In this paper, we present a new scan-path structure for improving the security of systems including scan paths, which normally introduce a security critical information leak channel into a design. Our structure, named differential scan path (DiSP), divides the internal state of the scan path in two sections. During the shift-out operation, only subtraction of the two sections is provided. Inferring the internal state from this subtraction requires much guesswork that increases exponen-tially with scan path length while the resulting fault coverage is only marginally altered. Subtraction does not preserve parity, thus avoiding attacks using parity information. The structure is simple, needs little area and does not require unlocking keys. Through implementing the DiSP in an elliptic curve crypto-graphic coprocessor, we demonstrate how easily it can be inte-grated into existing design tools. Simulations show that test effectiveness is preserved and that the internal state is effec-tively hidden.     «

In this paper, we present a new scan-path structure for improving the security of systems including scan paths, which normally introduce a security critical information leak channel into a design. Our structure, named differential scan path (DiSP), divides the internal state of the scan path in two sections. During the shift-out operation, only subtraction of the two sections is provided. Inferring the internal state from this subtraction requires much guesswork that increases exponen-tially wit...     »