effect of the implicit power and explicit affiliation motives on salary requests in this special situation. I tested the effect of a three-way

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**Figure 4.** Predicted values for Salary Request depending on the implicit affiliation and explicit power motives. \(n\text{Aff} = \) implicit affiliation motive, \(san\text{Pow} = \) explicit power motive.
interaction between the explicit affiliation motive, the implicit power motive, and negotiation condition on salary request. It was not significant.

Just as the explicit affiliation motive is supposed to work as an antagonist of the implicit power motive, the explicit power motive is analogously supposed to work as an antagonist of the implicit affiliation motive. As in Hypothesis 2, I expected the two motives to play opposing roles in a negotiation for oneself but not to conflict in the negotiation for another person. Therefore, in the further analyses section, I tested the effect of a three-way interaction between the explicit power motive, the implicit affiliation motive, and negotiation condition on salary request. This effect was not significant either. Nevertheless, across negotiation conditions, the two-way interaction between the explicit power motive and implicit affiliation motive predicted negotiation performance: Participants high on the explicit power motive differed in their salary requests according to their implicit affiliation motive, whereas participants low on the explicit power motive did not. Contrary to expectations, this pattern of results appeared across negotiation conditions. This indicates that even in the negotiation for another person, a high implicit affiliation motive and a high explicit power motive constitute a conflicting motive pattern: The higher the implicit affiliation motive and the explicit power motive, the lower were the resulting salary requests. This pattern contradicts my original expectation that the two motives would not conflict in the special situation of negotiating for another person.

Thus, not even this special negotiation situation, in which assertiveness was supposed to be less socially sanctioned, was able to reduce the social anxiety of individuals high on the implicit affiliation motive (Byrne, 1961; Mussen & Jones, 1957). In accordance with McClelland (1987), in both negotiation conditions, “individuals high in n Affiliation act in various ways to avoid conflict and competition as if they feared negative feedback from others” (p. 356). Thus, neither negotiation condition was able to provide an environment in which individuals with a high implicit affiliation motive could act without social anxiety.

Because the results of the main and further analyses from Study 2 were either not significant or pointed in an unexpected direction, the two negotiation scenarios that were
chosen did not appear to be appropriate for finding differences in an implicit power and explicit affiliation motive combination. In Study 3 (cf. Chapter 6), I therefore concentrated on the negotiation for oneself and chose to emphasize the effects of the two motives on subsequent behavior by arousing them prior to the negotiation.

It is notable that the two-way interaction between the explicit power motive and the implicit affiliation motive was significant although the two-way interaction between the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive was not.

There are two explanations for these results. First, the explicit motives were assessed prior to the experiment. Thus, it is possible that participants who rated themselves high or low on the explicit power motive wanted to confirm their ratings in the laboratory session of the experiment, assuming that they had remembered their self-rated explicit power motive. This is especially plausible because negotiations are obviously linked to power for many people. By contrast, the explicit affiliation motive, even if participants had remembered it, might not have guided participants' behavior because affiliation is not as clearly linked to negotiations.

Second, explicit motives are part of people’s self-concepts and reflect opinions they have about themselves. Thus, the higher an explicit motive, the more relevant it is supposed to be to a person’s self-concept. Consequently, people high on the explicit power motive might expend more effort in the form of self-regulation with the goal of having their actions correspond with their judgments of their explicit power motive if they see a situation as being obviously linked to power.
6  Study 3: The roles of the aroused implicit power motive and aroused explicit affiliation motive in negotiations

6.1  Introduction

In Study 2, I expected that high implicit or explicit motive values would lead to higher motivation and consequently to higher salary requests in a salary negotiation. Because I could not confirm Study 2’s hypothesis, dispositional motive differences might not have led to a distinct motivational arousal pattern, and therefore, no differences in negotiation performance in terms of salary requests could be found. Especially the examination of an implicit as well as an explicit dispositional motive may make it difficult to distinguish their respective effects on performance.

Therefore, in Study 3, I decided to create distinct arousal conditions for both the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive. For the implicit power motive, I implemented an established arousal method (Schultheiss, Wirth, & Stanton, 2004, cf. Chapter 6.2 Experimental conditions for a more detailed description). To arouse the explicit affiliation motive, I constructed a method to induce arousal in accordance with McClelland and colleagues’ theoretical reasoning because I could not find any established methods (cf. Chapter 2.4). According to McClelland and colleagues (1989), explicit motives can be aroused via explicitly stated social norms or goals in a verbal format (cf. Chapter 2.2.3). Thus, I constructed explicit instructions that were directly relevant to the subsequent negotiation situation (cf. Chapter 6.2 Experimental conditions).

The arousal of both implicit and explicit motives occurred immediately prior to the negotiation. Again, as in Studies 1 and 2, participants conducted a salary negotiation according to Amanatullah and Morris’ (2010) procedure.

Because Study 2 revealed comparable results between the two negotiation conditions in which participants negotiated for themselves or for another person (cf. Chapter 5.3.3), I restricted the design to the more common form of a negotiation for oneself. Unlike Studies 1
and 2, the salary requests from the final negotiation round were not examined: As explained in Chapter 4.2, the salary requests from the final negotiation round are considered the best indicators of the effects of an aroused implicit power motive. But because my main focus in the current study was on the effects of the distinct arousal conditions that were administered prior to the negotiation, I used the last salary request that was available for each participant in the analysis. In the event that participants did not negotiate for all five rounds, this was the salary that they left the negotiation table with. If they decided to negotiate through the final round, their request from the final round was used in the analysis. This measure allowed the last salary request available for each participant to be used, but at the same time, I was able to account for the dropout that was supposed to occur naturally due to the manipulation. In the following, I will to refer to this variable as the last salary request.

As in Study 1, I expected that participants whose implicit power motive had been aroused prior to the negotiation would request a higher salary than participants in the control group who exhibited no motive arousal at all. To explore this expectation, I tested the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 3.** Participants whose implicit power motive is aroused will request a higher salary than participants in the control group.

As in Study 2, I expected that the situational arousal of both the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive would lead to declines in performance as compared with a situation in which only the implicit power motive was aroused. To explore this expectation, I tested the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 4:** Participants whose implicit power motive is aroused will request a higher salary when their explicit affiliation motive is not aroused than when it is aroused.
6.2 Method

Participants. I performed a power analysis using G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2007). Studies 1 and 2 dealt with dispositional motives and produced medium to large effect sizes. In the current study, I intended to study the effects of aroused motives on behavior: Research on aroused motives (e.g., Schultheiss et al., 2004) indicates that they have medium to large effects on PSE scores and hormones. A model introduced by Stanton and Schultheiss (2009) also indicates that an arousal of the implicit power motive leads to more pronounced effects on behavior via hormones than when only the dispositional implicit power motive is considered. Therefore, I also assumed a medium to large effect size. Thus, to yield an effect size of $R^2 = 0.35$ and a power of 80%, a sample size of 84 participants was required according to G*Power. Because I planned to examine the last salary participants accepted or demanded (cf. Chapter 6.1) in the current study and not the salary request from the final round, I expected less experimental dropout. Nevertheless, as I had in Studies 1 and 2, I expected to have to exclude some participants from the analyses. Therefore, I recruited 96 participants enrolled at Technische Universität München who participated in exchange for course credit. Three participants typed in monthly salaries (instead of annual salaries as requested), one participant inadvertently typed in a 6-digit instead of a 5-digit annual salary, and one participant had already participated in Study 1. As in the first two studies, participants were excluded if they had a delayed start (four participants) or if they doubted they were negotiating against a real negotiation partner (four participants). Thus, the final data set consisted of 83 participants (66 female, $M_{age} = 24.40$, $SD_{age} = 2.60$).

Procedure. As in the first two studies, participants registered for the study via an online platform at least 24 h before the laboratory session. Upon their arrival at the laboratory, they signed an informed consent form and were seated at a single computer workspace, where the whole study took place. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions.
At the start of the study, they were informed about the cover story, which was similar to the cover stories from the first two studies: Participants were told that the study would examine how communication via computers influences interaction outcomes in comparison with real face-to-face interactions. Participants were introduced to the negotiation in the same way as in the first two studies. They read the hiring manager role description, which was shortened by one sentence to ensure that it would be absolutely neutral in motive content (Appendix E “Role description for the negotiation for oneself in Study 3”). Then participants filled out their prenegotiation aspirations. After that and directly before they began the negotiation, they were shown a film excerpt and assigned the goal that corresponded to their experimental condition. After that, the negotiation proceeded as it had in the first two studies.

Experimental conditions. In Experimental Groups 1 \((n = 27)\) and 2 \((n = 30)\), the implicit power motive was aroused with a film excerpt. In the control group \((n = 26)\), no implicit motive was aroused, but for reasons of comparability, a film excerpt with no motive content was shown. Then, in Experimental Group 2, the explicit affiliation motive was aroused with the help of an affiliation goal. In Experimental Group 1 and the control group, no explicit motive was aroused, but again, for reasons of comparability, a neutral goal was administered.

The film excerpt from *The Godfather – Part II* (Coppola & Frederickson, 1974) shown to Experimental Groups 1 and 2 was first used by Schultheiss, Wirth, and Stanton (2004) and is about 27 min long. It shows the rise of the protagonist Michael Corleone from a store owner to a mafia boss and comprises many cues related to power and dominance but almost no cues related to affiliation. The film excerpt shown to the control group is also about 27 min long and contains no cues related to motives. It was taken from the BBC documentary *Die Geburt der Erde* (Page & Sington, 1998) about the formation of the earth. The excerpt focuses on stones, tectonics, and ice ages.

In Experimental Group 2, the explicit affiliation motive was aroused by highlighting the importance of good relationships between colleagues. Participants were asked to name three
ways to further a good relationship with their negotiation partner who was obviously a potential future colleague of theirs (Appendix F “Arousal of the explicit affiliation motive in Study 3”).

In Experimental Group 1 and in the control group, no explicit motive arousal was intended. Thus, participants were told about the importance of virtual communication and were asked to name three ways to convey information with the help of a computer (Appendix G “Neutral condition in Study 3”).

*Negotiation performance.* As already explained in detail in Chapter 6.1, I used the last salary participants either requested or accepted as the dependent variable, thus, the salary participants left the negotiation table with.

*Control items.* Participants were asked to speculate on the aim of the study. After we collected their biographical data, participants were thanked and debriefed. If they suspected that they had not negotiated against a real negotiation partner, their data were excluded from the analyses (see above).

### 6.3 Results

#### 6.3.1 Preliminary analyses

The age of the participants had no significant effect on their last salary request, $b = 14.67$, $SE = 195.63$, $t(81) = 0.08$, $r = .01$, $p = .940$. Gender did not influence the last salary request either, $b = -815.31$, $SE = 1,076.55$, $t(81) = -0.76$, $r = .084$, $p = .451$, and was therefore not controlled for in further analyses.

Correlations between all variables are displayed in Table 10. The independent variables were z-standardized for all further analyses. The dependent variable salary request was not z-standardized for reasons of better interpretability.
Table 10

*Intercorrelations between the Variables in Study 3*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Last salary request</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.084</td>
<td>-.249*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gender</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Experimental condition</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 83. Last salary request = salary request from the last negotiation round.*

*p < .05.

6.3.2 Main analysis

In order to test the general effect of experimental condition, I computed an analysis of variance, which was significant, $F(2, 80) = 3.83, p = .026, \eta^2 = .09, 1-\beta = 0.68$ (see Figure 5).

According to Hypothesis 4, participants whose implicit power motive was aroused should request a higher salary than participants whose implicit power motive was not aroused. Therefore, I conducted a planned contrast analysis using weights of 1 for Experimental Group 1, 0 for Experimental Group 2, and -1 for the control group. Supporting my expectations, the contrast confirmed that participants in Experimental Group 1 requested a significantly higher salary in comparison with participants in the control group, $t(80)= -2.34, p = .022, d = 0.59, 1-\beta = 0.64$.

To examine whether participants in Experimental Group 1 would request a higher salary than participants in Experimental Group 2 (Hypothesis 3), I conducted a planned contrast analysis on the last salary request using weights of 1 for the Experimental Group 1, -1 for Experimental Group 2, and 0 for the control group. Supporting my expectations, the contrast confirmed that participants in Experimental Group 1 requested a significantly higher salary in comparison with participants in Experimental Group 2, $t(80)= -2.48, p = .015, d = 0.63, 1-\beta = 0.69$.
Pairwise comparisons revealed that Experimental Group 2’s last salary requests did not differ significantly from the control group’s, $t(80) = -0.08$, $p = .938$, $1-\beta = 0.05$.

Figure 5. Results from Study 3: Mean values on the last salary request for each experimental condition. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Asterisks indicate a significant difference between groups ($ps < .05$).

6.3.3 Further Analyses

Analogous to Study 1, in Study 3 I tested whether participants who exhibited a discrepant motive arousal or no motive arousal at all would rather concede than participants whose implicit power motive was aroused prior to the negotiation. Accordingly, participants in Experimental Group 2 and in the control group were expected to be more likely to give in during the first four negotiation rounds than participants in Experimental Group 1. I expected that participants in Experimental Group 1 would not accept low offers by the computer or make low offers that would lead to the end of the negotiation. To test this expectation, I computed a
binary logistic regression analysis with the two-alternative forced-choice data “gave in” coded as 1 and “did not give in” coded as 0. As expected, participants in Experimental Group 1 gave in less often than participants in Experimental Group 2 or the control group, $\beta = -2.44$, Wald test $\chi^2(1, N = 83) = 5.56, p = .018$. Only 22% of the participants whose implicit power motive had been aroused gave in compared with 47% in the other two conditions.

Although gender did not significantly influence the last salary requests, I reran all of the above-mentioned analyses controlling for gender to ensure comparability to Study 2. There was a main effect of experimental condition, $F(2, 79) = 3.76, p = .028, \eta^2 = .09, 1-\beta = 0.67$. The planned contrast analyses computed above revealed significant differences between Experimental Group 1 and the control group $t(79) = -2.28, p = .025, d = 0.58, 1-\beta = 0.61$, and between Experimental Group 1 and Experimental Group 2, $t(79) = -2.49, p = .015, d = 0.63, 1-\beta = 0.69$. Pairwise comparisons revealed no significant differences in last salary requests between Experimental Group 2 and the control group, $t(79) = -0.15, p = .885, 1-\beta = 0.05$.

In Studies 1 and 2, the dependent variable was the salary request from the final negotiation round. To ensure comparability, I reran all analyses with the salary request from the final negotiation round as well. Thirty-two participants did not negotiate for all five rounds; therefore, this analysis included data from 51 participants. There was a marginally significant overall effect, $F(2, 49) = 2.42, p = .099, \eta^2 = .09, 1-\beta = 0.47$. Planned contrast analyses revealed a marginally significant difference between Experimental Group 1 and the control group, $t(49) = -1.67, p = .101, d = 0.55, 1-\beta = 0.38$, and a significant difference between Experimental Group 1 and Experimental Group 2, $t(49) = -2.05, p = .046, d = 0.63, 1-\beta = 0.52$. Pairwise comparisons showed that Experimental Group 2 did not differ significantly from the control group in their salary requests, $t(49) = -0.33, p = .742, 1-\beta = 0.06$.

6.4 Discussion Study 3

The first aim of Study 3 was to examine the conflict between two competing motives that had been aroused prior to the negotiation: the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation
motive. Second, I intended to establish the link between an aroused implicit power motive and negotiation performance in terms of last salary requests. I was able to confirm both expectations: First, participants whose implicit power motive had been aroused requested a higher salary than participants whose explicit affiliation motive had been aroused in addition to the implicit power motive. Second, participants whose implicit power motive had been aroused requested a higher salary than the participants in the control group.

An indication that an arousal of the implicit power motive has a stronger effect on salary requests than the dispositional implicit power motive can be found by analyzing participants’ willingness to give in. In the further analyses section of Study 1 (Chapter 4.3.3), I tested whether participants differed in their willingness to accept a low offer by the computer or in their demands for a salary that was lower than the computer’s next offer according to their implicit power motive. I did not find that participants low on the implicit power motive were more likely to give in than individuals high on the implicit power motive.

In Study 3 (Chapter 6.3.3), I compared participants whose implicit power motive had been aroused with participants in the other two conditions in which either their implicit power motive and their explicit affiliation motive or no motive at all had been aroused. Participants in the latter two conditions gave in significantly more often than participants whose implicit power motive had been aroused by itself.

In Studies 1 and 2, in which I examined the dispositional implicit power motive, I chose to analyze the salary request from the final negotiation round as the dependent variable. The implicit power motive should be more aroused in the final round compared with any other negotiation round (cf. Chapter 4.2). By contrast, in Study 3, I wanted to examine the effect of the manipulations administered prior to the negotiation and therefore, the dependent variable was the salary that participants left the negotiation with. As explained in Chapter 6.1, this measure allowed me to avoid the impact of dropout, which occurs naturally due to the manipulation.
Nevertheless, I also analyzed whether the manipulation in Study 3 could also account for differences in the final negotiation round. Contrary to Study 1, in Study 3, I was not able to find an effect of negotiation condition on the salary request from the final negotiation round.

This may be due to the fact that participants in the two conditions in which either the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive or no motive at all had been aroused gave in significantly more often than participants whose implicit power motive had been aroused by itself (see above). In other words, participants in the first two conditions dropped out significantly more often (47%) due to the manipulation than participants in the other condition (22%; cf. Chapter 6.3.3). This signifies that using the salary request from the final round in this experimental design did not adequately reflect the effects of the manipulation because those who were expected to request a lower salary in the final round had already dropped out in prior rounds.

This reasoning is supported by a higher total dropout of 32 participants in Study 3 compared with Study 1. In Study 3, 32 participants corresponded to 39% of the whole sample, whereas in Study 1, only 24% of the sample dropped out before the final round.
7 General discussion

This thesis had three major goals: First, I aimed to examine the role of the implicit power motive in a negotiation for oneself and for another person, exploring if it would have an effect in the negotiation for oneself compared with no effect in the negotiation for another person.

Second, I planned to consider whether the explicit affiliation motive would diminish the effect of the implicit power motive on performance in the negotiation for oneself and whether the explicit affiliation motive and the implicit power motive would have a synergetic effect on performance in the negotiation for another person.

Third, I intended to research the consequences of a prenegotiation arousal of both the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive, expecting that the dual arousal would lead to a worse performance than the arousal of the implicit power motive alone in a negotiation for oneself.

To pursue these goals, I conducted three experimental studies. In Studies 1 and 2, the negotiation for oneself was contrasted with the negotiation for another person. In Studies 1 and 2, I assessed dispositional motives, whereas in Study 3, I aroused the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive.

In Study 1, I examined the effect of negotiation condition and implicit power motive on salary requests and confirmed Hypothesis 1, which had predicted that negotiation condition would moderate the relation between the implicit power motive and salary request. In other words, in a negotiation for oneself, the implicit power motive was expected to positively predict negotiation performance in terms of salary requests, whereas in a negotiation for another person, the implicit power motive was not expected to be associated with salary requests.

In Study 2, I additionally took the explicit affiliation motive into account and examined the effects it would have when it interacted with negotiation condition and the implicit power motive. I assessed the explicit affiliation motive in an online session prior to the negotiation in the laboratory. In the laboratory session, participants' implicit power motive was assessed, and they conducted the same negotiation as in Study 1. I predicted with Hypothesis 2 that the
interaction between negotiation condition, implicit power motive, and explicit affiliation motive would predict salary requests in that the explicit affiliation motive would differentially moderate the relation between the implicit power motive and salary requests in the two negotiation conditions. In particular, I expected that a high implicit power motive in combination with a low explicit affiliation motive would lead to higher salary requests in a negotiation for oneself than in a negotiation for another person, whereas a high implicit power motive in combination with a high explicit affiliation motive would lead to a higher salary request in a negotiation for another person than in a negotiation for oneself. I was not able to confirm Hypothesis 2.

Because I was not able to establish any effect of an interaction between the dispositional implicit power and explicit affiliation motives, I decided to arouse both motives in the third study. Moreover, I decided to consider only the negotiation for oneself in the third study because this is the more common form of negotiation, and no differences between the negotiation for oneself and for another person appeared in Study 2. First, participants' implicit power motive was aroused. Then one group exhibited an arousal of their explicit affiliation motive (Experimental Group 1), whereas the other group did not (Experimental Group 2). I confirmed Hypothesis 4, which had predicted that participants whose implicit power motive was aroused would request a higher salary when their explicit affiliation motive was not aroused than when it was aroused. Building on Study 1, Study 3 was designed to examine whether participants with an aroused implicit power motive would request a higher salary like participants with a high dispositional implicit power motive do. Thus, a control group in which neither motive was aroused was compared with Experimental Group 1. I confirmed Hypothesis 3, which had predicted that participants whose implicit power motive was aroused would request a higher salary than participants in the control group.

7.1 Integration of findings

In this section, I will highlight the main findings of this thesis in short thematic sections and integrate them with existing research.
7.1.1 Effects of the implicit power motive in a salary negotiation for oneself

I was able to establish the interactive effect of negotiation condition and the implicit power motive on negotiation performance in terms of salary requests. More specifically, in a negotiation for oneself, individuals with a high implicit power motive requested a higher salary than individuals low on the implicit power motive (Study 1). Moreover, individuals whose implicit power motive had been aroused prior to the negotiation requested a higher salary than participants whose implicit power motive had not been aroused (Study 3). Thus, the aim of examining the link between negotiation condition, the implicit power motive, and negotiation performance was achieved. Moreover, the aim of establishing a link between the implicit power motive and negotiation performance was achieved regardless of whether the implicit power motive had been assessed or aroused. Accordingly, McClelland (1985) stated, “the effect of increased motive strength is similar whether it is the result of individual differences or situational manipulations” (p. 815).

Therefore, the current studies are the first to illustrate the important role of the implicit power motive for negotiation performance. The current findings clearly fit the picture delivered by research on basic principles of the implicit power motive. In competitions, individuals high on the power motive, in comparison with those low on the power motive, seek cues that signal opportunities to exert influence (Schmalt, 1987). In the competition itself, they do better than individuals low on the power motive in terms of gaining points, winning rounds, increasing their dominance from round to round, and gaining an advantage over their opponents (Schnackers & Kleinbeck, 1975; Terhune, 1968). The arousal of the implicit power motive during competitions has also been shown with the help of physiological indicators; that is, individuals high on the power motive show increases in hormones that are associated with dominance after winning a competition (Schultheiss, Campbell, & McClelland, 1999; Schultheiss & Rhode, 2002; Stanton & Schultheiss, 2007).

In contrast to competitions, negotiations are usually embedded in a context and therefore have an overarching goal. It is often not sufficient to gain an advantage over one’s negotiation
partner at any price (cf. Chapter 7.3). More subtle forms of influence or even strategic approaches are expedient (Rubin & Brown, 1975). Supposedly, cognitive processes have more relevance in negotiations than in competitions in which usually the simple principle of winning applies (Schultheiss, Campbell, & McClelland, 1999; Schultheiss & Rohde, 2002; Stanton & Schultheiss, 2007). It is thus intuitively compelling that the implicit power motive plays a major role in competitions (cf. Chapter 2.3), whereas more complex processes are at work in negotiations. Therefore, it was all the more important to examine effects of the implicit power motive on performance in negotiations.

### 7.1.2 Effects of the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive in a salary negotiation for oneself and for another person

With regard to the explicit affiliation motive, I examined whether it would interact with the implicit power motive and negotiation condition in predicting salary requests.

I did not find the expected pattern that the higher participants’ implicit power and explicit affiliation motives would be, the higher their salary requests would be when negotiating for another person but the lower their salary requests would be when negotiating for themselves (Study 2). But I found that an aroused explicit affiliation motive diminished the effect of an aroused implicit power motive (Study 3).

Thus, I was not able to fulfill my aim of showing an effect of the implicit power motive, the explicit affiliation motive, and negotiation condition on salary requests in negotiations. But I was able to show that a prenegotiation arousal of both the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive leads to a decline in performance in comparison with an arousal of only the implicit power motive.

According to Kehr (2004b), a latent behavioral conflict arises if neither implicit nor explicit motives are aroused in a certain situation (cf. Chapter 2.2.5). In the current Study 2, the explicit affiliation motive was not explicitly aroused, but I expected that it would nevertheless influence negotiation performance. Because I was not able to find support for my hypotheses, it could
be assumed that the explicit affiliation motive was not sufficiently aroused to conflict or interact with the implicit power motive. In other words, the latent behavioral conflict may not have become manifest and therefore was not measurable in negotiation performance.

Lang and colleagues (2012) also examined the combined effects of implicit and explicit motives on performance. In particular, a channeling effect of the explicit achievement motive on the implicit achievement motive on task and contextual performance was found (cf. Chapter 2.2.6). The implicit and explicit achievement motives were not aroused but were instead measured as dispositions. The reason why the results were nevertheless obtained could be found in the measurement of the dependent variable: Task and contextual performance were measured as an accumulated overall rating by participants’ supervisors on two questionnaires. Thus, both the independent and dependent variables were assessed on a rather general overall level. According to Brunswick’s (1955) lens model, from a methodological point of view, it is easier to find correlations between variables that have been assessed at comparable levels of abstractness (Wittmann, 1998). By contrast, in the current study, performance was assessed very concretely in an actual situation, whereas motives were assessed with dispositional, and thus rather abstract, measures beforehand. To deal with these assessment difficulties, in Study 3, both the implicit power and explicit affiliation motives were aroused. With the help of these motive arousals, a manifest behavioral conflict occurred, and I was able to find effects of the two motives on negotiation performance.

As expected, an arousal of the explicit affiliation motive led to reduced salary requests, which can be interpreted as a shift toward cooperative behavior. Accordingly and not surprisingly, these findings parallel the findings on arousals of the need to belong and the need for relatedness (cf. Chapter 2.4). Priming or arousing behavior according to these concepts also tends to cause individuals to cooperate: They allocated fewer points to themselves on the Social Value Orientation Scale and were more cooperative in a resource dilemma (Prentice & Sheldon, 2015), showed more prosocial behavior (Pavey, Greitemeyer, & Sparks, 2011), and more often conformed to other people’s incorrect judgments (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000).
7.1.3 The role of fear of anticipated social backlash in negotiations

In the further analyses section of Study 1, I analyzed the role the fear of anticipated social backlash would play in the negotiation behavior of individuals who were low on the implicit power motive. I found that individuals high on the implicit power motive did not differ in their fear of anticipated social backlash or salary requests according to which negotiation condition they were in. By contrast, individuals low on the implicit power motive had more fear of anticipated social backlash in the negotiation for themselves than in the negotiation for another person and therefore requested a higher salary in the latter condition.

Thus, with the help of Study 1, I focused on the behavior of individuals low on the implicit power motive in negotiations, explaining it with their fear of anticipated social backlash. To phrase this more generally, this result demonstrates that situations have different meanings for individuals low or high on the implicit power motive. This different meaning may also be reflected through post-competition hormonal changes that differ between individuals who are low versus high on the implicit power motive (Wirth, Welsh, & Schultheiss, 2006). Individuals who are low on the implicit power motive seem to perceive a victory as stressful because they show high levels of cortisol after winning a contest. By contrast, individuals high on the implicit power motive instead perceive losing as stressful as their cortisol rate increases when they lose.

From the very beginning, motivation research has acknowledged the role of situations and integrated them into motivation models (Heckhausen, 1977; McClelland, 1987; McClelland et al., 1953; Rheinberg, 2008). Nevertheless, until now, situations have not been analyzed in detail with respect to slight nuances that may or may not arouse an implicit motive.

In Study 1, I took a first step in this direction by changing a typical negotiation situation into the less common situation of negotiating for another person. As found in Study 1, this second negotiation condition was perceived differently by individuals with a low implicit power motive. To my knowledge, this is the first research to demonstrate an interaction between the implicit power motive and the negotiation situation in that the negotiation condition predicted
differences in negotiation outcomes only for individuals with a low implicit power motive. Previous research has already emphasized the role of negotiation situations for different groups of individuals, for example, women and men (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Rudman & Glick, 1999; Rudman & Phelan, 2010; Tinsley, Cheldelin, Kupfer Schneider, & Amanatullah, 2009; Wade, 2001). Nevertheless, more research is needed to corroborate the distinct role of the implicit power motive in different negotiation situations.

7.1.4 Considerations across studies

It is notable that, across studies, the implicit power motive is not connected to participants’ self-judged competitiveness or their self-rated assertiveness. This finding indicates that, although the implicit power motive accounts for differences in participants’ actual negotiation performance, it does not account for participants’ judgments about their performance.

A set of variables participants cognitively reflected on prior to the negotiation (e.g., their target salary, their reservation point, or anticipated opening offer) were, for the most part, not associated with the implicit power motive either (with the exception that the implicit power motive had a marginally significant effect on target salary in Study 1 and anticipated opening offer in Study 2). Although these variables are more closely linked to negotiation behavior than, for example, general assertiveness, the implicit power motive is not likely to predict them consistently, indicating again the differences between actual behavior and anticipated judgments about it. Thus, in line with basic research by McClelland and colleagues (1989), these results underscore the finding that implicit motives are likely to predict performance itself rather than reflections on or predictions of performance.

Considerable parallels between the findings in this thesis and another field of psychology (i.e., social psychology) can be seen. As explained in Chapter 2.3, power priming has been shown to affect several variables in negotiations, inter alia their initiation, demand level, or
expression of a person’s own attitude. These behaviors can be conceived of as approach behavior according to Keltner and colleagues’ (2003) model. Findings from the current Studies 1 and 3 corroborate this theoretical model: The association of a high implicit power motive with enhanced performance in a negotiation can be conceived of as approach behavior with attention to rewards (i.e., a satisfactory negotiation outcome) and disinhibited trait-driven behavior.

In accordance, individuals with a low implicit power motive or whose implicit power motive had not been aroused showed behavior that paralleled the activation of the inhibition system when negotiating for themselves: They constrained their behavior in terms of lower salary requests due to negative emotions such as fear, and they paid more attention to threats such as social sanctions. But when they were asked to negotiate for another person, they showed approach-oriented behavior just like individuals with a high implicit power motive or whose implicit power motive had been aroused. These findings can also be explained by Keltner and colleagues’ (2003) model: According to this model, individuals with a low implicit power motive are supposed to show situationally constrained behavior in contrast to individuals with a high implicit power motive who should show trait-driven behavior (cf. Chapter 2.5.1). But in a negotiation for another person, individuals with a low implicit power motive do not have to fear negative social reactions (i.e., they do not have to act according to situational constraints). On the contrary, this situational framework allows them to be assertive without fearing social sanctions. Instead, they can expect positive reactions from others. Accordingly, their salary requests were as high as those of individuals with a high implicit power motive.

This is in accordance with Schultheiss and colleagues’ (2005) theorizing that individuals with a low implicit power motive “are not indifferent to the power incentive of having impact on others, but may actually fear and avoid it” (p. 184). Schultheiss and colleagues (2005) found that individuals with a low implicit power motive who won a contest showed impaired learning in contrast to individuals with a low implicit power motive who lost a contest and showed enhanced learning. They viewed these differences in learning as a consequence of the individuals feeling either comfortable or uncomfortable with the result of the contest. In other
words, individuals with a low implicit power motive felt uncomfortable when they beat an opponent but were comfortable with avoiding influence over an opponent when losing.

Accordingly, it may be the case that in the current study, the reduced fear in the negotiation for another person led individuals with a low implicit power motive to feel more comfortable in this situation and consequently to request a higher salary than in the negotiation for themselves.

The theoretical model by Keltner and colleagues (2003) has already been empirically supported (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011). Nevertheless, stable individual differences in implicit or explicit motives have not been addressed yet. At this point, the results of this thesis provide hints that point in the right direction, but nevertheless, it would be interesting to systematically test in future research whether the behavior of individuals who are high and low on the power motive is comparable to the behavior of individuals who are either primed with power or not.

7.2 Limitations and future directions

In this chapter, I will address limitations and further research questions in the realm of motive and negotiation research. Research on salary negotiations is of great relevance because such negotiations have been shown to make an important difference in starting salaries (cf. Chapter 2.5.4). This thesis has taken a first step toward researching social motives in the realm of salary negotiations. Nevertheless, numerous research questions can be deduced from the present work. I will first outline future directions in the realm of motive research and then make recommendations for future research on negotiations.
7.2.1 Limitations of the current research and future directions in motive research

In this thesis, I examined the effects of the dispositional and aroused implicit power motive separately in two studies. It would be especially interesting to examine the interaction between the implicit power motive as a disposition and implicit power motive arousal on negotiation behavior. This research question could be examined with the same method implemented in Study 3 (i.e., a film excerpt that arouses the implicit power motive). The film excerpt in Study 3 took about 30 min. To enhance economy in both research and practice, it would be important to examine the extent to which and in which respects this stimulus could be shortened. Further research could address the question of indispensable stimulus characteristics (i.e., length, degree of vividness, and possibility of identification).

Thus, parallel to Studies 1 and 3, participants’ implicit power motive could be assessed and then aroused. Alternatively and more economically, a method introduced by Langner and Winter (2001) could be used: The researchers either removed all affiliation images or all power images from the original letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy (cf. Chapter 2.5.2) and found that “received motive imagery primed response motive imagery” (p. 722). In this way, there was an arousal of participants’ implicit power motive (i.e., their implicit power motivation could be assessed). This allowed the authors to account for individual differences in implicit power motivation and, at the same time, to compare the effects of an implicit power motive arousal to a control group that exhibited no arousal.

As stated by Winter et al. (1998), affiliation and power constitute the two most important social motives. Thus, even in negotiations in which assertion and influence are the predominant actions, the implicit affiliation motive may be aroused simply due to the possibility of turning the negotiation into a friendly interaction. To systematically assess and arouse the implicit affiliation motive, the same method as mentioned above could be implemented: A letter from which all power images had been removed could be used as stimulus material. In Study 1, there were fewer affiliation images ($M = 0.59$) than power images ($M = 3.96$) in participants’
answer letters, thus indicating that the pulling character of Khruschev’s original letter was not the same for both motives (Chapter 2.2.1). Thus, as an alternative to the above-mentioned letter with affiliation motive content, following Schultheiss and Schultheiss’ (2014) suggestions, PSE pictures that especially pull the implicit affiliation motive could be used for assessment.

Motive arousal does not affect only implicit behavioral impulses or actual behavior. It also has an effect on affective preferences in situations in which implicit motives are aroused (Kehr, 2004b). As outlined in Chapter 2.2.5, behavioral impulses stemming from an aroused implicit power motive do not have the same accessibility to consciousness as explicit action tendencies stemming from an aroused explicit affiliation motive. A person with an aroused implicit power motive may thus not be as aware of the reasons for his or her behavior as a person with an aroused explicit affiliation motive. Nevertheless, if asked, a person with an aroused implicit power motive may provide information about how much he or she likes the situation just as a person with an aroused explicit affiliation motive may give information about the perceived relevance of certain goals in this situation. Thus, in future research, it would be interesting to test whether affective preferences for the negotiation situation are associated with the implicit power motive. I suspect that individuals high on the power motive who do well in the negotiation will indicate high affective preferences for the negotiation afterwards. These findings would have considerable relevance for practice: Employees who have affective preferences for negotiations are supposed to do well and can be entrusted with this kind of task.

According to the compensatory model of work motivation and volition, implicit motives affect performance as long as no explicit motives are around to disturb them (Kehr, 2004b). This reasoning is supported by the current Study 3. Intrinsic motivation is likely to occur if aroused implicit motives can be expressed through behavior in a certain situation. Intrinsic motivation can still occur even if congruent explicit motives are not present in addition to the aroused implicit motives. “Nevertheless, it seems likely that intrinsic motivation from aroused
implicit motives is accompanied by more profound experiences of meaning and purposefulness only if aroused implicit and activated explicit motives are thematically congruent” (Kehr, 2004b, p. 489). Thus, it would be interesting to analyze the effects of a corresponding explicit motive: the explicit power motive. Yet, particular attention should be paid to the occurrence of a possible ceiling effect. The scenarios used in this thesis implemented rather low salary offers by the negotiation counterpart to ensure an adequate implicit power motive arousal in participants. Thus, there was a natural limit to the height of reasonable salary requests set by the scenario itself. Presumably, an additional explicit power motive arousal would have led most participants to request the highest salary that appeared barely justified within the context of this limit. Therefore, not much variation could be expected, and a ceiling effect would likely occur.

According to Kehr (2004b), one major consequence of a discrepancy between aroused implicit and explicit motives is volitional depletion. Thus, if participants whose implicit power motive and explicit affiliation motive have been aroused do not have the opportunity to leave the negotiation as was the case in the present study, but are obliged to negotiate for the full five rounds, they are supposed to show volitional depletion. By contrast, participants whose implicit power motive only has been aroused should show less volitional depletion. In future research, this pattern could be experimentally illustrated with the help of tasks constructed to measure ego-depletion (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998) after the negotiation. In this vein, participants in Experimental Group 2 should do worse on such a task than participants in Experimental Group 1.

### 7.2.2 Limitations of the current research and future directions in negotiation research

The aim of the current thesis was to examine basic motivational processes in the applied scenario of a salary negotiation. Student samples were analyzed because basic motivational processes are supposed to be the same across all individuals (McClelland, 1987) and because
students should be able to understand negotiation frameworks and to perform accordingly in
a negotiation. Nevertheless, a limitation of the current studies is that the results cannot be
generalized beyond student samples. In addition, there is no guarantee that students in the
study exhibited representative behavior that could be transferred to a professional context. It
is thus necessary to transfer the research questions from the current studies to professional
contexts. This is probably not an easy endeavor because many negotiations are confidential
and have substantial financial consequences. Therefore, such contexts might not be
accessible to researchers.

A first step in shifting the research focus to a more practical context might involve an-
alyzing data that already exist. Winter (1993, 2007) and Langner and Winter (2001) analyzed
international crises and conflicts and specifically conditions that led to war or to a peaceful res-
olution of conflicts. Fodor (2009) proposed that this research method be applied to an organiza-
tional context: “Should organizational psychologists obtain evidence that parallel what Winter
found, they might possibly develop diagnostic criteria and intervention techniques that could
forestall the injurious personal and economic consequences that accompany the breakdown of
negotiations” (p. 439). Thus, paralleling Langner and Winter (2001) who selected official, public,
government statements or government-to-government communications, official statements or
communication by CEOs could be examined for their power and affiliation motive content in an
organizational context. Accordingly, CEOs high on the implicit power motive are supposed to
bargain more assertively and, in general, are expected to escalate organizational conflicts in
comparison with CEOs high on the implicit affiliation motive.

To increase the authenticity of the negotiation situation, a first step could also be to
examine the role of the implicit power motive in a face-to-face negotiation. As already
mentioned in Chapter 2.5.2, a disadvantage of face-to-face negotiations is the diminished
experimental control. In this thesis, an advantage of the computerized negotiation was that all
participants received exactly the same salary offers according to the round they were in. To
maintain comparability across participants, an experimental confederate could be the other
negotiator and could be instructed to provide specific responses and salary offers.
Nevertheless, several particularities of human interaction might not be held constant as easily as in a computerized negotiation: For example, effects of sympathy for the other negotiator or the perceived attractiveness of the other negotiator could be expected to exert considerable influence over the course of the negotiation and are not easy to control.

An additional interesting and very relevant research topic would be to examine the natural course of negotiations. Although, as just mentioned, research in practical contexts is very relevant and important, such a new and unexamined topic should first be analyzed in the protected environment of a laboratory. In Study 1, I found that the implicit power motive affected salary requests only in the final negotiation round, which indicates that individual differences on the implicit power motive gain particular relevance if a situation turns out to be an assertion challenge. Presumably individuals high on the implicit power motive would rather pursue a negotiation lasting for several rounds than individuals low on the implicit power motive. In particular, because the implicit power motive is supposed to become even more aroused as the negotiation continues (cf. Chapter 4.2), the explicit affiliation motive might gain influence as well, thus controlling behavioral impulses that stem from the implicit power motive. Accordingly, it would be especially relevant to study the interplay between the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive at different stages of negotiations.

In the present work, I expected that requests in a negotiation would be a clear indicator of actual negotiation performance (cf. Chapter 4.2; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Schaefer, Schwab, & Galinsky, 2015). Nevertheless, in future research, it will be an important challenge to economically assess actual negotiation agreements (i.e., not only salary requests). If negotiators are instructed to reach an agreement, this will on average take longer than potentially letting the negotiation end in an impasse. Thus, as a consequence of the extension of the negotiation paradigm, economy will be reduced. However, the time negotiators will need to reach an agreement will vary substantially. Thus, the major challenge will probably be to hold constant the duration of the negotiation and, associated therewith, the degree to which the implicit power motive is aroused.
7.3 Implications for practice

Several important consequences for practice can be deduced from the current research. I will outline four:

First, the implicit power motive disposition predicts negotiation performance. As outlined in Chapter 2.3, negotiations are ideally apt to arouse the implicit power motive because they contain many power-relevant incentives. Thus, in general, if a situation is in line with a person’s implicit motives, one can assume that he or she has high affective preferences for this situation because it provides many motive arousing incentives and the individual consequently performs better (cf. Chapters 2.2.5 and 7.2.1). Thus, although implicit motives are only seldom directly accessible in practice, they can be addressed by asking people for their affective preferences in certain situations. Then, provided that they respond sincerely, it would be reasonable to conclude that they will perform better if they have high compared with low affective preferences (Kehr, 2004b; cf. Chapter 7.2.1).

Second, an arousal of the implicit power motive leads to enhanced negotiation performance. As outlined in Chapter 7.2.1, future research could focus on designing special stimuli to arouse the implicit power motive. If such stimuli are reasonably short, they could be used to arouse the implicit power motive prior to an important negotiation in practice. Another factor that can have an arousing effect on implicit motives is the experience of visions (Chapter 2.2.3). Thus, in practical contexts, negotiators could develop a power vision that they could concentrate on prior to negotiations.

Regardless of whether the implicit power motive is measured or aroused, it is supposed to further competitive behavior and enhance performance in negotiations. This is in line with research that has shown positive effects of a competitive orientation on starting salaries, whereas a compromising orientation did not affect starting salaries (cf. Chapter 2.5.4). Nevertheless, in practice, a special focus has to be placed on the situational suitability of competition and dominance in negotiations. Often negotiations can be resolved without the dominance of one negotiator over the other (i.e., no one wins or loses). As outlined by Fisher,
Ury, and Patton (2011), in practice, many negotiations can lead to positive results for both parties if they focus on their actual interests rather than on their positions. Focusing on positions leads negotiators to neglect the original interests they had at the beginning of the negotiation as well as the goal of the negotiation. Instead, they delve into the negotiation, and the goal of dominating the other party at any price becomes their focus. This behavioral pattern is similar to the behavior of individuals high on the power motive. In other words, the influence and dominance over the other negotiator arouses and satisfies the implicit power motive to such a considerable degree that the actual goal is pushed into the background.

Nevertheless, in practice, it is often important to gain integrative results. At this point, the explicit affiliation motive comes into play: It is likely that the explicit affiliation motive will shift the focus from the flow of the situation to more far-reaching goals. Accordingly, a third important practical implication is that an arousal of the explicit affiliation motive can diminish the power motive’s influence on negotiation performance. As much as it is important to be able to assert oneself in a negotiation, it is no less relevant to keep in mind how one’s relationship with the other negotiator might continue after the negotiation has ended. Thus, it makes practical sense to remember the overall goal of establishing or maintaining positive and friendly relationships with other negotiators, for example, business partners. Setting a practical goal (cf. Chapter 6.2)—for example, asking employees who are responsible for conducting negotiations to devise three ways of maintaining a positive relationship with their co-negotiator—is an effective way to strengthen the importance of relationships in a business context. Similarly in other contexts, it may be important to keep in mind that the personal, business, or political relationship might continue. As referred to in the Introduction (cf. Chapter 1), Premier Khrushchev and President John F. Kennedy also kept in mind the future goal of peaceful coexistence and resolved the Cuban Missile Crisis with the help of negotiation.

In summary, both the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive are important requirements in negotiations: If the implicit power motive is high, individuals’ liking of the situation is probably enhanced, and they are supposed to do well in negotiations because their motive disposition is in line with this kind of situation. If their explicit affiliation motive is also
high, individuals will probably not tend to overshoot the target and will be able to limit their demands to an appropriate level and not threaten their relationships with negotiation partners.

Fourth, as proposed by Winter (2007), stimuli in the environment in terms of key variables can be identified and used to either tame escalating conflicts or to enhance efforts in a negotiation. Building on research in the context of embodiment (Giessner & Schubert, 2007; Schubert & Koole, 2009), it is possible for special spatial configurations to lead to an arousal of the implicit power motive, and as a consequence, to a better negotiation performance. Giessner and Schubert (2007) found that participants, confronted with a figure displaying hierarchical structures with elongated vertical lines (i.e., an organigram), perceived higher leader power compared with participants confronted with an organigram with shorter vertical lines. Even feedback from bodily gestures associated with power (e.g., making a fist) leads participants to perceive themselves as more assertive (Schubert & Koole, 2009). Also, Kille, Wood, and Forest (2015) found that embodiment motivates selection preferences outside of participants’ awareness. They created a physically unstable condition in which a table and the chair that participants sat on were slightly wobbly. In the physically stable condition, the table and chair were stable. The results revealed that, compared with participants in the stable condition, participants in the unstable condition indicated a greater desire for traits reflecting stability in a potential romantic partner.

Thus, conditions in the environment, stimuli presented to participants, or performed gestures can influence subsequent judgments. These results could be transferred to performance measures: A study could test, for example, whether participants making a fist perform better in negotiations.

Nevertheless, this knowledge has to be treated with care. Many stimuli addressing and influencing individuals’ implicit motives operate outside their conscious perceptions. This can have a negative side as reported by Winter (1987): He analyzed how the media presented speeches by key persons they either favored or were opposed to in a conflict situation. He found that in speeches made by key persons from the opposing side, the implicit power motive was accentuated in comparison with speeches made by key persons who were favored. In
the realm of the affiliation motive, the opposite pattern appeared. As shown by Langner and Winter (2001), expressed implicit motives elicited motives in the recipient even without his or her awareness. Thus, this media coverage is a potent way to influence public opinion.
7.4 Conclusion

This thesis is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to examine the implicit power motive in salary negotiations. I was able to show that the implicit power motive, irrespective of whether it was measured or aroused, influences negotiation performance in terms of salary requests. In addition, I tested McClelland’s proposition that conflicting implicit and explicit motives would lead to compromise behavior. I found that the arousal of both the implicit power motive and the conflicting explicit affiliation motive led to performance declines. Building on McClelland and Pilon (1983), I additionally placed a special focus on the negotiation behavior of individuals who were low on the power motive. Individuals low on the implicit power motive negotiate worse than individuals high on the implicit power only when the negotiation is for themselves. By contrast, when they negotiate for another person, they perform as well as individuals high on the implicit power motive.

In this thesis, I have laid a foundation for further research into both the implicit and explicit power and affiliation motives in negotiations. This foundation opens possibilities for both research and practice. Future basic and applied research can, on the one hand, examine the role of different arousal conditions for both the implicit power motive and the explicit affiliation motive in negotiations and, on the other hand, transfer results to other implicit and explicit motives and situations. In practice, the results of this thesis can contribute to an enhanced understanding of the resources and development opportunities for the human element in negotiations.
Zusammenfassung [Summary]


In einer ersten experimentellen Studie hat sich gezeigt, dass Verhandlungsbedingung den Zusammenhang zwischen impliziten Machtmotiv und Verhandlungsverhalten moderiert. Das implizite Machtmotiv hat die Performanz in einer Verhandlung für sich selbst vorhergesagt, wohingegen es keinen Effekt auf die Performanz in einer Verhandlung für eine andere Person hatte. Wie erwartet deutet dieses Ergebnismuster darauf hin, dass niedrig machtmotivierte Individuen nicht davor zurückschrecken sich in dieser speziellen Verhandlungssituation durchzusetzen.

In einer zweiten experimentellen Studie habe ich die Effekte des dispositionalen expliziten Anschlussmotivs, des dispositionalen impliziten Machtmotivs und Verhandlungsbedingung auf Verhandlungsverhalten untersucht. Die Ergebnisse konnten meine Annahme nicht bestätigen, dass ein hohes explizites Anschlussmotiv die Effekte eines hohen impliziten Machtmotivs auf Verhandlungsverhalten in einer Verhandlung für sich selbst, nicht aber in einer Verhandlung für eine andere Person reduziert.

In einer dritten experimentellen Studie habe ich die Effekte des angeregten impliziten Machtmotivs und angeregten expliziten Anschlussmotivs auf Verhandlungsverhalten untersucht. Individuen, deren implizites Machtmotiv angeregt wurde, zeigten bessere Performanz in der Verhandlung als Individuen, deren implizites Machtmotiv und explizites Anschlussmotiv angeregt wurde oder die keinerlei Motivanregung erfuhren.

References


Appendix A: Historical background to the Cuban Missile Crisis

Historischer Hintergrund zur Kubakrise im Oktober 1962


Experten des Außenministeriums, die Khruschev kannten, glaubten, dass er ihn selbst geschrieben habe.
Appendix B: Role description for the negotiation for oneself

Rollenbeschreibung BEWERBER


Obwohl Sie daran interessiert sind, in der Gegend um München zu bleiben, wollen Sie nicht für eine große, unpersönliche Firma arbeiten. Also haben Sie sich entschieden, nicht an den Rekrutierungsmaßnahmen dieser Firmen teilzunehmen, die v.a. auf dem Campus der TU stattfinden. Stattdessen haben Sie sich über andere Bewerbungsmöglichkeiten informiert.

Von einem Unternehmen, Alpha, haben Sie von einem Freund erfahren, der zwei Jahre vor Ihnen seinen Abschluss gemacht hat. Ihr Freund hat von den bereichernden Erfahrungen und dem kleineren, intimen Arbeitsumfeld bei Alpha geschwärmt; diese beiden Aspekte machen Alpha zu einem Unternehmen, für das Sie gerne arbeiten würden.

Seit Sie das Angebot Ihres Freundes angenommen haben, hat Alpha sich aktiv um Sie bemüht. Alpha war von Ihrem Lebenslauf beeindruckt. Dieser umfasst Anerkennungen des Dekans für Ihre einflussreiche Führungsrolle auf dem Campus, einen dritten Platz in einem kreativen Problemlösewettbewerb, Ihre vorherige Arbeitserfahrung und weitere Leistungen. Alpha wollte Sie umgehend persönlich kennenlernen. Nachdem Alpha Sie für Auswahlgespräche mit verschiedenen Mitarbeitern eingeladen hat, hat Alpha Ihnen ein Jobangebot unterbreitet!

Alle Aspekte Ihrer zukünftigen Position sind geklärt, bis auf einen... Ihr Gehalt!
Da Alpha eine kleine Firma ist und in der Regel pro Jahr nicht viele neue Mitarbeiter einstellt, ist die Gehaltssstruktur flexibel und offen für Verhandlungen.
Sie haben für den heutigen Tag einen Termin vereinbart, bei dem Sie mit einem Vertreter von Alpha Gehaltsoptionen besprechen wollen.

Zur Vorbereitung der heutigen Verhandlung haben Sie viel recherchiert, u.a. haben Sie durchschnittliche Gehälter der Branche gegoogelt. Sie haben herausgefunden, dass Neueinsteiger in der Consulting-Branche, die eine ähnliche Ausbildung und Erfahrung wie Sie haben, durchschnittlich 40 000 Euro pro Jahr verdienen. Einige zusätzliche Statistiken, die Sie gefunden haben sind: Ca. 70% der jungen Consultants verdienen zwischen 33 000 und 50 000 Euro, das niedrigste Gehalt beträgt 31 000 Euro, das höchste 54 000 Euro.

Wenn Sie heute eine zufriedenstellende Übereinkunft über die Höhe Ihres Gehalts erzielen können, werden Sie das Jobangebot von Alpha annehmen und für Alpha arbeiten. Wenn Sie keine Übereinkunft erzielen, werden Sie Alphas Jobangebot ablehnen und stattdessen ein nicht verhandelbares Jobangebot von Lambda annehmen. Lambda ist eine weitere Consulting Firma, die Ihnen einen Job angeboten hat, bei dem Sie jeden Grund haben anzunehmen, dass sich seine Bezahlung am industriellen Standard orientieren wird.
Appendix C: Role description for the negotiation for another person

Rollenbeschreibung BEWERBER

Sie haben vor zwei Jahren Ihren Abschluss an der TU München gemacht und unmittelbar danach begonnen für eine kleine Consulting-Firma mit dem Namen „Alpha“ im Raum München zu arbeiten. Sie haben Alpha bisher als einen bereichernden Arbeitsplatz erlebt, der im Vergleich zu den größeren, unpersönlicheren Firmen der Branche ein kleineres, intimeres Arbeitsumfeld bietet.


Obwohl Ihr Freund/Ihre Freundin daran interessiert ist, in der Gegend um München zu bleiben, will er/sie nicht für eine große, unpersönliche Firma arbeiten. Also hat er/sie sich entschieden nicht an den Rekrutierungsmaßnahmen dieser Firmen teilzunehmen, die v.a. auf dem Campus der TU stattfinden. Stattdessen hat er/sie sich über andere Bewerbungsmöglichkeiten informiert.

Die Firma, für die Sie arbeiten, Alpha, ist auf der Suche nach einem aufgeweckten und kreativen neuen Mitarbeiter. Sie haben Ihren Freund/Ihre Freundin kurzlich über dieses Jobangebot Ihrer Firma informiert und angeboten, seine/ihrer Bewerbung und eine persönliche Empfehlung weiterzuleiten, falls er/sie Interesse an der ausgeschriebenen Stelle haben sollte. Ihr Freund/Ihre Freundin hätte aufgrund der bereichernden Erfahrungen und des kleinen Arbeitsumfelds bei Alpha größtes Interesse daran für Alpha zu arbeiten.

Ihr Freund/Ihre Freundin hat Ihr Angebot angenommen und seitdem hat sich Alpha aktiv um ihn/sie bemüht. Alpha war von seinem/ihrer Lebenslauf beeindruckt. Dieser umfasst Anerkennungen des Dekans für seine/ihrer einflussreiche Führungsrolle auf dem Campus, einen dritten Platz in einem kreativen Problemlösewettbewerb, seine/ihrer vorherige Arbeitserfahrung und weitere Leistungen.

Alpha wollte ihn/sie umgehend persönlich kennenlernen. Nachdem Sie Ihren Freund/Ihre Freundin für einige Auswahlgespräche mit verschiedenen Mitarbeitern eingeladen haben, hat Alpha ihm/ihr ein Jobangebot unterbreitet!

Alle Aspekte seiner/ihrer zukünftigen Position sind geklärt, bis auf einen... sein/ihr Gehalt!

Da Alpha eine kleine Firma ist und in der Regel pro Jahr nicht viele neue Mitarbeiter einstellt, ist die Gehaltsstruktur flexibel und offen für Verhandlungen.

Da Sie Ihren Freund/Ihre Freundin empfohlen haben, haben Sie nun die Verantwortung sein Gehalt zu verhandeln. Sie haben für den heutigen Tag einen Termin vereinbart, bei dem Sie mit einem Vertreter von Alpha Gehaltsoptionen für Ihren Freund/Ihre Freundin besprechen wollen.

Zur Vorbereitung der heutigen Verhandlung haben Sie viel recherchiert, u.a. haben Sie durchschnittliche Gehälter der Branche geprüft. Sie haben herausgefunden, dass Neuensteiger in der Consulting-Branche, die eine ähnlich Ausbildung und Erfahrung wie Ihr Freund/Ihre Freundin haben, durchschnittlich 40.000 Euro pro Jahr verdienen. Einige zusätzliche Statistiken, die Sie gefunden haben sind: Ca. 70% der jungen Consultants verdienen zwischen 33.000 und 50.000 Euro, das niedrigste Gehalt beträgt 31.000 Euro, das höchste 54.000 Euro.

Wenn Sie heute eine zufriedenstellende Übereinkunft über die Höhe des Gehalts für Ihren Freund/Ihre Freundin erzielen können, wird er/sie das Jobangebot von Alpha annehmen und für Alpha arbeiten. Wenn Sie keine Übereinkunft erzielen, wird Ihr Freund/Ihre Freundin Alphas Jobangebot ablehnen und stattdessen ein nicht verhandelbares Jobangebot von Lambda annehmen. Lambda ist eine weitere Consulting Firma, die Ihrem Freund/Ihre Freundin einen Job angeboten hat, bei dem Sie jeden Grund haben anzunehmen, dass sich das Gehalt am industriellen Standard orientieren wird.
Appendix D: Role description for the negotiation for oneself in Study 3

Rollenbeschreibung BEWERBER


Von einem Unternehmen, Alpha, haben Sie von einem Freund erfahren, der zwei Jahre vor Ihnen seinen Abschluss gemacht hat. Ihr Freund hat von den bereichernden Erfahrungen und dem kleineren, intimeren Arbeitsumfeld bei Alpha geschwärmt; diese beiden Aspekte machen Alpha zu einem Unternehmen, für das Sie gerne arbeiten würden. Ihr Freund hat Sie kürzlich über ein Jobangebot bei dieser Firma informiert und angeboten, Ihre Bewerbung und eine persönliche Empfehlung weiterzuleiten, falls Sie Interesse an der ausgeschriebenen Stelle haben sollten.

Daher haben Sie sich bei Alpha beworben. Alpha möchte Sie nun persönlich kennenlernen.


Zur Vorbereitung der heutigen Verhandlung haben Sie viel recherchiert, u.a. haben Sie durchschnittliche Gehälter der Branche gegoogelt. Sie haben herausgefunden, dass Neuneinsteiger in der Consulting-Branche, die eine ähnliche Ausbildung und Erfahrung wie Sie haben, durchschnittlich 40 000 Euro pro Jahr verdienen. Einige zusätzliche Statistiken, die Sie gefunden haben sind: Ca. 70% junger Consultants verdienen zwischen 33 000 und 50 000 Euro, das niedrigste Gehalt beträgt 31 000 Euro, das höchste 54 000 Euro.

Wenn Sie heute eine zufriedenstellende Übereinkunft über die Höhe Ihres Gehalts erzielen können, werden Sie das Jobangebot von Alpha annehmen und für Alpha arbeiten. Wenn Sie keine Übereinkunft erzielen, werden Sie Alphas Jobangebot ablehnen und stattdessen ein nicht verhandelbares Jobangebot von QR-Consulting annehmen. QR-Consulting ist eine weitere Consulting Firma, die Ihnen einen Job angeboten hat, bei dem Sie jeden Grund haben anzunehmen, dass sich seine Bezahlung am industriellen Standard orientieren wird.
Appendix E: Arousal of the explicit affiliation motive in Study 3

In vielen Situationen des täglichen Lebens ist es wichtig, gute und nachhaltige Beziehungen zu Anderen aufzubauen. Verhandlungen bieten zahlreiche Möglichkeiten, den Anderen besser kennenzulernen und sich über persönliche Dinge auszutauschen. Da das Arbeitsumfeld bei Alpha klein und intim ist, sind die Beziehungen der Mitarbeiter untereinander sehr wichtig. Ihr Ziel ist es also, eine gute Beziehung zu Ihrem Verhandlungspartner, einem Mitarbeiter von Alpha, aufzubauen.

Bitte nennen Sie drei Wege, wie Sie konkret eine gute Beziehung zu Ihrem Verhandlungspartner aufbauen können (sei es bzgl. der aktuell anstehenden Verhandlung oder bzgl. Verhandlungen im Allgemeinen).

Weg 1:
Weg 2:
Weg 3:

Appendix F: Neutral condition in Study 3


Bitte nennen Sie drei Wege, wie sie über den Computer Informationen an Ihren Verhandlungspartner übermitteln können (sei es bzgl. der aktuell anstehenden Verhandlung oder bzgl. Verhandlungen am PC im Allgemeinen).

Weg 1:
Weg 2:
Weg 3: